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Abstract 
Shipping contributes to around 3% of global CO2 emissions and this is expected to increase to around 
20 – 25% of global CO2 emissions by 2050 as other sectors under national inventories decarbonise to 
avoid dangerous climate change. Improving energy efficiency has a key role as one of the strategies 
to address the challenges of climate change and this research investigates the barriers to energy 
efficiency in shipping, which is motivated by the increasing attention given to this subject from 
shipping regulators, both regional (e.g. UK and EU) and international (e.g. UN and IMO). The few 
studies that analyse the shipping sector for barriers to energy efficiency lack clear barriers 
taxonomy, are not rigorous methodologically and theoretically and can benefit from empirical 
examination of barriers in other sectors. The aim of this research therefore is to thoroughly 
understand the energy efficiency gap in shipping by examining the level of implementation of energy 
efficient operational measures and the barriers that may be affecting implementation of these 
measures. To do this, the research establishes a novel framework for empirically analysing the 
barriers to energy efficiency. The framework utilises agency theory for comparing perceptions of 
barriers using the survey method to observed level of barriers using the content analysis method 
and actual operational data. The survey results show that operational energy efficiency measures 
are not fully implemented and their implementation varies by sector of operation, size of the firm 
and chartering level of the firm. More specifically, the survey results show that on average more 
operational measures are being implemented by firms which have a majority of their fleet on time 
charter in comparison to firms that have a majority of their fleet on voyage charter and that more 
measures are being implemented by firms in the drybulk sector than in the wetbulk sector. This 
supports the findings from fixtures analysis that shows the wetbulk sector has the majority of its 
fleet on voyage charter, and the content analysis findings show that the voyage charter is more 
prone to the principal agent usage problem, which affects the implementation of operational 
measures more than technical measures. The survey results also show that the respondents 
perceive more market failures in comparison to non-market failures as barriers to implementation of 
operational measures. This perception of barriers differs amongst the implementation of operational 
measures, with more technical operational measures being affected by informational problems and 
speed related measures being affected by split incentives. These findings suggest that the principal 
agent problem can be a plausible explanation for some of the energy efficiency gap in the 
implementation of operational measures in the shipping charter markets. 
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1. Introduction  
This chapter introduces shipping’s current and future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Thereafter, 
the rationale for investigating barriers to energy efficiency in this research is discussed. Common 
concepts in energy efficiency economics are introduced with a view to linking general barriers 
literature to shipping. This is followed by a discussion of energy efficiency in shipping as a strategy 
towards low carbon shipping and reducing the GHG emissions. The last section of this chapter 
provides a brief overview of the following chapters in the thesis.  
1.1. Shipping greenhouse gas emissions 
Reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 50-80% below 1990 levels by 2050 is necessary 
to stabilise the climate and avoid dangerous climate change impacts (IPCC 2007). To avoid 
dangerous climate change, all the sectors of the global economy will be required to lower their GHG 
emissions. The shipping sector, through its exhaust emissions, is a major contributing source of 
several greenhouse gases and non-greenhouse gases. Of the GHG’s, the most important is carbon 
dioxide (CO2), because of the quantity that is emitted and the global warming potential. Other GHG 
emissions include methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Hydroflourocarbons (HFC’s), Flourocarbons 
(PFC’s) and Sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). The shipping sector is also a major source of non-greenhouse 
gas emissions such as Nitrogen Oxides (NO2), Sulphur Dioxides (SO2) and particulate matter (PM). 
The focus of this research is on GHG’s and specifically CO2 emissions.  
1.1.1. Baseline GHG emissions 
Since there is no real monitoring of CO2 emissions in the industry, there are two key ways of 
estimating CO2 emissions, based on top down fuel sales estimates or bottom up activity based 
estimates. The top-down approach is where the ship emissions are based on bunker fuel sales 
allocated to specific ports/regions and countries, whereas the bottom up approach uses an activity 
based model to estimate fuel consumption consisting of assumptions of operational profiles, trading 
patterns etc., which are collected from different sources. The carbon emissions of the industry can 
be expressed as the product of transport demand (measured in tonne miles) and supply side 
represented by emissions intensity of the transport supply (gCO2/t.nm i.e. grams of CO2 emitted per 
tonne mile). Using the fuel sales method has its limitations with respect to coverage, consistency of 
reporting and accuracy in various parts of the world, which presents a risk of errors and under-
reporting in fuel statistics (Buhaug et al. 2009). Similarly, the limitations of a bottom up approach to 
estimating fuel consumption are that it relies on various assumptions about the efficiency of 
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different ship types and activity levels of ships. The result is that estimates from both these 
approaches vary by over 50%, making it difficult to estimate baseline CO2 emissions for shipping.  
The global transport sector emissions represent around 13% of global CO2 emissions, of which total 
shipping CO2 emissions (from international and domestic shipping) accounted for over 3% (1 Giga 
tonnes) of global CO2 emissions in 2007 (Buhaug et al. 2009). Various studies suggest that this 
estimate can be as low as 2% or as high as 4% of global CO2 emissions. Figure ‎1.1 depicts the share of 
GHG emissions from shipping.  
 
 
Figure ‎1.1 Share of international and domestic shipping emissions  
Source: Buhaug et al. (2009) 
1.1.2. Future GHG emissions 
Looking at the historic relationship of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and shipping activity, 
there seems to be a very high correlation between the two (Stopford 2008), thus GDP can be used as 
an indicator to some extent for estimating demand for future shipping activity, although more 
recently the trend between the two shows signs of decoupling. At an annual GDP growth rate of 
around 3-4%, it is estimated that shipping’s emissions share will grow by one and half to three times 
under the business-as-usual scenario (compared to emissions in 2007) by 2050, if the industry is left 
uncontrolled and in the absence of policies (Buhaug et al. 2009) as shown in Figure 1.2. Moreover, as 
all other sectors decarbonise, shipping’s future CO2 emissions will represent an even larger share of 
global CO2 emissions (Gilbert, Bows & Starkey 2010), estimated to be around 25% of the global CO2 
emissions (CCC 2011).  
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Figure ‎1.2: International shipping emissions based on IPCC SRES Scenarios 
Source: Buhaug et al. (2009) 
1.1.3. Regulatory and political context for regulating global CO2 emissions 
Under the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), GHG emissions from shipping and aviation have been left to the designated UN agencies, 
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO), 
respectively. The IMO under MARPOL Annex VI introduced a mandatory design based energy 
efficiency standard, called the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for all newly built ships built 
from 2013 onwards. The EEDI (an example of a command and control instrument for environmental 
regulation) sets mandatory reduction targets, measured in gCO2/t.nm (as explained earlier in section 
1.1.1) when the ship is built, which get tightened every five years up until 2030 and can be said to be 
driving supply side efficiency. The amendment also introduced the Ship Energy Efficiency 
Management Plan (SEEMP) which is no more than a requirement to have on-board a vessel a plan to 
improve operational efficiency.  
Negotiations on market based measures (either tax or emissions trading) to curb CO2 emissions at 
the IMO level have been hampered due to ineffective ways of reconciling the often conflicting 
principles of the IMO of ‘no more favourable treatment’ (NMFT) and UNFCCC ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR). Non annex I nations argue strongly against a uniform 
maritime scheme, as it would not fulfil the UNFCCC principle. At the same time, the difficulty in 
negotiating a global scheme is exacerbated because of the way shipping operations are organised. A 
ship is a territorial extension of the country whose flag it flies and must be registered to a certain 
flag (i.e. country) in order to operate and be governed by the rules of that state. However, because 
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the ship is a moveable entity, it is relatively easy to change legal jurisdiction by registering to a flag of 
choice (often called flag of convenience, that provides benefits such as tax, low compliance to safety 
and lack of enforcement) resulting in lower costs of operation (as shown below in Figure ‎1.3). For 
these reasons attribution of bunker fuels and CO2 emissions to a specific nation is very problematic 
(SBSTA 1999; CSC & WWF 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1.3: Vessel registration, ownership and trade. 
Source: McCollum, Gould & Greene (2009) 
Due to the stalemate in international agreements that will deal with the rising level of CO2 emissions 
from shipping, both the European Union (EU) and UK have considered unilateral action. The EU after 
deciding not to incorporate shipping emissions into its EU wide emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) is 
pursuing mandatory monitoring reporting and verification (MRV) of CO2 emissions from all ships that 
trade within the EU from 2015. With respect to the UK’s position, emissions from aviation and 
shipping are not currently included in the carbon budgets, however the UK parliament is due to give 
its decision imminently on whether to include aviation and shipping in its carbon budgets. Part of the 
reason for non-inclusion is due to various ways of apportioning the share of UK shipping emissions, 
e.g. based on fuel sales, based on activity, GDP, cargo ownership etc., which result in substantial 
differences between the apportionment methods (Smith & O'Keefe 2012; Smith, O'Keefe & Haji 
2013b). 
1.2. Rationale for investigating barriers to energy efficiency 
On the supply side i.e. affecting energy intensity (gCO2/t.nm) there are four options available to 
reduce emissions from shipping (Buhaug et al. 2009); improving energy efficiency i.e. increasing 
productivity using the same amount of energy, using renewable energy sources (e.g. solar and wind), 
using fuels with lower carbon content (e.g. liquid natural gas and biofuels) and using emission 
reduction technologies (e.g. through chemical conversion, capture and storage). The EU, UK and the 
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IMO believe there is a need and potential for greater energy efficiency (option one above) to lead 
the shipping industry towards a low carbon future. The UK government through its Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) in 2009 funded the ‘Low Carbon Shipping – A Systems 
Approach’ and tasked it to specifically address implementation barriers to low carbon shipping. 
Previously the UK government, through the Department for Transport (DfT) and Committee on 
Climate Change (CCC) tasked AEA (Hobson et al. 2007; Kollamthodi et al. 2008) to investigate key 
barriers to uptake of low carbon technologies. The reasons for the interest in barriers to energy 
efficiency are that it enables policy makers to develop policies which would overcome such barriers 
and secondly barriers may directly be affecting a policy’s effectiveness.  
At the EU level, after having conducted several impact studies for unilateral action on shipping 
market based measures (Faber et al. 2009; Kollamthodi et al. 2013); the EU also recently completed 
its assessment of market barriers to cost-effective measures (Maddox Consulting 2012). It is 
important to note that the focus was, unlike UK government, on negative or low marginal 
abatement cost opportunities (i.e. fuel savings would exceed the cost of implementing the 
measures) which include technical and operational measures. The EU and IMO impact studies as well 
as others (Wang et al. 2010; DNV 2009) identified several measures that could be implemented at 
current fuel prices (at around $650 per MT). The IMO in its second GHG study identified design and 
operational measures that could result in between 25-75% in CO2 savings per tonne mile. The study 
clearly states that a “considerable proportion of the abatement potential appears to be cost-
effective at present. However non-financial barriers (costs, lack of incentives and other barriers) may 
currently limit the adoption of measures” (Buhaug et al. 2009, p11). Lack of incentives is suggested 
to be an important barrier and is also found in the terms of references (criteria for evaluation) of the 
IMO market based measures (MBM) expert group feasibility study (IMO 2010a), which sought to 
evaluate several MBM’s with respect to them incentivising the right stakeholder in the shipping 
system. Therefore the analysis of barriers to energy efficiency (which can also be seen as 
opportunities for CO2 reduction) are important for the ongoing debate of MBM’s at IMO level. 
Criteria three (IMO 2010b) for MBM is that “the proposed MBM's potential to provide incentives to 
technological change and innovation – and the accommodation of current emission reduction and 
energy efficiency technologies”.  An understanding of incentivisation of stakeholders is important in 
order to understand why cost-effective energy efficiency measures are not being implemented. The 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP 2006; UNEP 2011) also considers addressing barriers to 
energy efficiency to be fundamental in closing the future emissions gap.  
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Lately, there has also been increased interest from non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) in 
shipping’s CO2 abatement potential. The Carbon War Room with other industry partners have joined 
efforts to improve uptake of cost-effective measures by targeting the lack of information and 
financial or capital barriers. Meanwhile, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Forum for the Future 
launched the Sustainable Shipping Initiative (SSI) and believe that the financing of energy efficient 
ships needs to overcome the split incentives that separate key decisions from their financial, 
environmental and social consequences (FFF 2011). Research outputs (directly and indirectly) from 
this study have helped both these initiatives.  
Having recognized the role and potential of shipping from a climate perspective and having 
identified the need to investigate barriers to energy efficiency in shipping, this research aims to 
ascertain the implementation of energy efficiency measures and to improve the understanding of 
the lack of uptake of energy efficiency measures in shipping through multidisciplinary research 
methods.  Section ‎2.5.2 delves further into the details of the aims of this research. 
1.3. Common concepts from barriers to energy efficiency literature 
The above sections highlighted the need for energy efficiency as a strategy in tackling rising CO2 
emissions and avoiding dangerous climate change. Despite the substantial abatement potential at 
negative costs, several studies across different sectors have empirically shown that cost-effective 
energy efficiency measures are not always implemented, see for example (Velthuijsen 1993; 
Gillissen & Opschoor 1994; Harris 2000; Sorrell et al. 2000; Sorrell et al. 2004; de Groot, Verhoef & 
Nijkamp 2001; UNEP 2006; Zilahy 2004; Rohdin, Thollander & Solding 2007; Sardianou 2008; 
Thollander & Ottosson 2008; Schleich & Grubber 2008; Schleich 2009; Hasanbeigi, Menke & du Pont 
2009; Trianni et al. 2012; Shi et al. 2008).  
The barriers debate has gained momentum since the 1980’s with the first bibliographical account of 
barriers by York et al. (1978) followed by empirical research by Blumstein et al. (1980) which is then 
followed by a host of literature e.g. (Fisher & Rothkopf 1989; Hirst & Brown 1990; Howarth & 
Andersson 1993; Howarth, Haddad & Paton 2000; Howarth & Winslow 1994; Brown 2001; Sorrell et 
al. 2000; Sorrell et al. 2004; Golove & Eto 1996; Thollander, Palm & Rohdin 2010). A barrier may be 
defined as a postulated mechanism that inhibits investment in technologies that are both energy 
efficient and economically efficient (Sorrell et al. 2000). An energy efficient measure is a measure by 
which the same amount of productivity is achieved by using less energy, whereas a cost-effective 
(economically efficient) measure is a measure whereby the costs of implementing a measure are 
outweighed by future returns of the measure. Therefore an energy efficient cost-effective measure 
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could be defined as one that produces the same output with less energy and the savings in energy 
enable it to pay for itself (i.e. results in net profit, positive net present value). This is an important 
clarification in the barriers debate (Golove & Eto 1996). According to Sweeney (1993) energy 
efficiency investments should only be promoted if they improve economic efficiency or increase net 
social welfare as shown in Table ‎1.1. 
 Decreases energy intensity Increases energy intensity 
Increases economic efficiency Energy efficiency Energy enhanced progress 
Decreases economic efficiency Not promoted Rejected as undesirable 
Table ‎1.1: Energy efficiency versus economic efficiency             
Source: Golove and Eto (1996) 
1.3.1. The energy efficiency gap 
The term ‘energy efficiency gap’ refers to the difference between the actual lower levels of 
implementation of energy efficiency measures and the higher level that would appear to be cost-
beneficial or cost-effective from the consumers or firms point of view based on techno-economic 
analysis (definition derived by combining Brown (2001) and Golove and Eto (1996)). Therefore there 
are two issues to consider, firstly obtaining actual levels of implementation, and second is the 
estimation of level of uptake based on the techno-economic analysis. Some of the energy efficiency 
gap can be explained by rational behaviour to market barriers that may not be captured by the 
techno-economic analysis. If these can be accurately modelled then the remaining energy efficiency 
gap can be explained by market failures, as shown in Table ‎1.2 and Figure ‎1.4. 
 Explains energy efficiency gap Doesn’t explain energy efficiency 
gap 
Barriers that 
are market 
failures 
 Public good attributes of information 
 Positive externalities of technology 
adoption 
 Asymmetric information leading to 
problems of adverse selection, moral 
hazard and split incentives 
 Distortions in energy pricing 
 Environmental externalities 
Barriers that 
are not market 
failures 
 Hidden costs 
 Reduced product performance 
 Option value of delaying investment 
 
Table ‎1.2: Barriers and orthodox economic theory that explain the energy efficiency gap           
Source: Sorrell et al. (2004) 
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Whilst the above provides a useful starting point and a framework to investigate barriers, Sorrell et 
al. (2004) suggest introducing transaction costs and more realistic representation of the decision 
making process to explain the energy efficiency gap.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1.4: Explaining the energy efficiency gap 
The scope and focus of this research is less on market barriers and more on market failures that can 
explain the energy efficiency gap. According to Brown (2001) market barriers are obstacles that are 
not based on market failures but nonetheless contribute to the slow diffusion and adoption of 
energy efficient measures. They can therefore be called non-market failures, which are defined as 
“where the organisation is behaving rationally given the risk adjusted rate of return on an 
investment in the existing context of energy, capital and unavoidable ‘hidden’ costs” (Sorrell et al. 
2004, p.33). These are real features of the decision making environment, albeit ones which are 
difficult to incorporate in engineering-economic modelling (Sorrell et al. 2000). A market failure 
occurs when the requirements for efficient or optimal allocation of resources through well-
functioning markets are violated, which leads to incomplete markets, imperfect competition, 
imperfect and asymmetric information (Sorrell et al. 2000). The latter two are more important and 
relevant in the context of explaining the energy efficiency gap (Sorrell et al. 2004). In other words 
market failures occur when there are flaws in the way a market operates (Brown 2001). The 
important distinction between general market barriers (or non-market failures) and market failures 
is to do with the legitimacy of policy intervention to rectify market failures (Sorrell et al. 2004; 
Thollander and Palm 2013).  
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It should be noted however, that the above classification of barriers is not entirely accurate 
(Thollander and Ottosson 2008). According to Weber (1997) barriers are “unobservable” and it is 
“empirically impossible” to find the true reason for lack of action (Weber 1997, p. 834). Moreover, 
Blumstein (1980) suggests that the causes of barriers are often interlinked and follow a causal chain, 
citing an example of commercial building operators initially lacking information on conservation 
measures and about their site energy use, which is further exacerbated by misplaced incentives. 
Nonetheless, Sorrell et al. (2000 and 2004) provide a useful framework for investigating barriers to 
energy efficiency by categorising them as organisational, behavioural and economic as shown in 
Figure ‎1.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1.5: Classification of barriers to energy efficiency 
1.3.2. Analysis of shipping abatement potential 
A common method of calculating the techno-economic potential of CO2 reducing measures and the 
order in which they may be adopted is through marginal abatement cost curves (MACC). A MACC 
presents measures to reduce CO2 emissions in the order of their cost-effectiveness, which is 
calculated using the net present value (NPV) cost per tonne of the carbon reduction measure against 
the amount of carbon saved. A negative marginal abatement cost means that a measure can be 
implemented at a net profit to the individual/firm, i.e. to reduce one tonne of CO2 the 
firm/individual pays zero costs. MACC’s are increasingly being used as a tool in the decision making 
of climate policies. According to Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (1998) several instruments are 
available to internalise the cost of environmental externalities such as air pollution. The way these 
correspond to the measures shown on MACC’s has been discussed by Kesicki (2010) as shown in 
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Figure ‎1.6. MACC’s have been produced for several sectors and most feature measures that can be 
implemented at negative costs.  
Figure ‎1.6: Marginal abatement cost curves with relevant instruments             
Source: Kesicki (2010) 
1.4. Energy efficiency measures in shipping 
Shipping as a freight transport mode is considered to be the most energy efficient, with the lowest 
CO2 emissions per unit of transport work (cargo carried over distance, t.nm), compared to air, road 
and rail (Buhaug et al. 2009). The emissions intensity has improved significantly over the 20th 
century, but remained stagnant over the last decade (Buhaug et al. 2009). If a ship is able to improve 
its energy efficiency it will result in lower fuel bills and direct CO2 emission reductions, resulting in a 
win-win situation. It is suggested that fuel costs in shipping generally account for between 50-70% of 
a ships operating costs, which is set to increase as Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) costs increase, so there is an 
even greater incentive towards energy efficiency in shipping. More than fifty measures (Buhaug et 
al. 2009; Wang et al. 2010) have been identified that could result in efficiency gains and they are 
generally grouped as technical measures (some applicable to new ships and some to existing ships) 
and operational measures. These measures along with their abatement potentials have also been 
presented in several shipping specific MACC’s (Buhaug et al. 2009, Faber et al. 2009; DNV 2009; Eide 
et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2010). Once again these shipping specific MACC’s show that several 
measures especially operational measures can be implemented at negative costs as shown in 
Figure ‎1.7. 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1.7: MACC for shipping for the year 2030                    
Source: DNV (2009) 
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Note that EEDI (which is an example of command and control instrument) is employed to drive 
uptake of technical measures that are mainly at positive cost, which is in contrast to what is 
proposed by Kesicki (2010) as shown in Figure  1.6. It is clear from the figure above that several 
operational measures (shown in blue in Figure  1.8) that can be implemented at negative costs are 
being neglected perhaps due to institutional barriers (Wang et al. 2010). It is suggested that one of 
the reasons for not pursuing policies to do with operations is because of the contractual 
arrangements that have traditionally existed in shipping. For example in the case of speed reduction, 
the IMO considers it to be one of the best practice measures that should be incorporated in the 
SEEMP but also recognises that under many charterparties (contracts) the speed of the vessel is 
determined by the charterer and not the operator (IMO 2009), thus the optimum operational speed 
may rarely be achieved due to the contractual arrangements that exist within the industry. On the 
other hand where fuel bill and speed are controlled by the shipowner-operator, and when there are 
high demurrage rates (cost payable by charterer for additional time a ship spends at ports) there are 
“incentives for the shipowner to sail at high speed to arrive as early as possible. The net result may 
be low flexibility for efficient operation and, in the worst cases, incentives for inefficient operation” 
(Buhaug et al. 2009, p64). 
 
There are two basic forms of contracts (charterparties) for carriage of goods with which the 
shipowner-operators and charterers contract, namely the voyage charter and time charter. There 
are other types of contracts but they are not contracts for carriage of goods, for example the 
bareboat charter is a lease of the vessel to the charterer. Other hybrid forms of charters also exist 
but they can be reclassified as either voyage or time charter due to the similarities in the cost 
allocation, examples of these are trip charters which fall into time charter category despite the 
contract being for a single voyage and Contracts of Affreightment (COA) which fall into the voyage 
charter category despite the time element (Wilson 2010). The voyage and time charters are of 
different lengths ranging from days to years, which allocate or divide the responsibility for capital 
and running costs (including fuel costs) between a shipowner-operator and charterer as shown in 
Table ‎1.3. The result of this divided responsibility for costs is that both parties would have diverging 
or conflicting interests to minimise their share of costs according to the charter arrangements used 
and that shipowners may not always be in a position to recoup the investment in energy efficiency 
(Faber et al. 2009). 
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Figure ‎1.8: Measures targeted by the EEDI                            
Source: Longva (2011) 
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Cost element 
Voyage charter 
$/tonne 
Time charter 
$/day 
Cargo Handling     
Voyage Expenses     
Operating expense     
Capital costs     
Table ‎1.3: Cost allocation in the different types of charter 
It is important to note that there isn’t a clear classification/taxonomy of measures. Operational 
measures can be more technical (referred to as techno-operational measures such as trim/draft 
optimisation, autopilot adjustment), some operational measures are more related to maintenance 
measures (such as hull and propeller polishing) and some can be voyage related (such as speed 
reduction). For the barriers discussion it is first essential to identify the measures which show 
sizeable fuel saving potential and are shown to be cost-effective. Below is a brief description of most 
of the operational measures and their fuel saving potential as estimated from various industry based 
literature. Note that fuel savings would vary considerably across different ship types and operational 
assumptions.  Also much of the saving potential given by Buhaug et al. (2009) and Wang et al. (2010) 
is derived from Wärtsilä (2008) (Large engine manufacturer and technical service provider) product 
catalogue, which could bring into question the figures. Lockley et al. (2011) is an industry guide on 
energy efficiency technology and energy service providers that assesses fuel savings claims through 
verification from shipowner-operators. DNV (2010) is a classification society’s (similar to auditing 
company) account of fuel savings potential for energy efficiency measures based on expertise in the 
sector.  
1) Weather routing: Weather routing is a measure whereby a vessel’s master is given information 
on prevailing weather conditions towards the destination, which should result in reduction of 
travel time or avoiding rough weather conditions, both leading to lower fuel consumption. There 
are weather routing services available that help to optimize the route a ship takes, given the 
corresponding weather conditions. A significant portion of the world's fleet already employs this 
measure (Faber, Behrends & Nelissen 2011), but for different reasons: some companies use it 
for safety purposes (passage planning), some charterers use it to monitor ship performance and 
guarantees by owners (speed and fuel consumption) but few use it for the purpose of saving 
fuel. The fuel saving potential from this measure is unassessed (Faber et al. 2009), however fuel 
Charterer 
Owner 
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savings reported from Fathom (2011), DNV (2010), Wang et al. (2010), Buhaug et al. (2009) are 
around 0.1 - 4%. 
2) Autopilot upgrade/adjustment: The ships autopilot is used to maintain a steady course. 
“Adjusting the autopilot for the route and the operation area prevents unnecessary use of the 
rudder for keeping the ship on course” (Wang et al. 2010). The fuel saving potential from this 
measure as reported from Fathom (2011), DNV (2010), Wang et al. (2010), Buhaug et al. (2009) 
are around 1.5%. 
3) General speed reduction: Speed reduction is a measure whereby ships reduce their power 
requirement and hence their fuel consumption. Speed reduction in the industry has a range of 
interpretations which differ according to the stakeholders, most commonly this measure is 
known as slow steaming, optimal steaming and speed optimisation. There are different levels of 
speed reduction leading to a range of potential savings, which will be attractive for different 
stakeholders over time.  As a rule of thumb, power requirement is related to ship speed by a 
third power function. This means that a 10% reduction in speed results in an approximate 27% 
reduction in power requirements. 
4) Fuel consumption monitoring: Several forms of monitoring exist from the most basic tank 
soundings to accurate fuel flow meters providing real time monitoring of energy consumption. 
Fuel saving potential of this measure is unassessed.  
5) Trim/draft optimisation: A vessel’s hull is designed and optimized for the fully loaded condition, 
therefore the trim that is optimal for a vessel under the different conditions would vary. Trim 
can be improved by arranging bunkers, by positioning cargo or by varying the amount of ballast 
water, which will affect displacement and resistance and thus have a direct impact on fuel 
consumption. There are also other ship specific and voyage related factors that also contribute 
towards optimal trim. In order to compute the effect of these variables, software 
packages/decision support systems can analyse and facilitate counter measures. Fuel savings are 
gained by a reduction of extra ballast water. The fuel saving potential for this measure varies 
considerably across the sources but is in the range of 3%-10%.  
6) Speed reduction due to port efficiency – Just In Time arrivals: Current contracting process 
through the use of standard voyage charterparty clauses stipulates that vessels proceed at 
utmost despatch towards a port, regardless of the prevailing conditions at that port. Therefore 
conditions that affect the berthing of the vessel such as temporary congestion or lack of cargo 
space (quay side, oil tank space, etc.) are simply ignored in the current system. It therefore 
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becomes wasteful for a vessel to steam at full speed only to then wait at anchor for a berth or 
storage space to become available. Industry initiatives such as the Virtual Arrival (OCIMF & 
INTERTANKO 2010) therefore shifts the port waiting time into extra sailing time, resulting in fuel 
cost savings from speed reduction. This measure is reliant on port infrastructure because ports 
need to be able to secure a vessel’s place in a queue without it actually being there and since 
most ports operate a first come first serve (FCFS) queuing system, the measure’s potential has 
been limited. Fuel saving potential from this should be similar to general speed reduction, but 
Wang et al. (2010) quote savings of 10% and Buhaug et al. (2009) quote savings of 1%.  
7) Raising crew awareness & energy efficiency training: Improving energy awareness of crew 
through training and correct incentives can lead to energy demand reduction on-board ships. 
There is good scope for reducing CO2 emissions by making changes to on-board crewing 
processes, such as through creation of incentive structures, focussed guidelines, etc. Several 
shipping firms have already begun incentivising crews by paying bonuses based on fuel savings 
(Sustainable Shipping News 2012a). The fuel saving potential is unknown. 
8) Efficient voyage execution – Voyage planning & DWT utilisation: For various reasons (such as 
contractual and tramp operations) ships often do operate without fully making use of their cargo 
loading capacity. In principle fuel consumption would increase for that voyage but, it should 
result in lower fuel consumption per cargo/mass transported. The abatement potential for this 
measure is unknown. 
9) Optimisation of ballast voyages – speed reduction: Generally there are some routes and ship 
types that perform round trips between two ports, with one laden leg and one ballast return leg. 
On some routes and ship types the ratio of ballast voyages is lower. Where there is a high ratio 
of ballast voyages reducing speed in the ballast voyages when not bound by charterparty speed 
limits, can result in similar savings as general speed reduction.  
10) Hull and propeller maintenance: Maintaining the hull surface and propeller surface of a vessel 
reduces the frictional drag that is caused by biofouling (accumulation of organic materials). 
There are two types of intervention; based on regular intervals over a period of time or through 
monitoring (mainly for propeller maintenance). The fuel savings potential of this measure is high 
considered to be between 2% - 10% based on Buhaug et al. (2009) and Wang et al. (2010).  
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1.4.1. Speed reduction measures 
General speed reduction is considered to have the highest impact on energy efficiency (Faber et al., 
2009), therefore this section will deliberate briefly on the measure and the following chapters will 
add details. Based on the rule of thumb, a 10% reduction in speed results in nearly 30% reduction of 
power requirements. However this rule ignores that a slower ship would require more time to 
complete the same amount of transport work. According to Wang et al. (2010) a ship sailing 10% 
slower would use approximately 11% more time. Taking this into account, a new rule of thumb can 
be stated that “per tonne mile, there is a quadratic relation between speed and fuel consumption, 
so that a 10% decrease in speed would result in 19% reduction in power” (Wang et al. 2010, p45). 
The effect of this is illustrated in Figure ‎1.9 for three different ship types. There are different levels of 
speed reductions leading to a range of potential savings, which will be attractive for different 
stakeholders over time as shown in Figure ‎1.10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1.9: Relationship between speed and CO2 for various ship types 
Source: Smith, Parker and Rehmatulla (2011) 
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Figure ‎1.10: Interaction between speed and profit function                 
 Source: INTERTANKO (2012) 
 
1.5. Thesis structure 
The thesis follows the chapter outline below;  
 Chapter 2 – Barriers to energy efficiency: This chapter provides a review of literature on agency 
theory in general and in the context of energy efficiency. Empirical research on barriers to 
energy efficiency in general and in shipping is investigated. The chapter concludes with gaps in 
literature, formulation of research questions and hypothesis. 
 Chapter 3 – Approaches to gathering evidence: This chapter provides a discussion and evaluation 
of the research strategy, research design, research methods and data collection mode choices 
for this research.  
 Chapter 4 – This chapter delves further into the details of the design and implementation of the 
data collection methods that have been selected to answer the research questions.   
 Chapter 5 – Decomposing the structure of shipping: This chapter uses the principal agent theory 
in the context of energy efficiency and applies it to the shipping sector using secondary data.  
 Chapter 6 –Survey results and preliminary analysis: This chapter presents the findings of the self-
administered online questionnaire on implementation of energy efficient operational measures 
and factors affecting their implementation. The chapter is mainly focussed on the univariate 
analysis of the survey data.  
0
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 Chapter 7 – Further analysis of survey data: This chapter examines the survey data using a 
specific approach to analysis, using the bivariate elaboration model to investigate key 
relationships between variables of interest.  
 Chapter 8 – Charterparty content analysis: This chapter combines the content analysis method 
and the general principal agent theory framework to examine the contracts between the 
principal and the agent in the shipping industry.  
 Chapter 9 – Discussion: This chapter triangulates the findings from the various strands of 
research to explain implementation of energy efficient operational measures and barriers to 
their uptake. The chapter attempts to answer the research questions and hypothesis by 
connecting the findings together and analysing them in the context of literature and theory. 
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2. Barriers to energy efficiency 
This chapter provides a review of the literature on agency theory in general and in the context of 
energy efficiency. Empirical research on barriers to energy efficiency in general and in shipping is 
investigated and the chapter concludes with gaps in literature, formulation of research questions 
and hypothesis. 
2.1. Role of agency theory in understanding barriers to energy efficiency  
Generally and more commonly barriers to energy efficiency are discussed in the context of economic 
theories. There are several theories within orthodox or neo-classical economics and other extensions 
of these that can be used to understand and explain barriers to energy efficiency. These theories 
have existed since the beginning of this century, whilst the barriers to energy efficiency discussion 
began in the early 80’s. It is important to discuss neo-classical economics as much of agency theory is 
nested on it, and the tenets of the theory itself have been extracted for discussion of barriers to 
energy efficiency. 
2.1.1. Orthodox economics and agency theory 
Orthodox or neo-classical economic theory is characterised by the use of mathematical models, 
calculus, an emphasis on formal modelling and focus on relative prices (Sorrell et al. 2004). The core 
assumptions of this theory are that (adapted from Sorrell et al. 2004): 
 It is based on individuals or unitary actors/agents 
 Allocation of resources to attain equilibrium  
 Utility and profit maximising behaviour 
 Stable and constant preferences 
 Ability to solve complex problems instantly at no cost. 
The above assumptions will become important in the discussion to barriers to energy efficiency, 
where for example actors are assumed to be boundedly rational, costs and marginal costs of 
obtaining information and transactions impede savings etc. Under the neo-classical economic 
theory, the allocation of resources should lead to Pareto efficiency, where no one can be made 
better off without making someone else worse off. Market failures under the orthodox perspective 
occur when the conditions required for Pareto efficiency are violated and result in (Sorrell et al. 
2004): 
 Incomplete property rights 
 Positive and negative externalities 
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 Imperfect competition 
 Asymmetric information 
Once again the above conditions for market failures under orthodox perspective are highlighted 
here in order to understand the barriers to energy efficiency, which are broadly categorised as 
market barriers (non-market failures) and market failures (Brown. 2001).  
Within the context of barriers to energy efficiency, agency theory has been utilised to explain some 
of the market failures (Levinson & Neimann 2003; Murtishaw & Sathaye 2006; Prindle et al. 2006; 
IEA 2007; Graus & Worrel 2008; Gillingham, Harding & Rapson 2011; Vernon & Meier 2012). The 
tenets of agency theory lie under the orthodox economics perspective; hence it was important to 
understand the assumptions of orthodox perspective earlier, which permeate some of the 
assumptions of agency theory. The theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which 
one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work (Ross 1986, 
cited by Eisenhardt 1989) or when one individual depends on the action of another (Pratt & 
Zeckhauser 1985). According to leading authors on this subject, Jensen & Meckling (1976) describe 
the agency relationship as: 
“Agency relationship is a contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent” Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) 
 
From the perspective of the stakeholders involved in shipping, the shipowner and the charterer can 
be seen as being in an agency relationship, where the principal, the charterer hires the shipowner as 
an agent to provide service of carrying goods from A to B. This agency relationship is expanded upon 
in chapter five of this thesis, where the different types of contracts are analysed. Agency theory has 
expanded the literature that originally discussed only the risk sharing between parties (e.g. Arrow 
1971). The theory aims to resolve two key agency problems that occur as a result of this relationship: 
 Problem 1: The desires or the goals of the principal and agent conflict (split incentives problem) 
 Problems 2: It is difficult or expensive to verify the agent’s actions (informational problem) 
The unit of analysis is the contract that governs the relationship between the parties, with the 
objective of the most efficient contract given the above problems. This research attempts to 
understand both the above problems and the unit of analysis (i.e. contracts) from barriers to energy 
efficiency perspective. It therefore becomes important to review the theory and its assumptions in 
its general form first, followed by its application to the barriers discussion. The below assumptions of 
agency theory are further discussed in chapter five and eight in the context of specific contractual 
barriers in shipping.  
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2.1.1.1. Overview and assumptions of the general form of agency theory 
Key idea Principal agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organisation of information and risk bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion 
Organisational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants, efficiency as the 
effectiveness criterion, 
Information asymmetry between principal agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problem Moral hazard, adverse selection, risk sharing 
Source of problem Contract is inadequate 
Implications of inefficient 
contract 
Adverse selection, moral hazard, split incentives 
Table ‎2.1: Overview and assumptions of agency theory 
Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989) and Sharma (1997) 
2.1.1.2. Positivist and principal agent research for examining contracts 
Agency theory has been applied in several fields from political science to marketing and 
organisational behaviour (Eisenhardt 1989) and has developed along two lines of enquiry by 
researchers: positivist type research and principal agent type research (Jensen 1983; cited by 
Eisenhardt 1989), which share a common unit of analysis (the contract) and assumption outlined 
earlier, however the research differs in three key areas; mathematical rigour, dependent variables 
and style (Eisenhardt 1989). This section addresses which type of enquiry will be followed within this 
research and how it is appropriate in answering the research questions that follow. Positivist type 
researchers have focussed on identifying situations of agency problems, leading to agency costs (e.g. 
costs of monitoring, costs of incentivising for alignment of goals) and then describing the solutions 
that limit agency problems, in a less mathematically rigorous way. Much of this type of research has 
focussed almost exclusively (Eisenhardt 1989) on the principal agent relationship between owners 
and managers of large public corporations (organisational behaviour/economics), (see for example 
Ahimud & Lev 1981; Walking & Long 1984; Wolfson 1985; Argawal & Mandelker 1987). On the other 
hand principal agent type researchers apply the assumptions rigorously, followed by logical 
deduction and mathematical proof. The result of the different types is that under the positivist type 
research some contract alternatives or propositions can be identified, whereas the principal agent 
type research indicates which contract is most efficient or optimal under varying levels of outcome 
uncertainty, risk aversion levels, information etc., resulting in many more alternatives or 
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propositions. This research presented here is primarily focussed on the positivist type research, thus 
is an extension of owner-manager (organisational) relationships applied to shipowner-charterer 
relationships (chapters five, six and seven) but also draws upon some of the propositions of the 
principal agent type research (chapter eight) with the aim that a combination of the two will 
improve understanding of the relevant barriers and required type of contracts.  
2.1.1.3. Examples of applications of agency theory 
Agency theory has been used and applied extensively by both positivist and principal agent type 
researchers. Most frequently the theory has been applied in the organisational context e.g. 
compensation, acquisitions, managerial relationships, ownership and financing, etc. in large 
organisations, of which some examples are outlined below. 
Ahimud and Lev (1981) sampled 500 firms to test managerial attitudes to mergers as a strategy of 
risk diversification and found that conglomerate mergers occur in strong managerial control as 
opposed to firms with strong owner control, thus supporting agency theory. Walking and Long 
(1984) come to the same conclusion when testing the managerial welfare hypothesis in the context 
of resisting takeover bids in a sample of 95 cash tender offers. Their results provide “substantial 
evidence that the decision to contest a tender offer is conditioned on personal wealth changes” 
(Walking and Long 1984, p. 67). These were examples of positivist type research. Eisenhardt (1988) 
is an example of principal agent type research, where she compared use of salary (behaviour based) 
and commission (outcome based) compensation predicted by job programmability, span of control 
and outcome uncertainty (key assumptions of agency theory) and found that agency theory 
provided a good indication (80% correctly identified) of compensation policies actually used. Other 
examples that empirically examined agency theory are Walker & Weber (1984) on vertical 
integration, Eccles (1985) on transfer pricing, Cotter & Zenner (1994) on tender offers, Baker, Jensen 
& Murphy (1988) on executive compensation, etc. Apart from the numerous applications of agency 
theory in the organisational context, the theory has been applied in positivist type research in 
different contexts, where assumptions of neo-classical economics may not hold (e.g. profit 
maximising, self-interested) such as politics and policies (Neil & Morris 2012; Lane 2005), human 
justice systems (Songer, Segal & Cameron 1994), etc. Section ‎2.3 of this chapter discusses the 
application of agency theory in the context of barriers to energy efficiency; however the taxonomy 
followed is slightly modified to what has been discussed so far. Positivist type research is referred to 
as qualitative research and quantification of principal agent problem is seen as an extension of 
positivist type research. There is very little known application of principal agent type research to 
barriers to energy efficiency.  
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2.1.1.4. Supposed shortcomings of agency theory 
Agency theory has been criticised for being too narrow and having very few testable propositions, 
resulting in assumptions that make it unrealistic (Perrow 1986) and focussing only on very few 
dependent variables (e.g. stock price, mergers etc.) (Hirsch & Friedman 1986). Agency theory only 
presents a partial view of the world and ignores much of the complexity that can be found in 
organisations and other theories (Eisenhardt 1989). Sorrell et al. (2004) suggest that agency theory 
lacks consistency and is based on complex and highly formalised mathematical models. Since agency 
theory is rooted in the neo-classical economics perspectives, it becomes very easy to pick and select 
those assumptions it is based upon and argue against those. However, one should bear in mind that 
agency theory has been founded on previous theories of opportunism, information and risk within 
organisations. Therefore the strength of the theory is that it leverages upon these three 
fundamental concepts, to define a problem structure that is applicable to a wide variety of 
transactions (Sharma 1997). The theory has spawned a large volume of conceptual work that flesh 
out its basic assumptions as well as research that has empirically examined its testable implications 
in a variety of situations (Sharma 1997). Eisenhardt (1989) based on the above criticisms 
recommends that the application of agency theory should be expanded to richer contexts (e.g. 
where there may be a continuum of compensation rather than a simple dichotomy of compensation 
i.e. salary or commission), that multiple theories that are complementary be used and to look 
beyond economics where there is better payoff (e.g. empirical research). It is hoped that this 
research will take into account these recommendations by firstly applying it in the shipping sector 
and agency problems occurring inter-organisations, rather than within organisations (e.g. owner-
manager). Secondly combining agency theory with barriers to energy efficiency it is hoped that 
complementarity will be achieved and finally use empirical research to examine these theories. It is 
also important to bear in mind where agency theory adds to the general barriers theory and its 
position and relationship with other theories that also add to the barriers debate as shown in 
Figure ‎2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.1: Various perspectives in understanding barriers to energy efficiency 
Source: Adapted from Sorrell et al. (2004).  
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2.2. Literature review of studies on market barriers and market failures  
2.2.1. Discussion of market barriers and market failures in shipping 
As highlighted in chapter one, there exist many opportunities to improve the energy efficiency of 
new and existing ships through technical and operational measures, some of which at negative costs 
(i.e. profitable) at current fuel prices. Failure to realise this potential could be attributed to various 
market barriers and failures, resulting in an energy efficiency gap. Having examined agency theory in 
detail, this section is a discussion of market barriers and market failures literature combined with 
agency theory. The result from the referenced analyses in shipping has so far been the identification 
of substantial unrealised abatement potential using options that often appear to be cost-negative at 
current fuel prices. Possible explanations for the unrealised abatement potential are that either: 
 Models for analysis are inadequate for representing costs/benefits of low carbon and energy 
efficiency investment or the data used are incorrect; or  
 Other implementation barriers (market barriers and failures) exist which are obstructing the 
shipping industry’s implementation of low carbon 
Market failures and non-market failures in general were discussed in 1.3.1. This section briefly 
examines these in context of shipping, beginning with analysis each of the non-market failures 
followed by the market failures (as presented in Figure ‎1.5). Non-market failures are obstacles that 
contribute to the slow diffusion and adoption of energy efficient measures and where the 
organisation is behaving rationally given their existence. They include heterogeneity, risk, hidden 
costs and access to capital, which are discussed in turn below in relation to literature in shipping.  
Heterogeneity – although a technology may be cost-effective on average for a class of users taken in 
aggregate, the class (e.g. panamax container ships, specific routes, commodities), itself, consists of a 
distribution of owners and operators: some could economically purchase additional efficiency, while 
others will find the new level of efficiency not cost-effective (Sweeney 1993).  
Risk - technologies are assumed incorrectly to be mature or a risk is perceived by the firm that 
performance may be lower than expected, thus risk premiums and depreciation are not adequately 
included in the model. Early investors may be sceptical about the prospects of a technology and 
demand a premium on return in order to cover the risks of the investment (Faber et al. 2009). For 
example, when commissioning newbuilds if depreciation is faster than expected, due to the 
adoption of technology i.e. diffusion and lower costs due to the learning curve, the solvency of the 
company may be threatened. So in some cases a shipowner commissioning a new ship would have 
to compare the risk of having a ship with an innovative design that may depreciate faster than 
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expected with the risk of having a ship with a conventional design but higher operational costs. In 
such an assessment, the most fuel efficient ship may not always come out best (Faber et al. 2009). 
Hidden costs (these are hidden to the analyst but not the investing firm) - the following costs may 
not have been included: 
Life cycle costs - Hidden costs relating to the energy efficient option’s life cycle costs including: 
identification or search costs, project appraisal costs, commissioning costs, disruption or opportunity 
costs and additional/specific engineering costs. 
Transactional costs – Transaction costs and other unobserved cost items may render apparently 
cost-effective measures costly. Especially smaller ship owners and operators may experience high 
transaction costs as they cannot spread the costs of for example gathering information over a large 
number of ships (Faber et al. 2009). 
Commissioning or disruption costs - Some measures to reduce emissions require retrofits that can 
only be installed by temporarily suspending operations. These measures are very costly to 
implement except at times when production is halted for other reasons, such as major maintenance 
of installations. There may therefore be a lag between the time when a measure becomes available 
and its actual implementation. Retrofits to existing ships such as the installation of wind power, 
waste heat recovery systems etc. can only be done cost-effectively when a ship undergoes a major 
overhaul during a drydock. This causes a time-lag of several years in the implementation of cost-
effective measures. 
Access and costs of capital - Restricted access to capital markets is often considered to be an 
important barrier to investing in energy efficiency. Investments may not be profitable because 
companies also face a high price for capital. As a result, only investments yielding an expected return 
that exceeds this (high) hurdle rate will be realised (Schleich & Grubber 2008). Capital rationing is 
often used within firms as an allocation means for investments (Bhattacharyya 2011), leading to 
hurdle rates that are much higher than the cost of capital, especially for small projects (Ross 1986). 
This leads to competition between projects within a company and may lead to low priority given to 
energy efficiency (Bhattacharyya 2011). If improving energy efficiency comes at the cost of forgoing 
other more cost-effective opportunities (because of capital or labour constraints or because the 
projects are mutually exclusive alternatives), it would be rational for the firm to give energy 
efficiency a low priority (Faber et al. 2009). As an example, a shipowner-operator currently has to 
decide between investing in a scrubber technology given the regulations around SOx and NOx 
emissions or improve the energy efficiency of ships given the increasing fuel price.  
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If the above non-market failures could be accurately represented as modifications in a model and 
still show existence of apparent cost-negative options that were not being implemented, one could 
then draw the conclusion that market failures or other types of barriers existed, these are discussed 
in turn below. 
Split incentives - refer to the potential difficulties that arise when two parties engaged in a contract 
have different goals and different levels of information (IEA 2007). Split incentives occur when the 
costs and benefits of energy efficiency accrue to different agents (Blumstein et al. 1980; Fisher & 
Rothkopf 1989; Howarth & Winslow 1994). In shipping, split incentives are likely to occur due to the 
different types of charter (and the divided responsibility for fuel costs) existing between shipowners 
and charterers. Ship owners who invest in fuel efficiency improving measures cannot, in general, 
recoup their investment, unless they operate their own ships or have long term agreements with 
charterers, because neither charter rates nor second hand prices of ships reflect the economic 
benefit of its fuel efficiency (Faber et al. 2009). Charter markets not representing fuel efficiency 
could be due to the variability of actual fuel use, it may be risky for the ship owner to guarantee a 
low fuel use and hence the fuel efficiency is not reflected in the charter market (Wang et al. 2010). 
Similarly in time charter contracts speed may be understated and fuel consumption per day may be 
overstated (Veenstra & Dalen 2011). 
Information problems - Accurate and reliable information may be difficult to obtain as those who 
have information have strategic reasons to manipulate it in order to inflate its value. Sellers 
advertise and promote their goods by providing information about their own goods. “Self-interest is 
an incentive for the provision of misinformation by sellers and the costs of acquiring additional 
information may be high enough to inhibit acquisition of sufficient unbiased information to 
overcome well-distributed misinformation” (Golove & Eto 1996, p. 20). It has been argued that even 
when information on energy efficiency is signalled through for example labelling, consumers may 
still be wary because of past experience with advertised misinformation (Stern & Aronson 1984). 
EEDI and other indicators of fuel efficiency thus may not increase the transparency in the market 
and owners of efficient ships may not be able to command higher charter rates (Faber et al. 2009). 
Informational problems don’t necessarily arise due to agent opportunism, it may well be that one 
party may have relevant information on the costs and benefits of an energy efficiency investment, 
but may find this difficult to convey to the other party (Jaffe & Stavins 1994, p. 805). In this case if 
there were no informational problems, the parties would be able to enter into contracts to share the 
costs and benefits of the investment. However, sometimes this may be outweighed by the 
transaction costs involved hence investment is likely to be forgone despite potential advantages to 
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both parties (Sorrell et al. 2004). A solution to this would be to standardise energy savings contracts. 
As shown in Table ‎1.2 informational problems also have the characteristics of a public good. This 
means that “to the extent that this information is known by competitors, the risk associated with the 
subsequent adoption of this same technology may be reduced, yet the value inherent in this 
reduced risk cannot be captured by its creator” (Golove & Eto 1996, p. 19). 
Apart from the economic market failures and non-market failures, Sorrell et al. (2000) suggest other 
barrier categories such as behavioural and organisational, which could also be plausible explanations 
of the unrealised potential in shipping. Behavioural barriers stem from the behavioural science field 
and explain the energy efficiency gap, for example: 
Bounded rationality – Orthodox economics as shown in section  2.1.1 assumes that the decision 
maker will make rational decisions given the available information. Simon (1959) argues that 
bounded rationality may result in satisfying behaviour using rules of thumb. So, instead of being 
based on perfect information, decisions are made by rule of thumb (Stern & Aronson 1984). This is 
connected to the inability to assess life cycle costs of energy purchasing decisions, the same 
investment appraisals may be utilised throughout all the different types of investment opportunities 
including, energy efficiency.  
Inertia - means that “individuals and organizations are, in part, creatures of habit and established 
routines, which may make it difficult to create changes to such behaviours and habits” (Thollander, 
Palm & Rohdin 2010). People generally do not welcome change in their environments and avoid or 
ignore problems (Stern & Aronson 1984). 
Values – implementation of energy efficiency measures is influenced by norms and values in a group 
or society at large. “Values such as helping others, concern for the environment and a moral 
commitment to use energy more efficiently are influencing individuals and groups of individuals to 
adopt energy efficiency measures” (Thollander, Palm & Rohdin 2010, p. 55). 
Credibility and trust – This is not only related to the information itself but also the provider of 
information. As with informational problems, it is also the ability of the provider of information to 
portray and show these qualities, since the adoption is dependent on the receiver’s perceived 
credibility of and trust in the information provider. The trustworthiness of the information provider 
is of significant importance, Thollander, Palm & Rohdin (2010) cite an example of householders’ 
implementation of measures when information is provided by state versus the same information 
being supplied by a utility company. The shipping industry is also subject to this issue of 
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trustworthiness of information regarding savings potentials of energy efficiency measures as shown 
in section  1.4. 
Before proceeding to the next section, it is important to clarify the use of some terms that will 
follow. When agency theory or agency problem is used it will refer to the general economic theory 
that aims to create most efficient contracts given the assumptions and problems of the agency 
relationship. When the term principal agent problems is used, it will refer to application of agency 
theory to the barriers to energy efficiency, which results in several cases suggesting optimal or sub 
optimal outcomes for investment in energy efficiency.  
2.2.2. Empirical research to investigate barriers and drivers to energy efficiency 
To date there have been several studies that have empirically (primary data gathered through 
various research methods) examined barriers to energy efficiency, which can be classified in three 
types: regional, sectoral and technology specific, see for example (Velthuijsen 1993; Gillissen & 
Opschoor 1994; Harris 2000; Sorrell et al. 2000; Sorrell et al. 2004; de Groot, Verhoef & Nijkamp 
2001; UNEP 2006; Zilahy 2004; Rohdin, Thollander & Solding 2007; Sardianou 2008) (Thollander & 
Ottosson 2008; Schleich & Grubber 2008; Schleich 2009; Hasanbeigi, Menke & du Pont 2009; Trianni 
et al. 2012; Shi et al. 2008) etc. Sorrell, Mallet & Nye (2011) cite sixty four such empirical studies. In 
this section only a handful of these, that are thought to be related to the shipping industry, are 
reviewed with the following criteria: 
 Methodological rigour for empirical research - strategy, design and methods consideration 
including mixed methods, sampling (frame and types), validity/errors, instrument design, etc. 
 Taxonomy of barriers – categorisation, does it follow economic theory? 
 Framework on investigating barriers – does it follow a logical framework? 
The problem in the earlier barriers literature has been that the term barriers was not being used in a 
rigorous manner (Sutherland 1991; cited by Sorrell et al. 2004), therefore it is important to classify 
barriers based on some established theory e.g. market failures economic theory. One of the earliest 
empirical studies was by Velthuijsen (1993) who used a mixed method approach (interviews and a 
self-administered questionnaire) to investigate barriers in the following way: 
1. Comparing energy efficiency improvement potential of measures (perceived vs. calculated) 
2. Actual implementation of energy efficient measures (actual vs. calculated) 
3. Identifying the decision process or criteria for implementation 
4. Identifying disturbing factors/barriers (based on perception) 
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5. Determining price elasticities of energy efficiency and its determinants 
The above was the first framework or methodology to investigate barriers in a systematic way. The 
total number of responses for both methods is seventy and the above provides a valuable approach 
to determining barriers to energy efficiency in a self-administered questionnaire. It is not known 
where the sample was recruited from (i.e. sampling frame is unknown). The study makes use of the 
questionnaire method to find the stated and revealed reactions, by combining qualitative questions 
with quantitative questions (e.g. opinions or perceptions and actual energy use). The purpose of the 
mixed method approach in the study is for instrument development (Bryman 2006) although not 
explicitly stated. One of the drawbacks to this study is that it does not use properly defined barriers 
or categories, perhaps owing to the relatively little literature on this subject. Respondents are given 
only seven broad categories of barriers for each measure such as ‘energy bill is too small thus no 
priority is accorded to energy efficiency’, ‘lack of knowledge’, ‘budgetary constraints’, etc. 
Nonetheless, the results elucidate the energy efficiency gap and indicate quantitatively the level of 
impact of barriers that contribute to the gap.  Gillissen and Opschoor (1994) follow the above 
phased approach (only phases one to four) in their empirical analysis of the potential influential 
factors and barriers among 300 Dutch firms through the use of self-administered questionnaires. 
Once again they also explain implementation by correlation with observed firm specific variables and 
secondly by analysing the perception of barriers. In the first question regarding implementation they 
restrict the number of technologies to just six, perhaps due to limitations of the modelling approach 
that is used to calculate sector specific technology potentials. This suggests that the above phased 
methodology is helpful in determining the energy efficiency gap, barriers and determinants to 
energy efficiency, although the categorisation of barriers itself may not be grounded on a theoretical 
basis. Sorrell, Mallet & Nye (2011) conduct a meta-analysis of all the energy efficiency barrier related 
studies (empirical and grey literature, academic and non-academic) and conclude that these studies: 
“Classified barriers in a variety of overlapping and often inconsistent ways, with most of them 
conceptualizing barriers from the viewpoint of the industrial firms rather than economic theory. 
Also, several of the studies are methodologically weak and/or include factors that do not qualify as 
barriers under our definition” (Sorrell, Mallet & Nye 2011, p. 58).  
Various studies have used different classification or taxonomy for various barriers. Table ‎2.2 below 
shows just some of these classifications for categorising barriers to energy efficiency. 
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Classification Source 
 Market failures 
 Market barriers 
Brown (2001) 
 Economic: Market failures and non-market failures 
 Behavioural  
 Organisational 
Sorrell et al. (2004) 
 Management knowledge or information 
 Finance 
 Policy 
UNEP (2006) 
 Prices 
 Financing 
 Trade and environment 
 Market structure 
 Institutional frameworks 
 Information provision 
 Social, cultural, behavioural and norms 
Sathaye et al. (2001) 
Table ‎2.2: Classification of barriers in literature 
Rohdin, Thollander & Solding (2007) draw on the taxonomy of barriers as developed by Sorrell et al. 
(2000). A mixed method approach is used that utilises focus groups (qualitative strategy) with the 
high level management of the Swedish foundry industry, to investigate major barriers and drivers to 
energy efficiency. This is then followed by a self-administered e-mail questionnaire (quantitative 
strategy) which seeks to assess the perception of barriers and driving forces for implementation of 
energy efficient measures. The email survey is sent out to fifty nine association members resulting in 
twenty eight responses, 47% response rate, and a very low response rate for other small companies 
which are consequently removed from the analysis. This brings into question the validity of the 
research and whether there is systematic bias in the results but also suggests that targeting large 
organisations is important because of their share in energy consumption and their having resources 
to contribute towards research. The study starts with assessing the implementation (phase two) 
followed by phase three and four (driving forces replace decision criteria phase used by previous 
studies but is not too dissimilar). Examples of drivers are long term strategy, third party financing, 
competition etc. Limited access to capital and risk were the highest barriers to energy efficiency 
perceived by the respondents.  
32 
 
Hasanbeigi, Menke & du Pont (2009) carry out a regional specific study to investigate barriers and 
drivers in two Thai industrial sectors, combining two research methods, the self-administered postal 
questionnaire followed by case study interviews, a mixed methods approach with the aim of 
complementarity and expansion. The sampling methods used in the survey have however brought 
several concerns over the representativeness of the sample, which could result in coverage and 
sampling errors. For example postal questionnaire was only sent to textile companies that were 
members of the Textile Club of Institute of Industrial Energy, resulting in further biases due to their 
membership of energy related club. The response rate achieved from this sample was around 50%. 
For the cement industry the postal questionnaire was sent directly to the six cement companies 
(accounting for the largest share of production capacity), of which only three responded. This 
method is similar to the probability proportionate to size (PPS) sampling method. The study assumes 
the energy efficiency gap therefore there are no questions in the questionnaire asking respondents 
on implementation of measures. The questionnaire is mainly focussed on the barriers and drivers 
stage (three and four) and policies to overcome those barriers. Ratings on barriers are based on a 
five-point Likert scale, enabling means of barriers to be calculated for analysis. The Likert scale has 
repeatedly been used in these studies, suggesting that it is a useful instrument to capture the 
attitudes and perceptions of respondents on implementation of measures, barriers and drivers to 
energy efficiency. So far, many studies have used interviews as a research method, but rarely have 
these been applied to the same type of respondents i.e. the companies who undertake the 
questionnaire for example, instead interviews seem to be with a wide variety of other stakeholders 
in the system of the company. This is also the case in Hasanbeigi, Menke & du Pont (2009), where all 
of the interviews are with governmental departments, federations and consultancies.  
Sardinaou (2008) conducted empirical analysis based on face to face interviews using a 
questionnaire (structured interviews) of fifty out of 779 industrial Greek industrial firms (6.5% 
response rate) over a one year period. The questionnaire follows the structure that has been used in 
the aforementioned studies, i.e. contains firm specific questions or variables and perception of 
barriers, however it does not follow the methodology employed by previously mentioned studies. 
Moreover the classification or taxonomy of barriers is inconsistent with that which has been 
developed thus far (e.g. by Sorrell et al. (2000, 2004), Thollander and Palm (2012), etc.) although 
they broadly fall in those categories e.g. difficulty in keeping proper records of energy consumption 
and lack of knowhow, would be classified as informational barriers. Nevertheless, this breakdown is 
perhaps an effort to make the taxonomy of barriers specific to the respondents, however if this was 
the case, it is envisaged that they would be regrouped for analysis after the survey had taken place. 
The taxonomy employed thus makes it difficult to interpret some of the results. Generally the results 
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showed significant variation of perception of barriers between sectors and size of the firms. Hidden 
costs and access to capital were the most cited barriers by the respondents. 
Thollander & Ottosson (2008) use the self-administered questionnaire research method to conduct a 
survey of the Swedish pulp and paper industry. The study received a good response rate of 68% 
(forty out fifty nine companies responded). There are several factors that contributed to such a high 
response rate. The study used the taxonomy developed by Sorrell et al. (2000) and their 
questionnaire was based on a simplified methodology as presented above. For example in order to 
determine the energy efficiency gap by asking and then comparing energy efficiency potentials of 
respondents and theoretical, and actual versus theoretical/modelled implementation, they simply 
ask whether the respondent believes that there exist cost-effective measures within their 
organisations. There is also evidence that the study has carefully evaluated the research method and 
executed it with precision.  For example, only for the second time in barriers literature references 
such as Yin (1994) and Bryman (2006) are cited, who are regarded as leading authorities in the social 
research methods. Another example is a carefully targeted postal mail to the company energy 
managers, however its unknown as to what exactly was the process that was followed for example 
for invitation, follow ups etc. Not only did they use Sorrell et al. (2000) barriers taxonomy but also 
developed on the driving forces taxonomy established by Rohdin et al (2007), that is later also used 
by Hasanbeigi et al. (2009). It is important to take note of the drivers or opportunities to energy 
efficiency which have been defined as opposite of barriers, different types of factors that stress 
investment in technologies that are both energy and cost efficient (Thollander & Ottosson 2008). 
Table ‎2.3 identifies the growing literature on drivers to energy efficiency.  
Sorrell et al. (2000, 2004) use the structured interviewing method, case studies and postal 
questionnaire (differed according to sector and country) to investigate four sectors for a host of 
barriers to energy efficiency. The response rates to postal questionnaire were 31% and 53% in the 
sectors where this method was used. The barriers taxonomy is derived from different branches of 
economic theory; orthodox and agency perspectives combined with transaction cost economics and 
behavioural economics and this is one of the first empirical studies to do this. The methodology 
varies from sector to sector. For each sector a short list of technologies for energy efficiency is 
created. Respondents are asked using a rating scale of agreement on the range of efficiency 
measures with payback of less than four years. Thereafter, respondents are asked to rate (on a 
numbered scale) the extent to which the energy efficient technologies had been adopted, thus 
resulting in mean implementation rates, which are converted into percentages. Following this, 
respondents are asked to rate (on a numbered scale) their perceptions on barriers to energy 
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efficiency in general (not specific to the measure), which have been disaggregated from the main 
taxonomy, for example indicators for capital barriers were: other priorities for capital investment, 
adherence to capital budgeting, lack of capital.  The perception of barriers is then used to see if 
there are significant differences among classes of respondents e.g. by size. This research method is 
then complemented by case study interviews generally of around five to seven companies or 
institutions for triangulation of results and analysis.  
Category Driver 
Market related driving 
forces 
 Cost reduction resulting from lower energy use 
 Rising energy prices 
 International competition 
 Third party financing (ESCO’s) 
Policy related driving forces  Price on emissions 
 Obligations 
 Rebates 
 Codes and standards 
 Subsidies 
Behavioural & 
organisational 
 Green image 
 Corporate social responsibility 
 Personnel  
 Visions and strategy  
Table ‎2.3: Drivers to energy efficiency 
Source: Thollander and Ottosson (2008) 
Harris (2000) surveyed 100 Australian firms that participated in the part government funded audit 
program (Enterprise Energy Audit Program) in order to investigate whether recommendations from 
the audit had been implemented (i.e. actual levels of uptake), how were decisions made on 
implementation and why recommendations were ignored or not taken up. The paper explains in 
detail how the survey questions were developed and how they sought to answer the main 
questions. The paper demonstrates a well thought sampling strategy (stratified sampling based on 
industry), design and planning. Implementation rate is based on number of recommendations of the 
audit (average of around six per firm) and measures actually implemented at the time of survey 
(average of five per firm), resulting in an implementation rate of 80%. Generally through the survey, 
scale questions are used to identify justification on implementation, decision rules and perception 
on barriers. Some of the findings suggest market barriers that explain the energy efficiency gap but 
do not find market failures as main barriers to implementation. For example, the most widely used 
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decision making rule was the payback period, almost half of the respondents did not implement a 
measure because of long payback periods. Interestingly the implementation rates did not differ 
between firms that leased their premises and firms that owned their premises, suggesting that the 
principal agent problem did not exist in this case, perhaps due to the medium to long length of the 
leases, which were on average around five years. Secondly, it may be that the survey over 
represented the firms that own their premises (88% owned all or part of the premises).  
An alternative approach to assessing barriers empirically, is to apply econometric analysis to the 
empirically obtained data, for example Berchling & Smith (1994), Scott (1997),  de Groot, Verhoef & 
Nijkamp (2001), Shcleich and Gruber (2006) etc. The above methodology is also followed by de 
Groot, Verhoef & Nijkamp (2001) who use a mail questionnaire to obtain 135 responses (4.2% 
response rate) from various Dutch companies across several sectors. This is then followed by 
econometric analysis (mainly regressions) used to determine how investment attitude, barriers to 
investment and responsiveness to policy intervention varied with firm characteristics and sector. 
Schleich and Gruber (2008) perform econometric analysis on data that is derived from a separate 
survey of German companies through the use of interviews conducted of nearly 3000 companies 
across twenty sectors. The interviews loosely followed the above methodology from step two to 
three. The first set of questions asked which of the energy saving measures (general and sector 
specific) had been implemented in the organisation. This was then followed by respondents being 
asked to judge the relevance of potential barriers to energy efficiency in general (rather than 
technology specific barriers) i.e. perception of barriers. The implementation rate is calculated based 
on the number of cost-effective measures implemented as a % of total cost-effective measures. It is 
important to note the different approaches that have been used so far to calculate implementation 
rates.  
2.2.2.1. Conclusions from review of empirical studies literature 
The above empirical studies show that a wide variety of social research methods, especially the use 
of self-administered questionnaires and interviews have been combined and can be helpful in 
determining the barriers to energy efficiency and perception of barriers to energy efficiency, when 
conducted with a good phased methodology that governs when the methods are used and how each 
instrument within the research method is to be deployed. For example, use and position of rating 
scales and respondent demographics (instruments) etc. within the research method. Moreover, 
most of the studies reviewed here have used a mixed methods approach (combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods) for various reasons such as triangulation, complementarity, instrument 
development etc. (discussed in section ‎3.2 in the next chapter). Most studies have used the self-
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administered questionnaire method followed by interview method, with three studies combing 
these methods, suggesting that these methods are applicable to barriers to energy efficiency 
research and thus could be potential methods that could be used within this research. Table ‎2.5 
below summarises the methods used by the aforementioned studies. 
Study Method for calculating implementation rates 
Velthuijsen (1993) Asking respondents: 
 Views on own efficiency vs. sector average.  
 Technologies suggested actually known by the firm, to derive % 
 Technologies suggested actually implemented by the firm, to derive % 
Gillissen and 
Opschoor (1994) 
Asking respondents: 
 Technologies suggested actually known by the firm, to derive % 
 Technologies suggested actually implemented by the firm, to derive % 
 technology is considered profitable, to derive % 
Harris et al. (2000) Asking respondents: 
 Number of measures implemented from energy audit recommendation 
Schleich and 
Gruber (2008) 
Asking respondents: 
 Technologies suggested actually implemented by the firm, to derive % 
 Split above into groups of active (greater than or equal to 50%)  
Rohdin et al (2007) Do not calculate implementation rates, only look at whether cost efficient 
measures existed or not, to derive % and assume energy efficiency gap 
Sordinaou (2008) Do not calculate implementation rates, assume energy efficiency gap 
Thollander & 
Ottosson (2008) 
Do not calculate implementation rates, assume energy efficiency gap 
Sorrell et al. (2000, 
2004) 
Asking respondents: 
 To rate technologies on a rating scale to show level of implementation, 
to derive mean implementation.  
Table ‎2.4: Methods for calculating implementation rates or energy efficiency gap 
It was also observed that response rates to these studies have been generally low even when the 
studies lasted for nearly a year (e.g. Sardinaou, 2008). The methodological rigour of many of the 
aforementioned studies simply either lacked reporting or was neglected. As Sorrell et al. (2011) 
conclude: 
“Several of the studies are methodologically weak and/or include factors that do not qualify as 
barriers under our definition” Sorrell et al. (2011, p.58) 
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This has made it difficult for some of the studies to make broader generalisations of the population 
from the sample. It suggests that the research strategy, design, methods and sampling will need to 
be carefully designed and implemented if a good response rate is to be achieved. This will be 
discussed in the following chapter and strategies that are used to ensure a good response rates and 
valid generalizable results.  
Depending on the methodology, some of the studies assume that an energy efficiency gap exists and 
focus their discussion on barriers and drivers to energy efficiency, whereas some studies start from 
before this, take a step back to calculate the implementation rates of the ideal versus actual, to 
postulate an energy efficiency gap. Those studies that do use the latter approach have used different 
ways to calculate implementation rates. However this approach could result in respondent burden, 
which explains the differences in the level of response rates achieved by the two types.  All the 
above studies acknowledged the fact that the research methods which will be used will enable 
‘perception’ of barriers to be understood, which is then compared with firm specific indicators such 
as size, energy use, energy investment as a proportion of total investments. Only in some studies do 
the firm specific indicators actually contribute towards a barrier itself.  
Many of the pre 2000 studies used a taxonomy of barriers that lacked consistency, usually 
overlapped and were not derived directly from economic theory. Some authors incorporated this in 
their studies, whereas some simply ignored or argued against such narrow classification, suggesting 
that actual barriers encountered do not fit neatly into one of the above classifications (Blumstein, 
1980; Chai & Yeo 2012). In this research it was felt that economic and theoretical background will 
enable a better understanding and provide testable hypothesis in order to support or reject the 
barriers to energy efficiency theory in shipping.  
Finally, all of the above studies point toward a wide range of barriers that are inhibiting the uptake 
of energy efficiency measures, which suggests heterogeneity of the firms and sectors under 
investigation, implying that the shipping sector would also be susceptible to a wide variety of 
barriers. Most of the studies (regional and sector specific) above have focussed on the industrial 
sector, mainly energy intensive production (shipping is not dissimilar to these, in terms of the share 
of energy costs as total of all the operating costs) and some studies intentionally focussed on non-
energy intensive sectors such as commercial (banking etc.) and yet found that barriers to energy 
efficiency were inhibiting uptake of energy efficiency measures. The above conclusions and lessons 
are helpful in directing this research, from formulating the research questions to development of 
empirical research methods. The following section looks at empirical studies on barriers to energy 
efficiency studies in shipping.  
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Study Interviews Survey Focus 
groups 
Mixed 
methods 
Econometric 
analysis 
Velthuijsen (1993)      
Gillissen and Opschoor (1994)      
Harris et al. (2000)      
De Groot et al (2001)      
Schleich and Gruber (2008)      
Rohdin et al (2007)      
Sordinaou (2008)      
Hassanbeigi et al. (2009)      
Thollander and Ottosson (2008)      
Sorrell et al. (2000, 2004)      
% of studies used 40% 70% 10% 40% 20% 
Table ‎2.5: Methods used by empirical studies 
2.2.3. Empirical research to investigate barriers to energy efficiency in shipping  
To date there have been relatively fewer empirical studies that have investigated barriers to energy 
efficiency in shipping. Much of the literature on this subject is grey literature (unpublished and 
mainly industry reports), thus can hardly be found via conventional channels such as journals. The 
criteria to assess these studies are same as outlined above. One of the first empirical studies on this 
subject is by Gordon (2008) an MSc study that uses an online questionnaire to identify barriers to 
five specific energy efficiency measures (four technical and one operational) and obtains seventy 
responses (response rate is not mentioned). The barriers are not specific to the measures but rather 
generic and don’t follow any established barriers taxonomy that existed at the time. The survey asks 
respondents their perception on barriers, potential to save fuel and cost-effectiveness of those 
measures but does not ask questions on implementation of those measures (similar to Rohdin, 
Thollander & Solding 2007). Two open ended questions also ask respondents to comment on the 
biggest barrier and how this could be overcome. To some extent the short survey does follow the 
framework outlined in the earlier section. However the study is not properly backed with 
methodological rigour and quality. For example there is no use of a sampling frame, respondents are 
recruited through affiliations with industry associations, resulting in systematic non-response errors 
and bias. The survey is targeted towards all those involved in the shipping industry from 
classification societies and ship builders to owners and charterers, which has meant that the 
questionnaire would lose its depth over breadth.  
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Another MSc dissertation by Hill (2010) uses fifteen semi-structured interviews to investigate 
barriers to uptake of cost negative measures derived from a marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) 
modelling. The study follows established taxonomy of barriers and at times uses specific barriers to 
the implementation of measures, which are later classified into the barriers taxonomy. The 
methodology framework is followed quite well with the exception of calculating actual 
implementation. The study extends the barriers framework that has been developed thus far, in that 
it seeks to quantify some barriers, in other words, compares perception of barriers with observed 
and then follows on to propose policies for removal of those barriers. This is done for the hidden 
costs barrier (includes additional costs and opportunity costs) for a specific measure. Regarding the 
methodological quality of the study, one could comment that the respondents are recruited as a 
purposive sample (to represent a variety of stakeholders) which could perhaps be biased views and 
therefore questions the validity of the responses as interviews have been shown to have a social 
desirability bias (Dillman 2007). 
There have also been several grey literature studies specific to the shipping industry based on expert 
views or on less rigorous methods for data collection. These sources include consultancy reports, 
non-governmental (NGO) reports, International Maritime Organisation (IMO) paper submissions and 
EU research. See for example Faber et al. (2009), Faber, Behrends & Nelissen (2011), Heisman & 
Tomkins (2011), Maddox Consulting (2012), Hobson et al. (2007) Kollamthodi et al. (2008), Wang et 
al. (2010). In this section only two studies are reviewed (based on the aforementioned criteria), as 
they were specifically commissioned to address the barriers debate. Faber, Behrends & Nelissen 
(2011) provide a comparative analysis of the marginal abatement cost curves (MACC’s) that have 
been produced so far for the shipping industries (similar approach to Velthuijsen (1993)). The 
MACC’s include the level of uptake or implementation of technologies by assuming adoption 
behaviour by specifying the criteria for adoption which could be based on cost-effectiveness, highest 
profits or least cost. This is then followed by semi-structured interviews of two groups of 
stakeholders: five shipping companies and other stakeholders on the subject of barriers. The 
interview comprises of two parts, structured questionnaire and another part with open ended 
questions on barriers. For the structured part, instead of selecting individual measures, individual 
measures are grouped according technical, alternative fuels and operational measures and 
implementation rates (as %) are calculated by asking the respondents directly whether they have 
implemented the specific measure. The questionnaire also asks for expected savings potential which 
could have been used for gauging differences in calculated and real (similar to Velthuijsen, 1993), 
but for reasons not mentioned, this is not included in the report. Barriers in general are discussed 
per measure; however the clear taxonomy of barriers that is suggested within the report is not 
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followed through in the interviews. Moreover the implementation rates (although based on a very 
small sample) could have been fed in the MACC’s to present an alternative or realistic picture of the 
abatement potential of measures. The empirical analysis is based on only twelve interviews and the 
actual implementation of measures is answered by only four shipping companies, making the study 
subject to all four types of errors; coverage, sampling, non-response and measurement error (Groves 
1989). 
Another report by Maddox Consulting (2012) follows the barriers framework or methodology 
aforementioned very closely by providing a comprehensive analysis of measures available for 
reducing CO2 from shipping at negative cost, with many measures being operational measures. The 
implementation rates of each of the measures are subjectively determined by a literature review, 
expert opinions and interviews with stakeholders (such as suppliers of technologies and ship owners 
and operators 80 altogether including 25 ship owners and operators). At this point they bring in the 
concept of product life cycle or the ‘S’ curve (theory of diffusions of innovations, which is also 
discussed by Jaffe and Stavins (1994)) to determine whether low penetration is due to the measures 
position in the curve or due to barriers.  This is applied to thirteen different measures, with most 
operational measures (shown to be mature on the S curve) having penetration rates between 50% 
and 75%, suggesting that there are some barriers to implementation of operational measures. 
Barriers are then discussed for each measure in good detail, particularly for speed reduction 
measures, which were shown to have the highest fuel saving potential. However the barriers 
taxonomy once again does not follow economic theory, except for the barriers classified as market 
failures (which include split incentives), other barriers could be categorised into the barriers 
taxonomy presented by Sorrell et al. (2000) such as administrative barrier could be classified as 
hidden costs, regulatory barrier could be categorised risk barrier. The analysis shows that market 
failures or split incentives were applicable to all measures. As per the framework on barriers the 
study looks at policy options to remove or overcome those barriers and also comments on best 
practice for market barrier removal per measure in other sectors and within shipping. It is not clear 
from the report how exactly the empirical data was collected, the interview guide/template is not 
present and sampling of the respondents is absent.  
2.2.3.1. Conclusions from review of empirical studies literature in shipping 
The above empirical studies show that a variety of social research methods (especially 
questionnaires and interviews) can be helpful in determining the economics of energy efficiency and 
perception of barriers to energy efficiency in shipping. However there is a need to adopt the 
framework that has been developed from the literature in other sectors in order to have a 
41 
 
consistent understanding of barriers in shipping. There is also a need for methodological rigour in 
testing barriers in shipping for example by targeting specific respondents’ rather than a broad range 
of stakeholder. When using interviews as a method to gather primary data it is important to have it 
structured or semi structured and extra consideration is also required as it can create social 
desirability bias and interviewer variability. The above empirical studies have not made full use of 
the mixed methods research as used by empirical studies in other sectors, to overcome the 
weaknesses of the methods employed or for other purposes such as further development and 
triangulation.  
The response rates to the shipping studies have not been presented perhaps owing to methods 
employed. The methodological rigour of many of the aforementioned studies simply either lacked 
reporting or was neglected. This has made it difficult for some of the studies to make broader 
generalisations of the population from the sample. It suggests that research strategy, design and 
methods will need to be carefully designed and implemented if a good response rate is to be 
achieved. This will be discussed in the following chapter and strategies that are used to ensure a 
good response rates and valid generalizable results. Most of the above studies acknowledged the 
barriers literature and taxonomy of barriers, but still failed to incorporate it in their studies thus 
lacked consistency, and developed other categories that cannot be derived directly from or linked to 
economic theory.  
Faber, Behrends & Nelissen (2011) and Maddox Consulting (2012) aimed to obtain the 
implementation rates of the measures, but both of them differed in the way implementation rates 
were calculated. Nonetheless, either they have lacked rigour in the way that it has been calculated 
or sufficient sample size was not obtained. Hill (2010) expanded the framework by comparing or 
testing perceptions of the barriers with observed or quantification of one of the barriers. All of the 
above studies show that the number of measures under investigation can be limited to around five 
to ten to gain sufficient depth on barriers to their implementation.  
2.2.4. Non empirical research on barriers to energy efficiency  
Koomey & Sanstad (1994) give a modelling framework for ascertaining whether market failures exist 
or not, and apply this framework to four examples mainly domestic appliances (light bulbs, 
refrigirators, computers and TV’s). Internal rates of return (IRR) for both the energy efficient devices 
and inefficient devices can be calculated based on purchase prices (initial costs) and operating costs. 
When the IRR exceeds the social and private discount rate and yet the inefficient device is 
purchased, then it suggests goods are not being purchased at minimum costs, a necessary condition 
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for efficient allocation of resources, implying the existence of market imperfections. Their 
framework suggests starting from:  
1. Hidden costs (to the analyst) not included in calculations e.g. service levels, tax etc. 
2. Incorrect parameter specification in the calculations e.g. running hours 
3. Time lags between introduction and adoption e.g. S curve/diffusion of innovation theory  
4. Then conclude that market failures are inhibiting uptake.  
For all the examples where this was applied, the analysis showed that in all cases there were market 
failures inhibiting uptake of the technologies.  
2.2.5. Non empirical research on barriers to energy efficiency in shipping 
One of the first papers to specifically discuss barriers to uptake of low carbon technologies in 
shipping was Hobson et al. (2007). It classified barriers as technical, economic, social and legislative 
and discussed each of these for a given set of technologies. This categorisation is disconnected to 
the general barriers literature and taxonomy. However, a follow on study by Kollamthodi et al. 
(2008) reviews the barriers literature cited and mentions the principal agent problem, although they 
conclude that this problem is not significant for capital intensive measures, as owners will be able to 
increase the charter rates for an improved ship, while users (charterers) are willing to pay the 
increase if this entails a reduction in fuel costs. This analysis is based on a single conversation with 
the Norwegian Shipowners Association. They analyse in the same way other barriers such as risks, 
hidden costs, informational problems for both new and existing ships and technical and operational 
measures.  
Wang et al. (2010) develop marginal abatement cost curves for twenty two technical and 
operational measures and discuss the implementation barriers for each of the measures, based on 
the authors’ expert opinions. They categorise barriers into technological, institutional and financial. 
Within the institutional barrier they cite the split incentives barrier, with reference to the barriers 
literature in other contexts. Wang et al. (2010) challenge Kollamthodi et al.’s (2008) assumption that 
energy efficient ships can obtain higher charter rates. There is a short discussion of barriers related 
to speed, length of ownership and cost pass through in shipping.  
2.3. Literature review of agency problems in the context of energy efficiency 
This section of the chapter examines studies that have specifically focussed on the two agency 
problems; split incentives and informational problems, that are also categorised as market failures in 
the barriers literature.  These are discussed in the general context and in the context of shipping. 
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2.3.1. Agency problems in the building and other sectors 
2.3.1.1. Qualitative analysis of agency problems (positivist type research) 
There are several studies that have focussed on the type of lease and barriers to energy efficiency, 
however most of them tend to be for private rental in the residential sector. The possibility of split 
incentives between owners and occupants of residential dwellings was first researched by Blumstein 
(1980) with case study interviews suggesting a “landlord-tenant” issue. The research first attempts 
to classify barriers but understandably there was very shallow literature of barriers, so new terms 
are used. Prior to this study, York et al. (1978) first catalogued around fifty studies that pointed 
towards the barriers to energy efficiency and barriers to innovation. Blumstein (1980) suggests that 
the causes of barriers are often interlinked and follow a causal chain, citing an example of 
commercial building operators initially lacking of information on conservation measures and about 
their site energy use, which is further exacerbated by misplaced incentives. Blumstein (1980) uses 
the semi structured interview method to interview twelve stakeholders in the buildings industry, 
grouped into two. The first group of stakeholders are owners, managers and operators and the 
second group are those that are indirectly linked to the sector such as brokers and institutional 
investors.  A very good level of detail is provided for each of the interview findings, which mainly 
suggest existence of split incentives and informational problems.  
Meyer (2008) investigates how different types of leases for rental offices in Boston affect the energy 
efficiency investments of landlords. The research method is semi structured interviews of thirty five 
office rental stakeholders including; landlords and tenants, real estate brokers, contractors, 
engineers etc. using purposive sampling strategy. Meyer (2008) also does some analysis (similar to 
qualitative content analysis) of existing leases used in the Boston area and how each type of lease or 
lease clauses impact investment in energy efficiency. The key finding is that attitudes of the 
interviews differed according to leases, which were determined by the market, and at the time of 
interviewing it was discovered that there was no appetite for renters to pay higher rent for energy 
efficient space or lack of energy efficiency premium, thus landlords are unable to recoup their 
investment. More specifically existing recapture clauses, operating expense allocation and payback 
periods do not justify the investment.  
Barriers and principal agent problems in the context of energy efficiency have been also qualitatively 
discussed in a variety of studies elucidating the potential market failures e.g. Fisher and Rothkopf 
(1989), Jaffe and Stavins (1994), Brown (2001), Hirst & Brown (1990), Nadel (2002), Carbon Trust 
(2005), Gillingham, Newell & Palmer (2009) Golove & Eto (1996), Howarth & Anderson (1993), 
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Carbon Trust (2005), Howarth & Winslow (1994), Howarth, Haddad & Paton (2000), Sanstad & 
Howarth (1994), Thollander, Palm & Rohdin (2010), etc.  
2.3.1.2. Quantification of agency problems 
Several studies have attempted to quantify or estimate the amount of energy that is affected by the 
principal agent problem. By doing so they show how much energy efficiency potential is forgone, so 
that policies can be developed to address them. The forgone energy efficiency potential or extra 
energy consumption can be said to be analogous to the agency costs encountered in principal agent 
relationships. Agency costs arise as a result of the two agency problems, so for the first problem of 
misaligned incentives, the agency costs arise out of the measures that seek to align incentives of the 
principal and the agent (e.g. stock options to managers), for the informational problems, agency 
costs are costs of monitoring or obtaining information (e.g. screening) of the agent. These studies 
are re-examined in detail in chapter five in order to apply the quantification of agency problems in 
shipping.  
Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) is the first research that attempts the quantification of principal 
agent problem on US residential energy use. They provide a methodology and a matrix (refer to 
Table ‎5.8) allocate households to various principal agent cases, which has been used by all the 
studies that follow below. The study also draws upon previous work from Sathaye & Murtishaw 
(2004) quantifying the effects of market failures in domestic appliances market and how these affect 
take up using a modelling approach. Importantly, in this study, they show that principal agent cases 
are not static, rather dynamic depending on the appliance or end use (e.g. space heating) being 
studied. For example a renter is generally said to be the principal and landlord his agent, and 
appliances where the agent is responsible will typically encounter the efficiency problem, but when 
appliances where the principal is responsible, such as televisions and set top boxes, there may not 
be such efficiency problems, thus the principal can be exposed to efficiency problems only in some 
situations in the residential sector. Another example is of an owner-occupier, thought to be 
representing a case where no principal agent problem exists, but when the owner-occupier buys an 
apartment with already fitted appliances (especially new building stock) it would be classified as an 
efficiency problem, since purchasing decisions on appliance energy efficiency is made by the 
contractor or builder. Combining the housing survey census data, households are split into the 
principal agent cases. The number of households affected by principal agent efficiency problem 
varied for the different energy end use, for example in case of lighting only 5% of households are 
affected by principal agent efficiency problem, for refrigerators over 30% of households are affected 
by principal agent efficiency problem, for water heaters 78% of households are affected by principal 
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agent efficiency problem. This finding perhaps suggests that the mobility of energy efficiency 
measures is an important factor affecting the principal agent problem. Davis (2009) also uses census 
residential energy consumption survey data to compare energy efficiency of appliances between 
owner-occupiers and tenants. Controlling for all other factors such as income, building particulars 
etc. he finds that tenants were “significantly less likely to have energy efficient refrigerators, clothes 
washers and dishwashers” (Davis 2009, p. 1), confirming findings of Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) 
and the efficiency principal agent problem.  
Levinson and Niemann (2004) focus on contracts where energy costs are included in monthly rental, 
a specific case of the principal agent problem, resulting in a ‘usage problem’ according to Murtishaw 
and Sathaye (2006). They confirm this ‘usage problem’ hypothesis using the same data set as above 
and controlling for all other things, show that tenants living in homes where energy is included in the 
rent have higher temperatures, between one and three degrees higher during the winter months 
and when they are absent from their homes. Maruejols & Young (2011) also find that tenant 
behaviour for households that have energy included in their rent opt for increased thermal comfort 
and are found to be less sensitive to temperature whether or not someone is at home and severity 
of the climate when deciding on the temperature. This is an important finding as it suggests that 
operational efficiency of homes with energy included in rent in the residential sector is lower than 
non-energy included contracts despite the technical efficiency of the former being higher than the 
latter.  
Prindle et al (2006) and IEA (2007) are both a compilation of several quantification studies, some of 
which have already been mentioned above. The report brings together several studies from different 
nations and sectors. Table ‎2.6 shows the results of the various studies included in the report. It 
shows there is a wide ranging level of pervasiveness of the principal agent problem by sector and 
country.  
Two studies have attempted to estimate energy end use affected by principal agent problems in the 
transport sector. Grauss & Worrell (2008) examine the principal agent problem in the Netherlands 
company lease cars for executives. They show that despite company cars being newer and 
employing diesel engines, the fuel efficiency is worse than private cars due to them being larger, 
which is further worsened due to company cars also driving for longer distances compared to private 
cars. This results in a principal agent problem where both the ‘efficiency’ and ‘usage’ problems 
occur. Vernon & Meier (2012) investigate principal agent problems in the US trucking sector, in 
which contracts and stakeholders are very similar to shipping contracts and stakeholders. Using 
Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) principal agent matrix they estimate that over 90% of the sectors fuel 
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consumption is affected by ‘usage’ problem because the truck driver does not pay for fuel costs and 
lacks incentive for fuel saving operation, despite monitoring through miles travelled and fuel used. 
Only in a few cases the split incentives is addressed by larger firms offering fuel efficiency bonuses. 
Nearly a quarter of trailers are affected by the ‘efficiency’ problem because owners of rental trailers 
do not pay for fuel costs and contracts for rentals do not monetize fuel efficiency of trailers (gained 
through aerodynamics, energy efficient tyres, etc.).  Vernon and Meier (2012) review contracts and 
do not find any mention of efficiency of trailers and the same is concluded for interviews of 
stakeholders who were found to have little knowledge or no interest in fuel efficiency of trailers.  
 
End use/sector Countries 
examined 
Fraction of end use energy affected by all 
types of principal agent problems 
Residential refrigerators USA 25% 
Residential water 
heating 
Norway 
USA 
38% 
77% 
Residential lighting USA 2% 
Television set top boxes USA 100% 
Company cars Nethterlands 32% 
HVAC Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
17% 
44% 
90% 
Vending machines Japan 
Australia 
44% 
80% 
Table ‎2.6: End use energy affected by principal agent problems       
Source: Meier & Eide (2007) 
2.3.2. Agency problems in shipping 
To date there haven’t been any specific studies to investigate agency problems in the context of 
energy efficiency. There have however been a handful of studies that explore the general agency 
problem in a positivist type research, in a non-energy context. Bergantino & Veenstra (2002) 
investigate specifically the principal agent problems in shipping contracts from an economics 
perspective. Within the agency theory they focus on the information asymmetry problem and its 
outcomes adverse selection and moral hazard, thus ignore split incentives branch of the theory. 
However, the study suggests the heterogeneity of the shipping industry, where practices differ from 
one sector to another. As an example the use of vetting by oil majors is very different to that used in 
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other sectors. This has large impact on the way information is presented by parties, possibly 
affecting the barriers to energy efficiency in that sector. Veenstra & Ludema (2006) show from a 
naval architecture point of view, how design specifications set by shipowners do not actually fully 
account for the full service life of the ships they order. They show that shipowners only concern 
themselves with earnings potential which is directly based on cargo carrying capacity, speed & 
manoeuvrability and versatility. This disconnect eludes to the principal agent problems and lack of 
priority accorded to energy efficiency.  
Other research such as that shown in section ‎2.2 in shipping has only mentioned the principal agent 
problem without exploring the subject in greater detail. Both Kollamthodi et al. (2008) and Faber et 
al. (2009) highlight that the principal agent barrier only affects certain segments of the industry. 
Kollamthodi et al. (2008) maps out the measures and types of vessel likely to be affected by principal 
agent problems, however this not based on any empirical data or modelling, and is solely based on 
subjective opinions of the authors.  
Similarly Faber et al. (2009) survey the range of chartering arrangements in shipping, and conclude 
that either the operator pays for bunkers, or that the price of bunkers is passed on as inclusive in 
freight rates or additional levies in liner shipping (called Bunker Adjustment Factors). On this basis, 
they estimate that costs may be passed on for 70-90% of the bunker fuel consumed. Wilson (2010) 
also estimates that 80% of the fuel in shipping is for the charterers account. These statistics imply a 
significant ‘efficiency’ problem since charterers generally do not own their own ships and hire ships, 
similar to tenants in the building (residential or commercial offices) sector. The problem is that none 
of the research mentioned here show how these figures have been derived. The key questions then 
are; how much of the charter market is affected by the principal agent problem? Whether time 
charter rates reflect or monetize energy efficiency? Do charterers demand energy efficient ships? 
And as a result do shipowners consider investments in energy efficiency worthwhile i.e. are they 
able to recoup the investment?  
2.4. Summary 
The review of literature on barriers to energy efficiency can be categorised into five different topics 
depending on the focus and sector analysed. This section provides a brief summary using the criteria 
set out in section ‎2.2.2 of this chapter; methodological rigour for empirical research, taxonomy of 
barriers and framework on investigating barriers. 
The first set of studies can be categorised as empirical studies that investigated barriers to energy 
efficiency. Only a handful of studies were reviewed for their methodological rigour and approach 
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towards investigating barriers to energy efficiency (Velthuijsen 1993; Rohdin, Thollander & Solding 
2007; Harris 2000; Sardinaou 2008; Thollander & Ottosson 2008; Hasanbeigi et al. 2009). These 
studies are thought to be most important highly relevant to this research because they have set the 
foundation on empirical research on barriers to energy efficiency but due to time and resource 
constraints several other sources were not critically reviewed. These studies generally lacked a good 
taxonomy on barriers to energy efficiency but followed a good phased approach to investigating the 
barriers to energy efficiency. Most of the studies did not completely follow the methodology i.e. 
beginning from analysis of measures to improve energy efficiency and concluding with policies to 
remove barriers for those specific measures. Most of the studies used the self-administered 
questionnaire method and interviews (and some combination of these) but did not present the 
methods in sufficient detail for example the sampling strategy, sampling frames, errors, 
questionnaire design etc., therefore their methods could not be assessed in detail. Of all, Thollander 
and Ottosson (2008) is the only study that goes into some detail regarding why the methods were 
selected, question content, sampling etc. This study is therefore closely followed in this research.  
The second set of studies can be categorised as those empirical studies that investigated barriers to 
energy efficiency in shipping (Gordon 2008; Hill 2010; Faber, Behrends & Nelissen 2011 and Maddox 
Consulting 2012). Gordon (2008) and Kollamthodi et al. (2008) vaguely followed the taxonomy on 
barriers to energy efficiency and neither did they follow a good phased approach to investigating the 
barriers to energy efficiency. Hobson et al. (2007) does not follow the methodology i.e. beginning 
from analysis of measures to improve energy efficiency and concluding with policies to remove 
barriers for those specific measures. Hill (2010), Faber, Behrends & Nelissen (2011) and Maddox 
Consulting (2012) follow the barriers taxonomy and methodology to some extent i.e. some focus on 
implementation and perception of barriers. The methods selected to do so were also mainly 
interviews and self-administered questionnaires. The main shortcoming of these studies is that they 
have very low response rates perhaps due to their failure to address the methods more thoroughly.  
The third set of studies focussed on the agency problem and were mainly of qualitative nature and 
focussed on buildings and other sectors (Blumstein 1980; Sorrell et al. 2000 and 2004; Meyer 2008). 
Although none of these were exclusively focussed on agency problems in the context of barriers to 
energy efficiency, they had considerable content which analysed the agency problem. Sorrell et al. 
(2000 and 2004) thoroughly examined the methods (interviews and self-administered questionnaire) 
for conducting the research across different industries as well as proposing a well explained 
taxonomy of barriers. The framework or methodology varied from sector to sector but mainly 
focussed on implementation level of measures and perception of barriers to energy efficiency. Most 
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of the studies here used interviews followed by self-administered questionnaires. Sorrell et al. (2000 
and 2004) are considered to be the only study that meets the review criteria and is therefore 
thoroughly understood in order to aid this research.  
The fourth set of studies focussed on the agency problem and were mainly of quantitative nature 
investigating agency problems in the building industry and other sectors (Murtishaw and Sathaye 
2006; Prindle et al. 2006; IEA 2007; Grauss and Worrell 2008; Vernon and Meier 2012). These studies 
sought to quantify or estimate the level of principal agent problem in a wide range of sectors. 
Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) develop a framework to categorise principal agent problems in the 
context of energy efficiency in residential sector which is consequently followed by all other 
literature in other industries.   
Finally, the fifth set of studies focussed on the agency problem but mainly from a qualitative 
perspective in shipping (Bergantino and Veenstra 2002; Veenstra and Ludema 2006; Kollamthodi et 
al. 2008; Wang et al. 2010). The former two do not apply the agency theory in the context of energy 
efficiency and the latter two only briefly mention principal agent problem as a barrier category and 
subjectively show which energy efficiency measures it may affect. These are mainly based on 
subjective analysis of the barriers with some anecdotal evidence.  
2.4.1. Gaps in the literature 
From the foregoing analysis, it can be seen that previous studies that used good theoretical 
framework on barriers, mainly looked at firms (mainly manufacturing) in different sectors e.g. 
Velthuijsen (1993), Sourdinaou (2008), Sorrell et al (2000) and have ignored transportation 
companies and shipping companies. The empirical studies that did look at shipping companies e.g. 
Gordon (2008) and Faber, Behrends & Nelissen (2011) did not base their analysis on any established 
barriers framework or theories. Most studies that used social research methods such as interviews 
and surveys were not methodologically rigorous, therefore they did not really go further to explain 
the lack of uptake of energy efficiency measures. 
None of the shipping barriers literature has tested for the principal agent problem rigorously or 
exclusively, instead they only mention it as barrier to uptake of energy efficiency measures. Few 
studies attempted to create a baseline on implementation of energy efficiency measures but these 
were methodologically weak and did not capture the full extent of the perceived barriers in shipping. 
Several studies have quantified the principal agent problems for various sectors, but no such 
quantification of the principal agent problem exists for shipping. Thus the positivist type principal 
agent research is lacking in shipping industry. There has been very little or unknown application of 
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principal-agent type research in the context of barriers to energy efficiency in general and for 
shipping.  
Barriers to energy efficiency literature in buildings and other sectors looked at the principal agent 
problems mainly on the way it affects investment in energy efficiency but have not looked at how 
the principal agent problem affects operations or behaviour, e.g. when a tenant does not pay fuel 
bill how does their action/behaviour differ? Principal agent problem in shipping is approached 
mainly from an investment in technology or technical measures perspective by the studies that 
looked at it, but shipping is unique, in that in time charters there are opportunities for operational 
measures that may not require such investments and changes to attitudes or contracts can provide 
opportunities or solutions to the principal agent problem. 
Agency theory hasn’t been applied in a rigorous manner under the positivist type research in the 
context of energy efficiency (except for a few studies) and in shipping. It has also not been applied 
under the principal-agent type research for both barriers to energy efficiency in general and in 
shipping. Finally, the studies reviewed above were in majority empirical studies that examine only 
perception of barriers, some statistical studies examine the observed level of principal agent 
problems and very few studies combined both, perception of barriers and observed barriers.  
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Figure ‎2.2: Depiction of gaps in literature 
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52 
 
2.4.2. Theoretical framework  
Agency theory explains a large part of the barriers framework by explaining the market failure barriers, other peripheral theories such as transaction cost 
theory, behavioural economics branch, contract theory add to the barriers framework but are not in the scope of this research. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.3: Theoretical framework used in this research 
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2.5. Research questions and hypothesis 
2.5.1. Research focus  
From the preceding sections of this chapter, it can be concluded that there are several gaps in the 
shipping literature on the issue of barriers to energy efficiency. Previous studies exploring barriers to 
energy efficiency did not make use of specific frameworks or theories and the principal-agent 
problem or split incentives has not been rigorously tested and quantified, despite being reiterated 
by many. Moreover, much of the research so far is on how barriers to energy efficiency have 
affected investments in energy efficiency without much attention to how these barriers might affect 
energy efficient operations.  
Therefore the focus of this research is on operational measures for improving energy efficiency in 
shipping and the market failures (those explained by agency theory) category of barriers, with more 
attention paid to the speed reduction energy efficiency measure because it has been suggested that 
it has highest emission reduction potential (of up to 30%) and principal agent problems are thought 
to inhibit the uptake of this measure. 
There are several reasons why operational or voyage related measures have significant potential for 
reducing CO2 emissions, which are outlined below; 
 Can lead to instant reductions in CO2 emissions since they are applicable to existing and future 
fleet. 
 Unlike most retrofit measures or technological measures, operational measures can also be 
implemented by time charterers; therefore there is greater scope for CO2 reduction.  
 Require comparably smaller investment in contrast to other technical and retrofit measures, 
therefore access to capital market barrier may not be a significant problem. 
 Have generally been shown to have a negative CO2 costs (i.e. resulting also in fuel savings if 
implemented) by the aforementioned references. 
 There also exists significant potential to improve operational efficiency of ships, which has been 
shown to be wide ranging for different ship types relative to technical efficiency of ships.  
Within shipping the main sectors of interest are wet bulk, dry bulk and container because together 
they represent around 70% of the CO2 emissions of the industry as illustrated in Figure ‎2.4. This 
focus is however not reflective of their relative efficiencies compared to other sectors, which 
although represent a smaller share of total emissions but perhaps are more inefficient and therefore 
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may have greater potential for energy efficiency. The research is also focussed on the 
aforementioned sectors because data is generally more accessible for these sectors.  
 
Figure ‎2.4: CO2 emissions of the various ship types                  
Source: IMO (2010c) 
2.5.2. Research aims 
The literature review showed that there exist many opportunities for shipping companies to improve 
energy efficiency through cost-effective measures. The aim of this research is to understand what 
the level of implementation of such measures is and if there is low uptake, why such opportunities 
are not being taken up or implemented. Specifically, how can agency theory and barriers to energy 
efficiency explain the lack of uptake. The research aims to investigate the barriers by combining 
perception of barriers and observed level of barriers to energy efficiency. 
2.5.3. Formulation of research questions and hypothesis  
The research follows the framework below and steps that have been constructed from relevant 
literature on barriers to energy efficiency. It proposes different ways to investigate perceived and 
observed extent of barriers to energy efficiency. Note that some parts of the framework (Figure 2.5) 
have been greyed out to show that these are not central to the framework but nonetheless will be 
investigated to some extent. Figure ‎2.5 depicts the framework, which has the following steps: 
Step 1: Understanding what shipowners and charterers think are the most important energy 
efficient operational measures in shipping. 
Step 2: Assessing which of the energy efficient operational measures shipowners and charterers 
have implemented. 
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Step 3: Assessing perceptions of barriers to implementation of energy efficient operational 
measures. 
Step 4: Using other methods to assess the observed extent of the identified barriers to 
implementation of operational energy efficiency measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.5: Research framework used in this research 
Note that some parts of the framework (Figure 2.5) have been greyed out to show that these are not 
central to the framework but nonetheless will be investigated to some extent. 
The following section provides greater detail for identifying the hypothesis and research questions 
for each step of the framework. 
Step 1: Understanding what shipowners and charterers think are the most important energy 
efficient operational measures in shipping. 
Most studies that aimed to investigate perception of barriers to energy efficiency e.g. Velthuijsen 
(1993), Sorrell et al. (2000), etc. start with the identification of energy efficient technologies and 
measures, which are derived from various sources e.g. best practice guides, energy audits, literature 
review etc. from which the technical and economic potentials are obtained. A list of select promising 
measures is compiled. Operational measures that are available to shipping to improve energy 
efficiency along with their energy saving potential have been discussed in the previous chapter.  
Step 4: Observed barriers 
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Step 2: Assessing which of the energy efficient operational measures shipowners and charterers 
have implemented. 
The next step is to find the actual uptake or implementation of these measures. Respondents in a 
survey or an interview are asked which of those measures they have implemented in their 
organisations and the results are then presented as mean scores for adoption. The results from this 
method are then compared with ideal or potential levels of uptake estimated using models. Many 
MACC and models assume a certain level of uptake or implementation but this may not be 
representative of the real world situation. To some extent, as suggested by Koomey and Sanstad 
(1994) the models may be susceptible to modelling or parametric specification errors, but even 
when these have been resolved, there may still be a difference between actual and potential level of 
uptake. Therefore, the first research question aims to understand more about the actual 
implementation of operational measures in shipping, which to date has only been investigated by 
Maddox Consulting (2012) based on expert opinions and interviews with stakeholders from the 
shipping industry. The general hypothesis is based on the market barriers theory, which suggests 
that energy efficiency measures may not be fully implemented across the sector because of market 
barriers and market failures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.6: Focus of research question one 
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Research question:  
Research question 1 - To what extent are energy efficient operational measures implemented in 
shipping? 
Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a – Energy efficient operational measures are not fully implemented. 
Hypothesis 1b - Implementation varies across the measures according to size and sector. 
Hypothesis 1c - Implementation of energy efficient operational measures is higher for time 
chartered ships compared to voyage chartered ships.  
 
Step 3: Assessing perceptions of barriers to implementation of energy efficient operational 
measures. 
Once the actual implementation rates for each of the operational measures are ascertained, the 
literature based framework proposes that some of the gap between ideal or modelled and observed 
originates from a range of barriers, which limit the adoption of those measures, which is explained 
by market barriers and market failures, assuming or holding for parametric specifications and costs 
in the models to be accurate. For the measures that are adopted, there are some references e.g. 
Rohdin, Thollander & Solding (2007), Thollander & Ottosson (2008) that show that there are also 
factors that lead to adoption for that energy efficiency measure, however an investigation of these is 
beyond the scope of this research. This is generally based on perception of barriers, which are then 
linked to independent variables such as size and sector. The methods (generally surveys) followed by 
Sorrell et al. (2000), Hasanbeigi et al. (2009), Rohdin, Thollander & Solding (2007), Thollander & 
Ottosson (2008) are concerned with just the perception of barriers across all measures. So for 
example the principal-agent barrier indicator in the surveys or interviews would be when a 
respondent selects ‘energy savings cannot be fully recouped’. It is important to note that not all 
energy efficiency measures in shipping would have the same characteristics; therefore barriers for 
each measure may differ. Based on this, the following research question is formulated:  
Research question:  
Research question 2 - What factors are perceived to be the most important in explaining the lack of 
implementation of energy efficient operational measures? 
Hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 - Market failures (principal agent problems specifically) are perceived to be more 
important than non-market failures for lack of implementation of operational measures. 
 
 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.7: Focus of research question two 
Step 4: Using other methods to assess the observed extent of the identified barriers to 
implementation of operational energy efficiency measures.  
The barriers framework as proposed by Velthuijsen (1993), Koomey & Sanstad (1994), Jaffe and 
Stavins (1994), Sorrell et al (2000) combines general economic theory and barriers theory with 
empirical research where hypothesis and research questions are based on respondent’s perception 
of barriers. In this research, the framework is adapted to focus more on the principal agent problem. 
In order to validate or cross check the responses on perception of barriers and get a fuller picture of 
the pervasiveness of the principal agent problem, there is a need to combine several strands of 
research and triangulate between the methods and data. One method is to quantify or estimate the 
amount of energy consumption that is affected by the principal agent problem (Prindle et al. 2006; 
Vernon & Meier 2012), through desk or secondary research. One can also estimate the extent of the 
principal agent problem by asking the respondent their ownership and leasing in and out structure 
(called chartering). Harris (2000), Trianni et al. (2012) adopt this approach of perceived barriers and 
measuring the extent of observed barriers. The unit of analysis within the agency theory is the 
contract governing the relationship between the principal and the agent and the objective is to 
determine the most efficient contract taking into account assumptions such as risk, incentives, etc. 
Sorrell et al. (2004) suggest that split incentives could be addressed by properly designed contracts. 
Since the focus of this research is the principal agent problem and operational measures, a review of 
the contracts between the principal and the agent for the most promising operational measures e.g. 
speed reduction, would also provide some insight into how charterparties (contracts) can affect 
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implementation of certain measures. Therefore the remaining research questions seek to investigate 
the observed extent of the principal agent problem in shipping and whether there are differences 
between perceived and observed principal agent barriers?  
Research questions:  
Research question 3 – What population of ships is affected by the principal agent problem in 
implementation of energy efficient operational measures? 
Research question 4 – How is the energy efficiency in operations affected by the principal agent 
problem? 
Research question 5 – How do the agency problems in contracts affect implementation of energy 
efficient operational measures? 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 3 – A high proportion of the population is affected by the principal agent problem when 
implementing energy efficient operational measures. 
Hypothesis 4 – Operational energy efficiency of ships is better for time chartered ships compared to 
voyage chartered ships. 
Hypothesis 5 – Agency problems affect the implementation of energy efficient operational 
measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.8: Focus of research question three, four and five. 
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2.5.4. Summary of research questions and hypotheses 
Research question Hypotheses 
RQ 1 - To what extent are energy efficient 
operational measures implemented in 
shipping? 
 
H1a – Energy efficient operational measures are 
not fully implemented. 
H1b - Implementation varies across the measures 
according to size and sector. 
H1c - Implementation of energy efficient 
operational measures is higher for time chartered 
ships compared to voyage chartered ships.  
RQ2 - What factors are perceived to be the 
most important in explaining the lack of 
implementation of energy efficient 
operational measures? 
H2 - Market failures (principal agent problems 
specifically) are perceived to be more important 
than non-market failures for lack of 
implementation of operational measures. 
RQ3 – What population of ships is affected 
by the principal agent problem in 
implementation of energy efficient 
operational measures? 
H3 – A high proportion of the population is 
affected by the principal agent problem when 
implementing energy efficient operational 
measures. 
 
RQ4 – How is the energy efficiency in 
operations affected by the principal agent 
problem? 
H4 – Operational energy efficiency of ships is 
better for time chartered ships compared to 
voyage chartered ships. 
RQ5 – How do the agency problems in 
contracts affect implementation of energy 
efficient operational measures? 
H5 – Agency problems affect the implementation 
of energy efficient operational measures. 
 
 Table ‎2.7: Summary of research questions
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2.5.5. Barriers framework and thesis structure 
The chapters of this thesis are organised using the research framework constructed earlier and 
shown in Figure ‎2.9 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.9: Structure of thesis and barriers framework 
Note that some parts of the framework (Figure 2.9) have been greyed out to show that those are not 
central to the framework but will be investigated to some extent in the respective chapters. 
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3. Approaches and methods for gathering evidence 
Having established the theoretical frameworks and research questions, this chapter discusses the 
structure of the research to answer the research questions. The first section identifies the general 
approach to theory, followed by a discussion of the research design and research strategy employed 
laying a foundation for the research methods that follow. The research methods are discussed 
briefly, with some detail on the method that contributes the most to answering the research 
questions. 
3.1. General theoretical approach  
The research questions formulated are a mixture of ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions. ‘What’ is going on is 
described as descriptive research and ‘why’ is it going on is described as explanatory research, with 
the aim of describing and understanding the phenomena (de Vaus 1995). Descriptive research is 
used in the first set of methods discussed in section 4.4, to describe what is going on in shipping, for 
example stakeholders and contracts interaction, and explanatory research is used in this research to 
describe why something is happening for example why do companies forego energy efficient 
operational measures, why is the level of implementation different, why do barriers exist etc. Much 
of the research undertaken here is explanatory. Explanatory research involves two related 
processes, theory construction and theory testing, according to de Vaus (1995). Theory testing starts 
with a theory, and using this theory a prediction is made how things will be in the ‘real’ world (de 
Vaus 1995) and is often called deductive research. Deductive research starts from general to more 
specific, starting with a theory, hypothesis, observation and ending with confirmation, i.e. theory 
guides the research (Bryman 2008). Theory construction begins with a set of observations and 
moves up to develop theories for the observations, of which Grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin 
1990) is an example. This is often called inductive research and moves from specific observations to 
broader generalisations and theories. The process starts with observations, patterns, hypothesis and 
followed by a theory i.e. theory is an outcome of research (Bryman 2008). The majority of the work 
in this research is based on theory testing or deductive research, where the two methods are 
applied to answer research questions one to four, the process for which is outlined below. Another 
method is used to inductively answer research question five. Stage one has already been discussed 
in chapter two and the remainder of this chapter will cover stages two, three and four. Stages five 
and six are covered in chapter six, seven and eight.  
There are six stages to theory testing according to de Vaus (1995): 
1. Specifying theory to be tested – in a causal or diagrammatic form 
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2. Deriving a set of conceptual propositions – making a statement which specifies the relationship 
between two factors, which are still abstract terms (i.e. not directly observable). According to 
Stinchcombe (1968, cited by de Vaus 1995) the more propositions tested the stronger the test of 
theory. 
3. Restatement of conceptual propositions as testable propositions – the process of deciding how 
to translate abstract concepts into something more concrete and directly observable 
(operationalization). Abstract concepts are rigidly defined and replaced with indicators.  
4. Collection of relevant data  
5. Analysing the data – how much support there is for testable propositions, conceptual 
propositions and initial theory. 
6. Assessing the theory – implications for propositions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.1: Logic of this research process 
Source: adapted from de Vaus (1995) 
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3.2. Research Strategy 
According to Bryman (2008) research strategies refer to the choice of quantitative research, 
qualitative research or a mixture of the two (mixed methods research). Quantitative research 
emphasises quantification in data collection and analysis, whereas qualitative research emphasises 
words or observations, and mixed methods employ some combination of the two (Bryman 2008). 
Generally, a quantitative research strategy is deductive and considered to conform to the theory 
testing approach, whereas a qualitative research is generally inductive and conform to theory 
construction approach. Mixed methods research strategy would generally therefore be inductive 
and deductive, employing theory testing and construction approach. Table A1 in Appendix A shows 
the differences between quantitative and qualitative research from different research orientations. 
In order to evaluate the research strategy choices, table A2 in Appendix A briefly presents the 
strengths and weaknesses of the different strategies and thereafter a discussion of which research 
choice is most relevant to this research follows. 
The choice of research strategy will affect a number of criteria that are used in the evaluation of a 
study. The criteria for each of the strategies are outlined in the table 3.1, which are also applicable 
when selecting the appropriate research designs. Table ‎3.1 is used also as a framework for 
evaluating and selecting the strategy that is appropriate for this research. The main research 
questions that guide this study seem to require a combined approach. The first set of research 
questions are of a quantitative nature and the second set research question is both of quantitative 
and qualitative nature, thus a mixed methods strategy could be employed. This combining of 
methods and paradigms is important because the subject of barriers is complex and may require 
more than one method for the research to be valid, as suggested by Mangan, Lalwani & Gardner 
(2004) in the context of general logistics or transportation research. This research choice is also 
increasingly advocated within business and management research (Curran & Blackburn 2001), where 
quantitative and qualitative methods as well as using primary and secondary data are combined 
within one single research study (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007). The following section further 
elaborates on this strategy and its appropriateness and applicability to this research. 
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Quantitative  Qualitative 
Reliability – consistency of results if repeated Dependability – parallels reliability in 
quantitative strategy, i.e. are the findings likely 
to apply at other times? 
Replicability – repeating the exact study Confirmability – parallels objectivity in 
quantitative strategy 
Validity – integrity of the conclusions, which 
includes;  
 measurement validity – whether a measure 
that is devised of a concept really reflects 
the concept 
 internal validity – whether a conclusion that 
incorporates causality is real 
 external validity – generalisation beyond 
the specific sample 
 Ecological validity – findings applicable in 
natural social settings 
 Credibility – parallels internal validity in 
quantitative strategy, i.e. how believable 
are the findings? 
 Transferability – parallels external validity in 
quantitative strategy, i.e. do findings apply 
to others? 
Table ‎3.1: Evaluation criteria for research strategies 
Source: Lincoln & Guba (1985, cited by Bryman 2008) 
3.2.1. Mixed methods strategy  
A combination of research strategies as described above is referred to as multiple method research 
(Mark & Shotland 1987) multi-strategy research (Bryman 2006) or mixed methods (Greene, Caracelli 
& Graham 1989; Bryman 2008). Mixed methods have been defined either as “adopting a research 
strategy employing more than one type of research method” by Brannen (2005) or “those that 
include at least one quantitative method (designed to collect numbers) and one qualitative method 
(designed to collect words)” by Greene, Caracelli & Graham (1989). There are several reasons for 
combining more than one method according to Greene, Caracelli & Graham (1989): 
 Triangulation – seeks convergence, corroboration, correspondence of results from the different 
methods, which increases the validity of constructs and counteracts inherent method bias. There 
are four types of triangulation according to Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe (1991; cited by 
Mangan, Lalwani & Gardner 2004); 
o Data triangulation – data collected at different times and from different sources 
o Investigator triangulation – different investigators independently collect data 
o Methodological triangulation – both quantitative and qualitative methods are employed 
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o Theory triangulation – theory from one discipline is applied to another.  
 Complementarity – seeks enhancement, elaboration, clarification of results from one method to 
another, in order to increase interpretability, meaningfulness and validity of constructs. 
 Development - the results from one method are used to help develop or inform the other 
method, where development is broadly construed to include sampling and implementation, as 
well as measurement decisions, making use of each method’s strengths.  
 Initiation - the discovery of paradox and contradiction, new perspectives of frameworks, the 
recasting of questions or results from one method with questions or results from the other 
method, in order to increase the breadth and depth of inquiry. 
 Expansion - extends the breadth and range of enquiry by using different methods for different 
inquiry components. 
 
Bryman (2006) gives sixteen justifications for combining quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies in their analysis of 232 articles, which had a rationale of combining them or combined 
them in practice. The use of both quantitative and qualitative research strategies is consistent with 
the aims of this research because each method would help answer a different set of questions, 
provide a level of completeness and explanation to the results obtained from each strategy, thus 
providing context. The mixed method approach will also help to illustrate, confirm and discover, and 
enhancement of the findings generated as explained in table A3 in appendix A. Thus the use of both 
approaches in tandem will add strength to the research which is greater than either qualitative or 
quantitative research alone (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007). Although mixing qualitative and 
quantitative strategies have been shown to help researchers think ‘creatively and outside the box’ 
(Mason 2006) and as shown above can help to further research in many directions, there have been 
philosophical issues that were debated during the paradigm wars of the 1980’s (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie 1998; Bazely 2002; Bryman 2008; Mangan, Lalwani & Gardner 2004). It is important to 
understand the issues surrounding mixed methods because they enable the researcher to evaluate 
in what way the research strategy is useful i.e. understand the basis for the reasons mentioned in 
table A3 in Appendix A. Traditionally there has existed the so called qualitative and quantitative 
divide (Mason 2006; Greene, Caracelli & Graham 1989; Bazeley 2002), which has been discussed 
since, but perhaps not fully resolved. Three positions on this issue have been outlined by Greene 
Caracelli & Graham (1989), the purist stance which rejects the mixing of methods, the second 
position being that qualitative and quantitative methods are logically independent and therefore can 
be mixed and finally the situationalist which argues the purist approach but also argues that 
understanding of an enquiry can be significantly enhanced by exploring convergences in the 
strategies. The combining of quantitative and qualitative method with a view to providing 
67 
 
‘completeness and enhancement’ to the subject of barriers to energy efficiency can be seen to be 
the situationalist stance, as the aim is to provide a comprehensive account of the enquiry. Bryman 
(2006) suggests a set of questions, which are each addressed to explain the methodology in this 
research as shown in table A4 in appendix A. 
3.2.2. Summary 
Using the framework constructed in chapter two, agency theory and market barriers theories are 
used to assess implementation of measures and perception of barriers (using one method), 
observing the extent of the barriers (using another method) and quantifying the extent of barriers 
(using a third method). The use of these methods provides methodological and data triangulation 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 1991). It is hoped that this triangulation of methods and data will 
improve overall research validity and accuracy. The quantitative method is used first (sequential 
mixed method) to deductively test for principal agent problem and market barrier theories in 
shipping. Then a qualitative method is used to inductively assess and propose a theory on barriers 
specific to shipping, but more generally adding to the agency theory. This approach fits well with the 
procedures for mixed methods as defined by Creswell (2009) as shown below in Table ‎3.2 and 
Figure ‎3.2. 
Timing Priority Mixing the data 
Concurrent  Equal Integrating – merging quantitative data with qualitative data 
Qualitative first Qualitative Connecting – data analysis of quantitative with data collection 
of qualitative 
Quantitative first Quantitative Embedding – Collecting quantitative form of data supported 
with qualitative data 
Table ‎3.2: Planning a mixed methods design 
Source: Adapted from Creswell (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.2: Sequential explanatory design        
Source: Adapted from Creswell (2009) 
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3.3. Research Design  
According to de Vaus (2001) “The function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence 
obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible” (de Vaus 2001, p9). 
It provides a framework and structure for determining the way data is to be collected, when is it be 
collected, what data to gather and from whom and how to analyze that data (Bryman 2008). 
Research designs are important in explanatory research (why something is or isn’t happening) 
because they help in avoiding invalid inferences about causation of variables (de Vaus 2001). 
Appendix A provides a brief explanation of the four main types of research in table A5 and table A6 
briefly presents the strengths and weaknesses of each of the research designs. This is followed by 
the below evaluation using criteria from Yin (2003), Creswell (2009) and Bryman (2008) to discuss 
which one is most appropriate for this research.  
According to Yin (2003), each of the above designs has advantages and disadvantages depending on: 
 Type of research questions 
 Control over actual behaviour or events 
 Focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena 
According to Bryman (2008), the choice of research design reflects importance attached to: 
 Expressing causal connection between variables 
 Generalising to larger groups of individuals 
 Understanding behaviour in its context 
 Having a temporal appreciation of social phenomena and their interconnections 
Bryman (2008) further outlines other criteria for selection of the research design, which fall under 
the ‘practical considerations’. Practical considerations in selecting the right research design require 
the researcher to evaluate: 
 Nature of topic and people being studied 
 Existence of previous research  
 Resources such as time and money 
For the purposes of this research each of the four research designs is discussed briefly using the 
aforementioned criteria. Research question one and two require assessment of implementation of 
energy efficiency operational measures and their perception of barriers in the population of interest.  
A longitudinal design would be useful for this research question, particularly in understanding the 
different phases of implementation of operational measures, for example in terms of evolving 
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regulatory environment (mandatory EEDI and SEEMP) or changing attitudes towards speed 
reduction. A longitudinal research design could also track changes in perception of barriers and 
observed barriers and contrast these with the findings on implementation of operational measures. 
An experimental design requires a good level of control and manipulation of the variables (Bryman 
2008) and the lack of these means that this research design is not appropriate in answering this 
research question in the context of business or social research. Similarly a case study design would 
limit the research on implementation to a small population due to concerns over low external 
validity or generalizability (Bryman 2008). 
Research question five aims to investigate the observed barriers to implementation. Here some of 
the research designs can be appropriate. A case study design would provide contextual depth on 
barriers to implementation of operational measures, giving ‘complex and fuller explanation’ (de 
Vaus 2006) of the barriers that may be encountered by the case firms. A cross sectional design on 
the other hand would provide a ‘broad’ view of these (Gerring 2007) by obtaining a snapshot 
(Barrington 2012) of the variables of interest (X and Y) included in the study, revealing how those 
variables are represented in a cross-section of the population, which could either be a subset or the 
whole population. A longitudinal research design could also track changes in perception of barriers 
and actual barriers and contrast these with the findings on implementation of operational measures.  
From the discussion above and Table ‎3.3, it can be seen that longitudinal and cross-sectional 
research designs are appropriate for both sets of research questions. Both of these research designs 
can be helpful in expressing causal connection between variables if correct procedures are followed 
resulting in high internal validity (Bryman 2008) and as a result they can be used to make 
generalisations. To narrow down the research design selection, the last selection criteria on practical 
considerations are therefore important. This research needs to engage with businesses to determine 
their adoption of measures and perception of barriers to implementation. This business type 
research has to minimize respondent burden (Purdon & O'Connor 2008) and therefore be as 
unobtrusive as possible. A cross-sectional design would require data to be collected at a single point 
in time, whereas longitudinal data would require data to be collected over multiple time periods, 
making longitudinal data more obtrusive. Furthermore “because of the time and cost involved, 
longitudinal research design is relatively little-used in social research” (Bryman 2008, p.49). The 
shipping industry is often considered to be a conservative industry (Lloyds List 2013) i.e. changes 
often are as a result of regulation rather than innovation, for example in the case of safety 
regulations, etc. and especially on the subject of GHG emissions and energy efficiency (e.g. only a 
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handful of companies reporting annual GHG emissions), thus making repeated engagement through 
longitudinal designs on this subject difficult.  
Research design RQ1 – 
implementation 
RQ2 – Perception of 
barriers 
RQ5 – Observed 
extent of barriers 
Longitudinal    
Cross-sectional    
Case-study    
Experimental    
Table ‎3.3: Research questions and research design 
Bryman (2008) expands the definition of cross-sectional designs to not only include the number of 
cases (more than one) and time (single point in time) but also adds that it is used to collect a body of 
quantitative or quantifiable data to detect patterns of association among variables. Using this design 
information is collected from at least two groups of people at one point in time and this is then 
compared with the extent to which the two groups differ in the dependent variable (de Vaus 1995). 
Cross-sectional designs can be helpful when there are constraints of time and resources as they are 
generally less expensive compared to other research designs (Collis & Hussey 2003). According to 
Collis & Hussey (2003) cross-sectional designs are a positivistic methodology designed to obtain 
information on variables in different contexts. This means that they can be used in a deductive 
approach and for theory testing. It also places it firmly in the quantitative research strategy, 
however even qualitative research also entails a form of cross-sectional design mainly in the form of 
interviews (Bryman 2008, Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007). Issues of reliability, replicability and 
validity of cross-sectional designs will be discussed in later sections after considering the research 
methods and data collection modes. Based on the evaluation criteria discussion above, the cross-
sectional design was deemed most appropriate for answering the different types of research 
questions in this research.   
3.4. Research methods 
A research method is a technique or instrument for collecting data (Bryman 2008). There are several 
research methods that fit into the cross-sectional design and mixed methods strategy. These 
include: questionnaires, interviews, observation, content analysis and focus groups (Saunders, Lewis 
& Thornhill 2007). Each of these methods can be applied using the quantitative or qualitative 
strategy with the exception of focus groups. A very brief description of each research method and its 
quantitative and qualitative variant is given in appendix A, followed by strengths and weaknesses of 
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each of these methods given in table A7. This is followed by the below evaluation on their 
applicability and appropriateness to this research using Creswell’s (2009) selection criteria. 
The choice of research methods will depend on the purpose of the research, research strategy and 
research design (Creswell 2009). The purpose of the research as outlined in chapter two is to 
understand why seemingly energy efficient operational measures are not being implemented by 
firms and to understand the role of barriers that may be inhibiting their implementation, which have 
been subsequently translated into two types of overarching research questions. The first set of 
research questions attempt to understand level of implementation of operational measures i.e. 
what is going on (descriptive research) and perception of barriers. The second set of research 
question is mainly of an exploratory nature attempting to understand observed barriers i.e. asking 
why something is going on or not going on, thus using both the inductive theory testing approach. 
Hence a mixed methods strategy in a cross-sectional design is deemed appropriate to meet the 
research aims. As described above there are mainly four research methods that can be of 
quantitative nature and equal number of research methods for qualitative research.  
It is thought that a structured interview method would be applicable and appropriate in answering 
mainly the second set of research questions and possibly to some extent also the first question (as 
used by Velthuijsen (1993) in assessing the implementation of measures if enough interviews are 
conducted). However the practicality in terms of the resources (time) was seen as a major setback, 
as well as issues of representativeness and generalisation to make inferences to the larger 
populations for the first research question. Similarly, the quantitative content analysis and 
structured observation methods are thought to be inappropriate to answering the first research 
question but there is a possibility of using these methods to collect data to answer the second 
research question. For example the quantitative content analysis of the news or media could reveal 
the barriers that are being mentioned by the businesses and industry or company policies relating to 
the implementation of measures. Structured observation would be suitable in a case-study design 
where for example organisational procedures and processes regarding the implementation of 
measures could be observed. Both these methods although applicable were deemed not adequate 
enough to add depth to answering the second research question, and secondly they would require 
many more resources including permissions and access to organisations. Since the structured 
interview (which can also be referred to interviewer administered questionnaire) was a very valid 
method to investigate the research questions but with the main disadvantage of resources, it is 
thought that self-completion questionnaires would overcome this problem. This is because self-
completion questionnaires are cheaper and quicker to administer. This research method can 
generate enough data to answer the first set of research questions, although employing this method 
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to answer this would also mean that the disadvantages such as response rates and missing data 
become a problem. It is thought that following the advice of respected authorities on this subject 
e.g. Dillman (2007) and de Vaus (1995) and carefully designing the instrument and implementing it 
carefully would enable to some extent to overcome the pitfalls of this method and thus improve the 
reliability and validity of the method. Furthermore, a carefully devised self-completion questionnaire 
using or learning from existing empirical barriers research (framework and methodological pitfalls as 
discussed in chapter three) should be able to also gauge the perception of barriers.  
Table ‎3.4 below shows that no single research method can answer all of the research questions with 
sufficient detail in a perfectly valid and reliable manner, hence the need to employ mixed methods 
strategy. To answer the second set of research question, which seeks to discover observed barriers 
the inductive research process, theory building approach is taken, employing the qualitative 
research strategy with a cross-sectional design. The semi-structured interview and focus groups 
research methods would be highly appropriate in this regard, for example to be able to gauge 
particular problems with charterparties by speaking to the relevant professionals on this subject or 
to shed light upon the most pertinent barriers perceived. Its major limitation is that it is an obtrusive 
method (Hussey & Hussey 1997), asking industry participants to partake in an interview and 
contributing their time is difficult because it presents a greater opportunity cost to the participant’s 
time. Considering the industry characteristics and the business type research, the repeated data 
input from people using the aforementioned methods would be more difficult. Nevertheless, every 
effort was made to obtain their views on this research in an informal way, enabling the research to 
be ecologically valid (Bryman 2008). Examples of engagement with industry stakeholders were 
through email exchanges with the experts, attending and presenting at seminars and conferences 
(e.g. as a subject matter expert on shipping in Carbon War Room Creating Climate Wealth 
symposium, presenting work at Low Carbon Shipping conferences, speaking in industry conferences 
such as Capital Link Forum and Royal Institute of Naval Architects). Other examples of this regular 
contact with industry were a DNV (classification society equivalent of an auditor in other industries) 
organised seminar on energy efficiency measures, where charterparties were discussed at length, 
attendance at a two day training course on charterparties which provided a network and an 
opportunity to present the findings thus far and email exchanges with a large shipping law firm and 
large operators, etc. This active participation and interaction with the industry meant that informal 
or anecdotal ethnographic observation was always taking place, which provided avenues to mould 
this piece of qualitative research.  
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Based on the limitations of the above methods in answering the qualitative research question, the 
qualitative content analysis (or ethnographic content analysis - ECA) method seems to be relatively 
convenient way of collecting data for the research question, least obtrusive method that would 
allow quick and easy access to data i.e. thinking that is going on this subject, with the advantage of a 
methodology enabling continuous refinement. The qualitative content analysis method can be 
merged to the results of the self-administered questionnaire to provide completeness to the 
research findings. Agency theory, which purports the principal agent barrier, focuses on the contract 
between the parties and is concerned with creating the most ‘efficient’ contracts that overcome the 
problems of agency i.e. goal conflict and informational problems between the principal and agent, as 
well as problems of risk. Agency theory research is based on research methods such as questionnaire 
(Eisenhardt 1985), and other data analysis such as meta-data analysis (Ahimud and Lev 1981) with 
some agency theory research focussing on contract itself or contract design (Crocker & Reynolds 
1993; Aubert, Patry & Rivard 1997; Molinie & Abran 1999; Stremitzer 2005; Masten & Snyder 1991; 
etc.). There are a host of charterparties (contracts) used by shipping companies which can be 
analysed for themes and categories as barriers to operational measures. There may still be a 
problem of access to these charterparties, which can result in a non-representative sample, but this 
is rarely a high priority objective of qualitative research (Patton 1990). Furthermore the 
charterparties may be difficult to interpret but it is anticipated that with sufficient reading of 
authoritative texts on this subject (such as Wilson 2010; Girvin 2007; Spurin 2004; etc.) the 
knowledge gap to adequately interpret the clauses will be overcome. This method will be further 
discussed in section ‎3.5.6 of this chapter and potential solutions to overcome the problems are 
addressed. For a summary of the research path or choices made so far refer to summary section ‎3.6.  
Using Creswell’s (2009) selection criteria for research methods as discussed above and weighing up 
the strengths and weaknesses of each method, it is deemed that the methods employed in this 
research would be a quantitative cross-sectional self-completion questionnaire and qualitative cross-
sectional content analysis. Both these research methods fit the research design and strategy well. In 
fact, of these the ones that fit cross-sectional design particularly well are questionnaires or surveys 
according to Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2007), de Vaus (1995) and Bryman (2006) and are by far 
the most common method employed in cross-sectional design. A cross-sectional design is also 
appropriate for the content analysis method because it involves more than one case, takes place in a 
single point in time and aims to determine patterns of association. For both the aforementioned 
methods, all three types of research strategies are possible i.e. a qualitative or quantitative survey, 
qualitative or quantitative content analysis or any combination of the two. The main reason for 
combining them in a mixed methods approach as outlined in section 4.3.1 was so that the latter 
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method would add depth to the broad findings of the questionnaire (enhancement), it would 
provide completeness in the subject of inquiry, in terms of assessing the principal-agent theory 
which is based on contractual relationships and illustrate the implementation of operational 
measures from a contractual perspective, adding “meat on the bones” (Bryman 2006, p106) in 
explaining associations gathered in the quantitative questionnaire. Furthermore, the combination of 
the methods is also thought to be balancing the advantages and disadvantages of the specific 
methods (i.e. offsetting, Bryman 2006), for example the advantage of content analysis methods over 
survey method is that it is a non-obtrusive method, where subjects of the study are unaware and 
unaffected by the research. The self-completion questionnaire is further discussed in section ‎4.1 and 
content analysis in section ‎4.2. 
Method RQ1 – Measures 
implementation 
RQ2 – Perception of 
barriers 
RQ5 – Observed 
barriers 
Structured interview    
Quantitative content analysis    
Structured observation    
Self- completion questionnaire     
Semi/un structured interview    
Qualitative content analysis    
Ethnographic observation    
Focus groups    
Table ‎3.4: Appropriateness of methods in answering research questions 
3.5. Data collection mode 
As a research method, the self-completion questionnaire can be applied in several different forms or 
modes. The most prominent mode being the mail or postal self-administered questionnaire (Bryman 
2008), which has been used extensively (in all cases where self-completion questionnaire method 
was used) in the empirical studies examining barriers to energy efficiency. According to Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill (2007) there are three types (modes) of self-administered questionnaires; internet 
mediated self-administered questionnaire, postal questionnaire, and deliver and collection 
questionnaire. The choice of questionnaires will be influenced by research questions and objectives 
of the research as well as (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007): 
 Characteristics of respondents 
 Importance of reaching particular respondents 
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 Types of question being asked and number of questions 
 Sample size required taking into account the likely response rates 
 Automation of data entry 
 Resources - Financial implication (cost) and time availability.  
The above criteria, Bryman’s (2008) criteria on practical consideration and a further three criteria 
derived from comparative literature on self-administered questionnaires (quality, time to 
completion and representativeness, e.g. Fricker & Schonlau 2002, etc.) are used to evaluate each of 
the data collection modes. Data collection mode discussion only applies to the quantitative self-
completion questionnaire that has been selected as a research method and does not apply to the 
qualitative content analysis method. The questionnaire would be administered to technical 
superintendents and operational managers of global shipping companies who are generally 
responsible for the implementation of operational measures of the fleet under their control. The 
people in these management roles are generally mobile but can also be located in the global or 
regional head offices of the companies. They can be said to be highly internet-literate and have good 
access to the internet. A highly established news agency (Lloyds List) which can be said to have a 
monopoly in the shipping news market recently claimed that vast majority of its readers now 
consume their content online and via email services rather than waiting for their newspaper. On 
average their website receives over 200,000 visits (71,000 unique visits) every month, 90% coming 
from desktop or laptop devices, with an average duration of over four minutes (Lloyds List 2012). It 
is thought that an email invitation to a web based survey would reach the intended recipient 
regardless of where they are located and would ensure that the required respondent answers. Web 
based surveys in conjunction with emails have a higher degree of control, because most users read 
and respond to their own mail at their personal computer (Witmer, Colman & Katzman 1999). The 
first research question is mainly quantitative and therefore much of the questionnaire could use 
closed ended questions (this is further discussed in instrument design section ‎4.1.5). Keeping the 
above mentioned respondent profile and research aims and questions in mind, the following section 
discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses and response rates of the two main modes of self-
administered questionnaires. 
From Table ‎3.5 it can be seen that web based questionnaires have several advantages over postal 
questionnaires, such as ease of data entry, financial resources, time taken to completion, confidence 
of the right respondent answering and low level of contamination. Each of these is assessed in detail 
and in relation to the respondent profile aforementioned. 
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 Web based Postal 
Population characteristics 
for which suitable 
Computer literate, contactable by 
email or internet 
Literate, contactable by post  
Confidence that right 
person has responded 
High if using email Low 
Size of sample Large, can be geographically 
dispersed 
Large, can be geographically 
dispersed 
Likely response rate Highly variable, 10% or lower 
(Wiltmer et al. 1999) 
Variable, 30% reasonable, 
60% reasonable for TDM  
Length of questionnaire Conflicting advice on typical length 
but fewer screens better 
6 – 8 pages  
Suitable types of question Closed questions, not too complex, 
can be complicated sequencing if 
uses IT 
Closed questions, not too 
complex, simple sequencing 
only 
Time taken to 
completion/collection 
2 – 6 weeks dependent on number 
of follow ups 
4 – 8 weeks dependent on 
number of follow ups 
Financial resource 
implications 
Web page design, although 
automated expert systems  reduce 
this dramatically 
Outward and return postage, 
photocopying, data entry time 
Data input Usually automated Only closed questions can be 
read by optical mark readers. 
Table ‎3.5: Main attributes of internet and postal questionnaires 
Source: Mostly from Saunders Lewis & Thornhill (2007) 
3.5.1. Cost  
By definition a web based survey will almost be cheaper than postal surveys (Fricker and Shonlau 
2002), but the total costs of the survey need to be considered. Expenses incurred in web based 
surveys include e.g. additional electronic mailing package costs, development costs if using tailored 
web page design, monthly fees of online software providers. Typical cost per 10,000 respondents for 
web survey cost much less than postal surveys (Watt 1999 cited by Yun & Trumbo 2000). 
Additionally, web based modes save time on data entry but this can be outweighed as the design 
stage can take longer (Fricker and Shonlau 2002). Cobanoglu, Warde & Moreo (2000) analyse the 
fixed and variable costs of three modes of questionnaire, postal, fax and web based and conclude 
that web based surveys were the least costly even when taking into account the high initial fixed 
costs, postal surveys were the costliest due to the variable costs despite the low initial costs. Their 
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analysis does not take into account the full cost i.e. coding costs, where web based surveys would 
have fared on top due to automation. Forrest & Schleyer (2000) conduct a similar study to evaluate 
the total cost-effectiveness of the different modes and conclude web survey to be the cheapest 
overall based on a certain breakeven point or formula that is suggested. The respondent’s profile 
mentioned earlier was shown to be geographically dispersed and global, thus a postal survey would 
entail significant cost in this case. 
3.5.2. Time to completion  
By definition delivery time of a web based survey is faster than postal, but there is little evidence 
that this leads to a shorter data collection period (Fricker and Shonlau 2002). Yun and Trumbo (2000) 
show that electronic surveys (mainly email surveys) provide a faster reaction time than mail surveys, 
with many responses arriving within two or three days following initial contact before the first 
completed paper surveys are returned. Cobanoglu, Warde & Moreo (2000) show that the fastest 
mode of response to their survey was fax with a mean of four days, web mean of six days, postal 
surveys with a mean of sixteen days.  
3.5.3. Representativeness  
Coverage error has almost received every mention in the discussion of web based and postal modes 
(Dillman 2007; Fielding, Lee & Blank (eds.) 2008). However, this is generally a concern for surveys on 
citizens or non-specialized groups and may not apply to businesses, as all businesses now have 
internet and email access (Vehovar, Lozar & Batagelj 1999 cited by Fricker & Shonlau 2002) and may 
not apply to specific sub sets of the population or those that are being studied (Cobanoglu, Warde & 
Moreo 2000). Fricker and Shonlau (2002) suggest that non response errors occur more in electronic 
formats email than postal. However, Stanton (1998) and Kwak & Radler (2002) report obtaining less 
missing data (item non response) from a web based survey perhaps because they can be designed to 
skip irrelevant questions.  
3.5.4. Quality  
Yun and Trumbo (2000) suggest that quality of responses to open-ended questions is better for 
electronic formats, where respondents have been noted to write lengthier and more self-disclosing 
comments, than on mail survey questionnaires (Bachmann, Elfrink & Vazzana 1996; Loke & Gilbert 
1995; Schaefer & Dillman 1998). For example, Schaefer & Dillman (1998) attained a four-fold 
increase in length of open-ended responses using electronic methods, and Lock and Gilbert's (1995) 
study showed greater self-disclosure in electronic formats, similar to that achieved by Kwak and 
Radler (2002). A possible explanation for this is the speed of typing compared to writing by hand 
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(Bachmann & Elfrink 1996). Stanton (1998) points out that the web based surveys have the 
advantage of being stricter in how they allow respondents to answer, as opposed to postal or paper 
based and e-mail surveys where respondents can write or type whatever they want in the marginal 
space of the paper or in the e-mail reply. In a web based survey this only permitted responses in the 
designated spaces such as in the open-ended question screen. The only serious disadvantage of 
using web based mode then is the level of response rates, which necessitates further evaluation of 
this mode for this research. 
3.5.5. Literature review of response rates for web based and mail questionnaires 
The only serious disadvantage of using web based mode is the level of response rates, which is 
generally a third or less of that achieved by postal (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007; Fricker and 
Shonlau 2002; Yun and Trumbo 2000). There have been several studies (Fricker & Shonlau 2002; Yun 
& Trumbo 2000; Cabanoglu, Warde & Moreo 2000; Greenlaw & Brown-Welty 2009; Hadre, Crowson 
& Xie 2012; Millar & Dillman 2011; Sax, Gilmartin & Bryant 2003; Shih & Fan 2008; etc.) that have 
compared the survey response rates between different modes especially web based and postal 
modes. Fricker & Shonlau (2002) show response rates for six web only surveys varied from 8% to 
44% across different types of respondents. Where respondents were given a choice between the 
modes, the postal survey mode had five to ten times greater selection than that of web based. 
However, there are two instances where response rates of web based exceeded that of mail by a 
factor of four and it is important to note who the respondents were; dentists and researchers 
(Fricker & Shonlau 2002), which suggests that respondent profile is a key factor in response rates. 
Other studies have only focussed on the response rates of web based questionnaires such as Cook, 
Heath & Thompson 2000; Fan & Yan 2010; Archer 2008; etc. Although web based survey response 
rates varied widely as shown earlier, in general around a 10% response rate is deemed acceptable 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007 give an average of 11%). Fielding, Lee & Blank (eds.) (2008) 
suggest that response rates vary considerably from less than 1% for enterprise surveys, resulting in 
large non-response error, to almost 100% for specific membership surveys. The difference in 
response rates could be due to many factors such as survey fatigue (Witte 2009), poor design, very 
lengthy and inappropriate subjects (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007). Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
(2007) give a table of factors and its impact on response rates. According to Archer (2007) there are 
many other questionnaire and process variables that affect the response rates, but the most 
significant are sending email invitations and allowing longer completion window to respondents.  
There are several ways to tackle the low level of response rates in web based surveys. One of the 
best ways to increase response rates is through the questionnaire design and deployment processes 
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(Archer 2008). Other methods include sending personalized email notifications, invitations, and 
follow-up reminders (Dillman 2007). Other factors that increase response rates include; incentives, 
sponsorship and multi-modal approaches (Dillman 2007), discussed in greater detail in section ‎4.1.  
3.5.5.1. Surveys in shipping  
This section briefly reviews surveys of all types and modes conducted in shipping and looks at the 
quality measured through the response rates achieved by the surveys. Response rates for Faber, 
Behrends & Nelissen (2011), Gordon (2008) and Hill (2010) have already been discussed in literature 
review. These coupled with DNV (2012) are most relevant surveys to this research as they are 
focussed on barriers to implementation of energy efficiency measures. DNV (2012) used the self-
administered questionnaires and received twenty four responses to their questionnaire, however 
the response rates are not known for these and it is not known which type of stakeholders 
participated in these.  
Norton Rose (2009, 2010, 2012, 2013) is an annual survey of three transport sectors including 
shipping, on issues such as finance, economy and future scenarios. The latest survey used the online 
questionnaire mode and received 1,100 responses from these sectors, of which nearly half were 
from shipping, actual response rate is not known. The respondents are recruited from subscriptions 
to industry magazines (e.g. Marine money) and the firm’s own contacts. The survey included all 
types of stakeholders including shipowner operators, population of interest for this research. Over 
half of the respondents were from Europe followed by a quarter from Asia Pacific and 15% from 
North America, which represents the shipping clusters.  
NAPA (2012) conducted a survey using the online questionnaire mode to assess the readiness of 
shipowners, operators and charterers for the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) 
legislation. The survey received just over fifty responses and the response rate again is not known, as 
well as the sampling frame and method. The respondents’ demographics are similar to that of 
Norton Rose (2012) but the survey received more Middle Eastern respondents than North American. 
A quarter of the respondents were from large companies (more than sixty ships), half from medium 
sized companies (between fifteen and sixty ships) and remainder from small sized companies (less 
than fifteen ships). The majority (90%) of the respondents were shipowner-operators and 
management companies. In addition to the above, industry press such as Lloyds List and Sustainable 
shipping carry out various polls and short surveys using the web based online questionnaires, which 
have had modest participation from the industry. This brief overview shows that most surveys in 
shipping can be conducted via online questionnaires. Table 3.6 summarises the strengths and 
weaknesses of web based and postal mail questionnaires.  
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 Online Postal 
Strengths   Relatively lower cost for a larger 
volume of data 
 Relatively faster response and 
turnaround times 
 Relatively more attractive formats and 
flexible designs focussing on user 
friendliness 
 Mixed mode administration 
 Not geographically limited 
 Lower item non response 
 Better response to open ended 
questions 
 Automation and accuracy of data entry 
and analysis 
 Easier to monitor responses and 
completion  
 Relatively higher response rates 
requiring relatively smaller sample 
 Easier to incentivise using prepaid 
tokens 
 Postal addresses provide more 
reliable sampling frame and enable 
variety of sampling methods 
 Can be relatively longer in number 
of questions 
 
 
Weaknesses  Lower response rates requiring a 
relatively larger sample 
 Restricted to online populations 
 Difficult to portray confidentiality and 
anonymity  
 Cost of programming or fees for web 
survey software 
 Concerns over some sampling methods 
used to recruit participants resulting in 
sampling and non-response bias 
 Need to be shorter up to fifteen 
questions to avoid dropouts 
 Susceptible to technical problems 
 Relatively difficult to incentivise 
 Limited to geographical coverage 
 Relatively more expensive and 
slower to administer  
 Requires additional time to input 
data or responses 
 Data entry accuracy is lower 
 Difficult to monitor progress of 
respondents 
 
 
Table ‎3.6: Strengths and weaknesses of self-administered questionnaire modes 
Source: Bryman (2008), ESRC NCRM (2013) 
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The evaluation of both the data collection modes using the criteria outlined above supports the use 
of a web based data collection mode for this research. Most important factors for this choice are the 
respondent profile (which has an implication on representativeness and bias), global nature of the 
industry (which has a cost implication) and time to completion. This choice of a web based data 
collection mode will have to address the issue of low response rates. In the next chapter the details 
of the design of the web based mode and other factors relating to the self-completion questionnaire 
(e.g. internet sampling strategies) are addressed in order to overcome the problem of low response 
rates.  
3.5.6. Content analysis forms 
Content analysis is defined as the “analysis of the manifest and latent content of a body of 
communicated material through classification, tabulation and evaluation of its key symbols and 
themes in order to ascertain its meaning and probable effect” (Krippendorf 2004, p. 17). It is an 
“empirically grounded method, exploratory in process and predictive or inferential in intent” 
(Krippendorff 2004, p.17). “Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the context of their use” (Krippendorff 2004, 
p.18). Thus it concerns itself with replication of results and what can be legitimately inferred from 
available texts. Schreier (2012) describes qualitative content analysis as a “method for systematically 
describing the meaning of qualitative material. It is done by classifying material as instances of the 
categories of a coding frame” (Schreier 2012, p.1).  Bryman (2008) sets out the key evaluation 
criteria for qualitative content analysis as discussed in section ‎4.2. In content analysis the source for 
categories and a coding scheme can be the data itself, previous related studies, and theories (Zhang 
& Wildemuth 2006). The key difference between quantitative and qualitative content analysis is the 
way categories are constructed. In quantitative content analysis categories are generated from 
sources other than the data to be analysed where as in qualitative content analysis the categories 
are constructed at least in part inductively (Forman & Damschroder 2007). An example of the use of 
quantitative content analysis in shipping is Karamperidis, Jackson & Mangan (2013). Since there are 
no previous studies that have done a thematic content analysis of charterparties in shipping it is 
advisable to use inductive content analysis. “The use of inductive content analysis is recommended 
when there are no previous studies dealing with the phenomenon or when knowledge is 
fragmented” (Elo & Kyngas 2008). Inductive research moves from specific observations to broader 
generalisations and theories (Spens & Kovacs 2006). Inductive research in qualitative content 
analysis is applied mainly through inductive category development process (Mayring 2000), which 
begins with research questions, broad or abstract categories, revision of categories and analysis. 
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There are several forms of qualitative content analysis, discourse analysis, social constructivist 
analysis, rhetorical analysis, ethnographic content analysis and conversation analysis (Krippendorf 
2004, see table A8). From these the most relevant form of content analysis for this research is 
thought to be qualitative content analysis in the form of ethnographic content analysis (ECA). The 
reasons for this are that it is thought that through the reflexive and re-iterative reading of the 
charterparties emergent categories that would allow for answering research questions would be 
constructed. The emphasis of ECA on gaining familiarity with the content tackles the researcher’s 
lack of content knowledge of charterparties. Furthermore, the use of ethnographic content analysis 
would remove the problems associated with structured protocols such as definitive categories, 
sampling methods etc. In section 4.2, the application of this method in this research is revisited. 
Table A9 in appendix A briefly summarises and contrasts the ECA method that is used in this 
research to quantitative content analysis.  
3.6. Summary 
So far the chapter has explored various theoretical approaches which underpin the research choices, 
research designs, research methods and the data collection mode of the research methods. Key to 
the choices of the aforementioned are the research questions that are developed in the preceding 
chapter. The questions could be answered through the combination of primary and secondary 
research. For primary research questions the mixed methods approach is deemed most appropriate, 
using the cross-sectional research design and employing the self-administered questionnaire and 
content analysis method. The justification and evaluation of each of these are provided in the 
relevant sections above and Figure ‎3.3 and Figure ‎3.4 present a pictorial format of the research 
choices. Figure 3.5 and 3.6 show how these research choices fit with the research framework 
developed earlier. 
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Figure ‎3.3: Research path and choices to answering research questions one and two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.4: Research path to answering research question five 
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Figure 3.5: Self completion questionnaire method used within the barriers framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Content analysis method used within the barriers framework 
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4. Design and implementation of research methods 
This chapter delves further into the details of the design and implementation of the data collection 
methods that have been selected above to answer the research questions. The chapter begins with 
describing the quantitative self-completion questionnaire method, followed by describing the 
qualitative content analysis method, thereafter describing the secondary data gathering analysis 
which is used as a parallel strategy to test the findings of the primary research methods. 
4.1. Self-completion questionnaire: Instrument design and implementation  
This section describes the process used in this research for creating, designing and implementing the 
self-completion questionnaire. This starts with a review of the aims and objectives of the survey, 
followed by discussion of the data collection mode, sampling of the participants, Tailored Design 
Method (TDM) that is used to maximise response rates, pretesting, design of questions and 
indicators and issues of concern. This is an important area for discussion because previous empirical 
studies on barriers to energy efficiency both in general and in the shipping literature have hardly 
been able to generalize beyond the sampling population as most lacked serious methodological 
rigour (e.g. Hasanbeigi, Menke & du Pont 2009; Sardinanou 2008; Kollamthodi et al. 2008)In order to 
address the issue, the Tailored Design Method (TDM) (Dillman 2009) is used. TDM has a set of 
several guidelines that if followed should yield in high response rates. There are various guidelines in 
TDM but two sets of guidelines are most relevant to this research; guidelines on web survey 
implementation and guidelines on web survey design, as outlined in appendix A. Some of these 
guidelines were handled by the web survey software, such as assigning respondent ID, providing a 
survey link, monitoring progress and completion rates. The remainder of the guidelines such as 
emails frequency, timing, and incentives are discussed in the following sections.  
4.1.1. Survey aims and objectives 
It is essential that the survey aims and objectives are kept in mind when implementing and designing 
the web survey. The purpose of the survey is to assess the level of uptake of energy efficiency 
operational measures within the shipping industry and to understand the perception of barriers to 
their implementation. Therefore, the survey should be able to provide an indication of what energy 
efficient measures are implemented in each of the shipping sectors and shed light on why some are 
not undertaken or seem unattractive for investment, thus enabling to answer research questions 
one and two.  
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4.1.2. Data collection mode 
The data collection mode has been discussed in section ‎3.5. It was concluded that a web based 
cross-sectional quantitative self-completion questionnaire would be best suited for answering the 
research questions. There is a very good set of literature (Fielding, Lee & Blank (eds.) 2008; Dillman 
2007; Witte 2009; etc.) that has been used throughout this research for ensuring that correct 
procedures are followed. Furthermore the extensive online training package by Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) for internet research methods was also used (www.restore.ac.uk/orm) in 
conjunction with the WebSM portal (www.websm.org). There are several off-the-shelf ‘point and 
click’ questionnaire design software available on the internet, which are best suited for university 
students (Fielding, Lee & Blank (eds.) 2008). WebSM portal lists more than 350 online software 
available, by type of source (open or closed), pricing structures, etc. (Kaczmirek 2008). After a 
thorough investigation of the available software, the best software that met the needs of this 
research was Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com) as it allowed many very advanced features (such as skip 
logic, display logic, JavaScript, branching, user interface enhancement in the design), as well as 
complex online analysis tools and good export functionality (for further analysis of data in SPSS), to 
be incorporated into the survey at no additional costs, thereby reducing the initial costs of the 
survey, which has been one of the major criticisms of the web based survey mode.  
Since the survey is a web based questionnaire the sample could be recruited by one of the online 
sample recruitment methods (discussed in the following section). According to DIllman (2007), there 
are four ways to mix modes in order to improve response rates: 
1. Use one mode to contact respondents and to encourage response by a different mode. 
2. Use a second mode to collect responses from the same respondents for specific questions 
3. Use alternative modes for different respondents in the same period 
4. Use a different mode to survey the same respondents in a later data collection period. 
The main motivation for the above is to increase response rates, reduce coverage error and non-
response rates. The primary limitation to combining different modes is measurement error or biases 
(Dillman 2007). Within this research only the first two approaches are used in order to reduce 
measurement error and different answers, with the expectation that participants will need to be 
reminded to take part in the web based survey and the second approach in order to remove item 
non-response. Fricker (2008) shows that response rates increased by 8% up to 35%, when more than 
one mode was used for follow up and administration of the survey. The modes used in this research 
were email and telephone, over the three to five contact points with the respondents, which 
followed the TDM guidelines. Note that only the follow up mode was changed from email to 
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telephone rather than administration of the questionnaire from web to telephone. The contact 
points are discussed in detail in section  4.1.3.3. A spreadsheet was used to track the contacts points 
and persons (from pre-notification to thanking respondents who completed the survey), listing 
completions which are then matched to the sampling frame, which is discussed below.  
4.1.3. Sampling  
A good sampling method is required to get a representative view of the cross-section of the 
population studied. “To be representative the sample should be a small scale replica of the 
population in all essential respects” (Orr 1995, p. 293). A sample is selected based upon the 
population, sampling frame and sample size required to make generalisations (de Vaus 1995). A 
population consists of all units to which one desires to generalise the result of the survey (Dillman 
2009). The population for the survey would be all the shipowners, ship operators, ship owner-
operators, charterers, management companies, as well as shipping divisions of cargo owning 
companies, i.e. any entity that is involved in the direct operation of the ship. The population does 
not include other stakeholders such as shippers, ports, etc. involved in the shipping supply chain. 
Each shipping company is considered as the unit of analysis as it would be implementing the 
operational measures, consequently only one person employed by the company is considered to be 
the decision maker or responsible for those measures i.e. operations manager or technical 
superintendent acting as a proxy for that company. This means that in very large companies, where 
it is likely that several operations managers would be employed, the results may not be 
representative of the whole company, although it is thought that these large firms would have 
unified policies on implementation of measures. In these situations every effort is made to contact 
the most senior personnel regarding the operational measures. 
4.1.3.1. Sampling frame 
A sampling frame is the “complete list of all the cases in the population from which a sample is 
drawn” (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007, p.610), although it is very rare to have a sampling frame 
which is truly complete (Bryman 2008; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007). There are many sampling 
frames (or online databases) that represent to a good degree the population of interest, of which 
the major ones are Clarksons Ship Information Network (SIN), IHS Fairplay Sea-web (previously 
known as World Shipping Directory), World Shipping Register and Infomarine. Clarksons SIN has the 
most up to date information and it is believed that this is the most comprehensive list of the target 
population. Access was granted through a user license already available under the LCS project. 
However, upon comparison with other online databases such as World Shipping Register slight 
under-coverage of companies was noted, suggesting a non-coverage error/frame coverage bias, for 
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which every effort was made to merge the frames to cover as accurately as possible the target 
population. Thus a completely new frame had to be constructed for the purposes of this research. 
The Clarksons SIN covered all the entities of the population shipowners, ship owner-operators, 
charterers, management companies and shipping divisions, however it most accurately reflected the 
first three types of respondents. For these categories certain useful information was held in an 
online database, which had to be manually entered onto a spreadsheet on a company by company 
basis, starting with companies with the highest number of ships in the fleet to the lowest. The 
sampling frame initially consisted of the following fields; company name, headquarter address, main 
telephone contact number and fax, company email (missing on average 10% for large and medium, 
25% for small), size by number of ships, size by total DWT and region. 
The above fields formed the basis of the first version of the sampling frame, gathered from Clarksons 
SIN, which is then updated with companies from other databases. Where there were missing cells or 
fields the company’s website was used to find the relevant details, as well as specific departments 
and personnel in the operations department. Companies were only included in the sampling frame if 
they belonged to one or more of the sectors of interest i.e. companies that actively traded in the 
wetbulk, drybulk and container. Actively traded in sector is defined when more than 90% of the 
company’s fleet is engaged in the any one of the sectors. Companies actively engaged in all the 
above sectors were categorised as operating in mixed sectors.  
According to Stopford (2008) in 2007 there were over 5,500 shipping companies, owning nearly 
40,000 ships, with an average of seven ships per company. 33% of the fleet (by number ships) was 
owned by only 112 companies with fifty ships and above (large companies). Another 33% of ships 
were owned by 716 companies operating ten to forty nine ships (medium sized companies) and the 
remainder third owned by 4700 companies owning between one and ten ships (small companies). 
The sampling frame based on the above taxonomy is then stratified according to sector and size. 
Regarding the size of companies there was a significantly large tail of small companies with less than 
five ships in their fleet (see Figure ‎4.1). Focussing only on the large and medium sized companies 
would result in nearly 70% of ships being covered. In business surveys it is quite common to have cut 
off samples because according to Eurostat (2008): 
“Small sub-populations may sometimes be quite impossible to reach although they are 
known,.....Cut-off samples are applied in business surveys where the smallest units do not 
contribute too much to the parameter of interest. However, since one part of the target population 
is deliberately excluded there is a chance to obtain bias in estimation” (Eurostat 2008, p.11). 
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There were more than 7500 companies that were listed on the online database, but a large majority 
of these were single ship companies, which are created to protect the beneficial owner (Stopford 
2008). It was therefore decided that a cut off of less than five ship companies would be appropriate, 
which would also be reflected under probability proportionate to size method, a common sampling 
method for sampling enterprises and organisations or business surveys, where a few large 
organisations dominate (Purdon and O’Connor 2008). This therefore does not reflect some very 
small companies i.e. less than five ships in their fleet, meaning that the results are not applicable to 
this group. As suggested above, the construction of the sampling frame required merging the 
databases, filtering companies and entering the required fields, which was a resource intensive task 
and therefore the cut off was an acceptable trade-off between time and resources expended versus 
creating a more reflective sampling frame containing almost 6000 very small companies. This 
characteristic will directly impact the sample size and required response rate and is further discussed 
in section  4.1.3.4. Most of the empirical studies on barriers to energy efficiency used sampling 
frames, generally membership frames e.g. Gordon (2008), Hasanbeigi, Menke & du Pont (2009) that 
would result in non-coverage errors and bias to a select group. The end result of the refinement of 
the sampling frame for this research resulted in the figures shown in table 4.3 to 4.5. The sampling 
frame was also divided according to four geographic regions in order to time the contact points both 
emails and telephone calls, according to TDM guidelines “carefully and strategically time all contacts 
with the population in mind” (Dillman 2009, p. 298). The majority of the companies are 
headquartered in European Union region and the Far East, altogether representing nearly 90% of the 
census population as shown in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1.  
 
 EU West Asia SC Far East Total 
Wetbulk Large 9 (2%) 6 (1%) 2 (0%) 10 (2%) 27 (5%) 
Wetbulk Medium 88 (15%) 6 (1%) 14 (2%) 33 (6%) 141 (24%) 
Drybulk Large 4 (1%) 3 (1%) 1 (0%) 10 (2%) 18 (3%) 
Drybulk Medium 75 (13%) 11 (2%) 6 (1%) 49 (8%) 141 (24%) 
Container Large 13 (2%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 11 (2%) 24 (4%) 
Container Medium 37 (6%) 4 (1%) 2 (0%) 14 (2%) 57 (10%) 
Mixed Large 23 (4%) 1 (0%) 4 (1%) 21 (4%) 49 (8%) 
Mixed Medium 80 (13%) 1 (0%) 8 (1%) 54 (9%) 143 (24%) 
 329 (55%) 32 (5%) 37 (6%) 202 (34%) 600 (100%) 
Table ‎4.1: Population divided according to major geographic regions for large and medium firms 
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4.1.3.2. Sampling method 
Sampling methods for internet based surveys differ from the traditional sampling methods which 
have been mentioned above. According to Couper (2000) and Fricker (2008) the similarity only lies in 
the probability (probability based or non-probability based). Table ‎4.2 shows the different methods 
in these and highlights the main sampling method used in this research. This research makes use of 
list based sampling, which is a similar method to traditional sampling, where only contact 
information is required and is applicable to large homogenous groups e.g. universities, large 
corporations etc. (Fricker 2008). Just after the survey was fully designed and set up via a link to the 
survey website, an opportunity to place the survey as a rotating banner on 
www.shippingefficiency.org, a website that is used by the population of interest for ascertaining 
energy efficiency of ships. This is equivalent of a non-probability based sampling, the self-selection 
web based sampling method. This method is used by Berson & Berson (2005) who placed their 
survey link in the relevant website and managed to obtain over 10,000 responses. This type of 
sampling is a convenience sample as it is based on respondents self-selection, and therefore may not 
be generalizable to a larger population (Fricker 2008). Thus this method has its major disadvantage 
of not allowing for generalisation. The survey for this shipping survey was hosted by the website for 
a period of two months (November to December 2011) in parallel to the list based sampling method 
and consequently yielded only three partially completed responses from this sampling method, 
which excluded in the analysis that follows in chapter six and seven. As a result the list based 
sampling frame was the best choice and efforts were concentrated on improving the sampling frame 
and contacting the respondents via email and telephone using this sampling method.  
 Traditional Web based 
Probability based  Simple random sampling 
 Stratified random sampling 
 Cluster sampling 
 Systematic sampling 
 List based sampling frame 
 Non list-based random sampling  
 Intercept (pop-up) survey 
 Pre-recruited panel 
Non probability based  Quota sampling 
 Snowball sampling 
 Judgement sampling 
 Unrestricted self-selected 
 Harvested email lists 
 Opt in panels 
Table ‎4.2: Traditional and web based sampling methods 
Source: Fricker (2008) and Bryman (2008) 
Because the concern of this research is to be able to make broader generalisations about the 
implementation and perception of barriers in the shipping industry and its sub sectors, there is a 
91 
 
need to recruit a representative sample and avoid sampling error. Sampling error is defined as error 
stemming from the fact that only subset of the entire population is surveyed. There are standards to 
determine the sample size in relation to accuracy that aim to reduce sampling error. As shown 
earlier in section  3.5 a significant disadvantage of web surveys is the very low level of response rates 
relative to other modes. For this reason and also to remove item non-response “when response to a 
single question is missing” (Groves et al. 2004, p. 187) it was decided that as many responses should 
be collected, thus the complete list based sampling frame (of large and medium sized firms) was 
contacted to take part in the survey. This is not unusual as Dillman (2000) indicates: 
“As population sizes drop lower, a greater and greater proportion of the population needs to be 
surveyed in order to achieve a given level of precision... this question is especially critical for self-
administered surveys, in which the marginal costs of contacting additional people is usually less than 
for interviews” 
Therefore for the large organisations (around 120 companies) and medium sized companies (around 
480 companies) the census approach was taken i.e. all the companies with more than ten ships were 
included in the sample, called a census tracts approach. A similar method is followed by (McMichael 
2011) in obtaining as many responses from the self-administered postal questionnaire. For the 
remaining 1000 small firms a simple random sampling was used as shown in Figure ‎4.1. 
Furthermore, the approach taken in this study makes use of auxiliary information (background 
information on variables) in this case the size variable, as derived from the sampling frame. There 
are several advantages of using this approach in business surveys according to Purdon and O’Connor 
(2008): 
“Using other sampling methods would generate very few cases from the top of the size distribution, 
which will often rule out separate sub-group analysis of the largest businesses. Given the impact the 
largest businesses have on the economy, not being able to test whether their behaviour is different 
to that of other companies can undermine the value of a survey” (Purdon and O’Connor, 2008, p. 14) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4.1: Sampling method, frame population by size in this research 
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The stratification is based on the number of ships within a company’s fleet, however equally the 
total DWT (deadweight) could also be used as determinant of company size. The method used here 
could be said to be biased against larger ship sizes and favouring small ships, for example a company 
with five Very large Crude Carriers (VLCC), with total cargo carrying capacity (deadweight tonnes, 
DWT) of 1 million, would be classed as a small company, whereas a company with twenty small 
tankers, with a total DWT capacity of 200,000 DWT, would be classified as a medium sized company. 
This quandary is generally also faced by other business surveys where different measures for size 
can be used such as number of employees, turnover, etc. Categorising by number of ships also 
meant that the stratification was subject to change during the six month survey period because a 
company acquired or sold ships, thus its position in the sampling frame could possibly change.  
4.1.3.3. Contact points 
The first contact point was a pre-notification email to each company’s general email (All large and 
medium companies i.e. 600 companies) and sample of small companies (400 companies out of 1000 
companies). The second contact point was a phone call to each of the large and medium size 
companies and a random sample of the small companies. Every effort was made to reach to the 
operations/technical department (for example by researching online the company’s departments 
and personnel). There were very few refusals at this stage, however the main problem encountered 
here was firstly getting through the company’s general telephone switchboard or reception and 
secondly getting to speak with the operations manager or technical superintendent. In some 
instances a departmental email would be provided with the name of the relevant person only. After 
the second contact, a total of 313 individual names, telephone numbers and email addresses were 
compiled for the large and medium sized firms, to which personalised emails were sent from the 
university email. This can be said to be the first email contact for many respondents. A follow up 
reminder email was then sent to this new personalized mailing list after two weeks to those who had 
not yet completed the survey. After one to two weeks from the reminder email, another telephone 
call was made to speak to those who had still not completed the survey. This was followed by a final 
reminder email to complete the survey, which was attached with draft report of the results that had 
been obtained so far, in order to create reciprocative response i.e. using norm of reciprocity 
(Gouldner 1960). 
4.1.3.4. Response rates required and achieved 
As a result of this mixed mode approach, exactly 150 surveys were completed or mostly completed 
by the large and medium firms resulting in a response rate of 48% (note this is based on the 
sampling frame tracking and does not match to all the results obtained directly from the 
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respondents, which further increases the response rate). In order to reduce item non response, 
when there were some questions with missing responses, especially the chartering ratios, a 
telephone call or an email was sent to those who had left their contact details. In order to be 
representative and to make generalisations i.e. reach statistically overall significant results with a 
confidence level of 90% or 95% and margin of error interval of +/-15% or +/-20% each stratum 
required a certain number of responses as shown in Table ‎4.3. Values are also included for large and 
medium sized companies where the whole sampling frame was used. Each stratum is considered as 
a sub-population. The confidence level portrays the degree of certainty that the population mean 
will fall within the margin of error or standard error (de Vaus 1995). Margin of error is the range 
within which the true mean can lie (de Vaus 1995). Table ‎4.4 and Table ‎4.5 show the number of 
responses required if the population is not stratified by size and sector. From Table ‎4.4 it can be seen 
that the actual results achieved in each stratum only allow for generalizations to be made for 
wetbulk and drybulk medium firms with confidence level of 90% and margin of error of 20%. Despite 
this, it is thought that the responses achieved in other stratums would also be beneficial because of 
scarcity of information on this subject area. Moreover, if the stratification is ignored i.e. if the 
industry is treated as homogeneous then the results allow for even greater accuracy with 95% 
confidence level and 12.5% margin of error.  
Sector Size Population +/- 15% 
error 
(90% CL) 
+/- 20% 
error 
(90% CL) 
+/- 15% 
error 
(95% CL) 
+/- 20% 
error 
(95% CL) 
Actual 
results 
achieved  
Wetbulk Large  27 15 11 17 13 9 
 Medium 141 25 16 33 21 17 
Drybulk Large  18 12 9 13 11 3 
 Medium 141 25 16 33 21 17 
Container Large 24 14 11 16 13 1 
 Medium 57 20 14 25 18 4 
Mixed Large  49 19 13 24 17  
 Medium 143 25 16 34 21  
All  Small ≈ 1000 30 17 41 24 20 
Table ‎4.3: Required sample sizes and actual responses achieved*  
* The actual results may be higher than what is shown for each stratum because not all respondents 
completed demographic questions. 
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Sector Population +/- 15% 
error 
(90% CL) 
+/- 20% 
error 
(90% CL) 
+/- 15% 
error 
(95% CL) 
+/- 20% 
error 
(95% CL) 
Actual 
results 
achieved  
Wetbulk 168 26 16 35 22 26 
Drybulk 159 26 16 34 21 20 
Container 81 23 15 29 19 5 
Table ‎4.4: Required sample sizes and actual responses achieved when stratified by sector only* 
 
Sector Size Population +/- 15% 
error 
(90% CL) 
+/- 20% 
error 
(90% CL) 
+/- 15% 
error 
(95% CL) 
+/- 20% 
error 
(95% CL) 
Actual 
results 
achieved 
Wetbulk, 
Drybulk & 
Container 
Large & 
medium 
408 29 17 39 23 51 
Table ‎4.5: Required sample sizes and actual responses achieved when no stratification* 
* The actual results may be higher than what is shown for each stratum because not all respondents 
completed demographic questions. 
The above values are calculated taking into account how much sampling error can be tolerated 
within a given confidence interval, the level of confidence required, how varied the population is 
with respect to the characteristics of interest and size of the population (each stratum in this case 
which is a finite population), following the formula given below: 
SI =  
          
  
 
Where: 
Z = Z value (e.g. 1.96 for 95% confidence level)  
P = Degree of variation in respondents, generally 0.5 if not known 
C = Confidence interval or margin of error 
Correction for Finite Population: 
SF = 
  
  
    
 
 
Where: 
SI = Calculated sample size assuming infinite population 
P = Population size 
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In conclusion, it can be said that the final sampling frame was a good representation of the actual 
population and therefore was used to stratify the population by size and sector. For large and 
medium wetbulk, drybulk and container strata, the sub populations were small and therefore the 
census tracts approach was employed. For small firms, which could not be stratified by sectors, the 
simple random sampling method was used. Where the census approach was applied, the TDM 
guidelines for implementation were followed (e.g. using mixed mode contact methods, 
personalisation, carefully drafted emails etc.). This generated a sampling frame with 313 respondent 
names and emails of operations managers and technical superintendents yielding 150 responses, a 
response rate of 48%. In addition the random sampling of the remainder 1000 small companies 
resulted in additional twenty responses, thus in total 170 responses were received from all sectors 
and sizes.  
4.1.4. Incentives 
Incentives are a common and effective means for increasing response rates in traditional surveys 
(Fricker 2008). Pre-paid monetary incentives have been found to have a high impact on the response 
rates (e.g. Church 1993; Petrolia & Bhattacharjee 2009; Brennan 1992; etc). However, most findings 
are based on postal questionnaires and “it is questionable whether findings from offline studies can 
be generalised to the online realm” (Goritz 2006, p. 59). This could be due to the different 
environments and types of monetary gifts that can be given. A brief review of literature on 
incentives in survey is provided in appendix A.  
As it was decided to also use a list based sampling method to recruit respondents many of the 
drawbacks of incentives can be limited (e.g. item non response in intercept sampling methods). 
Furthermore it is thought that the population of interest would be interested in responding to this 
survey as it is relevant (issue salience), which has also been shown to be a key determinant for 
response rates by Dillman (2009), Cobanoglu & Cobanoglu (2003) and Ray, Griggs & Tabor (2001). 
According to meta-analysis by Ray, Griggs & Tabor (2001) in 57% of web based surveys, respondents 
were promised summary survey results as an incentive to participate. Since the survey is topical and 
relevant it is believed that the respondents would benefit from knowing the outcome of the survey, 
hence it was decided to use the survey results as an incentive and token of appreciation for the 
participants. It should be remembered that incentives may only partially affect response rates in 
web surveys (Dillman 2000). In order to improve response rates and to alleviate the dangers of data 
validity inherent in the use of monetary incentives various different techniques are used in this 
research, as outlined below: 
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 Use of Tailored Design Method – personalisation, pre-notification, deadlines, reminders, mixed 
mode follow ups.  
 Sampling method – use of dynamic sampling frame  
 Use of incentives – non monetary, survey results report 
 Design of questionnaire – visual appearance, content, type of questions and length of survey 
(determined through pilot research and pre-testing and well evaluated web survey software) 
(discussed in next section) 
The following section looks at the design of the questionnaire and mainly focuses on the content, 
type of questions and pre-testing of the survey as well as operationalizing and creating indicators for 
measurement.  
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Figure ‎4.2: Global maritime clusters
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4.1.5. Questionnaire design 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the design of the questionnaire is a key element in increasing 
response rates. A good level of research has been done on the specifics of designing web surveys 
(e.g. screen layout, font size, page length, etc) to increase response rates (e.g. Dillman 2000, 2007 
and 2009; Healey, Macpherson & Kuijten 2005, Schleyer & Forrest 2000; etc). The web survey that is 
developed in this research largely follows the guidelines from Dillman (2009) Tailored Design 
Methods (TDM) and Best & Krueger (2008). TDM consists of sixteen specific guidelines for designing 
web questionnaire, centred around on visual stimulus, as outlined in appendix A. The TDM approach 
guidelines were also used in the sampling method and implementation stage. Most of these 
guidelines are supported by empirical evidence (e.g. Smyth et al. 2009; Couper, Traugott & Lamias 
2001; etc.), therefore are adhered to within this research. The following section provides discussion 
on how these were incorporated in the questionnaire design. 
4.1.5.1. General questionnaire design 
The questionnaire consisted of twenty questions, which appeared one page at a time as shown in 
Figure ‎4.3 (refer to appendix A for the full survey). The question format varied according to the 
need, but consistency in similar type of questions was maintained. Throughout the survey various 
tools have been used to make the survey as easy and quick as possible. This is done through the 
vendors advanced features such as skip logic (skips the questions not relevant to the respondent 
based on their previous selection), display logic (displays the respondent’s previous choices in the 
following questions). The first page is carefully designed so as not to discourage roll off or drop out 
by being welcoming to the respondent, describing the research and making it belong to an individual 
or student so that there is some degree of sympathy and a need to contribute to the greater good of 
society. The project is described in a couple of sentences and is followed by very brief instructions on 
completing the survey and the incentive is mentioned. Confidentiality is stressed by mentioning and 
providing the UK Data Protection reference number. This is followed by contact details and 
appreciation in advance.  
Each page has the survey title included at the top of the page and the bottom of the page displays 
the logo of the project and university, this consistency enables the respondent to stay focussed in 
the survey (Dillman 2009). A very soft tone of background colour was selected, so that the 
completion status, next/back buttons and questions can be contrasted. Use of point of completion 
(POC) indicators gives a sense of completion to the respondent (Dillman et al. 1998), although Best 
and Krueger (2008) suggest that it may increase download times and decrease completion rates, just 
as Crawford, Couper & Lamias (2001) discourage its use in open-ended web surveys. Since each 
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question is placed on a different page, it was decided that the POC would be important as it would 
enable the respondent to gain a sense of completion and remaining survey length. Questions were 
placed on different screens because Dillman (2009) suggests that a scroll down web questionnaire 
can have higher item non response. This also enabled use of skips logic and display logic to take the 
respondent to different pages according to the answers on previous questions. Displaying questions 
one page at a time also allows for keeping incomplete responses that may not yet be completed 
(Best and Krueger 2008).  
Figure ‎4.3: Screenshot of the first page of the survey 
The survey was tested for visual display across the most common browsers which include Mozilla 
Firefox, Internet Explorer, Google Chrome and Safari. Different font sizes and settings were 
experimented and in conclusion it was decided to keep the Arial font as it is one of the most widely 
used font on the internet (Best and Krueger 2008) and allows for backward compatibility on 
different operating systems. Questions were in bold and answer choices in normal format, important 
key words and instructions within each of the question were displayed in full capital letters. Error 
messages were made specific to the errors in questions. The survey consisted of a maximum of 
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twenty one questions (fourteen related to the subject and seven respondent profiling questions), 
depending on the respondents choices, and a minimum of two compulsory questions. Each question 
was displayed in a separate page of the browser following the guideline ‘avoiding placing questions 
side by side’, similar to Scyleyer and Forrest (2000). Only question one and two of the survey were 
made compulsory as it would be these that would determine the follow up questions on 
implementation and perception of barriers to implementation of energy efficiency measures, in line 
with TDM guidelines “Do not require responses to questions unless absolutely necessary”. The 
survey length was given significant consideration as it is a key element in determining retention and 
response rates. As a result many other peripheral and non-critical questions had to be deleted in 
order to make the completion time around ten minutes as promised to the respondent in the 
beginning of the survey. This corresponds to the ideal time a respondent would spend on a web 
survey (Sleep & Puleston 2008). 
The quick completion time and minimum respondent burden were accomplished through the use of 
multiple check boxes, radio buttons in a list format and semi-closed ended questions. Drop down 
menus and other sophisticated formats available from the vendor were not used because of the 
respondents’ lack of experience with those. The use of ‘all of the above’ was avoided in line with 
TDM guidelines. The web survey could be paused by the respondent and would remain open for two 
weeks allowing them to complete at a later time and date, in line with TDM guideline. Similarly, if 
the survey is closed half way and consequently the link is opened again as a result of a follow up, the 
respondent would start the survey from where they left. This has its benefits and drawbacks with 
the obvious benefit being that it would reduce completion time and encourage the respondent to 
complete the survey and the drawback being that the respondent may have forgotten the objectives 
of the survey and their answers to previous questions.  
4.1.5.2. Pretesting and piloting  
Dillman (2009) provides four guidelines on pretesting questionnaires, these are: 
1. Obtain feedback on the draft questionnaire from a number of people, each of whom has a 
specialized knowledge of some aspect of questionnaire quality. 
2. Conduct cognitive interviews of the complete questionnaire in order to identify wording, 
question order, visual design and navigation problems 
3. When stakes are high, consider doing experimental evaluations of questionnaire components 
4. Conduct a small pilot study with a subsample of the population in order to evaluate the 
questionnaire and implementation procedures.  
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The questionnaire was sent to nine colleagues at the institute who responded to the questionnaire 
and gave constructive feedback through the questions that were appended to the end of survey 
(refer to appendix A for details on pretesting). The pretesting stage benefited from expert advice 
from three researchers who have extensive experience of questionnaires and social research 
methods, with nearly twenty hours contact with one researcher whose PhD thesis used the self-
completion questionnaire in a similar context (implementation of energy efficiency measures in 
households). This was particularly useful for two reasons, testing the format of questions, e.g. 
moving from scalar to tick box questions and secondly providing clear instructions for each question 
e.g. capitalizing fonts, using bold fonts etc.  
The pretesting showed that the mean length of the survey was twenty three minutes, which was 
deemed to be high compared to that advocated in literature, thus further revisions to question 
formats and order were made. The initial request email sent out to the pilot panel was personalised 
to each respondent and the response rate was just over 90% with (ten out of eleven colleagues 
answering the questionnaire). Following the fourth guideline, the amended survey was piloted with 
a small subsample of the respondents within the shipping industry. The survey request was sent out 
to six industry respondents and resulted in 100% response rate. The mean completion time was 
fourteen minutes which was deemed acceptable. The mean completion time for the final survey was 
just over sixteen minutes, with almost 25% of the surveys being completed before ten minutes and 
under half of the respondents completing between ten minutes and half an hour.  Some surveys 
took much longer to complete and it is believed that the respondent may have left survey window 
open, whilst doing other things.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4.4: Final survey completion times 
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4.1.5.3. Operationalization and indicators of hypothesis 
Bryman (2008), de Vaus (1995) and Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2007) give clear instructions and 
practical examples on wording questions in a self-completion questionnaire, which have been 
adhered to in this research. In order to obtain high internal validity and reduce measurement error, 
the questionnaire should be able to reflect what is being measured, which is rooted in the research 
question and hypothesis, as shown in Table ‎2.7. 
According to de Vaus (1995) there are four aspects the questionnaire could be used to measure: 
 Measures of the dependent variable – what the research is trying to explain, in this case 
implementation of measures and perception of barriers to energy efficiency. 
 Measures of the independent variable – causal variables, in this case chartering ratio.  
 Measures of test variables – clarifying the link between independent and dependent variable 
similar to the background measures as below; 
 Background measures – characteristics such as age, sex, religion, in this case sector, company 
type etc.  
The variables of interest in this research are briefly discussed below.  
4.1.5.3.1. Measures of the dependent variable 
There are two measures of the dependent variables; implementation of measures and perception of 
barriers. The first survey question asks respondents to select the measures they believe have the 
highest fuel saving potential. This is similar to the approach taken by Velthuijsen (1993) where 
respondents are asked to provide what they believe to be the fuel saving potential of the measures, 
in percentages, this format is also known as the continuous interval variable measurement which is 
defined as “one in which the categories have a natural ranking and it is possible to quantify precisely 
the difference between categories” de Vaus (1995, p.130). According to Dillman (2009) this should 
be avoided especially in the beginning of the survey as it results in high respondent burden. 
Therefore, the first question of this survey asked respondents to select choices with highest 
potential. This format is also known as the categorical nominal variable which is defined as “one 
where we can distinguish between categories of a variable but cannot rank the categories in any 
order” de Vaus (1995). This is then followed by the second question in the survey asking 
respondents whether they have implemented those measures, using the nominal variable to 
measure implementation. Previous surveys on barriers to energy efficiency also start with a similar 
approach (e.g. Sorrell et al. 2000). Some studies limit the number of measures that a respondent 
selects (e.g. Velthuijsen 1993; Harris 2000) and the reason for doing so is to gain in-depth analysis of 
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the perception of barriers, and similar style is used in this research. In the second question the 
measures that appear on the left hand side (as rows) of the grid have been ‘followed through’ to this 
question, using the display logic feature of the web survey vendor. The question in the survey is 
constructed as a categorical variable rather than an ordinal variable, which is defined as one where 
there it is meaningful to rank the categories, however it isn’t possible to quantify precisely how 
much difference there is between categories (de Vaus 1995.) The ordinal variable format has been 
used in previous studies on barriers, for example Sorrell et al. (2000) and Schleich and Gruber (2008). 
This survey made use of the categorical nominal instead of the usual ordinal level measurement for 
measuring implementation because it reduces respondent burden, secondly, according to TDM 
guidelines, the first questions need to be easily comprehended to have retention of the respondent 
and finally use of ordinal scales is disputable as the distance from one position to another may or 
may not be the same (Field 2009). Using categorical nominal variables to measure implementation 
of measures will result in frequencies rather than a mean score (de Vaus 1995) and inferences to the 
larger population can be made from both of these level of measurements. The first two survey 
questions directly address the first hypothesis and will help to answer the first research question.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4.5: Question two, implementation of measures 
The second measure of the dependent variable is through perception of respondents to barriers to 
energy efficiency. Once respondents have completed the implementation of measures question, 
they are asked what made them believe that a measure did not have high fuel saving potential in the 
first question, as shown in Figure ‎4.6. This survey question is a matrix or grid style question which 
was designed to get many answers per question despite the risk of overburdening the respondents 
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and potentially resulting in dropouts according to Sleep and Puleston (2008). The measures appear 
on the top as columns and barriers as rows (opposite of that in second question) and this is 
contradictory to the guidelines of TDM, which emphasises consistency among all the survey 
questions. However it was decided to follow this style because the questions would not fit the entire 
screen, meaning the respondent would be required to scroll across and vertically, contravening 
another TDM guideline. This survey question addresses the second hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4.6: Reasons for measures believed not having a high fuel saving potential 
Following the matrix style question on barriers to energy efficiency measures that have been 
deemed not having a high fuel saving potential, the respondent is asked questions based on the 
implementation level of the measures that had been listed in question one and two. Use of display 
logic in the software allows the questions to be specifically written according to the respondent’s 
selection. For example, if the respondent selected weather routing measure in question one and 
selected ‘considering or trialling’ this measure in question two (implementation), the question 
perception of barriers question would automatically include these in the wording of the question 
and display the appropriate answer categories (tick box options) pertaining specifically to that 
measures barriers. Similarly, if the respondent selects weather routing as a measure with highest 
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fuel saving and selects already implemented in question two (implementation) the perception of 
barriers question would be worded with appropriate answer categories (tick box options) pertaining 
to drivers leading to implementation. This set of survey questions address the second research 
question. 
Figure ‎4.7: Follow on question from question two 
4.1.5.3.2. Measures of the independent variable 
An indicator for the principal agent problem in the context of barriers to energy efficiency and 
implementation of measures in shipping could be the chartering level of the shipping company. In 
order to estimate a company’s fleet that may be affected by this, one can ask what proportion of 
ships are owned or chartered in various forms to meet the demand that the company faces. This can 
be a mixture of ships fully owned by the company, bareboat chartered in, time chartered in or 
occasionally voyage chartered in. This is then compared to how the company utilises this mix to 
satisfy the demand through chartering out in the form of voyage charters (including contract of 
affreightments) and time charters mainly. This chartering level or ratio was measured in two 
questions split between chartering-in and chartering-out, as an interval variable, where the 
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respondent would estimate the percentages. This survey question addresses the first and second 
research questions. 
For the principal agent problem, it is important to categorise the population into maximum of four 
different groups. For example, Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) categorises households into three; 
owner-occupied, rented with utility included, rented without utility included. In order to assess the 
level and group according to the principal agent problem, the chartering level of the firm was used. 
According to de Vaus (1995) when there is no agreed way of measuring a concept (which is the case 
presented above) then it may be helpful in developing indicators for a range of definitions of the 
concept and it may require a number of questions to capture the scope of the concept. The principal 
agent problem was also captured through perception of respondents when asking about barriers to 
implementation of specific measures i.e. a categorical level variable for each of the measures. The 
specific assumptions of case two and four of the principal agent problem are related to two shipping 
charters; the voyage and time charter, as mentioned in chapter one. It is likely that shipping 
companies will employ their fleet on a mix of these. It was decided that 50% and above of any 
charter would represent that the fleet is mostly employed in that type of charter. Chapter five 
further discusses the principal agent problem in shipping and chapter six considers the grouping in 
detail. 
4.1.5.3.3. Background measures 
The main background variables which are also the test variables (i.e. that need to be controlled for in 
bivariate elaboration analysis) are sector, size and company type. The sector variable allows to see if 
there are differences in between sectors (through measures like the Chi squared test), measured as 
nominal variable and resulting in frequencies. Company type variable allows for checking if there are 
differences between the different types of shipping companies, measured as nominal variable. 
Company size measured as nominal variable in three different estimators of size; by number of 
ships, by annual fuel use, by number of employees. Chapter six discusses each of these and the 
choice made in greater detail.  
In summary the questionnaire design closely followed most of the guidelines set out by Dillman 
(2009). After feedback from pretesting and piloting in particular, the question formats were changed 
from scalar choices to list based choices in order to reduce respondent burden, improve item 
response and avoid dropouts. Thus, most questions made use of tick boxes which meant that data 
would be measured at the lowest measurement level, i.e. at the categorical nominal level. 
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Figure ‎4.8: Flow chart of survey questions, software tools and question formats used 
Opening & introduction page 
Q1: selection of five measures 
with highest potential 
Q2: implementation of 
measures with highest potential 
Q3: barriers to measures not 
selected 
Q4 – 8: Barriers and drivers to 
implementation of selected 
Q9 – 10: important factors 
during ship selection 
Q11 – 12: Energy Efficiency 
Design Index as an info tool 
Q13 – 14: Barriers to speed 
reduction 
Q15 – 18: Respondent profiling 
questions 
Q19 - 20: Company chartering 
ratio 
Respondent and company 
details 
Thank you and survey 
completion confirmation page 
Display logic 
Display logic 
Skip logic & 
display logic 
Skip logic & 
display logic 
Skip logic & 
display logic 
Survey tools Survey questions Question format 
Multiple check box 
Matrix/Grid 
Matrix/Grid 
Multiple check box 
Multiple check box 
Multiple check box 
Multiple check box 
Numerical input 
Text input 
Matrix/Grid 
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4.1.6. Issues of concern 
One of the important causes for concern in quantitative methods such as the self-administered 
questionnaire is the issue of reliability, replicability and validity (Bryman 2008). Reliability is 
concerned with issues of consistency of measures, whereas validity refers to whether an indicator 
that is used to gauge a concept really measures that concept. The aforementioned issues coupled 
with the sampling and non-sampling error are referred to as Total Sampling Error (Groves, 2004). 
Errors can be categorised as sampling errors and non-sampling errors as shown below in Table ‎4.6.  
Sampling error Sampling error Surveying only some, not all of the population 
Non-Sampling 
error 
Coverage error Not an equal or known chance of selection in a sample 
Measurement error Bad instrument design, poor question wording  
Non-response error Respondents being different from non-respondents 
Table ‎4.6: Different sources of error 
Source: Fielding (2008), Bryman (2008) and Dillman (2009) 
The most important criterion in evaluation of quantitative research is validity (Bryman 2008). The 
survey question that is most susceptible to the issue of validity is the chartering ratio question at the 
end of the survey. The chartering ratio is used as an indicator or a measure of the principal agent 
problem or concept. There is no previous research in shipping that suggests that this is the correct or 
stable indicator of the concept, however research from other transport sectors and building sectors 
have used similar indicators to measure principal agent problem. Secondly, during the piloting stage 
to test the validity of the measure the survey was sent to two different individuals of the same firm 
(large container line), to test the consistency of answers to this question. The answers to the 
chartering ratio question differed marginally. The results were then compared with the respondent’s 
actual answers and showed that there was no difference, suggesting the stability of the indicator.  
Another issue of concern is the internal validity of cross-sectional designs, employed in this research. 
Internal validity is concerned with the question of whether a conclusion that incorporates a causal 
relationship between two or more variables is true (Bryman 2008). This issue is dealt with bivariate 
elaboration analysis that is used to control for other intervening variables in the relationships of 
interest within the research e.g. to see the relationship of chartering group with implementation of a 
measure, when the sector variable is controlled. However because of the small number of responses 
it is not possible to control for more than one variable in the relationship. On the subject of external 
validity, which is concerned with the issue of whether results of a study can be generalized beyond 
the sample (Bryman 2008), this research can be to some extent be said to representative because of 
the census approach applied to the strata that had small populations and achieving a good response 
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rate for these. This research is also one of the first to have investigated this subject in a systematic 
and scientific way in the industry, therefore it provides baselines for a number of areas such as 
actual implementation of measures.  
Cross sectional designs are distinct from other designs in that they aim to collect data at a single 
point in time from a single subject. In the actual implementation of surveys (questionnaires and 
interviews) the time lag between initial contact and final response can often get quite drawn out 
between respondents (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007) for example Sardinaou (2008) conducted a 
cross-sectional survey of industrial companies and barriers to energy efficiency in Greece over a 
period of one year. In this research the survey data collection period spanned over six months. The 
long data collection period of this research may affect the comparability of results of those who 
answered initially to those who responded in the last contact points. This is because the industry is 
facing increasing pressure through regulations such as the EEDI and SEEMP as well as economic 
pressure through rising fuel prices, which may affect the level of uptake of operational measures and 
the perception of barriers to operational measures.  
With regards to coverage there was some bias towards companies headquartered in the European 
Union region mainly as a result of the language barrier with Far East and Asian headquartered 
companies. To some extent this reflects the population of the industry, where EU headquartered 
companies represent 55% of the population and the respondent profiles achieved by other surveys 
conducted in shipping.  
4.1.7. Ethics 
Ethical issues arise in various stages in social research (Bryman 2008) and are closely interrelated 
with the type of research methods (Eynon, Fry & Schroeder 2008). All primary social research will 
involve contact with people and therefore ethical considerations become a topic of concern. Diener 
& Crandall (1978) break down these considerations into four main areas for traditional social 
research methods:  
 Lack of informed consent 
 Harm to participants 
 Invasion of privacy 
 Deception 
The above are covered by the principles in the UK Data Protection Act (1998). Each of the above is 
addressed during the design and implementation of the survey and is evidenced through registration 
with UCL Data Protection Officer and obtaining a Data Protection number. The first point of 
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informed consent was the telephone conversation with the respondent and also clearly highlighted 
in the first (welcome page) of the survey. Internet related social research, which differs from 
traditional settings, adds novel ethical dilemmas for internet researchers (Eynon, Fry & Schroeder 
2008), however the extent to which new rules are required is debatable (Walther 2002; Ess and 
AOIR 2002) with little common agreement (Cavanagh 1999). To date there are no specific ethical 
guidelines for internet based research; hence the above ethics are used as a starting point, and as 
shall be seen below attempt to create separate guidelines has resulted in fairly similar issues of 
concern. The ethical concerns posed by Ess and AOIR (2002) for internet based research are in the 
form of questions as follows: 
1. What is the venue for the research? What are the privacy expectations established by the 
venue? 
2. Who are the subjects or participants? 
3. How will informed consent be obtained? 
4. How far do legal requirements or ethical guidelines of the country implicated in the research 
apply? 
5. How to monitor participants? 
6. How will anonymity, reputation and trust be maintained? 
7. How will deception be avoided? 
8. Does the benefit of the research outweigh the potential harm to the participants? 
4.2. Content analysis of charterparties 
Qualitative content analysis is used with the objective of providing complementary and 
corroborative analysis to the quantitative results from the survey method. The use of inductive 
content analysis is recommended when there are no previous studies dealing with the phenomenon 
or when knowledge is fragmented (Elo & Kyngas 2008).  
4.2.1. Aims and objectives 
The aim of this method is to provide completeness and comprehensiveness to the findings 
generated by the quantitative survey method. A qualitative analysis of charterparties will also give a 
detailed context of the barriers that may be hindering the uptake of operational measures. This 
method will also enable in directly answering the fifth research question and confirming or rejecting 
the hypothesis that there may be barriers inherent in the charterparty that affect the 
implementation of operational measures.  
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4.2.2. Content analysis design 
Zhang and Wildemuth (2006), Krippendorf (2004) and (GAO 1989, 1996) show practical steps in 
conducting qualitative content analysis with the use of several examples. The process they advocate 
is more inclined towards making the method more quantitative, however the examples and 
references to qualitative analysis are very helpful. Various forms of content analysis were discussed 
in section ‎3.5.6. There are also several different  (and sometimes overlapping) ways for conducting 
content analysis which were reviewed for suitability ranging from ethnographic content analysis 
(Altheide 1987), inductive and deductive content analysis (Mayring 2000), problem driven analysis 
(Krippendorff 2004) and directed content analysis (Hseih & Shannon 2005). The following steps as 
suggested by Altheide (2004; cited by Bryman 2008) are used in this research: 
1. Generate research questions 
2. Become familiar with the context within which the documents were/are generated 
3. Become familiar with a small number of documents (six to ten) 
4. Generate some categories that will guide the collection of data and draft a schedule for 
collecting the data in terms of the generated categories 
5. Test the schedule by using it for collecting data from a number of documents 
6. Revise the schedule and select further cases to sharpen it up.  
This study also uses salient aspects of each of the types of content analysis as they are not too 
dissimilar to each other and integrates them mainly for categories and coding development. So for 
example the deductive category determination was applied to use agency theory propositions and 
inductive category determination was applied to make it specific to shipping contracts, making the 
content analysis research a directed content analysis as well as conventional content analysis, 
according to Hseih and Shannon (2005).  
Categories can be therefore derived from previous research, data or theories (Zhang & Wildemuth 
2005; Krippendorff 2004) and researchers interest (Hseih and Shannon 2005). Since category 
development is key to the success or failure of content analysis method (Berelson 1952), it will be 
discussed in detail in chapter eight. As seen above there are many different typologies of content 
analysis. For this research agency theory is used as a starting point to derive the coding agenda, but 
since this theory has not been applied to the barriers to energy efficiency literature, the content 
analysis then moves more towards directed and summative research. This is applied in the form of 
ethnographic content analysis, as discussed in section  3.5.6, and the steps suggested above.  
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Categories can be therefore derived from previous research, data or theories (Zhang & Wildemuth 
2005; Krippendorff 2004) and researchers interest (Hseih and Shannon 2005). Since category 
development is key to the success or failure of content analysis method (Berelson 1952), it will be 
discussed in detail in chapter eight. As seen above there are many different typologies of content 
analysis. For this research agency theory is used as a starting point to derive the coding agenda, but 
since this theory has not been applied to the barriers to energy efficiency literature, the content 
analysis then moves more towards directed and summative research. This is applied in the form of 
ethnographic content analysis, as discussed in section  3.5.6, and the steps suggested above.  
Type of content 
analysis 
Study starts 
with 
Timing of defining codes 
or keywords 
Source of codes or keywords 
Conventional Observation Codes are defined during 
data analysis 
Codes are derived from data 
Directed Theory Codes defined before and 
during data analysis 
Codes are derived from theory 
or relevant research findings 
Summative Keywords Keywords are identified 
before and during data 
analysis 
Keywords are derived from 
interest of researchers or 
review of literature 
Table ‎4.7: Major coding differences among three approaches to content analysis 
Source: Hseih and Shannon (2005)                                                                                                                                        
4.2.3. Unit of analysis  
The unit of analysis or coding unit according to Krippendorf (2004) is the basic unit of text to be 
classified during content analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth 2006). According to Berg (2001) in content 
analysis there can be seven types of units of analysis; words, themes, characters, paragraphs, items, 
concepts, semantics. The theme is a more useful unit to count because it provides context and in its 
simplest form is a string of words or a sentence with a subject and predicate (Berg, 2001). For this 
research the units of analysis are specific clauses or sub-clauses dealing with a particular energy 
efficiency measure. 
Contextual units are “units of textual matter that set limits on the information to be considered in 
the description of recording units” Krippendorff (2004, p.101). According to Schreier (2012) it is 
useful to focus only on selected aspects of the material. For this research the charterparty content 
analysis focuses only on the aspects that would affect the operational energy efficiency related to 
the ship and its stakeholders. Therefore other clauses not related to the subject are ignored. The 
contextual units are clauses that address operations and measures; other clauses related to war 
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risks, general average, etc. do not fall within the research scope. The table below shows the clauses 
or sections of the voyage and time charterparty which will be investigated. 
Voyage charterparty components Time Charterparty components 
Preamble  Part A - details  
Owners responsibility  Preamble  
Deviation  Period & delivery  
Freight  Cancelling  
Loading/discharging  Trade  
Laytime  Owners obligations  
Demurrage  Charterer obligations  
Laydays and cancelling  Bunkers  
Lien  Hire payments  
Bills of lading  Redelivery  
General average  Cargo   
Brokerage  Master & crew  
Strikes  Direction & logs  
War risks  Offhire  
Ice  Maintenance   
Clause paramount  Advances  
Both to blame   Port exclusions  
Law and arbitration  Loss of vessel  
Rider clauses  Lien  
  Subletting  
  Rider clauses  
  Technical forms  
 
Table ‎4.8: Contextual units of investigation for content analysis 
4.2.4. Sampling  
In order to limit the research to a manageable body of texts and to collect data by means of 
sampling that minimise bias, a relevance sampling strategy is used. Relevance sampling is when all 
the units that contribute to answering a research question are selected (Krippendorff 2004). The 
resulting units of texts are not meant to be representative of a population of text; rather they are 
the population of relevant texts (Krippendorff 2004). This sampling method is typical of qualitative 
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research as it helps to enhance the understanding of the information-rich case (Sandelowski 2000; 
Patton 1990). This sampling strategy is particularly relevant to content analysis because it limits the 
texts to the most relevant records based on the analyst’s knowledge of the population. The 
knowledge of the important charterparties and salient points were derived from attendance at a two 
day intensive course on charterparties (Chartering in Practice: A commercial guide to charterparties 
in operation). A charterparty is a contract which is negotiated in a free market and the shipowner 
and charterer are able to negotiate their own terms (Wilson 2010) making the contract highly 
variable or deal specific. In practice however, the contracting parties will invariably select a standard 
form charterparty as the basis of their agreement, which will be modified in some way (Wilson 2010; 
Faber et al. 2012). 
In order to further identify the most important standard form charterparties an email was sent to 
twenty survey respondents who were selected based on the primary sector of their company. The 
survey contained a detailed list of standard form charterparties for that sector and the respondents 
were asked to select and comment on the most commonly used charterparties. This brief 
investigation confirmed that there are about fifteen to twenty most often used standard form 
voyage and time charterparties. These ‘off-the-shelf’ charterparties are generally preferred by 
brokers and shipping practitioners to creating a totally new document for an individual charter as 
they produce uniformity in the application of the law and its interpretation (Wilson 2010). 
Moreover, the use of standard form charterparties is usually made compulsory by the protection 
and indemnity (P&I) clubs to restrict the chance of disagreements resulting from different 
interpretations of unclear clauses. Another advantage of standard form charterparties is that they 
are of considerable advantage in international trade where parties may be domiciled in different 
countries and their negotiations hampered by language problems (Wilson 2010). 
These off-the-shelf standard form charterparties are usually modified in two ways, by use of rider 
clauses agreed between the parties and generally be appended to the standard clauses and 
amending the actual clauses. The result of these modifications is that sometimes the final agreement 
bears little resemblance to the original standard form (Wilson 2010). The focus of this analysis is only 
on the standard form charterparties since only off the shelf charterparties are being looked at, with 
a view that these are not modified in any way, for ease of comparison.  
Based on this brief research, literature on most often used charterparties from UNCTAD (1990) and 
Baltic and International Maritime Council’s (BIMCO) charterparty editor (IDEA), the most relevant 
charterparties to analyse were selected and are presented below in Table 4.9. It should be noted 
that there are a large number of standard charterparty forms, especially with respect to voyage 
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charter parties of which more than fifty have been approved by BIMCO covering various trades 
(UNCTAD 1990). Within the tanker voyage charterparties there are also standard charterparties that 
reflect the particular characteristics of the trade as well as partly reflecting the relatively stronger 
bargaining power of tanker charterers (UNCTAD 1990; Wilson 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table ‎4.9: Charterparties analysed 
4.2.5. Issues of reliability and validity 
In section  3.2, the criteria to evaluate quantitative and qualitative research were outlined. Issues of 
reliability and validity mainly apply to the quantitative research, whereas issues of credibility, 
transferability, dependability and conformability apply to qualitative research (Lincoln & Guba 1985). 
Each of these are discussed below. 
Sector Voyage charterparties Time charterparties 
Wetbulk BIMCHEMVOY 
INTERTANKVOY 
ASBATANKVOY 
BEEPEEVOY 4 
SHELLVOY 6 
INTERTANKTIME 
BIMCHEMTIME 
BPTIME 3 
SHELLTIME 
Drybulk COALOREVOY 
OREVOY 
NIPPONORE 
POLCOLVOY 
SYNACOMEX 
BHPBVOY03 
NIPPONCOAL 
NUBALTWOOD 
RIO DOCE ORE 
AMWELSH 
GRAINCON 
BHPBTIME03 
BALTIME 
GENTIME 
NYPE 46 
NYPE 93 
ASBATIME 
BOXTIME 
General GENCON 
SCANCON 
NUVOY 
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4.2.5.1. Credibility  
This criterion parallels internal validity i.e. how trustworthy are the findings? (Bryman 2008). In this 
study carefully designed coding agenda and data analysis procedures ensured the credibility of the 
research results from this method. The survey method solicited respondents own accounts of the 
relevance judgements they made on charterparties. Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend 
triangulation to improve credibility. The results of the charterparty content analysis are 
corroborated with survey results especially for the speed reduction measures. Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) also suggest that to improve credibility, research findings should be submitted to members in 
order confirm findings, a process called member or respondent validation (Bryman 2008). Every 
effort was made to communicate the findings with members with relevant expertise. Example of this 
was contacting survey respondents to confirm most often used standard form charterparties. 
Similarly the research findings were also published in conferences mainly consisting of industry 
members (e.g. presentation at Royal Institute of Naval Architects and Low Carbon Shipping 
Conferences). Attempt was made to contact four experts (mainly lawyers) involved in shipping and a 
professor who is thought to be working on the same subject, one of the experts responded with 
constructive feedback on the findings but unfortunately no feedback was received from the 
remaining experts. The key findings are currently being reviewed by another expert in the field of 
maritime law.  
4.2.5.2. Transferability 
This criterion parallels external validity i.e. do the findings apply to other contexts? The 
transferability of the research is made possible by the detailed documentation of the coding agenda 
used to categorise various clauses affecting implementation of measures. However, one needs to 
bear in mind that qualitative research entails intensive study of a small sample i.e. depth is 
emphasized over breadth, therefore the findings will be contextually unique. Qualitative research 
should produce ‘thick descriptions’ (Bryman 2008) i.e. rich accounts of details, which provides others 
to make judgements about the transferability (Lincoln and Guba 1985) of the findings.  
4.2.5.3. Dependability 
This criterion parallels reliability i.e. are the findings consistent? According to Bryman (2008) 
dependability of research is when the research process can be accessed by peers (as auditors) 
through complete records of problem formulation, selection, fieldwork notes, data analysis decisions 
etc. In this research, most of the above have been documented in the thesis and a separate 
spreadsheet file is also available as well as hard copies of the initial (step one) charterparties 
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investigated. Because the research was conducted by a single analyst, the issue of inter-coder 
reliability in content analysis is of little concern. 
4.2.5.4. Confirmability 
This criterion parallels objectivity i.e. is there investigator bias? Objectivity in this research is 
evidenced by use of existing theory to guide the content analysis design and coding agenda. 
However using theory also has some inherent limitations in that the researcher approaches the data 
with an informed but nonetheless with a strong bias and within qualitative research it is extremely 
difficult to have complete objectivity (Bryman 2008).  
4.3. Secondary desk research 
Much of this chapter focuses on answering the explanatory research questions, which primarily seek 
to answer why shipping firms may implement or not implement energy efficient operational 
measures and whether there are barriers inhibiting the uptake of operational measures. In order to 
complement the empirical primary research and to triangulate between methods (use of online 
survey method and content analysis method), there is a need to first have a good description of the 
problem, i.e. through descriptive questions that aim to address what is actually going on in shipping 
rather than ask ‘why’, through secondary desk research. A good description is important, as it forms 
the basis of sound theory and provides stimulus a for explanatory research (de Vaus 1995). 
4.3.1. Aims and objectives 
The aim of this task is to detail the stakeholders involved in the shipping system, the contracts with 
which they interact, conceptualise the principal agent problem, to be able to quantify the level of 
principal agent problem in shipping and assess the level of impact on energy efficiency. This will 
reflect to some extent the positivist type principal agent research as explained in section ‎2.1.1.2. 
Furthermore, it will help in the development of the survey (for example through the development of 
good indicators for the survey method, population of interest etc.) and enable comparison with 
perceived barriers after the survey has been conducted.   
4.3.2. Data collection methods 
A significant amount of data that is collected here is based on desk research (secondary research) 
which is analysed to provide a conceptualised form of the principal agent problem within the 
shipping industry.  
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1. Stakeholders and contracts in the shipping system - data and information is derived from various 
sources such as journals, specific databases, specific content related to the industry (e.g. charter 
parties) and maritime textbooks. Systems thinking methods such as the stakeholder mapping 
tool are used to depict the stakeholders within the shipping system and sub systems (sectors). 
Stakeholder mapping tool are used again to depict the stakeholders within the different types of 
contracts and business arrangements (types of companies) within the shipping system and sub 
systems (sectors).  
2. The data collected above will provide a better understanding of the principal agent problem, 
that to date has not been well defined within the industry. Several studies have mentioned its 
existence but none have holistically understood and applied the concept, with no attempt made 
to methodically quantify the amount of fuel that may exposed to such a problem. This section 
uses the previous analysis to define and conceptualise the principal agent problem in greater 
detail. 
3. Quantification or estimation of the principal agent problem – data is obtained from the 
Clarkson’s Shipping Information Network (SIN) for fixtures on the various contracts of carriage 
for the different sectors that are obtained from the above analysis. The Murtishaw and Sathaye 
(2006), Prindle et al. (2006), IEA (2007) and Vernon and Meier (2012) approach to quantification 
of the principal agent problem in the context of energy efficiency is applied.  
4.3.3. Issues of concern 
One of the main causes for concern is the database that is used to quantify the level of principal 
agent problem in shipping. The Clarkson’s SIN is not representative of all the fixtures that are taking 
place in the industry and its sectors, but cover only some part of those fixtures that have been 
mainly brokered by Clarksons brokers or for which information by the relevant parties to a fixture 
has been sent to Clarksons. The limited dataset would result in a bias and may perhaps only be a 
reflection of certain regions or specific types and size of companies, which could affect the 
generalizability of the research findings from the secondary data analysis.  
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5. Decomposing the structure of the shipping industry 
This chapter delves further into the principal agent problem and its use in explaining barriers to 
energy efficiency. Of the several barriers (market failures and non-failures) discussed in chapter two, 
the information asymmetry and split incentives are rooted in agency theory. In order to guide the 
primary research methods (use of online survey method and charterparty content analysis), this 
chapter attempts to define and describe the problem in greater detail for shipping, as this was 
shown to be lacking in previous literature that examined barriers to energy efficiency in shipping. 
This chapter follows part of the methodology set out by Prindle et al. (2006), Murtishaw and Sathaye 
(2006), IEA (2007), and Vernon and Meier (2012). This is done by following three of the four steps to 
identify the pervasiveness of the principal agent problem. Step one is identifying and selecting 
situations where principal agent problems may exist, which requires an analysis of the stakeholders 
and contracts used in shipping. Step two attempts to estimate the population of end users affected 
by principal agent problem and step three attempts to estimate the energy consumption affected by 
the principal agent problem. This type of research can be said to be positivist type research as it aims 
to ‘identify situations’ in which principals and agents are likely to have conflicting goals (Eisenhardt 
1989). This chapter deals with the quantification of principal agent components of the research 
framework as proposed in chapter two, highlighted in Figure ‎5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.1: Focus of this chapter in the context of the framework 
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5.1. Introduction to the structure of shipping  
In order to evaluate principal agent problems in the shipping industry, according to Vernon & Meier 
(2012) methodology, it is first necessary to identify the participating firms and understand the basic 
types of contracts through which they interact. Thereafter, it is necessary to identify which entity 
makes capital or equipment purchasing decisions and fuel consumption costs. Systems thinking 
methods such as the stakeholder mapping tool are used in this research to depict the stakeholders 
within the shipping system and sub systems (sectors). Stakeholder mapping tools are used again to 
depict the stakeholders within the different types of contracts and business arrangements (types of 
companies) within the shipping system and sub systems (sectors). The stakeholder map for shipping 
is represented in Figure 5.2. 
In the shipping industry there are various stakeholders that enable it to function and deliver the 
ocean transportation service, however a few stakeholders have the largest impact on the way that it 
operates. The industry aims to provide transportation service to firms that desire to ship goods from 
one location to another, in a broader international sales context these are called the shippers of 
goods. Within the context of shipping, these shippers are also called charterers of ships, when they 
hire or rent part or full ship to transport goods.  The former is mainly applicable to container 
shipping and the latter is applicable to bulk shipping such as wet and dry bulk commodities. These 
shippers and charterers contract with mainly shipowner-operators that provide the ship and the 
services to transport the goods under various types of arrangements. It should be noted that 
shipowner-operators could be common carriers (in container or liner shipping), tramp shipowner-
operators (bulk shipping), management companies (who assume the responsibility of operating the 
ships from shipowners). In some instances the charterer may wish to do the transportation using an 
in-house shipping service, which owns and operates ships solely for the purpose of carrying cargo for 
the charterer (the parent company), in which case these shipping companies are referred to as 
shipping divisions of cargo owning company (shipping divisions in short). These key companies and 
stakeholders are defined in Table ‎5.1. Figure ‎5.3: International sale and role of shipping shows a 
typical international sale, which involves shipping as part of the contract. 
121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.2: Stakeholders in the general shipping system
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Type of company in 
operations 
Description 
Shipowner-operator Own (or bareboat charter) the ship and operate the ship in voyage and 
time charter markets 
Common carrier Containership operator who may own or hire ships on bareboat or 
time charter 
Management company Manage day to day running (or full operation) of ships on behalf of 
shipowners 
Shipping division Department or separate legal entity of a major cargo owning company 
created with the sole purpose of carrying parent companies cargo 
Table ‎5.1: Types of ship operating firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.3: International sale and role of shipping 
Source: Shaddick (2012) 
Shippers and charterers enter into a contract with the shipping company/operator (as mentioned in 
Table ‎5.1) through various types of chartering arrangements to obtain shipping services. These 
arrangements are voyage charter and time charter which have been briefly explained in chapter 
two. In the following sections each of these are examined in greater detail.  
5.2. Analysis of the different types of contracts 
There are essentially only two basic forms of charter for carriage of goods with which the shipowner-
operators and charterers or shippers (referred to as charterers only from here onwards) contract, 
voyage (or voyage) charter and time charter (Wilson 2010). In a voyage charter, a charterer contracts 
a shipowner for the carriage of a specific amount of cargo, from a load port to discharge port, which 
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is comparative to hiring a taxi. In the voyage charter, the capital expenditure, operational control 
and fuel cost is borne by the shipowner-operator. The shipowner-operator’s earnings are based on 
the amount of cargo transported (hence $/tonne) and the average length of a voyage varies from 
days to months for round trip voyages. This is also called the ‘freight contract’ in which the shipper 
buys transport for a fixed price per tonne of cargo (Stopford 2008). 
 Responsible entity for cost elements 
Shipowner-operator Voyage charterer 
Operating costs  Voyage costs – fuel, port dues, 
canal dues 
 Despatch (cost of early relief from 
the contract) 
 Operating costs – crewing, repair, 
dry-docking, maintenance, 
surveys, insurance 
 Cargo handling 
 Freight 
 Demurrage (cost of delays) 
 
Capital costs  Debt repayment 
 Interest 
 Retrofit 
 None 
Table ‎5.2: Costs allocation under voyage charters 
In a time charter, a charterer contracts with a shipowner-operator for the use of a crewed vessel for 
a certain period of time, which may be for a single trip (trip charter) or certain length of time (period 
charter). This contract is similar to hiring a car from a rental company (but with the difference that 
the driver is also included in the hire). A time charterer gains the operational control of the ships 
carrying its cargo, while leaving the ownership and management of the ship for the shipowner. As 
shown in Table ‎5.3 under a time charter, the ships capital expenditure and some operational control 
is done by the shipowner (e.g. providing crew and master) but the fuel cost is paid by the charterer 
in addition to the charter day rate.  
A bareboat charter involves the use of a vessel in which the capital expenditure is accrued by the 
bareboat owner and all other costs are borne by the bareboat charterer, which is similar to a long 
lease in the property market as shown in Table ‎5.4. The bareboat charter is however not technically 
a carriage of goods contract rather it is a lease of the vessel to the charterer (Wilson 2010). Unlike in 
commercial property, the hire charge for the boat is on a per day basis rather than an upfront lump 
sum. The bareboat charterer obtains possession and full control of the vessel along with the legal 
and financial responsibility for it. 
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 Responsible entity for cost elements 
Ship owner Time charterer 
Operating costs  Operating costs – crewing, 
repair, dry-docking, 
maintenance, surveys, 
insurance 
 Cargo handling 
 Voyage costs – fuel, port dues, 
canal dues 
 Freight 
Capital costs  Debt repayment 
 Interest 
 Retrofit 
 None 
Table ‎5.3: Costs allocation under time charters 
 
 Responsible entity for cost elements 
Ship owner Bareboat charterer 
Operating costs  None  Cargo handling 
 Voyage costs – Fuel, port dues, 
canal dues 
 Operating costs – crewing, repair, 
dry-docking, maintenance, 
surveys, insurance 
 Freight  
Capital costs  Debt repayment 
 Interest 
 Retrofit 
 None 
Table ‎5.4: Cost allocation in bareboat charter 
The above types of charter are the main ways of earning revenue for a shipowner. However, other 
hybrid forms of charters also exist, such as trip charters, which fall into time charter category despite 
the contract being for a single voyage, Contracts of Affreightment (COA), which fall into the voyage 
charter category despite being for a specified period of time (Wilson 2010). In a COA the shipowner 
is free to choose whichever of the above contracted ships to meet this requirement, but generally 
this contract has the same profile as a voyage charter (Stopford 2008) and the actual vessels used 
are normally chartered under individual voyage charters. In summary, the different types of charters 
are as a result of varying degree of responsibility over operating and capital costs of running a ship 
as summarised in Table ‎5.6. These charters are also of different lengths ranging from days to 
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decades as shown in Table ‎5.5. The result of the varying degree over capital and operational costs 
and the duration of control is that both entities have conflicting interests (split incentives principal 
agent problem) to minimise their share of costs according to the charter arrangements used. 
Type  Voyage charter Time charter Bareboat charter 
Average length Single voyage, Up to 1 
month 
1 – 12 months, up to 5 
years 
7 – 10 years, up to 20 
years 
Table ‎5.5: Different types of charters and charter length  
Sources: Stopford (2008) and Clarksons SIN 
 
 
Voyage charter Time charter Bareboat charter 
Cargo Handling   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Load port 
Discharge port 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Voyage Expenses 
Fuel 
Port dues 
Canal dues 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Operating expense 
Crewing 
Maintenance 
Repairs 
Surveys 
Insurance 
management 
    
  
  
  
  
Capital costs 
Interest 
Dividends 
Debt repayment 
Table ‎5.6: Cost allocation in the different types of charter 
 
Owner 
Charterer 
126 
 
5.3. Principal agent problem in general 
Chapter two investigated the literature on the various barriers to energy efficiency. Much of this 
literature such as Blumstein (1980), Fisher and Rothkopf (1989), Jaffe and Stavins (1994), Sorrell et 
al. (2000 and 2004), etc. has focussed on understanding the market barriers to explain under-
investments in energy efficiency and identifying the specific barriers responsible for the under 
investment or lack of uptake. The principal agent problem (rooting from agency theory) has been 
classified as a market failure in the literature by Brown (2001), Jaffe and Stavins (1994), etc. and is 
the focus of this section. Under orthodox economics a market failure occurs when the conditions 
required for Pareto efficiency are violated, resulting in incomplete property rights, positive and 
negative externalities, imperfect competition and asymmetric information. According to Sorrell et al. 
(2000) market failures are market barriers that require policy intervention or in other words 
existence of market failures is a prerequisite for market intervention (Brown 2001).  The principal 
agent problem arises from an agency relationship, which was described in section ‎2.1.1. The 
principal agent problem as a barrier in energy efficiency arises in: 
“transactions when the entity responsible for making investment decisions is not the party 
responsible for paying future costs of operation caused by that investment” (Vernon & Meier 2012, 
p 267).  
It has long been recognised that principal agent problems are pervasive in the buildings sector, both 
residential and commercial rental markets (for which it has been referred to as the landlord-tenant 
problem) by Blumstein (1980), Jaffe & Stavins (1994), Lovins (1992), Fisher and Rothkopf (1989), IEA 
(2007) etc. Apart from the rental markets (or operations), it is thought to be impeding energy 
efficiency at design and construction as well. For example in construction of buildings, builders do 
not optimise for energy efficiency in order to hold construction costs down (e.g. developers choosing 
to install electric space heating, even though for tenants this is more expensive than gas) and 
because their productivity is measured in different scales (Lovins 1992 and IEA 2007). In the rental 
market, landlords will generally not purchase efficient devices for rental properties since the tenants 
pay the cost of operating the devices (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006; 
Maruejols & Young 2011) thus the tenant pays energy costs that are largely determined by the 
infrastructure present in the building, which is subject to landlord’s decision. Similarly, landlords may 
not maintain the devices well when tenants pay the operating costs (Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006). 
Generally, the landlord has no incentive to make energy efficient investment as only the tenant 
directly benefits from these reduced costs, which insulates the landlord from energy price signals.  
In some cases where markets are efficient this may not hold, as a landlord who has invested in 
energy efficiency of his building should be compensated with higher rent. Thus, the principal agent 
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problem is a function of several different conditions such as the number of contracting entities, 
length of contracts, apportionment of costs and the level of information. The above however are 
only related to one type of contract that is prevalent in the rental markets (this classical landlord-
tenant relationship is depicted Figure ‎5.4), where the tenant (the principal) pays rent to the landlord 
(agent) in exchange for the use of the building and additionally pays energy costs. According to 
Prindle et al. (2006), Meier and Eide (2007) and IEA (2007) up to four different relationships are 
possible depending between the contract between the parties as shown below in Table ‎5.7. 
 
According to the above sources, different questions have been put forward to determine whether 
the end use is affected by principal agent problem. According to Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) the 
following three questions must be answered: 
 Who uses the device? 
 Who selects the device? 
 Who pays the energy cost? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.4: Classical tenant-landlord problem 
If the answer to any of the above questions is; not the same person, then one any one type of the 
principal agent problem could exist. For example, a tenant living in a rented apartment buys a 
television, he or she would use the device, select the device and pay for its energy (Box one in 
Table ‎5.7), therefore no principal agent problem is envisaged here (at least in the purchasing market, 
the problem may exist further up the chain e.g. with manufacturers). For the same tenant, the 
replacement of refrigerator could pose a different type of principal agent problem, since the 
appliance is used by the tenant and energy is paid for by the tenant but the selection and purchase is 
by the landlord, thus efficiency principal agent problem (Box two in Table ‎5.7) can exist here.  
 
 Can chose technology Cannot chose technology 
Direct energy payment 1) No problem 2) Efficiency problem 
Indirect energy payment 3) Usage and efficiency problem 4) Usage problem 
Table ‎5.7: Classification of principal agent situations according to Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) 
Agent 
Landlord 
Space 
Principal  
Tenant 
Rent 
Energy 
Payments 
Energy efficiency 
investment 
Energy efficiency 
operation 
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The questions are extended by IEA (2007) and Meier and Eide (2007), to include the following: 
 Who selects the energy using technology? 
 Who purchases the energy using technology? 
 Who pays the energy bill?  
 Who owns the energy using technology? 
 Who controls operation of the energy-using technology?  
The two by two matrix to conceptualise the principal agent problem in energy end use, which 
classifies the energy end use by the ability to choose the device and responsibility for paying the 
energy costs differs slightly between the sources. By categorising who is responsible for energy costs 
and energy purchases (as shown in Table  5.7 and Table ‎5.8), the principal agent problem can arise 
from two kinds of split incentives, one concerning usage (demand for energy services) and other 
concerning the technical efficiency of the end use device (Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006). 
 End user can chose technology End user cannot chose technology 
End user pays energy 
bill 
No principal agent problem.  
Case 1 
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
End user does not pay 
energy bill 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
Table ‎5.8: Transactions from an end user perspective 
In case one, the end user (e.g. dwelling occupant) selects the energy-using technology (e.g. 
refrigerator, etc.), selects its energy efficiency and pays for its energy consumption, thus the end 
user will be incentivised to make a reasonable investment in energy efficiency (although this may be 
affected by other barriers that may be present). In this case there it can be said that no principal 
agent problem exists because the principal and agent are the same entity (IEA 2007) or the principal 
makes the energy efficiency investment and pays the energy cost. In the context of energy efficiency 
this is the ideal situation because there are no diverging interests between principal and agent, 
information is costless, easily transferred, and all costs and benefits of energy efficiency investment 
are internalised (Vernon and Meier 2012). This situation is illustrated in Figure ‎5.5. 
In case two, the end user cannot choose the energy using technology or make an energy efficiency 
investment, instead the agent selects the energy-using technology and makes the energy efficiency 
investment, but the end user i.e. the principal pays for the energy use. A principal agent problem can 
be said to exist here and is defined as an “efficiency problem”, which refers to the forgone energy 
efficiency investment, referred to in the earlier example of the classical tenant-landlord problem. In 
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this case, the market also fails to provide adequate information on energy efficiency to the principal 
(IEA 2007) resulting in adverse selection by the principal (due to agent’s pre contractual 
opportunism) or the inability of the agent to recoup the investment in energy efficiency. Other 
examples of this situation are in the car rentals business, sale and purchase of capital equipment and 
appliances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.5: Case one adapted from Vernon and Meier (2012) and IEA (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.6: Case two, efficiency problem in principal agent problems 
In case four, the end user is neither able to select the energy-using technology or make the energy 
efficiency investment nor pays the energy cost, as shown in Figure ‎5.7. This is classed as “usage” 
problem because the end user faces no economic constraint on usage, i.e. the end user consumes 
more energy than is reasonable (Meier and Aide 2007). Examples of this situation are where energy 
cost or utilities are included in the overall rental charge, hotel rooms, etc. The principal pays only 
indirectly for energy use as part of the payment for use of the product or service (IEA 2007). In this 
case, the agent may try to over-invest in efficiency in order to minimise the consequences of 
unconstrained usage problem.  
In case three, the end user selects the technology and makes the energy efficiency investment but 
does not pay the energy costs, as shown in Figure ‎5.8 which is a complete reversal of case two, 
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where the end user pays the energy cost but cannot choose the technology. Case three, is a 
combination of the usage problem as shown in case four and efficiency problem as shown in case 
two. This situation may seem unlikely but it actually exists. Examples of this case are company cars, 
where in some companies the employees are permitted to select their cars and the company pays 
for fuel consumed on both company and personal trips, and when costs of utilities are included in 
condominium fees charged to the owner-occupiers of condominiums. It is however unclear as to 
who is the agent and who is the principal in this case. IEA (2007) and Vernon and Meier (2012) 
consider the principal as making efficiency investments and agent paying for energy costs, whereas 
Grauss and Worrell (2008) consider the principal (company owning lease cars) as paying for fuel 
costs and agent (employees) making car selections i.e. making the energy efficiency investment and 
operating them, which results in the same situations as case two above, as shown in Figure ‎5.9. 
Grauss and Worrell (2008) find that company cars are less efficient despite being newer and using 
more efficient engines types (efficiency problem) and drive for longer distances (usage problem), 
resulting in up to 7% increase in fuel use in all passenger cars in Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.7: Case four, usage problem in principal agent problems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.8: Case three, Efficiency and usage problem according to IEA (2007) 
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Figure ‎5.9: Case three, Efficiency and usage problem according to Grauss and Worrell (2008) 
To summarise the above classification and to make it easier to understand, the following matrix has 
been developed. 
 Principal selects technology, 
agent cannot select 
technology 
Agent selects technology, 
principal cannot select 
technology 
Principal pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment), 
agent does not pay energy 
bill 
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
Efficiency problem can exist 
Case 2 
Agent pays energy bill, 
principal does not pay 
energy bill (indirect energy 
payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem 
can exist 
Case 3 
Usage problem can exist 
Case 4 
Table ‎5.9: Adapted classification of principal agent problems 
The following section of the chapter uses the above classifications and analysis from chapter two to 
define and conceptualise the principal agent problem in shipping.  
5.4. Step one: Identifying situations where principal agent problem may exist 
in shipping 
Section ‎5.2 briefly described the contracts through which the charterer i.e. the entity desiring the 
shipping service contracts with various types of shipping companies or operators. As with other 
studies and contexts (Vernon and Meier 2012; IEA 2007; etc.) this is the person who ‘hires’ an agent 
for a service, thus in this case the charterer is identified as the principal (this follows the 
classification in the tenant-landlord problem as well). The shipping companies or owner-operators 
(from here on referred to as shipowner-operator) are identified as agents to the charterer since they 
are contracted by the charterer. This characterisation is similar to Veenstra and Dalen (2011).  
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The end user perspective as shown in the earlier sections in shipping is somewhat different because 
operations of ships could be carried out by another entity that does not own the ship and neither 
pays for the fuel e.g. management companies or operators. Moreover, even when the charterer 
pays for the fuel e.g. in case two, the end user is actually the shipowner-operator’s agents e.g. the 
crew and master. Because this research goes further than just looking at technology selection i.e. 
mainly concerned with principal agent problem in operations, section ‎5.4.3 adds another dimension 
to the above matrix, the ability to select energy efficient operations e.g. weather routing, speed 
reduction etc.  
In case one, where the principal and the agent are the same entity or all costs are internalised then 
the principal agent problem may not exist. The same entity selects the energy efficiency of its 
purchases and pays for its energy consumption, thus it will be incentivised to make a reasonable 
investment in energy efficiency. An example of this in the residential sector is an owner-occupier, 
and within shipping, a shipping division that owns and operates its own ships (including crewing and 
all other management) and carries its own cargoes, examples of which are major commodities 
traders (or cargo owners) such as BP, Rio Tinto, Cargill who satisfy much of their transport demand 
through their owned and operated ships. Case one could also be said to reflect the bareboat charter, 
where the bareboat charterers, can be in control of the energy efficiency investment either at the 
design stage or during operation. In the design stage, where the vessel is merely an asset to another 
financial institution (beneficial owner or registered owner, see below), the bareboat charterer could 
govern the design of the vessel. In this case, it is not a true lease contract according to IEA (2007) 
and can be considered analogous to the owner-occupier. During the operations the bareboat 
charterer can also make changes to the vessel so long as there is consent of owners (either the 
financial institution or a professional ship owning company), according to clause nine of the Barecon 
89 charterparty (BIMCO 1989). Since the length of charter or ownership is sufficiently long, most 
energy efficiency investments could theoretically payback within this period. However, initial 
estimates by (Stott 2013) show that on average only under 10% of operating owners keep the ship 
for its full working life (of around 25 years), the remainder of the owners keep the asset for an 
average of around eight years, with the mode value of five years, which could have determining 
effect on the investment attitude towards energy efficiency of ships. It is important to note the two 
types of shipowners; 
 Beneficial owner: is the ultimate controlling owner who benefits from any profits the ship makes 
(Stopford 2008). According to the Harmonised Vessel Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) this is 
the registered owner, which could be a one ship company (protecting other assets of the 
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beneficial owner) or a holding company (shares in each one ship company) incorporated in a 
favourable tax jurisdiction. 
 Disponent owner – is the bareboat charterer who has the full operational control of the ship for 
a long period of time and can sometimes have a say in the design of the ship. 
Although this case is an ideal situation, there may still exist principal agent problems internally which 
would affect the energy efficiency investment and operations. According to Decanio (1993) this can 
happen because the firm is a collection of individuals brought together under a set of complex 
contracts (where the principal is the firm, employees are agents), which would affect the behaviour 
of those agents (with divergent goals) e.g. short-sightedness of management, overly stringent 
investment criteria due to managerial job rotation and performance related pay.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.10: Case one in shipping 
 
 Principal Agent 
Wetbulk  BP Oil International  BP Shipping 
Drybulk  Cargill Cargill Shipping division 
Container  N/A N/A 
Table ‎5.10: Example of case one principal agent problem in shipping carriage of goods contracts 
In case two, the charterer cannot select the technology but pays for the fuel as a result of the 
investment decision made by the shipowner-operator. This could result in a split incentive efficiency 
problem, where the principal would prefer to have an efficient technology or ship that results in 
lower fuel costs, but their agent the shipowner-operator is not incentivised because they are 
concerned with initial costs (capital) and not the energy costs. In most cases the contracts between 
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the entities in this case are signed after construction (and many years after), therefore the principal 
has little influence over the design (IEA 2007), however a few examples have begun to appear in 
shipping where the charterer influences the design of ships through retrofits and subsequently pays 
either a lower time charter rate or benefits from lower fuel consumption. The incentives could be 
realigned if the investment by the agent in energy efficiency could be directly reflected through a 
higher charter rate charged by the agent to the principal who would save on the fuel costs. 
According to Jaffe and Stavins (1994) adoption will only occur if the adopter can recover the 
investment from the party that enjoys the energy savings. The extent to which the fuel cost savings 
are passed back to the owner-operator through a higher charter rate i.e. the ability to recoup the 
investment, has not been investigated thoroughly in shipping. There is difference of opinion in the 
grey literature regarding this subject and this has been detailed in a paper submitted to 
Transportation Research Part A, Policy and Practice by Agnolucci, Smith & Rehmatulla (2014) who 
show that up to 50% of the investment can be recouped in the drybulk panamax sector. The inability 
to recoup the investment could in part be due to informational problems or information asymmetry 
meaning that a charterer is not fully able to assess the actual (technical and operational) efficiency 
of the ship and thus not willing to pay a higher rate to reflect this prior to signing the contract. This 
could be because the shipowner-operator is either not able to portray the energy efficiency of the 
ship (i.e. has difficulty in communicating information) to be able to reflect the charter rate, or in 
other cases is the result of agent opportunism (Williamson 1979) thus the market does not allow for 
a sufficient return on energy efficient vessels. Thirdly, despite paying for the fuel, the charterer is still 
not in ‘full’ control of its use because the operation of the ship is left to the shipowner-operator, the 
charterer can only direct the master with respect to cargo (Stopford 2008).  
According to agency theory the second problem (first being split incentives) of informational 
problem arises here because it is either difficult or costly to perfectly monitor the agent’s behaviour, 
leading to a moral hazard. Moral hazard refers to situations where actions of one party are 
unobservable to another party after the contract has been signed (post contractual opportunism) 
(Sorrell et al. 2004). To that extent, charterers would incur the cost of using weather routing 
companies to monitor the performance of the ship (speed and consumption under various weather 
conditions). However, even with perfect information the incapacity of the principal to control the 
actions of the agent may still produce a principal agent problem (Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006). In 
shipping this would be the ability to lodge a concrete claim against the shipowner for breach of 
contract, called the speed consumption claim. Even when this happens the principal is only able to 
monitor a very limited amount of information relating to the energy efficiency of the ship. Fourthly, 
the short term nature of the contract in various sectors (typically three to six months, see 
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Figure ‎5.24) is a relatively short period for a charterer to make an investment in energy efficiency 
technologies, as most of these would be expected to payback between two to ten years. This case is 
applicable to all three major sectors of interest; wetbulk, drybulk and container sector, which have 
varying amount of ships on this type of charter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.11: Case two, efficiency problem in principal agent problems 
 
 Principal Agent 
Wetbulk  Petrobras Frontline 2012 tankers 
Drybulk  Rio Tinto Gearbulk 
Container  Maersk Line Seaspan Corporation 
Table ‎5.11: Example of case two principal agent problem in carriage of goods contracts 
In case four, the charterer is neither able to select the energy-using technology or make the energy 
efficiency investment nor pays the energy cost (at least not directly), which is representative of the 
voyage charter. Generally in other contexts this case could result in a principal agent usage problem 
because the end user faces no economic constraint on usage, i.e. the end user consumes more 
energy than is reasonable, thus the agent over invests in efficiency. In shipping however, the 
charterer is not the end user as implied by this case, as the operation of the ship is still carried out by 
the agent, so in the literal sense the usage problem may not apply.  
In the voyage charter the price charged by the shipowner-operator (agent) to the charterer 
(principal) is called the freight rate. The freight rate for drybulk sector is quoted in $/tonne basis, for 
wetbulk sector quoted in Worldscale (route cost index) basis and for container sector quoted in 
$/TEU or FEU (Twenty foot equivalent, Forty foot equivalent), which cover all the transport or 
voyage related costs including fuel costs for that voyage. Thus, the principal would be indirectly 
paying for fuel costs as mentioned earlier, which is analogous to the residential sector where utility 
bills are included in the rent. When fuel costs increase the shipowner-operator must either increase 
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the freight rates or increase the fuel efficiency to maintain a constant profit margin (Vernon and 
Meier 2012), although the immediate and short-term response may be to pass on the fuel costs in 
the form of fuel surcharges (Vernon and Meier 2012; Faber et al. 2009), which is dependent on the 
elasticity of the freight rate to bunker price. This elasticity has been shown to be ranging widely 
across the shipping markets (Vivid Economics 2010; Chowdhury & Dinwoodie 2011). In the case, 
when the energy cost is passed through from the agent to the charterer the situation resembles case 
two. Thus, this case could then be similar to case two, and at times the lines between case two and 
four can be blurry (Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006). In fact IEA (2007) in two instances simplifies case 
two and four to be the same “To simplify calculations, this study assumed that all offices pay their 
own energy bill in the end, therefore only case one and two are applicable” IEA (2007, p79 and p88). 
Nevertheless the split between case two and four is important in shipping and in the context of 
investment in operational energy efficiency measures, which will be discussed in section  5.5.  
The pervasiveness of fuel cost pass through in the shipping industry may discourage the shipowner-
operator to invest in energy efficiency. There are many examples of cost pass through in shipping, 
especially those related to fuel (surcharges). There are many other common and uncommon 
surcharges that exist in shipping, such as peak season surcharge by container lines, low sulphur fuel 
surcharge etc. Bunker adjustment factors (BAF) are prevalent in the container sector, with almost all 
companies charging shippers for any fluctuations in bunker prices. They have also been introduced 
by some drybulk shipowner-operators and roll-on/roll-off operators. More recently this concept of 
surcharges (as a separate item on freight) was also being proposed by Maersk tankers, because the 
Worldscale index does not accurately account for the current fuel price. The following quotes 
demonstrate this:  
“We’re making sure that our higher oil costs are being covered by the bunker fuel charges that we 
add to the freight rates. As long as we’re covered via the *bunker+ surcharge, we won’t slow down 
any further.”  Maersk Line's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Eivind Kolding (Sustainable Shipping News 
2011b).  
"We will have this done in one way or another. To start with we can make our customers aware of 
how much bunker makes up of the bills we send them. Because of the way billing takes place in the 
tanker industry (Worldscale rates), we do not get compensated at all for the increase in bunker costs 
that has taken place" Maersk Tankers Chief Executive Hanne Sorensen (Sustainable Shipping News 
2012b).  
According to Faber et al. (2010) the cost pass through depends on market circumstances, thus in a 
market where demand for shipping is higher than supply of ships, the costs are borne by the 
shipowner-operator because prices are not cost related and based on marginal benefits, whereas 
when demand for shipping is lower than supply of ships, the costs will be passed on to the charterer 
137 
 
and ultimately the consumer because prices are based on marginal costs. Although this may not hold 
when a round voyage/trip (e.g. in the liner trade) is considered consisting of both the above markets, 
thus in this case the shipowner-operator would pass the costs even when demand for shipping is 
higher than supply (least price sensitive market), in order to cover the costs of the return journey 
(Faber et al. 2010).  
To some extent the usage problem (by the charterer) is illustrated by the way the speed is stipulated 
in the voyage charter. Generally the speed (which is one of the most important variables in energy 
efficient operation and has the highest energy saving potential) is not the energy efficient speed 
because the charterer does not pay the freight rate in direct relation to speed and there is often no 
negotiation of varying level of freight rates dependent on speed. This subject is further discussed in 
chapter eight. Generally, in other contexts or sectors this case results in over investment in energy 
efficiency, which suggests that in the absence of cost pass through of energy costs there is sufficient 
incentive for the shipowner-operator to invest in energy efficiency in order to maintain a profit 
margin or to compete on cheaper freight rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.12: Case four in shipping 
 
 Principal Agent 
Wetbulk  ExxonMobil Tsakos Energy Navigation (TEN) 
Drybulk  BHP Billiton Star Bulk carriers 
Container  B&Q Maersk 
Table ‎5.12: Example of case four principal agent problem in shipping 
In case three, the end user selects the technology and makes the energy efficiency investment but 
does not pay the energy costs. Since this case is very rare (IEA 2007) most studies have found it 
difficult to identify situations where this would exist. Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) only find a small 
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number of instances (almost negligible) in the residential sector, for example in the case of 
condominiums where the cost of fuel in non-residential parts of the buildings is included in the 
condominium fee. This case does not exist in shipping.  
 Charterer selects technology, 
Shipowner-operator cannot 
select technology 
Shipowner-operator selects 
technology, Charterer cannot 
select technology 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment), 
Shipowner-operator does 
not pay energy bill 
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
Charterers shipping division 
 
Efficiency problem can exist 
Case 2 
Time charter  
 
Shipowner-operator pays 
energy bill, Charterer does 
not pay energy bill (indirect 
energy payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem 
can exist.  
Case 3 
None 
Usage problem can exist 
Case 4 
Voyage charter 
Table ‎5.13: Allocation of cases in shipping to the principal agent matrix 
5.4.1. Multiple principal agent relationships 
 
The above cases highlight the principal agent problem between two stakeholders, the shipowner 
operator and the charterer or shipper. In many cases the applications of agency theory is limited to 
the analysis of a single, well defined one principal and one agent (Neill and Morris 2009). In reality 
there are many situations with several principals and agents, with the same entity being a principal 
in one case, but at the same time being an agent for another principal (Levine & Florence 1990; 
Breaux et al. 2002). This chain of relationships between principals and agents can lead to conflicting 
goals even in cases where the principal and agent have convergent goals (e.g. in case one). 
According to Neill and Morris (2009): 
“As the chain of principal agent relationships expands, it becomes less likely that the “interests of 
the original principal and the final agent coincide” (Breaux et al. 2002, 94). This chain of relationships 
exacerbates the problem of asymmetric information, as the initial principal is even less likely to 
know what its “contractor’s contractors” are doing” Neill and Morris (2009, p633) 
Figure ‎5.13 shows several cases of principal agent relationships (synonymous to the aforementioned 
four cases) but also shows that the same entity may have a different role in its relationship with 
other stakeholders in the same contractual context. Figure ‎5.14 is adapted to show the stakeholders 
in shipping specifically involved in carriage of goods contracts for voyage and time charters in various 
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sectors. It shows a typical principal agent relationship chain in an oil sale or other drybulk 
commodity sale, which is followed by an explanation of the chain and an example.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.13: Complex principal agent problems in Deepwater Horizon 
Source: Neill and Morris (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.14: Principal agent relationship chain in the wetbulk and drybulk shipping sector 
As can be seen the charterer who had been portrayed as the principal in all of the above cases 
(Figure ‎5.10 and Figure ‎5.12) is now shown to be the agent for the trader. This is typical of a CIF 
(Cost, Insurance & Freight) sale, where the charterer (seller of the commodity) would include these 
costs and thus would arrange the shipping of the goods as well. In an FOB (Free On Board) sale the 
trader (buyer of the commodity and seller to the end consumer) would arrange for shipping, thus 
bypassing or assuming the role of the charterer. In both cases the contract with the shipowner-
operator would be a voyage charter (case four), i.e. for a specific cargo requiring transport from A to 
B. Table ‎5.14 gives an example of this. In a time charter, the charterer would give the buyer the 
option to have the cargo delivered i.e. CIF (Cost, Insurance & Freight) sale, but this time would have 
some operational control of the shipping activity as long term charterer of the ship through either a 
time charter with the shipowner-operator or bareboat charter with the owner.  
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 End consumer Trader Charterer Shipowner-operator 
Drybulk Bao Steel        
Chinese Steelmill 
Trafigura Rio Tinto Gearbulk shipping 
Wetbulk Reliance 
Indian refinery 
Vitol Shell Teekay tankers 
Table ‎5.14: Example of multiple principal agent relationships 
In some cases where the principals or agents are small in size or geographically dispersed, there 
would be intermediaries that would connect the principal and the agent, such as brokers (cargo 
brokers and shipping brokers). Other examples of intermediaries between charterer and shipowner-
operator (case two and four) are shipping pools. Section  5.4 and the four cases only describe only 
the one principal and one agent relationship as shown by the dashed outline in Table ‎5.14. The 
above principal agent relationships are only in the context of carriage of goods, and there are many 
several dimensions or contexts other than these, for example a shipowner-operator (as a principal) 
would hire the crew (as agents), or shipowner (as a principal) would hire a management company 
(as an agent) to operate the ships, the management company (as a principal) would hire technical 
operators (as agents) and manning agents (as agents) as shown in Figure ‎5.15, relationships between 
other stakeholders (e.g. ports, classification societies etc. as shown in Figure 5.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.15: Principal agent relationship chain in other contexts 
When the chain of principal agent relationships extends, and other than interests of the original 
principal and the final agent not coinciding (goal conflict or split incentives), other agency related 
barriers such as asymmetric information and monitoring and other barriers become more pervasive. 
Combining the above analysis of multiple principal agent relationships with previously mentioned 
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one principal one agent cases (case one to four), should lead to a more realistic and accurate picture 
of the principal agent problems and its classification as well as other barriers that may be impending 
as a result of those relationships. The following section shows the various stakeholders arrangement 
in the voyage and time charter (case two and four) and shipping division and bareboat charter (case 
one) for bulk and container shipping sectors.  
5.4.2. Arrangements of stakeholders and barriers in the voyage and time charter 
Case two and four, mentioned above were shown to be prone to the principal agent efficiency and 
usage problem. Case two which represents the time charter has been extended from the initial one 
principal (time charterer) and one agent (shipowner-operator) to include principals and agents 
before and after. As can be seen in Figure ‎5.16 to Figure ‎5.19, investment in energy efficiency is 
farther out from where it was originally, the commercial operator is only responsible for maintaining 
the daily operations of the ship, with the energy efficiency investment responsibility carried out by 
the registered or beneficial owner. Operators can be analogous to management companies who 
have contracts that get renewed or expire typically every two years, which could further decrease 
the time horizon of ownership at that level. The situation of management companies is comparable 
to managers of publicly listed companies, discussed in section ‎5.4, where performance is assessed 
on a shorter timeframe compared to the timeframe that the energy efficiency measure will take to 
pay off. The Management company or operator is generally not allowed to make capital changes to 
vessels although it can make some operational changes to save fuel. All costs are passed from the 
operator or management company to either charterers or owners, hence the operator or 
management company may have no direct interest in energy efficiency. Unless the shipowner 
expects and rewards the operator to improve energy efficiency, split incentives will exist between 
the owner and operator.  
Under a voyage charter, in between the trader, charterer and operator, fuel costs are included on a 
dollar per-tonne basis, so the charterer cannot see the fuel costs of the voyage (lack of transparency) 
nor offered different rates for different efficiency levels e.g. at different speeds. Furthermore, the 
full efficiency of a vessel is generally not portrayed by the broker to the voyage charterer due to 
general lack of information and or information asymmetry. Maddox Consulting (2012) report that 
there is a general lack of fuel consumption data (most direct metric for energy use). Their discussions 
with numerous ship operators, charterers and brokers cite the lack of reliable, accurate, and publicly 
available information on the fuel consumption of individual ships. For example, the IHS Fairplay Sea-
Web which was used to calculate reference EEDI baselines has the fuel consumption data for only on 
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average 25% for tankers, dry bulkers, and container ships listed in the database. On the subject of 
information asymmetry in the chartering operations, Maddox Consulting (2012) say the following: 
“A few brokers and charterers maintain “proprietary” databases on vessels available for charter, 
which include fuel consumption figures for individual vessels. Based on discussions with industry 
participants, it appears that these data are either expensive to obtain or are not available to third 
parties” Maddox Consulting (2012, p65) 
In summary from the above sections, the principal agent problems and barriers in case two and four 
in shipping can be summarised generally as follows: 
Problems Explanation Mainly affecting 
Split responsibility 
for capital and 
operational costs 
The entity investing in technical energy efficiency is 
different from the one bearing the cost of the energy 
efficiency. 
Time charter  
(case two) 
Short term 
ownership periods 
compared to life of 
ships 
Owner-operators own ships on average for around 
eight years, each ship has around three owners with 
the first owner retaining the vessel for approximately 
fifteen years. 
Voyage charter 
(case one) 
Time charter  
(case two) 
Cost pass through 
and cost elasticity in 
different markets 
Freight rates quoted to the charterer in most 
markets include cost of fuel along with other costs, 
which are not discernable.  
Voyage charter 
(case one) 
Information 
asymmetry or lack of 
information on 
energy efficiency of 
ships 
Full energy efficiency of a vessel is generally not 
portrayed by broker to the voyage charterer due to 
general lack of information and or information 
asymmetry. Operational energy efficiency data is 
also seldom recorded and portrayed. Lack of 
information is also due to lack of accurate 
measurement. 
Voyage charter 
(case one) 
Time charter  
(case two) 
Cost of monitoring 
and claiming 
Charterer can only effectively challenge or verify 
shipowners fuel consumption guarantee through 
third party weather routing companies. Charterer 
also has to consider the cost of litigation in the event 
of underperformance or over consumption.  
Time charter  
(case two) 
Charterers lack of 
full or direct control 
Although in commercial control of the ship, the 
charterer does not employ the crew on-board ships 
Time charter 
(case two) 
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over operations 
Charter rates not 
reflecting energy 
efficiency 
proportionally 
The savings in fuel costs made by the charterer as a 
result of an energy efficient ship are not fully passed 
back to the shipowner in the form of proportionally 
higher charter rates.  
Time charter  
(case two) 
Fixed schedules and 
inventory costs 
resulting in usage 
problems 
Charterers stipulate that the ship should proceed at 
utmost despatch under the voyage charter and 
inventory costs sometimes outweigh the fuel savings 
from slower speed. Under the time charter, the 
charterer would have other contractual obligations 
(e.g. buyer) thus bill of ladings stipulate full speed 
and also have to consider their inventory costs across 
the supply chain.  
Voyage charter 
(case one) 
Time charter  
(case two) 
Short term duration 
of time charters  
Over 90% of time charters are for less than two 
years, therefore it does not permit charterers from 
getting payback from the investment in technical and 
some operational efficiency measures.  
Time charter 
(case two) 
Table ‎5.15: Summary of key problems in the contracts for carriage of goods 
Technical or capital intensive measures can therefore be challenging to implement. Operational 
energy efficiency measures can be implemented but in a limited number of situations. In case two 
the time charterer can implement a limited number of measures and in case four in very few 
situations can the charterer determine the speed at which the ship will travel. The next section 
explores the principal agent problem and operational measures in shipping in comparison to other 
literature looking at operational or behavioural aspects of the principal agent problem.  
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Figure ‎5.16: Extension of case two and four in bulk shipping (voyage and time charter)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.17: Extension of case one in bulk shipping (shipping division or bareboat charter) 
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Figure ‎5.18: Extension of case two and four in container shipping (time charter) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.19: Extension of case one in container shipping (carrier-operated or bareboat charter)
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5.4.3. Principal agent classification and operational measures in shipping 
Much of the literature on the classification principal agent has focussed on the problems of 
implementing technical measures in various cases. It is however possible for end users or principals 
to influence part of the energy use by changing their behaviour. Taking the example of the principal 
in case two, who cannot implement the technical measures as the agent is responsible for these, can 
to some extent modify his/her behaviour to control the energy payments. So a tenant in case two, 
could change his/her pattern of use of space heating, cooking, etc even though he or she is not in 
control of selecting their design based efficiency. Prindle et al. (2006), Murtishaw and Sathaye 
(2006), IEA (2007), Grauss and Worrell (2008), Vernon and Meier (2012) acknowledge that 
operational measures also need to be considered and classified as above, however none has applied 
this in their estimation of the principal agent problems. Furthermore for case two IEA (2007) show 
that it can be further split into two groups, one group not being able to choose the technology and 
another  group able to choose some technology. This is important for the analysis of the shipping 
cases as it suggests that charterers (principals) in case two can to some extent choose the efficiency 
measures which will affect the energy costs that they pay.  
Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) show that it is possible to create separate principal agent 
classification matrices for different energy efficiency measures for the same users, for example 
refrigirators, water heater, space heating and lighting. As an example a tenant cannot choose his or 
her own water heater (case two) but can choose his or her own television (case one). Moreover they 
show that not all rental households fall strictly in case two and four, as has been generally assumed 
in IEA (2007), and neither do all occupant owned households strictly fall in case one. For example 
some rental households with no refrigerators included can fall in case one and conversely newly 
built occupant-owned households can fall in case two. The result of this is that principal agent 
problems can be quite pervasive in some measures, whereas completely non-existent in other 
measures, for example, Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) find that for water heaters 21% of units are 
allocated in case one and 68% of units allocated in case two and for lighting 95% of units are 
allocated in case one.  
Thus it is important to examine the principal agent problems in shipping on a measure by measure 
basis, rather than assuming that a type of charter is representative of a principal agent case. As 
discussed in chapter one, operational measures are relatively cheaper to implement and mostly 
require a change in behaviour or contracts for implementation. For example a weather routing 
service subscription could cost between $1,000 to £20,000, depending of level of complexity (DNV 
2010) and can be applied to the whole fleet. ‘Just In Time’ arrival would require a change in 
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contractual terms or charterparty clauses. Under a time charter, charterers would generally have 
these options available to them, therefore as a principal paying the energy bill, they can select the 
operational measure, resulting in less of principal agent problem i.e. shifting from case two to case 
one, for example in applying the weather routing measure, Just In Time arrival (see appendix B). 
However, strictly speaking the charterers are still not in direct control of the vessel since they are 
using their agent’s subcontracted agents (shipowner-operators crew and master). Therefore, in 
some operational measures such as autopilot adjustment, trim/draft optimisation, the principal 
agent problem could still exist.  Under a voyage charter the charterer has no option of selecting the 
operational measures; only in a limited number of situations (in the case of oil major charterparties) 
can a charterer select the speed (as an operational measure) of the ship. When the above 
mentioned shift occurs, the principal agent problem of efficiency may be reduced from its original 
level but the situation is still surrounded by other barriers such as short time horizon, operational 
measures efficiency etc.  
 Charterer can select 
operational measure 
Charterer cannot select 
operational measure 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment),  
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
Time charter 
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
Some trip (time) charters 
Charterer does not pay 
energy bill (indirect energy 
payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
NA 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
Voyage charter 
Table ‎5.16: Operational measures and principal agent problems 
In conclusion it can be seen that for some operational measures the time charter can be classed as 
case one where there is no principal agent problem. In this case the implementation of operational 
measures should hypothetically be at its highest, but if it is not, could it be said that there are other 
barriers that are inhibiting the uptake of operational measures in time charters? Similarly, could the 
barriers also explain the lack of implementation of operational measures under voyage charters? 
The following chapter aims to answer these questions through the use of a survey method.                                                                                                          
5.5. Step two: Estimating population affected by principal agent problem 
Section ‎5.4 described the first step of the principal agent methodology as suggested by Murtishaw 
and Sathaye (2006), Prindle et al (2006) and IEA (2007). The second step involves estimating the 
population falling into each of the cases in the above matrices (Table ‎5.13 and Table ‎5.16). Step one 
discussed in depth the various situations in which principal agent problems may exist in shipping. 
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However, estimating the population for each of the cases in matrices is a challenging task, not least 
because the data is extremely difficult to obtain. As IEA (2007) suggests: 
“Estimating the population of end users falling into each category is a challenging task because 
statistics for energy consumption and stock (that is, the number of products) rarely correspond to 
the categories. This fraction of the population must be estimated indirectly through combinations of 
other sources” IEA (2007, p45)  
 
Thus in this step it is decided that a simplified approach would be taken, to gain a first order 
estimate of the population that would potentially be affected by the principal agent problem. This 
simplified approach has been taken in various case studies within Prindle et al. (2006) and IEA 
(2007). For example, in the case of commercial offices in Japan, Netherlands and Norway IEA (2007) 
used a fairly generic classification of the principal agent problems and assumptions to estimate the 
population affected.  
Most of the classifications or allocations into cases are based on assumptions or data derived from 
external sources such as national surveys or other studies. In the former case, the Norwegian case 
study uses two approaches to identify total office space, expert judgement and employment 
statistics. The most relevant IEA (2007) case study to this research is commercial office space in 
Netherlands. The relevance is mainly because it is focussed on businesses (which could be said to 
have a profit maximising or cost minimising objectives rather than individuals in residential sector 
who could be said to be utility maximising) and secondly it attempts to classify energy efficiency 
investment decisions into three cases instead of the dichotomous classification that other case 
studies use. The results are presented in Table ‎5.17, which suggest that when decisions can be made 
by renters of office space, they fall into case one. Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) have been able to 
disaggregate the classification of cases for separate end use devices, such as water heaters and 
lighting due to the good quality data from the American Housing survey and Residential Energy 
Consumption survey, as a result they are able to distinguish between twelve different types of 
households that can be allocated to each of the four cases. 
Each of the above studies estimates the number of units affected in each case, which could be 
households, offices etc., represented as a percentage of the total population of the units. In some 
cases this is extended to some other parameter such as floor area, rentable square foot, miles 
travelled etc. In shipping this could therefore mean number of ships (as units) or an extension of it 
being the total DWT or tonne miles. However, the important parameter is the unit because the 
principal agent problem is fairly dependent on each unit falling into a case rather than the size of the 
unit falling into a case. To illustrate this, take an example of a VLCC on time charter and a handysize 
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tanker on voyage charter. Suppose the VLCC falls in case two and the handysize falls in case four. 
According to the first parameter i.e. units in this case ships, they would both be the same i.e. one 
unit, however when considering DWT case two would be larger than case four. The ability to extend 
to the second parameter will depend on the data availability or can be made using assumptions 
based on the profile of ships in each sector. It is first important to identify in which case a unit falls 
and then estimating using the secondary parameter.  
Table ‎5.17: Principal agent problems in commercial leasing in Netherlands     
Source: IEA (2007) 
It is also important to note that the allocation into cases describes a given set of ships at one point in 
time. For other studies such as those relating to the residential sector, commercial offices sector the 
units don’t change very frequently i.e. households or offices generally remain constant in their use 
but may change over a longer period of time. In shipping this may not be the case, as most ships 
would move from voyage to time and vice versa and this is highly dependent on the market 
conditions and a company’s target ratio or risk bearing level as shown in Figure ‎5.20. As a result 
shipping companies have a range of options to charter-in and charter-out their fleet as shown in 
Figure ‎5.21. The following are examples of when chartering levels have changed over time (from 
Stopford 2008): 
 Most LNG projects were set up using vessels owned or leased by the project, but this has 
changed as the projects expired and LNG ships were beginning to enter the voyage charter 
market. 
 Until 1990’s almost all containerships were owned by liner companies, but this changed 
dramatically as the top thirty liner companies increasingly time chartered-in ships, which is up to 
50% of the container fleet.  
 End user can choose technology End user cannot choose technology 
End user pays the 
energy bill 
Case 1: No PA problem 
60% of all offices (26m rentable 
square foot, RSF), of which: 
-Owned: 17.3m RSF  
-Rented: 8.7m RSF 
Case 2: Efficiency problem 
40% of all offices (17.2m RSF) 
-Rented: 17.2 RSF 
22.5% not allowed to choose any 
measures 
77.5% allowed to choose some 
End user does 
not pay the 
energy bill 
Case 3: Usage and efficiency problem 
0% 
Case 4: Usage problem 
0% 
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 In the early 70’s around 80% of tanker fleet (in total DWT capacity) was on time charter to oil 
companies. By 1990 the position had reversed and only around 20% were on time charter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.20: Risk management options in bulk shipping            
Source: Stopford (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.21: Chartering options of a shipping firm 
Stopford (2008) refers to the varying levels of chartering as a shipping risk management strategy for 
the cargo owners i.e. the principal. There are different strategies employed by the principals in 
relation to risk and the quote below describes the risk management options in bulk shipping. 
 “If cargo owners feel very confident about their future cargo flows and want to control the shipping, 
they may decide on option one, which involves buying and operating their own ships (i.e. case one 
or bareboat charter). In doing this they cut the shipowner out of the equation (though they may use 
a shipping company to manage the vessels) and take all the shipping risk themselves. If all cargo 
owners do this then the voyage market (i.e. case four) disappears and the role of independent 
shipowner shrinks. However, if they are reasonably certain about future cargo volumes, but feel 
independent shipowners can do the job cheaper, they may prefer option two (i.e. case two), which 
involves taking long-term charters from independent owners and paying a daily rate, regardless of 
whether the ship is needed. Finally cargo owners can pass all the shipping risk to the shipowner by 
using the voyage market, option three (i.e. case four)” (Stopford 2008, p103).  
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The following sections outline the method for estimating the units falling into each case, following 
the simplified approach. In Table ‎5.18, the first allocation of cases, the time charter was allocated to 
case two (efficiency problem) and the voyage charter was allocated to case four (usage problem). 
These were in the later sections (departing from the traditional one principal one agent model and 
focussing on operational measures) shown to be more complex problems than this initial recursion. 
 Charterer selects technology, 
Shipowner-operator cannot 
select technology 
Charterer cannot select 
technology, Shipowner-
operator selects technology 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment), 
Shipowner-operator does 
not pay energy bill 
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
Charterers shipping division 
Bareboat charter 
Efficiency problem can exist 
Case 2 
Time charter  
 
Shipowner-operator pays 
energy bill, Charterer does 
not pay energy bill (indirect 
energy payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem 
can exist 
Case 3 
None 
Usage problem can exist  
Case 4 
Voyage charter 
Table ‎5.18: First allocation of principal agent problems in shipping 
The above section shows that the number of ships falling in each case would vary according to the 
market circumstances and the risk appetite of cargo owners (principals). As a result of the global 
financial crisis, the shipping industry has also been affected through significant over supply in the 
market (due to over ordering in the peak years and low demand). This market condition directly 
affects the risk outlook of the industry and the principals (i.e. charterers) would delay from investing 
in their own fleets (Stopford 2008). This in turn affects any quantification of the number of units 
falling into each of the cases in the principal agent matrix. Therefore it is important to note that the 
following analysis is just a snapshot/cross-sectional analysis of the fleet for the specific time period 
under investigation.  
5.5.1. Method for estimating principal agent problems in shipping 
In order to estimate the number of units falling in each of the cases, data is obtained from the 
Clarkson’s Shipping Information Network (SIN) for fixtures on voyage charter and time charter for 
the wetbulk and drybulk sectors. Limitations of using Clarksons SIN fixtures were mentioned in 
chapter four section ‎4.3.3 but the major limitations are geographical under-reporting and size 
related under-reporting, which was confirmed by the then Head of Clarksons Research Services, Dr. 
Stopford (Personal communication, 29th January 2012) that there is indeed under representation of 
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fixtures from Asia but for most large ships in Asia there is good level of reporting. Secondly, there is 
also ship size related under reporting i.e. the database has missing data on fixtures on very small 
tankers which number over 4000. Appendix B shows the number of fixtures (charters) in each of the 
sectors broken down by the ship size category for the year 2011. The number of fixtures in the 
voyage charter is very high compared to those on time charter. However, using just the number of 
fixtures is biased heavily towards voyage charters because of their shorter lengths, thus a single ship 
could be fixed as many as fifteen to twenty times in a single year.  
In the container sector all the fixtures reported in Clarksons SIN only relate to time charters because 
of the structure of the sector. A containership is always chartered by several (hundreds) of shippers 
who buy slots or capacity in the ship or route (i.e. a containership is never on a voyage fixture to a 
single shipper) making it very difficult to estimate the number of shippers who would fall in the 
voyage charterer column. For the purposes of classifying the case of principal agent problem for the 
container sector, it is therefore assumed that the shippers contract with the liner operators (who 
could be shipowners, bareboat charterers and time charterers of the container ships). Therefore the 
above reported time charter fixtures are second level contracts in a multiple principal agent chain, as 
shown in section ‎5.4.1. As mentioned earlier, for this section a simplified approach is followed, that 
looks only at one level of contracts, contracts of carriage of goods, as summarised in Table ‎5.19. 
 Voyage charter Time charter 
Wetbulk & 
Drybulk 
Charterer (principal) with 
shipowner-operator (agent) 
Charterer (principal) with shipowner-
operator (agent) 
Container Shipper (principal) with liner 
operator (agent) 
N.A 
Table ‎5.19: Principal agent problems in contracts of carriage of goods in different sectors 
In order to remove the bias of short term fixtures in voyage charter, the number of units i.e. ships 
falling in each of the cells is required. The result of the number of ships in 2011 falling into each 
category is shown in table B5 in appendix B. Table B5 limits the ships that are chartered multiple 
times in a year to only a single ship (or single count of units). As mentioned in the beginning of this 
section, other studies (e.g. Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006) have purely focussed on the number of 
units (e.g. dwellings and offices) falling in each category, without adjusting for the length of time of 
the lease. This is partly due to the units being in a fairly constant state for at least one year (most 
residential rental contracts are for six months to one year minimum, with office leases having longer 
minimum periods). As shown earlier, in shipping this may not be the case because ships constantly 
change the charter market they operate in. Table B5 would therefore be an inaccurate 
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representation, as ships which may be chartered only once on voyage charter will still show as single 
count for the whole of that year, whereas in reality the ship could have just been on voyage charter 
for only one month in that year. Similarly, a ship chartered-in on time charter for six months will 
show as a single count for the whole of the year. Furthermore ships time chartered in previous years 
for a longer period of time spanning over to or beyond 2011 would not have been captured. In order 
to represent the time a ship has spent in a particular charter market, further adjustments using 
several assumptions were required. The process and assumptions are detailed in appendix B.  
5.5.2. Results 
Table B6 in appendix B shows the estimated number of ships adjusted for time in each of the sectors 
broken down by the ship size category for the year 2011. Figure ‎5.22 and Figure ‎5.23 show the end 
results as a proportion of the charter market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.22: Proportion of ships on voyage and time charters in the wetbulk sector in 2011 
 
 
 
 
Ship type DWT >= DWT < 
Wet VLCC 200,000  
Wet Suezmax 120,000 200,000 
Wet Afra 80,000 120,000 
Wet Panamax 60,000 80,000 
Wet Handy 10,000 60,000 
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Ship type DWT >= DWT < 
Dry Cape 100,000  
Dry Panamax 60,000 100,000 
Dry Handymax 35,000 60,000 
Dry Handysize 10,000 35,000 
Figure ‎5.23: Proportion of ships on voyage and time charters in drybulk sector in 2011 
Figure ‎5.22 above closely matches with Stopford (2008), who shows that the tonnage in wetbulk 
charter is split similarly, i.e. around 20% of the tonnage is on time charter and remainder on voyage 
charter. The marginal difference could be explained by two reasons. Firstly, using the market 
circumstances proposition, one could argue that the 80:20 (voyage to time) ratio in 2007 would 
increase due to the financial crisis (i.e. cargo owners preferring more ships on voyage charter, to 
limit their own shipping risk). Secondly, Stopford (2008) measures the proportion in total fleet 
tonnage (DWT), whereas Figure ‎5.22 is based on number of ships. Figure ‎5.23 shows that the drybulk 
sector charter market is quite opposite of what is seen the wetbulk sector. The following tables 
allocate the findings according to cases in the principal agent matrix. Table ‎5.20 shows that on 
average just under 90% of the wetbulk fleet on charter market is allocated to case four i.e. 
potentially affected by the usage problem and over 10% of the wetbulk fleet is allocated to case two, 
potentially affected by the efficiency problem. However, when focussing on the principal agent 
problems in the context of operational measures this translates to just over 10% of the fleet on the 
charter market (which originally was on time charter in Table ‎5.18) and some charterer operated 
fleet may not face principal agent problems but the same level of the fleet could be affected by the 
usage problem. 
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 Charterer selects technology Shipowner-operator selects 
technology, Charterer cannot 
select technology 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment), 
Shipowner-operator does 
not pay energy bill 
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
- Small no. of ships operated by 
charterers shipping division and 
under bareboat charters. E.g: 
50 BP owned and  operated  
10 Shell owned and operated  
40 Total owned and operated 
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
- 12% of the fleet on charter 
market 
 
Shipowner-operator pays 
energy bill, Charterer does 
not pay energy bill 
(indirect energy payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
- None 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
- 88% of the fleet on charter 
market 
Table ‎5.20: Wetbulk sector principal agent problems in technology 
 Charterer can select 
operational measure 
Charterer cannot select 
operational measure 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment),  
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
- small no. of charter operated  
- 12% of fleet on charter market 
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
 
Charterer does not pay 
energy bill (indirect energy 
payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
- none 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
- 88% of fleet charter market 
Table ‎5.21: Wetbulk sector principal agent problems in operations 
Table ‎5.22 shows that over 60% of the drybulk fleet on charter market is allocated to case two, 
potentially affected by the efficiency problem and just under 40% of the drybulk fleet is allocated to 
case four, thus potentially affected by the usage problem. However, when focussing on the principal 
agent problems and operational measures this translates to just over 60% of the fleet (which 
originally was on time charter in Table ‎5.18) and some charter operated ships which may not face 
principal agent problems and the same level of the fleet is affected by the usage problem. 
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 Charterer selects technology,  Shipowner-operator selects 
technology, Charterer cannot 
select technology 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment), 
Shipowner-operator does 
not pay energy bill 
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
- Small no. of ships operated by 
charterers shipping division and 
under bareboat charters. E.g: 
5 Rio Tinto owned and operated  
30 Vale owned and operated 
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
- 62% of the fleet on charter 
market 
 
Shipowner-operator pays 
energy bill, Charterer does 
not pay energy bill 
(indirect energy payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
- None 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
- 38% of the fleet on charter 
market 
Table ‎5.22: Drybulk sector principal agent problems in technology 
 Charterer can select 
operational measure 
Charterer cannot select 
operational measure 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment),  
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
- Small no. of charter operated  
- 62% of the fleet on charter 
market 
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
 
Charterer does not pay 
energy bill (indirect energy 
payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
- none 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
- 38% of the fleet on charter 
market 
Table ‎5.23: Drybulk sector principal agent problems in operations 
100% of the container fleet could be affected by the usage problem and there is no difference in the 
number of cases principal agent problems related to technology and operational measures. Analysis 
of the wetbulk and drybulk sectors time charter durations showed that on average fixture lengths 
were seventeen months for wetbulk, eight months for drybulk and eleven months for container 
sector (with very high standard deviations). Table B7 in appendix B and Figure ‎5.24 shows the 
proportion of ships of different sectors for different time periods (Research on duration of time 
charters and relationship with ship type and size was conducted during the secondment to Forum 
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for the Future’s Sustainable Shipping Initiative that was investigating split incentives in the time 
charter market for the development of a financing mechanism for retrofitting of energy efficiency 
measures). The results suggests that around 70% of ships on time charter have a duration of less 
than two years, which suggests that payback of many technical measures may not fall within this 
period, whereas paypack of many operational measures (e.g. trim draft optimisation) has been 
suggested to be within six months to one year (Wang et al. 2010; Lockley et al. 2011), so in addition 
to aligned incentives there is even a greater chance of implementation of operational measures 
under case one.  
Figure ‎5.24: Distribution of time charters duration by sector (time normalized) 
5.6. Step three: Estimating the energy consumption affected by principal 
agent problems in shipping 
The final step in the principal agent methodology as suggested by Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006), 
Prindle et al. (2006) and IEA (2007) is to estimate the affected level of energy consumed i.e. the 
amount of energy consumed by the population of end users estimated in step two. The total 
affected energy is the sum of energy use falling into cases where principal agent problems exist. As 
discussed earlier the classification depends on whether a technology perspective or operational 
measures perspective is taken. According to IEA (2007) affected energy use can be calculated by 
estimating a devices average energy use and then multiplying it by the affected population. 
However, in most circumstances IEA (2007) acknowledges that this is rarely straightforward as data 
on energy consumption is difficult to obtain and requires making assumption of energy use in each 
of the cases, which is likely to differ as the devices can be used differently. For example IEA (2007) in 
the context of Japanese and Netherlands offices use average efficiency per unit/square foot and 
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assume the same level of energy efficiency for all cases. In another context in the same report IEA 
(2007) show that average efficiency is 20% better for owner-occupied offices and those owner-
occupied offices had higher implementation of energy saving measures.  
5.6.1. Method for estimating energy consumption affected by principal agent problems 
In shipping the energy consumption can be estimated using technical details obtained from 
databases such as the Clarksons World Fleet Register (WFR) and IHS Fairplay fleet database. 
However, the actual energy use can deviate significantly from the design based energy estimate 
because of the way a ship is operated. The operational efficiency of a ship is more relevant when 
looking at principal agent problems in operations. This research attempts to estimate the first part of 
this step i.e. to estimate the energy efficiency of ships only, instead of attempting to estimate the 
total energy consumed. To estimate the energy efficiency of ships in operation, data from Smith et 
al. (2013) are used. Smith et al. (2013) use newly acquired satellite Automated Identification System 
(S-AIS) data of ships actual movements to calculate the average normalised operational efficiency 
(ANOE) of ships in grams of CO2 emitted per tonne nautical mile (gCO2/t.nm). The technical 
specifications of the ships are derived from WFR, which gives the average technical efficiency (ATE). 
The data for ship‘s operational characteristics (speed, loading condition and voyage characteristics) 
are obtained from individual ship‘s AIS transponders for the period beginning from January 2011 to 
December 2011, which corresponds to the fixtures data used in the above analysis. Missing data on 
technical and operational data is mainly derived from Buhaug et al. (2009). Ship level data is then 
aggregated according to ship type or DWT range of ships, which is presented in Table ‎5.24. The 
emissions factor for CO2 emissions is 3.14 i.e. every tonne of fuel burnt (HFO) results in 3.14 tonnes 
of CO2. The below analysis is based on CO2 energy efficiency.  
Crude  Size range ANOE ATE 
 >= < gCO2/t.nm gCO2/t.nm 
Wet VLCC 200,000  4.3 2.3 
Wet Suezmax 120,000 200,000 6.5 3.4 
Wet Afra 80,000 120,000 11.3 3.8 
Wet Panamax 60,000 80,000 15.8 4.8 
Wet Handy 10,000 60,000 25.4 7.4 
Table ‎5.24: Average normalized operational efficiency and technical efficiency in the wetbulk sector 
Source: Smith et al. (2013)  
As can be seen from the table the average normalized operational efficiency in comparison to 
technical efficiency is higher by a factor of two for larger ships and by a factor of three for smaller 
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ships, which suggests that smaller ships have higher potential for improvement in their operations. 
The above data uses aggregate level and average data, and does not split the efficiencies for ships on 
different types of charter. To test whether there is a difference in normalized operational efficiency 
among the voyage and time chartered ships, fixtures data available from Clarksons SIN is matched 
with ship level data used in Smith et al. (2013). Details of ships thought to represent case one (i.e. 
charter operated and not occurring in the charter market) are obtained for one major oil company 
that uses its ships to carry 80% of its own cargoes. Fixtures for the year 2011 are obtained for voyage 
charters and for time charters fixtures for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are used to check if any fixtures are 
still running in 2011 as shown in Table ‎5.25. Ship X has been on time charter throughout the 2011 
period, ship Y has been on time charter from the mid to end of the year and ship Z has been on time 
charter from beginning of 2011 to mid 2011.  
 
Time charter 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Ship X     
Ship Y      
Ship Z      
Table ‎5.25: Time charter fixtures and analysis period 
Fixtures for each ship type falling within the DWT range are matched with Smith et al. (2013) data 
using the ships IMO number. However, Clarksons fixtures data only reports the name of the ship, 
thus Microsoft Excel’s lookup function is used to return the IMO number from Smith et al. (2013). 
This lookup had to overcome two problems, firstly names of ships are not unique i.e. repeated 
names (but only in different ship categories/DWT ranges) and names constantly get changed. In both 
cases the DWT of the ships is used to validate the matches. Filtering for ships that occur only in one 
charter market throughout the whole year i.e. they are not sublet nor enter the other market, 
results in very few cases of ships on time charter for both sectors. Refer to appendix B for analysis on 
the level of subletting in the time charter market for wetbulk and drybulk sectors and Figure ‎5.31. 
5.6.2. Results 
The figures below show that none of the parameters differ at least graphically between cases i.e. 
voyage, time and charterer operated. Comparing means using independent sample t-tests (95% 
confidence interval, two tailed tests) for each ship type suggested that the null hypothesis (no 
difference in means) could not be rejected for each of the parameters (refer to appendix B for 
examples of SPSS outputs). This suggests that the normalised operational efficiency, technical 
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efficiency and speed ratio of ships on voyage charter, ships on time charter and owner-operated 
ships are not statistically significantly different. Based on this finding it can be assumed that the 
initial estimate of emissions into voyage and time charter does not change significantly from 
Figure ‎5.22 and Figure ‎5.23. 
Figure ‎5.25: Normalized operational efficiency comparison for wetbulk  
Figure ‎5.26: Technical efficiency comparison for wetbulk 
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Figure ‎5.27: Design vs. operational speed ratio comparison for wetbulk 
 
 
Figure ‎5.28: Normalized operational efficiency comparison for drybulk 
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Figure ‎5.29: Technical efficiency comparison for drybulk 
 
Figure ‎5.30: Design vs. operational speed ratio comparison drybulk 
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Figure ‎5.31: Average number of times sublet per time charter 
5.7. Concluding remarks 
This chapter attempted to answer research questions three and four i.e. estimating the population 
affected by principal agent problems and how energy efficiency of ships in operations is affected by 
principal agent problems. The research was done mainly using secondary data and desk research. 
Using one principal and one agent scenario, it was seen that the time charter could potentially 
represent the principal agent efficiency problem and the voyage charter representing the principal 
agent usage problem. However, this was only true for technical measures and it was suggested that 
in the context of operational measures, the time charterer who pays for fuel also had the ability to 
implement operational measures and therefore better represented case one, where no principal 
agent problems occur, at least when focussing only on carriage of goods contracts. The principal 
agent problem was shown to be more complex than the one principal and one agent situation, due 
to the long chain of stakeholders involved in the operations, which meant that even when goals may 
be aligned in one context (e.g. contracts of carriage of goods), they may not be in other contexts 
(e.g. final sales, design etc.).  
In the context of operational measures, a high proportion of the wetbulk ships could be affected by 
principal agent problems, whereas relatively lower proportion of ships in drybulk sector could be 
affected by principal agent problems. This seems not to be reflected in the operational efficiency 
(nor technical efficiency or speed reduction ratio) of the ships however, both voyage chartered ships 
and time chartered ships had similar levels of efficiency. Furthermore, there was no difference in 
operational efficiency between the ships that were believed to be representing case one compared 
with those on the charter market. The following chapter therefore attempts to assess whether the 
level of implementation of operational measures reported by respondents actually differed for the 
different principal agent cases.  
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6. Survey results preliminary analysis 
This chapter and the following chapter present the findings of the self-administered online 
questionnaire that is used to directly answer the research questions on implementation of energy 
efficiency measures and factors affecting their implementation. The chapter begins with a brief 
section explaining the data preparation, followed by the demographic profiles of the respondents, 
i.e. reporting on background measures. This is followed by preliminary analysis of the results using 
mainly descriptive statistics to explain the dependent variables in the survey such as the 
implementation of measures, perception of barriers and factors affecting implementation. 
Thereafter, the results of the independent variables are discussed. The chapter mainly makes use of 
univariate and some bivariate analysis for the discussion of the above variables and it is hoped that 
this provides a good context and background for discussion and analysis of relationships that follows 
in the following chapters. This chapter deals with the implementation of energy efficiency measures, 
barriers and factors for implementation components of the research framework as proposed in 
chapter three, highlighted in Figure ‎6.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎6.1: Focus of this chapter and the research framework 
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6.1. Data preparation 
Data preparation for analysis of the survey results involved several stages. The first step was to close 
any open responses of the survey and record them as completed (or partially completed responses), 
which resulted in a total of 194 responses. Twenty four responses had a very high item non response 
for questions three onwards and it was decided to delete these cases, which is one of the ways of 
dealing with missing data, so long as it does not lead to loss of more than 15% of the cases according 
to Hertel (1976, cited by de Vaus 1995). The final response set of 170, which will be referred to as 
the N (sample population). The next step was to download the data files from the survey server with 
representation of answers as values and as labels (as Comma Separated Values .csv). The raw data 
files were imported into Microsoft Excel 2007 spreadsheet software for further sorting and 
preparation. The answers were grouped by implementation of measures, specific barriers to specific 
measures were re-grouped by generic barriers. For missing values especially in the background 
variables and independent variables (chartering ratios), respondents were contacted again through 
phone and email to remove item non-response. Results to most univariate analysis were obtained 
from computations in MS Excel, however there was a need to perform further analysis and statistical 
tests, and the final imputed data was transported to IBM SPSS to perform these. In some instances 
use of the web survey software’s online reporting was also used to perform drill down or further 
analysis per respondent.  
6.2. Data analysis plan 
Analysis of data depends on three factors, the number of variables being examined, level of 
measurement of variables and whether the data is used for descriptive or inferential purposes (de 
Vaus 1995). However, before analysis begins there needs to be a clear understanding of what 
specific questions the analysis will try and answer. These specific questions (operationalized 
questions and hypotheses) are rooted to the main research questions. Table ‎6.2 outlines the specific 
questions that the analysis aims to answer. The operationalized questions then dictate what type of 
analysis is chosen, which can be univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses. A key factor in the 
choice of type of analysis is the level of measurement of the variables being used. The survey mainly 
made use of categorical nominal level of measurement throughout the survey with the exception of 
the last questions relating to chartering ratio, which used interval level measurement. The reasons 
for this choice were explained in chapter four. Following on from determining the level of 
measurement and the choice of type of analysis, there is a need to choose the right method of 
analysis. Table ‎6.1 below shows some of the methods suggested by de Vaus (1995). Correlation 
matrix can also be included in the bivariate analysis as a method to summarise the association or 
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relationships between two variables. The method of analysis depends on the complexity of the 
research questions, i.e. if the question involves only one variable e.g. which measure had the highest 
implementation, then the appropriate method of analysis is univariate analysis under nominal level 
of measurement (because the implementation was measured in five categories) thus resulting in the 
frequency distribution method as the appropriate method for analysis. The method of analysis and 
level of measurement will affect the choice of statistics, both descriptive and inferential, so for 
example for nominal level data and frequency distribution the appropriate descriptive statistic for 
central tendency is the mode and for dispersion is the variation ratio, and the appropriate inferential 
statistic is standard error for the binomial distribution. Figure ‎6.2 below shows the plan of analysis 
with the choices made appropriate for this research.  
Univariate analysis Bivariate analysis Multivariate analysis 
 Frequency distributions  Crosstabulations 
 Scattergrams 
 Regression 
 Rank order correlation 
 Comparison of means 
 Conditional tables 
 Partial rank order 
correlation  
 Multiple and partial 
correlation 
 Multiple and partial 
regression 
 Path analysis 
Table ‎6.1: Some methods of analysis of survey results  
Source: de Vaus (1995) 
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6.2.1. Review of research questions for survey data analysis 
 
Main research questions Specific research questions for survey data analysis 
RQ1 - To what extent are 
energy efficient operational 
measures implemented in 
shipping? 
RQ1a - What is the level of implementation of operational 
energy efficiency measures in shipping? 
RQ1b - How does the level of implementation of operational 
measures vary across the different shipping sectors and size of 
firms? 
RQ1c – Is the implementation of energy efficient operational 
measures higher for time chartered ships compared to voyage 
chartered ships. 
RQ2 - What factors are 
perceived to be the most 
important in explaining the 
lack of implementation of 
energy efficient operational 
measures? 
RQ2a – What are the perceived barriers to the implementation 
of operational energy efficiency measures in shipping? 
RQ2b - How does the perception of barriers vary between 
different shipping sectors, size and chartering ratio for each 
operational measure? 
RQ2c - What are the factors leading to the implementation of 
operational measures? 
Table ‎6.2: Main research questions divided into specific research questions for survey data analysis 
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Figure ‎6.2: Data analysis path and choices for answering specific research questions 
6.3. Demographics 
This section presents the results of the background measures. The online survey asked respondents 
demographic questions on the size of the company by number of ships, number of employees and 
annual fuel use (all with mutually exclusive choices). These demographic questions as well as others 
were asked towards the final sections of the survey in a simple categorical format, in order to reduce 
survey attrition but their placement towards the end may result in relatively higher item non 
response. This was deemed acceptable because the survey respondents would have in any case 
completed other questions on dependent variables. As mentioned in chapter four, size of companies 
can be measured in various ways and it was decided that all of these would be relevant, however the 
measurement that is finally used is the number of ships or fleet size of the company. Figure ‎6.3 
shows the proportions for each of the size measures and includes the responses with missing 
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answers in other dependent variable questions, which will in the later stages be excluded from the 
analysis as per recommendations by de Vaus (1995). The responses from medium sized companies 
are approximately in proportion to the population (or the stratified sampling frame) as shown in 
Table ‎4.1 in chapter four, and similar to NAPA (2012) survey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎6.3: Company size by number of employees, ships and annual fuel use 
The following demographic question asked the respondents to identify which company types would 
best describe their company structure. The question did not have mutually exclusive choices i.e. had 
multiple response data, hence the number of pure ship-owning, operating and management 
companies was slightly lower. Figure ‎6.4 shows those respondents who identified themselves as 
purely one type of company. Since the sampling frame was mainly representing ship-owning and 
operating companies and management companies these types exceed chartering companies and 
shipping divisions. The distribution of company types are very similar to that achieved by NAPA 
(2012), which also had low levels of representation from shipping divisions and charterers.  
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Figure ‎6.4: Respondents to the survey by type of shipping company 
The last background measure captured in the online survey is the sector that the company mainly 
operates in. The question did not have mutually exclusive options as it is thought that companies 
especially bulk shipping companies would operate in wetbulk and drybulk sectors. The survey was 
primarily focussed on the wetbulk, drybulk and container sectors, hence all other responses 
suggesting different sectors have been re-coded as ‘other’ sectors. The responses from the wetbulk 
and drybulk are representative or proportionate to the population, however the container sector 
was significantly under-represented. Figure ‎6.5 shows respondents who identified themselves as 
purely operating in each sector (i.e. had 90% or more of their fleet engaged in one sector). Mixed 
shipping sector is when a company operates in either container and drybulk sectors or container and 
wetbulk sectors. The total number of companies operating in two or more sectors is forty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎6.5: Respondents to the survey by shipping sector 
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Figure ‎6.6 shows the geographical dispersion of the respondents. Although this was not captured in 
the survey explicitly, the online survey could track the locations of respondents. As can be seen an 
overwhelming majority of the responses were from the EU region, over representing the region, this 
is twice of that observed in the sampling frame, over 50% of the shipping companies are 
headquartered in EU and twice of that achieved by NAPA (2012) and Norton Rose (2012). This will 
clearly affect the generalizability of the results unless the responses are weighted by region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎6.6: Geographical location of respondents 
Figure ‎6.7 shows the job roles of the respondents who answered the questionnaire. As illustrated, 
most of these were operational managers or technical superintendents who are responsible for and 
are aware of implementation of operational measures in the company.  
 
Figure ‎6.7: Job roles of respondents 
This section summarises the background measures that provide context to the respondents to the 
survey. The next section presents the key findings of the survey, in a question by question format 
connected to the research questions. 
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6.4. Preliminary analysis 
The main part of the survey directly sought to answer the research questions regarding the level of 
implementation and perception of barriers to implementation. This section will mainly focus on the 
univariate analysis of the dependent variables and to some extent their relationship with 
background variables (bivariate analysis), followed by univariate analysis of the independent 
variable. According to de Vaus (1995) an appropriate method for univariate analysis of nominal 
variables is the frequency distribution method, which is the method that is widely used in this 
section. The first question asked respondents to select the top five operational measures that they 
believe have the highest fuel saving potential. Figure ‎6.8 shows the measures that were selected by 
the respondents. Fuel consumption monitoring, weather routing and general speed reduction 
measures were cited by around 70% of the respondents as measures that have the highest potential. 
This is followed by four measures that were selected by around 50% of the respondents to have the 
highest potential. Around 10% of the respondents believed there were other measures that also had 
high fuel saving potential, however these were a mixture of technical (which are beyond the scope 
of this study), maintenance and operational measures such as LNG propulsion, foul release coatings, 
regular hull bottom cleaning etc. Around 60% of the ‘other’ measures were technical measures and 
the remainder were operational measures. The majority of the of the operational measures were 
related to hull maintenance such as hull condition monitoring, hull and propeller cleaning, regular 
underwater grit blasting etc.  
Before proceeding with the univariate analysis which is presented mainly using frequency tables and 
frequency graphs (de Vaus 1995) there is a need to clarify frequency methods used in this chapter. 
Many of the survey questions required more than one response for an individual question i.e. 
contained multiple response data. For example, question one asks respondents to select five 
measures, other questions ask respondents to select three most important categories pertaining to 
implementation. There are two types of percentages that can describe this, percent of cases and 
percent of responses. Percent of cases (respondents) is a count for a particular variable divided by 
the total number of cases or respondents for that question. Percentage of responses is the count or 
frequency of that particular variable divided by the total of all the counts or frequencies for that 
particular question, which will always result in a sum of 100%. The analysis below uses both these 
methods to present frequency graphs, represented in the Y axis of the following figures, since 
percentage of cases provides better context for analysis and percent of responses provides a better 
picture for comparison. 
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Figure ‎6.8: Operational measures believed to have the highest fuel saving potential 
The results of the first question show that there are three modes (which is the best indicator of 
central tendency for nominal level data) for operational measures believed to have highest fuel 
saving potential. The respondents who selected fuel consumption monitoring, weather routing and 
general speed reduction on average represented 42% of the total responses to this question. The 
variation ratio (measure of dispersion for nominal data) cannot be calculated because the choices 
are not mutually exclusive. Because the survey used nominal variables, in order to make inferences 
to the population mean, Figure ‎6.8 above uses the standard error for the binomial distribution for 
interval estimation for each measure at 95% confidence level. Generally, because the survey had a 
relatively smaller sample size, the ranges for the population mean would lie between +/- 5% and 7% 
of the sample results. This procedure will be followed throughout this chapter, wherever nominal 
variable interval estimates or inferences are made. To some extent a representative sample was 
achieved (for most strata) as shown below in Table ‎6.3, with which some inferences can be made to 
the population (with some margin of error and confidence level as discussed in section  4.1.3.4). The 
discussion that follows is for the purposes of visually identifying relationships between the variables 
and to detect initial relationships or zero order relationships i.e. not controlled for intervening or 
test variables. According to de Vaus (1995) this is the first step towards elaboration analysis.  
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Table ‎6.3: Final results in each stratum 
When the results of the first question are disaggregated according to the size and sector of firms, the 
results show some interesting patterns (Figure ‎6.9 and Figure ‎6.10). For most measures, the belief in 
the highest fuel saving measures does not vary considerably by the company size and the range 
between large and small company responses generally did not exceed 15%. However, for some 
measures there exists some relationships between the views of large and small companies, for 
example trim draft optimisation. The range of responses by company sector was much more 
variable, ranging between 5% and 40% between sectors. Most of the operational measures were 
shown to be cost-effective energy efficient measures and therefore “should be implemented” 
(Thollander and Ottosson 2008, p23). According to the market barriers and failures proposition and 
looking at existing literature, the high fuel saving potential measures should have already been 
implemented broadly. The following section therefore focuses on the level of implementation of 
measures.  
Sector Actual results Size Actual results* 
Wetbulk 39 Large 8 
 Medium 17 
Small 9 
Drybulk 31 Large 3 
 Medium 17 
Small 10 
Container 6 Large 1 
 Medium 4 
Small 1 
Mixed 40 Large 6 
 Medium 27 
Small 5 
Total 116  108 
* The actual results may be higher than 
what is shown for each stratum because 
not all respondents completed 
demographic questions. 
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Figure ‎6.9: Operational measures believed to have the highest fuel saving potential by size 
Figure ‎6.10: Operational measures believed to have the highest fuel saving potential by sector 
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6.4.1. Implementation of measures 
The follow on survey question asked respondents the level of implementation of the five measures 
they selected and thereafter reasons for not selecting the remainder, which would highlight why 
some measures were believed to have a low fuel saving potential. There could be several reasons (as 
discussed in chapter two) why cost-effective operational measures would not be implemented 
according to their fuel saving potential. For this research it is hypothesised that if implementation 
rates for high fuel saving potential measures are low then there exist market barriers that hinder the 
uptake of such measures, which is in line with what has been claimed in the barriers literature i.e. 
failure to realise the potential has been attributed to various market barriers and failures, resulting 
in an energy efficiency gap. Figure 6.11 shows whether the highest fuel saving potential measures 
selected by the respondents have been implemented. The implementation in the survey was 
originally based on five choices; ‘considering or trialling’, ‘considered and decided against’, ‘plan to 
implement’, ‘already implemented’ and ‘did not consider’. These have been later recoded as 
implemented (already implemented) and not implemented (which includes the remainder 
categories) as this will allow for crosstabulation later on and according to de Vaus (1995) is one of 
the options available if the variables have too many categories. 
 
Figure ‎6.11: Implementation of measures selected as having high fuel saving potential 
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Figure ‎6.12: Recoding for implementation of measures  
Many MACC studies assume that measures with negative costs would have been fully implemented 
or would have been implemented under a certain fuel price. From the above it can be seen that 
even the top three cost-effective operational measures that were deemed to be of highest potential 
have actual implementation rates of around 60-70% (+/-9% for 95% confidence level). The average 
implementation across all the measures the implementation rate drops to around 50%, ranging from 
35% to 70%. Combining the ‘already implemented’ and ‘planning to implement’ categories, the 
average across all the measures is just under 70%. The answers to this question clearly show that 
despite the easiness of implementation and short payback of most operational measures (IMO 2009; 
Wang et al. 2010; Lockley et al. 2011; etc.) some measures still do not see high implementation 
rates. This analysis answers the first specific research question regarding the implementation of 
operational energy efficiency measures. Elaborating on this finding, Figure ‎6.13 below shows the 
number of measures already implemented by each company. Just fewer than 50% of the companies 
have implemented three to four measures and only 15% of the companies have implemented all five 
measures that they believe have the highest fuel saving potential. On average each company had 
implemented just under three measures (with a standard deviation of 1.6). The standard error of the 
mean is 0.12, which suggests that the population mean could be anywhere between 2.5 to 3 
measures for a 95% confidence level.  
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Figure ‎6.13: Number of measures implemented by each company 
Earlier it was shown that when the results of the first question are disaggregated according to the 
size and sector of companies, the belief in the highest fuel saving measures varied slightly by the 
company size but varied considerably when disaggregated by sector the company operates in. 
Figure ‎6.14 shows the implementation of measures disaggregated by size. There is a large difference 
between the levels of implementation by the different sized companies amongst the different 
measures. Note that the percentage of respondents is for respondents who selected a particular 
measure and then implemented it, for example weather routing implementation for large 
companies is 75%, of those who selected the measure (N=13) and not 75% of large companies 
(N=20). Thus the N varied considerably between each of the measures and is therefore shown as a 
separate table in Table ‎6.4 and Table ‎6.5. For four measures the small sized companies have higher 
implementation compared to the large companies, and similarly large companies higher 
implementation in four other measures. Some trends can be observed for five measures such as 
weather routing, fuel consumption monitoring, trim draft optimisation but these are not in 
consistent manner and in opposite directions. It is not clear at this stage why this is the case, the 
correlation could be due to some other intervening variable such as the chartering ratio of the firm, 
which will examined in later sections. A possible explanation of the difference in implementation 
rate could perhaps be due to the small sized fleet of small firms, which may make investment 
manageable or conversely the large sized companies not investing due to comparatively higher 
outlay. It is thought that the recoding exercise into ‘implemented’ and ‘not implemented’ may also 
have masked the level of implementation (de Vaus 1995), for example, further analysis of the data 
shows that the larger companies are still either ‘considering or trialling’ or ‘planning to implement’ 
those measures, hence shown to have relatively lower implementation.  
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Disaggregating the implementation of measures by sector reveals similar patterns as seen earlier in 
Figure ‎6.14, i.e. there is a large difference between implementation rates between sectors. One can 
see that for example weather routing implementation rate for drybulk sector is three times that of 
container sector. A possible explanation to this could be that container sector operates on fixed 
schedules or liner service, hence the benefits of weather routing on a specific voyage within a string 
would be minimal. On the other hand, the container sector has over three times more 
implementation of ‘raising crew awareness’ measure when compared to the drybulk sector. Since 
these are zero order relationships, it could suggest that there is a spurious relationship between 
sector and implementation, so for example, the variation in implementation could be due to the 
chartering or ownership structure of the container sector which is quite different to the bulk sectors. 
In chapter five it was noted that almost 50% of containerships were owned and operated by the 
carrier, which would suggest that the owner-operator has a long term interest in the crew and the 
fuel savings that could be achieved through training and incentivising them. The difference in the 
implementation of the speed reduction measure could be due to the contractual requirements for 
speed which are specific to those sectors, which are further investigated in chapter eight.  
Figure ‎6.16 shows the number of measures already implemented by each company broken down by 
size. Nearly 70% of small, medium and large companies have implemented three to five measures. 
All three sizes contributed almost equally to the implementation of all five measures they believed 
to have the highest fuel saving potential. On average the small and medium sized companies had 
slightly higher implementation rate compared to the overall average and that of large companies as 
shown in Table ‎6.6. Figure ‎6.17 shows the number of measures already implemented by each 
company broken down by sector they operate in. Once again there is quite a large spread of the 
number of measures implemented by sector. On average the drybulk and mixed sector companies 
had considerably higher implementation rates compared to the overall average and that of 
companies operating in container and wetbulk sectors as shown in Table ‎6.6. Section  6.5 looks at 
how the distribution of implementation varies by chartering level.  
The analysis presented here only answers to some extent research question 1b, because it only 
presents the initial uncontrolled zero order relationships, thus further elaboration is required. The 
implementation of each measure and its relationship with size, sector and chartering ratio is further 
elaborated using bivariate analysis and specifically the crosstabulations method, which are discussed 
in chapter seven.  
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Figure ‎6.14: Implementation of measures by company size 
 Large Medium Small 
Weather routing 13 51 22 
General speed reduction 16 47 21 
Fuel consumption monitoring 15 54 19 
Trim draft optimisation 9 36 18 
Speed reduction due to port efficiency – JIT arrivals 12 38 20 
Raising crew awareness & energy efficiency training 11 40 12 
Efficient voyage execution 11 40 13 
Optimisation of ballast voyages 11 23 12 
Autopilot adjustment 0 7 11 
Table ‎6.4: Total number of respondents for question two by size. 
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Figure ‎6.15: Implementation of measures by sector 
 
 Wetbulk Drybulk Container Mixed 
Weather routing 26 26 4 29 
Autopilot adjustment 7 6 1 6 
General speed reduction 27 24 4 25 
Fuel consumption monitoring 33 23 5 27 
Trim draft optimisation 15 16 5 24 
Speed reduction due to port efficiency – JIT arrivals 23 18 4 21 
Raising crew awareness & energy efficiency training 23 14 2 22 
Efficient voyage execution 22 11 3 26 
Optimisation of ballast voyages 15 12 2 16 
Table ‎6.5: Total number of respondents for question two by sector  
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Figure ‎6.16: Number of measures implemented by company size 
 
Figure ‎6.17: Number of measures implemented by sector 
 Large Medium Small   wetbulk Drybulk Container Mixed 
Mean 2.75 2.96 2.97 Mean 2.6 3.0 2.17 3.17 
St Dev 1.62 1.65 1.65 St Dev. 1.8 1.5 1.835 1.5 
SE 0.36 0.2 0.3 SE 0.29 0.27 0.75 0.24 
95% CI 2 – 3.5 2.6 – 3.4 2.4 – 3.6 95% CI 2 – 3.2 2.4 – 3.5 0.7 – 3.7 2.7 – 3.6 
Table ‎6.6: Summary statistics for implementation by firms in different size and sectors 
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6.4.2. Perception of barriers 
The second purpose of the survey was to gauge the perception of barriers to operational energy 
efficiency measures. This was measured in two ways; the first method is brief and uses general 
barriers classification in a single grid for the measures that were not selected in the first question 
(Figure ‎4.7). The second method is through asking respondents follow-up questions on the measures 
they had selected as having high potential but they had not yet implemented (i.e. trialling, plan to 
implement, etc., in the second question, see Figure ‎4.6). Table ‎6.7 shows the response choices that 
were presented to the respondents and the barriers categories they fall into. This approach of 
providing more specific choices and then recoding them as general barriers is adapted from previous 
research by Sorrell et al. (2000) and Thollander & Ottosson (2008). Sorrell et al. (2004) group choices 
such as ‘other priorities for capital investment’, ‘strict adherence to capital budgets’, ‘lack of capital’ 
into capital barriers. Similarly, they group choices such as ‘departments not accountable for energy 
costs’, ‘low priority given to energy management’, ‘conflict of interest within organisation’, ‘energy 
objectives not integrated into procedures’ into the split incentives barrier.  This approach is also very 
similar to building scale items as described by de Vaus (1995). Summated scaling consists of 
respondent’s answers to a number of questions. “Summated scales simply require that we measure 
the strength of some opinion on some matter by assessing ‘position’ on a number of questions”.  
Response choices in brackets were dropped for the barriers analysis, which is similar to the deleting 
variables solution according to Hertel (1976, cited by de Vaus, 1995) as they were only relevant to 
the speed reduction measures. They are however revisited in analysis of barriers to speed reduction 
measures. Figure ‎6.18 shows that in general the top three barriers across all the measures that were 
not selected (i.e. seemed to have lower fuel saving potential) were ‘difficult to implement under 
some types of charter’, ‘lack of reliable information on cost and savings’ and ‘lack of direct control 
over operations’. Due to item non response this survey question had an even smaller sample size, 
therefore the interval estimate ranges for the population mean would lie between +/- 7% and 9% of 
the sample results. Together the responses to the above three categories represented around half of 
all the responses to this question. The broader barrier categories these top response choices fall into 
are the informational problem and split incentives barrier, which suggests that market failures are a 
primary reason for companies to at least initially not consider the operational energy efficiency 
measures. The difficulty in implementing the operational measures could be due to lack of direct 
control over operations and charterparty clauses, cited by nearly 50% of the respondents. Nearly 
20% of the respondents made use of the ‘other – please specify’ category. Most of the respondents 
noted in the ‘other’ category that their reason for not selecting a measure was the materiality or lack 
of savings as the quotes show below. According to Kollamthodi et al. (2008), some measures may be 
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ignored by decision-makers due to their limited impact (Hobson et al. 2007). Some noted that they 
have already implemented the measures but they did not select the measure in the first question 
because they agreed that those measures had low impact on fuel savings. Other responses 
suggested that there were hidden costs involved with the time and skill required to evaluate the 
measures.  
“None of these are unattractive for investment, just not the top ones”- Global container line 
“Not always feasible”- Medium sized EU based shipping company 
“Already being done but savings are less than measures”- Small US based shipping company 
“Small effect”- Anonymous 
“Impact rather low”- Large EU based shipping company 
“Low fuel savings” – Medium sized tanker operator 
“Minimal savings” – Large Management company 
“Only small influence” – Small container ship owning company 
“Small impact” – Medium sized drybulk operator 
“Good but not in top 5 savers” Medium sized drybulk Management company  
Other respondents noted that they already implement the non-selected measures but believe they 
do not have the highest fuel saving potential, as highlighted below: 
“We do use weather routing and believe fuel saving is about 2%, worth having but just not in top 5, 
ditto the other 4” – Large drybulk ship owner operator 
“Already being done but savings are less than measures” Small mixed fleet shipowner operator 
“We are also doing this but the other Q1 statements have higher impact” Large container line 
“This is already implemented and minimum impact in saving” Large tanker operator 
“Crew awareness and training: Important factor but not a top five choice” Medium sized tanker 
operator 
“Already implemented without positive effect” Medium sized mixed fleet operator 
 
Other responses in the ‘other – please specify’ category were: 
 
“Not always feasible” Medium sized mixed fleet owner operator 
“Not clear how to evaluate and what to do” Medium sized mixed fleet owner operator 
“No time for it” Medium sized drybulk shipowner operator 
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Survey response choices Barrier Type 
a) Savings cannot be fully recouped 
b) Lack of direct control over operations 
c) Difficult to implement under some types of charter 
d) (Divided responsibility for fuel costs) 
Split 
incentives 
Market failures 
a) Lack of reliable information on cost & savings 
b) (Lack of information sharing on savings among parties) 
Informational 
problems 
a) Uncertain/long payback 
b) Immature technology 
c) Sailing off design conditions 
Risk Market barriers 
(non-market 
failures) 
a) Lack of access to capital Capital 
a) Additional costs e.g. transactional 
b) Opportunity costs 
Hidden costs Modelling 
artefacts 
a) Unsuitable to trade/route of operation 
b) Incompatible with other measures 
Heterogeneity  
a) Not allowed due to charterparty clauses 
b) Standard charterparty clauses 
c) Inadequate port infrastructure 
General/other 
specific to 
shipping 
 
Table ‎6.7: Choices available to respondents and their grouping into barriers to energy efficiency 
Analysis of the responses to the third question shows that there are specific barriers pertaining to 
each of the measures, as shown in Table ‎6.8. Lack of reliable information on cost and savings are 
mainly related to the more technical operational measures such as weather routing, autopilot 
adjustment, trim/draft optimisation. Weather routing, autopilot adjustment and trim/draft 
optimisation have been shown to be mature technologies (Maddox Consulting 2012) for which 
information is readily and reliably available (Lockley et al. 2011). This suggests that there may be 
other underlying factors such as the principal agent problem as a result of which, there could be 
issues regarding the level of trust due to information asymmetry, lack of or cost monitoring of 
performance or savings of those measures. On the other hand, for measures mainly related to speed 
(general speed reduction and Just In Time arrivals) or those that had an element of speed (efficient 
voyage execution and optimisation of ballast voyages) the respondents mainly cited that these were 
difficult to implement under different types of charter and that charterparties did not allow for 
implementation. Under the time charter, the charterer who has operational control of the ship is 
mainly responsible for the speed of the ships and under voyage charter where the shipowner has 
operational control of the ship the speed is set through use of charterparty, therefore, in general 
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only in the ballast leg is a shipowner operator allowed to decide the speed of the vessel. The speed 
at which a ship travels varies according to many factors such as the sector it operates, publisher of 
charterparties, the power of agents involved etc, which will be further investigated in chapter eight. 
The subject of speed reduction and its potential in different charters is discussed in section  8.4.1.  
Figures C7 and C8 in appendix C show the perception of all the barriers disaggregated by size of 
companies and sectors they operate in. This time the variation in size (between small and large) is 
almost similar to the variation found in sector (wetbulk and container). Nonetheless, there are some 
trends or patterns that can be observed in each. For example, the lack of capital and its relationship 
with the size of the company or additional costs and its relationship to size of the company. 
According to Faber et al. (2009) smaller ship owners and operators may experience high transaction 
costs as they cannot spread the costs of e.g. gathering information over a large number of ships. 
Similarly, the choices; ‘difficulty in implementing in different types of charter’, ‘savings cannot be 
fully recouped’ and ‘lack of direct control over operations’, are cited more by companies in the 
wetbulk sector than drybulk and container sector. The answers to this will be obtained from 
bivariate analysis of barriers and the chartering ratio independent variables, controlling for size and 
sector, as it may be that this is a spurious relationship that exists due to another variable. This 
elaboration analysis in the following chapter will further explore the key relationships.  
 
Figure ‎6.18: Most important barriers for measures that were not selected 
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Table ‎6.8: Most pertinent barriers for each operational energy efficiency measure  
 
Weather 
routing 
Autopilot 
adjustment 
General 
speed 
reduction 
Fuel 
consumption 
monitoring 
Trim/draft 
optimisation 
Speed 
reduction 
JIT arrivals 
Raising crew 
awareness & 
training 
Efficient 
voyage 
execution 
Optimisation 
of ballast 
voyages 
Lack of reliable information on 
cost & savings 
24% 27% 6% 15% 26% 7% 22% 16% 15% 
Savings cannot be fully 
recouped from the investment 
4% 12% 9% 11% 7% 5% 13% 6% 8% 
Difficult to implement under 
some types of charter 
16% 7% 29% 5% 21% 26% 6% 24% 24% 
Lack of access to capital 
 
4% 6% 2% 4% 3% 4% 4% 1% 5% 
Additional costs e.g. 
transactional, contractual 
9% 8% 10% 13% 7% 6% 7% 4% 7% 
Uncertain/long payback 
 
11% 14% 3% 22% 12% 6% 20% 5% 8% 
Not allowed due to 
charterparty clauses 
5% 4% 28% 4% 4% 26% 3% 17% 15% 
Lack of direct control over 
operations 
17% 13% 10% 15% 10% 17% 13% 20% 15% 
Other (Please specify) 
 
9% 9% 2% 13% 8% 2% 13% 8% 3% 
Total responses 75 197 87 55 121 121 112 107 164 
Measure 
Barrier 
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Perception of barriers was also measured through tailored questions for respondents that had 
selected ‘considering or trialling’ or had ‘considered and decided against’ implementing a particular 
measure. Figure ‎6.19 is an extension of Figure ‎6.18 shown above and includes all of the responses in 
the survey regarding barriers, i.e. total number of barriers cited by a respondent. It is important to 
note that not all respondents had an equal chance to see the questions on barriers, as it depended 
on the specific response in question one and two of the survey. Moreover, the barriers response 
choices were not uniformly distributed across all the measures. This is either because some choices 
are more common than others or some measures have specific response choices, for example 
inefficient port infrastructure is more relevant to speed related measures than other measures. Thus 
the figure below shows the unweighted results on the perception of barriers. The top most barriers 
cited by respondents remained the same as before, with most responses concentrating around the 
market failures categories rather than market barriers.  
 
Figure ‎6.19: Barriers cited by respondents across the survey 
In summary, the respondents perceived the split incentives barrier as the most important barrier to 
implementation of operational energy efficiency measures. These combined with informational 
problems as market failures outweighed the non-market failures (market barriers) such as risk, costs 
etc. as shown in Figure ‎6.20 below. There is a possibility that this imbalance is partly due to the 
aggregation of three response choices into the split incentives barrier, however the same was also 
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the case for other barrier categories such as risk and ‘specific to shipping’ barriers category, which 
also had three response choices recoded into a single barrier category. Analysing in detail the 
responses to barriers questions, it was observed that there are specific barriers pertaining to each of 
the measures.  
 
Figure ‎6.20: Barriers to operational energy efficiency measures grouped by category 
6.4.3. Factors affecting implementation 
Just as there are barriers affecting implementation of measures, it has been proposed in the barriers 
literature that there are also factors that drive implementation of measures. Rohdin, Thollander & 
Solding (2007) and Thollander and Ottosson (2008) provide a good overview of drivers to energy 
efficiency, which have been incorporated into their survey. They define a driving force as “the 
opposite of a barrier, in other words, different types of factors that stress investment in technologies 
that are energy efficient and cost-effective” (Thollander and Ottosson 2009, p26). Up to eleven high 
level drivers and twenty three specific drivers are discussed ranging from market related driving 
forces, regulatory, to company strategy as shown in Table ‎2.3 in chapter two. Although these drivers 
did not form the key part of the research framework, it is thought that an understanding of these 
would complement the barriers discussion, perhaps shed light on the opportunities for energy 
efficiency and suggest plausible ways to address barriers. The reasons that were cited for those who 
implemented the measures were generally because savings from the investment could be fully 
recouped, the operations were under direct control and that there were no additional costs 
involved, which are interestingly the opposite of the top barriers that were cited by the respondents. 
Since this question is based on the respondent’s initial choice the actual response (N) varied widely 
but the response rate per question generally was just under 80% (N = 125). Similar to the response 
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choices for barriers, not all measures had the same choice of factors, however some choices were 
always present to the respondent e.g. savings can be fully recouped, access to capital, and direct 
control over operations. Despite always being available as a response choice, access to capital was 
least cited as a factor influencing implementation, which tallies with previous response to the  
question on barriers to measures where lack of access to capital ranked lowest amongst other 
categories of barriers. This shows that capital (cost or access) is not a deciding factor when 
operational energy efficiency measures are concerned and that there may be other hindrances or 
motivation to carry them out. As mentioned earlier reliable information on cost and savings for a 
measure was cited as a key barrier to implementation and from what can be seen below, it is 
suggested that when this information is available it can be a driving factor for implementation. 
However, the key factor in driving implementation of the operational measures was that savings can 
be fully recouped from the investment (i.e. non-existence of split incentives), which was hardly cited 
as a barrier in the previous question on barriers to energy efficiency. This requires further analysis of 
each of the respondent’s demographics to see how much fuel is used and who pays for fuel using 
their chartering ratio and will be discussed in the bivariate analysis section. Many respondents made 
use of the ‘other – please specify’ category and some of the factors leading to implementation, some 
are shown below: 
 “Despite the initial investment the results have been very successful with short periods for return on 
investment.1) Reduced fuel consumption. 2) Shorter stay in drydock for future drydockings. 3) Good 
for the image of the company” Far East Global Container line 
 
 “No brainer - restoring the underwater hull profile to/close to original reduces frictional resistance in 
service and will reduce fuel consumption by at least 6% if done every 10 years. Superintendents in dry 
dock could, if their budget is under pressure, reduce on grit blasting and painting to balance their 
budget - this at the expense of future fuel consumption - in setting out this policy we have taken 
away their right to reduce this blasting and it is defined company policy increasing fuel prices and a 
worsening market in 2008 focused attention on fuel saving initiatives - this was the first and easiest 
to implement” Large Dry bulk shipping company  
 
Figures C9 and C10 in appendix C break down the responses to factors leading to implementation by 
sector and size. There do not seem to be any consistent trends or visual relationships, which is in 
contrast to what was found when perceptions of barriers were disaggregated in by the same 
independent variables.  
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Figure ‎6.21: Factors affecting implementation 
 
Figure ‎6.22: Factors affecting implementation 
6.4.4. Analysis of measures related to speed 
In chapter one, it was highlighted that the speed reduction measure had the highest potential for 
CO2 reductions in shipping. The focus of this research is on this operational measure and therefore, it 
justifies the discussion of this measure separately from the other operational measures that have 
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been suggested. In figure 6.11 it was seen that general speed reduction measure had the 
implementation rate of just over 60% on average for all those who saw this measure to have a high 
savings potential. Figure ‎6.23 decomposes this by sector, it can be seen that the wetbulk and drybulk 
sectors have similar implementation rate, with the container sector having 75% implementation of 
the measure (this is not necessarily representative of the whole sector due to the small sample size). 
This illustrates the heterogeneity amongst the sectors, which arises due to operation in different 
geographical markets, sector specificity such as the charterparty and bill of ladings etc. Speed 
reduction due to port efficiency – Just In Time arrivals, has a third less implementation compared to 
general speed reduction measure (as shown in figure 6.11), which could be because it requires many 
parties or stakeholders to come together, share information and act upon the information with an 
increased role by the port or terminal operators. Lack of information sharing between stakeholders 
as a barrier was cited by 30% of the ninety nine respondents who answered the question on barriers 
to speed reduction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎6.23: Implementation of speed reduction measures by sector 
6.4.4.1. Barriers to speed reduction 
The respondents who selected ‘considering or trialling’ or ‘considered and decided against’ the 
speed related measure were asked which barriers would prohibit or had prohibited them from 
implementing the measure. It was clear from their responses that most of them believed it would be 
difficult to implement speed reduction measures under different types of charter and that 
charterparty clauses were an important hurdle. For most it is also the case that there may not be 
enough savings due to the nature of their operations or the costs may outweigh the benefits of such 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Wetbulk
(N=27)
Drybulk
(N=24)
Container
(N=4)
Mixed
(N=25)
%
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 
Implementation of speed reduction measures by sectors 
General Speed reduction
Speed reduction due to port
efficiency - JIT arrivals
193 
 
savings e.g. piracy. At this stage the respondents did not think that there was significant risk in 
sailing ‘off design conditions’ or technical problems would amount to lack of implementation.  
 
Figure ‎6.24: Barriers to speed reduction for those trialling and deciding against its implementation 
Some of the respondents also noted that it is the charterer who sets the speed in time charters and 
that the shipowners were not in control of this under this charter;  
“Requested by Charterer” Large Ship management company 
 “Charterers' instructions on Time Chartered vessels” Anonymous 
 
This to some extent agrees with the following question that asked whether speed reduction is 
achievable in time and voyage charters. There was a small difference in the respondents’ perception 
on achievability of speed reduction under voyage and time charters as shown in Figure ‎6.25 and 
Figure ‎6.26. Figure ‎6.26 breaks down those who said that it was achievable by sector and shows that 
more wetbulk respondents were of the view that speed reduction is achievable in time charter 
compared with drybulk respondents who believed that it was achievable almost equally in both 
types of charter. This view suggests that there may be sector specific issues, such as bargaining 
power of charterers, sector charterparties, which are resulting in differences in implementation of 
speed reduction measures. Chapter eight investigates whether and how the charterparties are 
affecting implementation of speed reduction measures. 
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Figure ‎6.25: Achieving speed reduction under different types of charter 
 
Figure ‎6.26: Achieving speed reduction under different types of charter by sector 
Figure ‎6.27 shows the responses to the final survey question that was answerable by all survey 
respondents. Two of the top three barriers to speed reduction are sector specific (similar to 
institutional barriers in other barriers literature) followed by the lack of information barrier. Many 
respondents made use of the ‘other – please specify’ choice to provide their views on barriers to 
speed reduction, most pointed towards technical problems and opportunity costs, some examples of 
these are; 
“Stakeholder (customer) demands” Medium sized wetbulk shipowner operator 
“Voyages fixed at slow speed anyway. We cannot slow down further than the engine will alow - 
running an engine at slow speed entails operational difficulties. This is the biggest single reason we 
cannot move ships glacially slow at the moment” Large wetbulk operator 
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“Competition between shipping lines” Large containership line 
“non-commercial due to high hire rate” Large drybulk shipowner-operator 
“Main engine limits” Large mixed fleet shipowner-operator 
“Engine design” Medium sized drybulk and container shipowner-operator 
“Ship engine not designed for long navigation at reduced speed” Medium sized drybulk shipowner-
operator 
“Technical problems” Small sized wetbulk ship management company 
“Charterer orders” Medium sized drybulk shipowner 
 
Figure ‎6.27: Barriers to speed reduction in general 
6.4.4.2. Factors driving speed reduction 
The respondents who had already implemented or planned to implement speed related measures 
were asked what factors had the most influence on their decision to implement the measure. The 
results show that the speed related measures will only be applied if there are sufficient savings in 
the trade or route of operation, which reflects the heterogeneity of the shipping industry, as not all 
sectors and trades are the same e.g. coastal shipping and feeder services.  Following this, the three 
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most important factors were ‘direct control over operations’, ‘easy to implement under different 
types of charter’ and ‘ability to recoup savings’. These factors are later analysed in the context of the 
chartering ratios of the companies in order to examine whether the implementation of measures is 
affected by the different chartering arrangements of the company. Some of the respondents in the 
‘other’ category noted the following: 
“Market forces - given very low charter rates, a vessel’s fuel consumption has become very 
important” Medium sized tanker owning company 
“Most efficient measure of all”- Medium sized dry bulk company 
 
Figure ‎6.28: factors affecting uptake of speed reduction measures 
6.5. Univariate analysis of the chartering independent variable 
As mentioned earlier, most of the survey used categorical nominal level measurement of data. 
However, the final question in the survey asked respondents to enter their fleet profile by asking 
them what percentage of ships they own and ‘charter in’ and what percentage of these ships do 
they ‘charter out’ under various arrangements. As mentioned in chapter four and five, this is one of 
the ways of assessing the level of principal agent or split incentive barrier in shipping. This section 
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describes the data collected on this variable and how this is transformed for use in elaboration 
analysis in the next chapter. Table ‎6.9 shows the response rates on this question.  
Full responses 100 59% 
Partial responses 6 3.5% 
Missing responses 64 37.5% 
 170 100% 
Table ‎6.9: Response rate for chartering questions 
In order to perform bivariate analysis and crosstabulations, the interval level data can be reduced to 
nominal level data (de Vaus 1995). The responses to the chartering ratio question are split into the 
following groups shown below in Table ‎6.10. As can be seen the total number of responses that have 
been categorised in groups is 71 (42%), whereas there were 100 full responses to the question. The 
remainder that have not been grouped either did not have similar characteristics to be grouped or 
were not as prevalent e.g. there were only three cases where majority of the fleet is time chartered 
in and voyage chartered out.  
Group Description Grouping rule N 
1 Majority of the fleet is owned and majority of 
the fleet is chartered out on voyage charter. 
>50% owned & > 50% 
chartered out on voyage 
21 
2 Majority of the fleet is owned and majority of 
the fleet is chartered out on time charter.  
>50% owned & > 50% 
chartered out on time 
21 
3 Management company with majority of its 
managed fleet out on voyage charter.  
>50% chartered out on 
voyage 
9 
4 Management company with majority of its 
managed fleet out on time charter. 
>50% chartered out on time 20 
   71 
Table ‎6.10: Splitting the chartering ratio interval level data into nominal level data (Grouping A) 
For each of the above groups frequency distributions and summary statistics are analysed in order to 
question how well the interval variable fits in the category. The shapes of the histograms and 
summary statistics (in appendix C) show that there is a good fit and allocation is valid i.e. in most 
cases despite the cut of points being 50%, the values generally lay towards the extremes either 
closer to 100% or 0% as required in each group, with the exception of group one. Other grouping 
options (grouping B) have also been tested and equally result in as good distributions as the previous 
grouping. In this second grouping the four subgroups shown above in Table ‎6.10 have been 
collapsed into two subgroups as shown in Table ‎6.11, where the grouping does not take into account 
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the ownership of the fleet, rather it is just concerned with the chartering out levels. This grouping 
has more responses in each category and will therefore allow for more simpler and populated 
crosstabulations. In the following chapter both of these groupings are used in the crosstabulations, 
depending on the level of complexity and iterations required in the elaboration analysis.  
Group Description Grouping rule N 
1 Majority of the fleet is chartered out on 
voyage charter.  
> 50% chartered out on voyage 30 
2 Majority of the fleet is chartered out on 
time charter. 
> 50% chartered out on time 41 
   71 
Table ‎6.11: Splitting the chartering ratio interval level data into nominal level data (Grouping B) 
Using the second grouping option as shown in Table ‎6.11 above, the implementation level of the two 
groups is shown in Figure ‎6.29 and Figure ‎6.30 along with summary statistics on the average rate of 
implementation of the two groups in Table ‎6.13. Figure ‎6.29 shows that in most instances, the 
implementation by the group that has the majority of its fleet chartered out time (group two) 
exceeds that of the group that has the majority of its fleet chartered out on voyage (group one). On 
average, three measures were implemented by group one compared to a slightly higher average of 
3.24 by group two. A comparison of means test suggests that the means of the two groups are not 
statistically different (95% CL). Although this is a zero order relationship (not controlled for other 
background variables), Figure ‎6.29 suggests that there may be some difference in implementation 
even if it is not statistically significant at the aggregate level.  
The difference in implementation between the two groups can be explained by the principal agent 
problem and the analysis conducted in the preceding chapter. It was suggested that principal agent 
problems would not be as pervasive in the time charter in the context of operational measures 
because the fuel cost is borne by the charterer and the charterer is in some control of the 
operations. Therefore, it could be said that operational measures are more favourable to time 
charterers e.g. weather routing and fuel consumption monitoring (which enable monitoring) and 
general speed reduction (due to the power of dictating charterparty speed) and thus have a higher 
implementation in those chartering groups.  
Figure ‎6.33 shows the differences in perception of barriers to energy efficiency of the two chartering 
groups (grouping B). The majority of the differences lie in the indicators of split incentives barriers. 
Comparing the perception of respondents with actual implementation there seems to be some 
contradiction in the conclusions. The above analysis on implementation showed that the group with 
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a majority of the fleet on time charter had higher implementation on average across all the 
measures but it seems that at the same time this group perceived the lack of direct control and 
difficulty in implementing under various types of charter more of a problem than the other group. 
The following chapter investigates the relationship of the top three measures with the chartering 
group, controlling for other independent variables to test whether the implementation of measures 
and perception of barriers hold, which would describe more validly how the principal agent problem 
affects the implementation of measures. 
Figure ‎6.29: Implementation of operational measures by chartering groups 
 Group 1 Group 2 
Weather routing 22 32 
Autopilot adjustment 8 6 
General speed reduction 20 27 
Fuel consumption monitoring 23 33 
Trim draft optimisation 15 22 
Speed reduction due to port efficiency – JIT arrivals 16 23 
Raising crew awareness & energy efficiency training 18 16 
Efficient voyage execution 14 25 
Optimisation of ballast voyages 12 17 
Table ‎6.12: Total number of respondents for implementation per measure by chartering group 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
%
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 
Implementation by chartering groups 
Group 1
Group 2
200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎6.30: Number of measures already implemented by chartering groups 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 
Mean 3.00 3.24 
St Dev 1.74 1.56 
SE 0.318 0.244 
95% CI 2.36 – 3.64 2.76 – 3.73 
Table ‎6.13: Summary statistics for number of measures implemented by chartering groups 
 
Figure ‎6.31: Measures implemented by each chartering group 
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Table ‎6.14: Summary statistics for measures implemented by each chartering group 
  
 
Figure ‎6.32: Average rate of implementation by chartering groups 
 
 
Figure ‎6.33: Difference in perception of barriers between chartering groups 
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Total Measures already implemented 59 69 31 64 
Maximum measures that could be implemented 105 105 45 100 
Average number of measures implemented 2.8 3.3 3.45 3.2 
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6.6. Concluding remarks 
The respondents to the survey generally represented well the stratified sampling frame (by size and 
sector), although there was a very high number of responses that came from European countries, 
which represent 55% of the large and medium firms in the census population. The measures 
believed to have the highest fuel saving potential, especially the top three measures, were also 
highly implemented, suggesting a high correlation between potential of the measures and their 
implementation, however these were not as high as expected, which suggests that to some extent 
there may be some factors affecting their implementation. The key barriers to the implementation 
of all the operational measures as perceived by the respondents were the difficulty of 
implementation under different types of charter, lack of reliable information and lack of direct 
control over operations. These respondent choices were indicators for the split incentives and 
informational problems, suggesting that the main type of barriers to implementation of operational 
measures are market failures rather than non-market failures. It is also observed that there are 
specific barriers pertaining to each of the measures, informational problems mainly affect the more 
technical operational measures such as weather routing, autopilot adjustment, trim/draft 
optimisation, whereas split incentive barriers affect measures mainly related to speed (general 
speed reduction and Just In Time arrivals) or those that had an element of speed (efficient voyage 
execution and optimisation of ballast voyages). In chapter five it was concluded that the time charter 
will be less exposed to the principal agent efficiency problem because the charterer pays for fuel and 
has some control over the vessel or operations, but that this exposure varied between wetbulk and 
drybulk. The preliminary analysis of the chartering group variable corroborates with this conclusion, 
as it showed that the group with a majority of the fleet on time charter generally had higher 
implementation, but it was not possible to disaggregate these results further by sector, in order to 
verify the sector specific conclusions from the preceding chapter. This chapter provided a first 
analysis of the survey results, however the analysis presented could not result in specific and valid 
conclusions as many relationships between the variables were not controlled for. The following 
chapter attempts to answer the research questions by focussing on a few measures in order to draw 
some conclusions through controlling relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables.  
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7. Survey results further analysis 
In this chapter, variables that were discussed in the univariate analysis are revisited in order to 
further explore and investigate relationships that may exist between them, which will enable 
answering aspects of research questions one and two that involve more than one variable. This 
chapter concentrates mainly on one method of bivariate analysis as shown in Table ‎6.1, the 
crosstabulation. Crosstabulations are a way of displaying data so that association between two 
variables can be fairly readily detected (de Vaus 1995). This method is used in parallel with the basic 
procedures of the elaboration model as well as combining the use of descriptive and inferential 
statistics, in order to make broader generalisations and inferences for the specific research questions 
on implementation of energy efficiency measures and barriers to their implementation.  
The chapter begins with a brief section explaining the elaboration model, followed by elaboration 
analysis for implementation of the top three operational measures and perception of the top two 
barriers to energy efficiency. This chapter deals with the implementation of energy efficiency 
measures and barriers to implementation components of the research framework as proposed in 
chapter three, highlighted in Figure ‎7.1. In chapter nine the discussion will bring together the 
findings from this analysis with analysis from other methods to explain why particular effects and 
relationships are observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎7.1: Focus of this chapter and the research framework 
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7.1. Bivariate elaboration analysis 
Bivariate analysis is the analysis of two variables at a time in order to uncover whether two variables 
are related (Bryman 2008). “The heart of bivariate analysis is to see whether two variables are 
related or associated” (de Vaus 1995, p154). Bivariate analysis is the first step in explaining the 
differences that are seen in univariate analysis. It can be used to partly explain relationships which 
could then be further analysed through multivariate analysis. Bivariate analysis and use of 
crosstabulations is relevant to this research because of the cross-sectional research design that is 
employed and the use of categorical (nominal) variables in most of the survey questions. Alternative 
methods of bivariate analysis such as comparison of means, scattergrams, regression analysis etc. 
are of limited value to the analysis because nominal level data is lower than interval level 
measurement.  
Once an initial relationship is established between two variables, elaboration analysis will allow for 
investigation of this relationship under a variety of different conditions. The elaboration model was 
developed principally by Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates in 1950 (Babbie 2004). Elaboration 
analysis can help to answer why a relationship exists, what is the nature of the relationship (causal 
or non-causal) and the generality of the relationship (de Vaus 1995) by introducing controls 
(comparing like with like) at the data analysis stage. Thus, the elaboration analysis is moving further 
from correlation (or establishing relationships) and is more about causality or causation “Elaboration 
analysis enables us to refine our understanding of the means by which X affects Y” (de Vaus 2002, p 
299). The elaboration model has been suggested by Babbie (2004) to offer the clearest available 
picture of the logic of causal analysis in social research. Apart from elaboration analysis, other 
techniques for bivariate analyses are effects analysis, path and flow analysis (Davis 1985). 
Elaboration analysis is relevant to this research because it is one of the various “survey-based 
approaches to analysing survey data” (de Vaus 2002, p.297). The survey variables, recalling from 
chapter four, are: 
 Dependent variables – what the research is trying to explain, in this case implementation of 
measures, perception of barriers and driving factors. 
 Independent variables – causal variables, in this case sector, size and chartering group.  
The survey sample respondents can be divided into groups (i.e. sample subgroups) on the basis of 
which category of the independent variable they belong to and these subgroups are compared with 
other independent variable subgroups in terms of the dependent variable. So for example the 
sample could be divided in size groups and their responses to perception of barriers can be 
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compared. Differences in groups might be taken to be the influence of group membership, but this 
can only be said if the groups are alike in all other respects (de Vaus 1995). Elaboration analysis 
makes use of multiple statistical controls to control for other variables for explanation of the zero 
order relationship i.e. when other things are equal does X (independent variable) make a difference 
to Y (dependent variable). This approach is to some degree limited in its use in this research because 
controlling for more than two test variables simultaneously leads to very small subgroups and 
sparsely populated crosstabulations resulting in inflated correlations and problems of statistical 
reliability. 
7.1.1. The elaboration model 
This section delves further into the elaboration model and it is important to detail this here because 
the majority of this chapter will rely on the interpretations of the elaboration model. The basic 
procedure of elaboration analysis has four steps as outlined by de Vaus, (1995 and 2002);  
1) Look at zero order relationship 
2) Select a test variable and assess the new conditional relationship 
3) Compare conditional relationship with zero order relationship 
4) Interpret using the below interpretations.  
It is also important to visually examine the conditional tables (crosstabulation for each category of 
the test variable) to describe the relationship in context of the data and zero order relationship 
(Babbie 2004). When statistical controls are introduced the following outcomes are possible; 
 Explanation: this is when spurious relationships are detected i.e. when two variables have 
apparently high correlation, yet have no direct causal connection, thus both could be a 
consequence of another common cause. A relationship is said to be spurious when the third 
variable is held constant or controlled and the relationship between the initial two variables 
(zero order relationship) disappears. This implies that the conditional relationship is small or the 
relationship can be explained away (Babbie 2004). The test variable is determined before (in 
time) independent and dependent variables, and thus called the antecedent variable (Babbie 
2004) or extraneous variable (de Vaus 2002). The independent variable must be capable of being 
changed by test variable and the test variable must precede both independent and dependent 
variable in time, for a relationship to be called spurious (de Vaus 2002). 
Rule: If zero order relationship (correlation coefficient) decreases for independent and 
dependent variables = spurious relationship 
206 
 
      If zero order relationship (correlation coefficient) persists for independent and dependent 
variables = no spurious relationship, it could be any of the outcomes below. 
 
 Interpretation: This is when indirect causal relationships are detected. Two variables can be said 
to be causally linked by an intervening (mediating) variable. An intervening variable is one that 
occurs between the independent and dependent variable, providing an indirect causal link 
between variables. The patterns of results detected are the same as spurious relationships but 
the differentiating factor is the logical or theoretical understanding of the variables and the 
timeliness of the intervening variable (i.e. in between X and Y variables) (de Vaus 1995). The test 
variable comes between (in time) independent and dependent variables, thus called mediating 
variable (Babbie 2004) and therefore the test variable must also be capable of being changed by 
the independent variable (de Vaus 2002).  
Rule: If zero order relationship (correlation coefficient) decreases for independent and 
dependent variables = intervening variable found 
    If zero order relationship (correlation coefficient) persists for independent and dependent 
variables = no intervening variable found, it could be any of the outcomes below. 
 
 Specification: This is when the relationship between the original two variables differs according 
to the category of the test variable, i.e. the relationship holds for some categories of the test 
variable and does not hold for another category of the same test variable. In other words the 
relationship between independent and dependent variable might be specific to some subgroups. 
When this happens the original relationship can be said to be moderated by the test variable, 
thus called the moderator variable (Bryman 2008). This means that the original independent 
variable does not have an effect on its own but has a special effect when it occurs in 
combination with a particular category of the test variable. Babbie (2004) defines statistical 
interaction when partial relationships differ significantly from each other and therefore the 
above rule from de Vaus (1995) in direction of the conditional relationship is not necessary.  
Rule: If zero order relationship (correlation coefficient) decreases for one category of test 
variable and increases (or persists) for another category = specification effect found 
    
 Replication: This is when a zero order relationship persists for all categories of the test variable 
which means that the initial relationship is not due to the influence of the test variable. The 
more control variables tested for, the tougher the test of the original relationship and it 
increases our confidence that it is a real and direct relationship which cannot be easily explained 
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away (de Vaus, 1995). In the elaboration analysis that follows it may not be possible to control 
for multiple variables simultaneously, because of the large sample sizes needed.   
Rule: If zero order relationship (correlation coefficient) decreases = no replication found, could   
be any of the above outcomes. 
    If zero order relationship (correlation coefficient) persists = replication found 
Relationships Interpretation 
When conditional relationship is significantly less than zero order 
relationship ( and test variable comes before X and Y variables) 
Spurious relationship (non-
causal), explanation 
When conditional relationship is less than zero order relationship 
(and test variable comes in time between X and Y variables) 
Indirect causal relationship 
with intervening variable, 
Interpretation 
When conditional relationship is split with zero order relationship Specification 
Conditional relationship is much the same as zero order 
relationship 
Replication (directly causal) 
Table ‎7.1: interpretation of conditional relationships summary 
7.1.2. Extensions to the elaboration model              
The preceding section presented the main logic of the elaboration model. Several attempts have 
been made to refine the model to reflect the variety of results from real life data e.g. Rosenberg 
(1968). de Vaus (2002) further expands on the different types of relationships between two 
variables. The difference in this extension is that a relationship can also be ‘partial’ i.e. some 
combination of the aforementioned outcomes. This is more realistic of the real life data analysis but 
results in numerous types of relationships, for example previously there was only one definition of a 
spurious relationship, however in this extended model three types of spurious relationship can exist, 
i.e. spurious with direct, spurious with indirect and purely spurious relationship. Table ‎7.2 below 
shows the various relationships that may be found in the elaboration analysis of the survey results.  
One outcome that has not been discussed in detail in the literature and is thought to be important 
or relevant to this research (as shall be seen in the conditional table summaries) is how does one 
explain the outcome where one category of the conditional relationship is similar to the zero order 
relationship and the other category of the conditional relationship is even stronger? Babbie (2004) 
describes only briefly that this means that one has specified one condition under which the original 
relationship holds, but at the same time one has also specified another condition under which it 
holds even more clearly. Similarly, other outcomes of the elaboration analysis observed in this 
research come from further refinements to the elaboration model from Babbie (2004) regarding 
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Spurious, indirect and direct 
suppressor variables, variables that conceal the original zero order relationship between two 
variables. This is when the zero order relationship does not show any relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable, but when a test variable is controlled for, the original 
relationship between categories of the test variable show an improvement, thus the test variable 
can be said to suppress the original relationship (Babbie 2004). When the original relationship is not 
controlled, the relationship would be weaker than it otherwise would be (Rubin & Babbie 2008). This 
is because the suppressor variable and the independent variable may be related. Given this relation, 
some prefer to call the suppressor variable an enhancer variable (McFatter 1979 cited by Pandey & 
Elliot 2010).  
 Directly causal Indirectly causal Spurious 
Directly causal  
 
 
  
Indirectly causal  
 
 
  
Spurious  
 
 
  
  
 
Table ‎7.2: The extended elaboration model 
7.2. Data preparation and data analysis plan 
7.2.1. Collapsing categories 
In many instances, the original survey categories have been collapsed or combined into few 
categories, e.g. implementation and chartering groups variables. This was most importantly done 
because using bivariate elaboration analysis results in a separate table for each category of the test 
variable and having too many conditional tables will not allow for meaningful interpretation. Other 
justification for collapsing categories are that only the categories that are of interest to the research 
are reflected, in order to keep the cells in crosstabulation adequately populated in order to avoid 
distortion of some statistics (de Vaus 1995). 
Y X 
Z 
Y X 
Z 
Y X 
Z 
Y X 
Z 
Y X 
Z 
Y X 
Z 
X Y 
Z 
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7.2.2. Summated scaling 
Several indicators of various barriers were placed in questions throughout the survey. In order to 
represent the barriers perception of respondents, a summated scale of choices to the questions is 
produced. This scale score is then used to indicate the respondent’s position on the perception of 
barriers. According to de Vaus (1995) one can produce satisfactory scales by conceptually and 
empirically testing the scale. The survey captured perception on barriers in two main ways as 
explained in section ‎6.4.2. These were summed into a scale using only the conceptual method, i.e. 
ensuring the categories conceptually belong together, which is also followed by Sorrell et al. (2000 
and 2004).  
In chapter six, the interval level data on chartering ratio was reduced to nominal level data by 
creating groups, which is similar to grouping the exact age or income (interval variable) into several 
groups or bands (categorical variable) (de Vaus 1995). The chartering ratio data were broken down 
into four different groups of chartering ratio (grouping A) or two different groups of chartering ratio 
(grouping B). The grouping into four chartering subgroups reflected ownership and chartering out of 
the fleet and the distribution better reflected the characteristics (i.e. frequencies in opposite ends) 
but the problem encountered was the small size of the subgroups, whereas the second grouping 
option leads to larger sample size but does not result in as good a fit as the former approach. For the 
crosstabulations method of analysis this is not a problem, however for the appropriate inferential 
statistic (Pearson’s chi-square test) small sample sizes are a problem because in “small samples, the 
approximation (to the chi square distribution) is not good enough” (Field 2009) as it results in 
expected frequencies that are too low (less than five). Fisher’s exact test can accurately calculate the 
exact probability of the chi square statistic when the sample size is small. It can be used on two by 
two crosstabulations as well as larger crosstabulations. This means that the four subgroups can be 
used as well as the two subgroups, with varying descriptive and inferential statistics. Subsequently, 
four chartering subgroups are used because it is thought that the ownership of fleet will provide 
more context to the analysis. The size and sector independent variables also have three and four 
categories. Since the container sector had very low response rate, it is removed as a category of the 
sector variable. Since the variables are all nominal (or reduced to nominal level in the case of 
chartering group) crosstabulations analysis will only reveal the strength of the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables, direction and linearity of relationships are not possible 
for nominal level data. Figure ‎7.2 below takes this into account and shows the relevant statistics for 
this analysis.  
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Figure ‎7.2: Selection of methods and relevant statistics in elaboration analysis 
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relationship 
Conditional 
relationship 
Conditional 
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Conditional 
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Table ‎7.3: Elaboration analysis in this research 
7.3. Statistics and procedures appropriate for this analysis 
This section very briefly describes the aforementioned statistics used to assess the strength of 
relationships between variables in the survey data. The information about the association shown in 
crosstabulation table can be summarised using correlation coefficient, which is an index that 
describes the character of relationship between two variables (de Vaus 1995). Of relevance to this 
research (because of nominal level data) are chi square based coefficients. These statistics show how 
Nominal - nominal 
2 * 2 
Crosstabulations 
Phi  
Pearsons Chi-
squared/Fisher’s exact  
Larger 
Crosstabulations 
Cramers V 
Pearsons Chi-
squared/Fisher’s exact  
Chi-squared Sig      
Fisher’s Exact Sig                       
Phi  Sig     
Cramer’s V          Sig   
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the actual frequencies in the crosstabulation differ from the expected frequency i.e. when there is 
no association (Field 2009). The raw chi square figure is converted into an index using phi and 
Cramer’s V. Phi is used with two by two crosstabulations and Cramer’s V is used when one or both of 
the variables have more than two categories (Field 2009).  
In the previous chapter, the univariate analysis of nominal variables mainly used interval estimates 
to make inferences to the population. In this chapter, after assessing the association of two 
variables, inferences are made using tests of significance. These tests assess the likelihood of the 
sample obtained being inaccurate due to sampling error, thus lower significance levels suggest that 
the observed association is likely to persist in the population. Conventionally 0.05 and 0.01 are used 
as the critical points, which are arbitrary but as a rule of thumb for small samples it is suggested to 
use 0.05 as the critical point (de Vaus 1995). In chapter four, Table ‎4.3 showed that this would not 
be possible due to the small sample size, which reduces even further during crosstabulation. 
Because of the small sample sizes it is recommended to use the Fisher’s exact test, as it overcomes 
the problem that with small samples the sampling distribution deviates from the chi square 
distribution (Field 2005a). There has been considerable debate on the weight that has been placed 
on statistical inference. Field (2005) and Ellis (2010) suggest that effect sizes are more important 
(examples of which are correlation coefficients aforementioned) because they provide an objective 
measure of the importance of an effect. Cohen’s (1988) widely accepted interpretation of effect 
sizes is that; 0.1 is a small effect size, 0.3 is medium or moderate effect size and 0.5 is a large effect 
size. de Vaus (1995) suggests that both, descriptive and inferential statistics complement the data 
analysis, however knowing that the sample results will hold in the population is useful additional 
information but is ineffective unless the sample data is first thoroughly and imaginatively analysed.  
It is also important to briefly review some of the assumptions that lie behind some of the statistics 
that will be used for the analysis. The correlation coefficients aforementioned assess whether there 
is a linear relationship between the variables of interest. It may be that some of the relationships are 
non-linear for example, implementation of a measure with chartering ratio. Secondly, a response 
distribution of 50% is used for all statistics, this means that the prediction about the general 
population is symmetrical, for example 50% of the population will answer ‘yes’ and 50% will answer 
‘no’ to a question e.g. on implementation. In reality this may be different but changing this 
parameter to a different level e.g. 60:40 split, requires support from existing literature, therefore 
setting the response distribution to 50% is the most conservative assumption (de Vaus 1995).  
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7.4. Assessing correlation between the test variables and independent 
variables  
The second step of the elaboration model requires controlling for a test variable. de Vaus (2002) 
suggests the following criteria for selecting the appropriate test variables; 
1. They must be from among the variables in the data set 
2. Must make sense theoretically 
3. Test variable must be correlated at zero order level with both independent and dependent 
variables. 
This section mainly tests for the correlations between size, sector and chartering group variables, 
which are interchangeably used as independent and test variables. The justification for this is that it 
is not known whether there exists a causal relationship between the aforementioned variables, e.g. 
it could be that size of the company affects the chartering group or vice versa, or it could be that 
sector affects the chartering level of the firm or that a certain size group is more prevalent in a 
particular sector (i.e. related). Secondly, unlike social research variables, such as gender, it is not 
possible to assess the timeline of the variables, e.g. which of the above variables come first in time, 
allowing for determining causation.  
From Table ‎7.4 below it can be observed that there are almost three times more large companies in 
the wetbulk sector compared to drybulk sector. Table ‎7.6 shows there are more of chartering groups 
one and two in drybulk sector compared to the wetbulk sector and vice versa for groups three and 
four. Grouping the charter groups by voyage charter and time charter for each of the sector as 
shown in Table ‎7.7, does not reveal similar patterns to that observed in chapter five for each sector, 
which shall be discussed in the discussion chapter.   
 Small (N=28) Medium (N=65) Large (N=19) 
Wetbulk 43% 26% 47% 
Drybulk 36% 26% 16% 
Container 4% 6% 5% 
Mixed 18% 42% 32% 
Table ‎7.4: Correlation between size and sector (all) 
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 Small (N=16) Medium (N=47) Large (N=8) 
Group 1 38% 26% 38% 
Group 2 25% 34% 13% 
Group 3 6% 15% 13% 
Group 4 31% 26% 38% 
Table ‎7.5: Correlation between size and chartering group 
 
 Wetbulk (N=20) Drybulk (N=18) Container (N=4) Mixed (N=26) 
Group 1 20% 56% 0% 23% 
Group 2 20% 33% 75% 23% 
Group 3 20% 6% 0% 15% 
Group 4 40% 6% 25% 38% 
Table ‎7.6: Correlation between sector and chartering group  
 
 Wetbulk (N=20) Drybulk (N=18) 
Majority on voyage charter 40% 62% 
Majority on time charter 60% 38% 
Table ‎7.7: Correlation for types of charter prevalent in the bulk sectors 
From the above analysis and summary Table ‎7.8, it can be seen that there is a strong and significant 
relationship between sector and chartering group and when controlling for size the relationship gets 
even stronger and is still found to be significant, suggesting that size is a suppressing variable for the 
zero order relationship. The implication of this strong relationship is that in the following analysis 
when the relationship between size and a dependent variable controlling for chartering group or 
sector will overlap, thus the impact of chartering group or sector as test variables would be inflated.  
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 Size and sector Size and charter group Sector (bulk) and Charter group 
Zero order 
relationship 
 
Chi2 = 8.04 (p .234) 
FE = 8.19 (p .195) 
CV = .190 (p .234) 
Phi = .268 (p .234) 
 
Chi2 = 3.109 (p .820) 
FE = 3.241 (p .804) 
CV = .148 (p .820) 
Phi = .209 (p .820) 
 
Chi2 = 10.139 (p .015) 
FE = 9.892 (p .015) 
CV = .517 (p .015) 
Phi = .517 (p .015) 
 
Controlling for Charter group Sector (bulk only) size 
 Group 1 
Chi2 = 8.54 (p .075) 
FE = 7.5 (p .064)  
CV = .462 (p .075) 
Phi = .653 (p .075) 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = 5.79 (p .533) 
FE = 5.36 (p .551) 
CV = .381 (p .533) 
Phi = .538 (p .533) 
 
Small 
Chi2 = 6.67 (p .071) 
FE = 5.55 (p .071) 
CV = .816 (p .071) 
Phi = .816 (p .071) 
 
Group 2 
Chi2 = 8.44 (p .173) 
FE = 7.73 (p .134) 
CV = .471 (p .173) 
Phi = .667 (p .173) 
 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = 4.11 (p .368) 
FE = 3.91 (p .368) 
CV = .478 (p .368) 
Phi = .478 (p .368) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 7.93 (p .045) 
FE = 7.3 (p .054) 
CV = .575 (p .045) 
Phi = .575 (p .045) 
 
Group 3 
Chi2 = 2.57 (p 1) 
FE = 3.79 (p 1) 
CV = .378 (p 1) 
Phi = .535 (p 1) 
 
 Large 
All large companies only in 
wetbulk sector. 
 
Group 4 
Chi2 = 2.26 (p .940) 
FE = 3.574 (p .940) 
CV = .238 (p .940) 
Phi = .337 (p .940) 
  
Table ‎7.8: Zero order and conditional relationships between independent variables. 
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7.5. Implementation of measures 
This section aims to investigate the relationship or association between the implementation of a 
particular measure (whether it has been implemented or not) and the characteristics of firms, such 
as their size, sector in which they operate and their chartering levels. This is done only for the three 
most implemented measures (representing almost 50% of total responses) from question two of the 
survey that were believed to have the highest fuel saving potential, not only because it is believed 
that deeper understanding on these would provide a rich picture of the interactions of the variables, 
but also the high number of respondents would mean that data analysis would not suffer from small 
sample sizes.  
The null hypothesis in the following analysis would be that there is no relationship between the 
implementation of a measure and each of the independent variables. The alternative hypothesis is 
that there is a relationship between implementation of a particular measure and each of the 
independent variables, however since there is no knowledge of the direction of the relationship, a 
two tailed significance test is used for each test. The following analysis follows the elaboration 
model steps outlined in section ‎7.1, beginning with zero order relationships and then moving to 
conditional relationships. 
7.5.1. Weather routing implementation 
In the preliminary analysis chapter it was seen that 70% of the respondents thought that weather 
routing measure had the highest fuel saving potential and just under 70% (78 out of 114) of the 
respondents who selected this measure had already implemented this measure. Bar charts that 
disaggregated these results in the preliminary analysis at the zero order level showed that large 
companies had the highest level of implementation followed by medium sized and lastly small 
companies with the lowest level of implementation. This section tests for the relationship that exists 
between its implementation and other firm characteristics.  
7.5.1.1. Relationship of implementation of weather routing with size 
The alternative hypothesis being tested here is that there is a relationship between implementation 
of weather routing measure (Y variable) and size of the company (X variable). In order to see how 
(i.e. spuriously, directly, indirectly etc.) size (X) affects implementation of weather routing measure 
(Y) (zero order direct relationship) two test variables are introduced separately, the sector (Za) the 
firm operates in and the firm’s chartering level (Zb). Sector is introduced as a test variable because it 
is plausible that the difference in implementation may be partly explained by this variable. From the 
survey preliminary analysis (Figure ‎6.15) it was found that there was varying degree of 
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implementation of measures amongst the sectors, for example speed reduction due to port 
efficiency was implemented in the bulk sectors, raising crew awareness was highly implemented in 
the container sector. Chartering group is also introduced as a test variable separately because it is 
plausible that it may also partly explain the zero order relationship. From Figure ‎6.29 above it can be 
seen that implementation varied amongst the different chartering groups. It is also introduced 
because it is used as an indicator of the principal agent problem which is thought to affect the 
implementation of measures. These justifications are used for the analysis of the remaining two 
measures being investigated in the elaboration analysis.  
Although a clear linear relationship can be seen in Figure ‎7.3, the descriptive statistic for showing the 
strength of association showed a weak relationship between size and implementation coupled with 
a highly non-significant relationship. This zero order relationship had Chi-squared test result of 1.17 
(sig 0.559) and Cramer’s V of 0.117 (p 0.559). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎7.3: Zero order relationships between weather routing and size variable 
The effect size further increased for conditional relationships i.e. when controlling for sector, to 
moderate level for drybulk sector (Cramer’s V = 0.25, p = 0.517) and marginally for wetbulk sector 
(Cramer’s V = 0.136, p 0.876). This difference in association between sectors (categories of test 
variables) suggests a specification effect, thus implying that size on its own does not have an effect 
on implementation of weather routing but when it occurs in combination with a specific sector there 
seems to be some relationship. So when sector is controlled the differences in size seem to affect 
the implementation of weather routing measure more for drybulk sector than for wetbulk sector, 
i.e. the relationship holds more for the drybulk and less for wetbulk sector. This is supported by 
findings in Figure ‎6.15 and Table ‎7.9 below which shows on average around 50% of the respondents 
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in the wetbulk sector had implemented it whilst on average nearly 80% in the drybulk sector had 
implemented the measure, with marked differences amongst the size categories. Although effect 
sizes showed an increase, the null hypothesis (that there is no association between the original 
relationships) could not be rejected due to the highly non-significant relationship.  
 Wetbulk  Drybulk 
Small                
(N=7) 
Medium             
(N=14) 
Large                
(N=5) 
Small                
(N=8) 
Medium             
(N=15) 
Large                
(N=2) 
Implemented 43% 57% 60% 63% 80% 100% 
Not implemented 57% 43% 40% 38% 20% 0% 
Table ‎7.9: Conditional tables by sector for size and weather routing implementation 
When controlling for the chartering group the original association showed interaction effects 
(specification) for the various groups (Table ‎7.11), with the relationship getting stronger when 
controlling for chartering groups one and three (voyage chartered out fleet), and decreasing for 
chartering groups two and four (time chartered out fleet). This suggests that implementation of 
weather routing and size of a company is more related with certain types of chartering levels, and in 
this case it affects the implementation of firms which have a majority of their fleet chartered out on 
voyage charter. A closer examination of the conditional tables shows reversal of patterns across 
sizes. For chartering group one 50% of the small sized companies had implemented weather routing 
compared to 100% of large sized companies. For chartering group three 100% of small sized 
companies had implemented this measure compared to none of the large sized companies. For 
group two and four the implementation levels were around 60% across all size categories. This 
finding seems to confirm the earlier finding from Figure ‎6.29, which showed that groups with a 
majority of their fleet chartered out time had higher implementation and the relationship with size 
does not matter, but at the same time suggesting that the implementation for groups with a 
majority of the fleet on voyage charter is also partly due to the sizes of companies in those 
chartering groups. The next section therefore attempts to assess the relationship of implementation 
with chartering group. 
7.5.1.2. Relationship of implementation of weather routing with chartering group 
The alternative hypothesis being tested is that there is a direct relationship between implementation 
of weather routing measure (Y variable) and chartering level of the company (X variable). In order to 
see how chartering group (X) affects implementation of weather routing measure (Y) (zero order 
direct relationship) two test variables are introduced separately, the size (Za) of the firm and sector 
(Zb) the firm operates in. Size is introduced as a test variable separately because it is plausible that it 
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may also partly explain the zero order relationship. Sector is introduced as a test variable because it 
is plausible that the difference in implementation may be partly explained by this variable.  
For the zero order relationship between implementation of weather routing measure and chartering 
the effect size showed a modest increase (Cramers V = 0.252), which can be said to be between 
weak and moderate association. The actual levels of implementation are shown in Figure ‎7.4. It can 
be seen that when not controlling for other variables groups one and three (majority out on voyage) 
actually have lower average implementation than groups two and four (majority out on time). 
Earlier, it was seen that group three on average across all the measures had the highest level of 
implementation, whereas for the weather routing measure the group appears to have the lowest 
level of implementation. The explanation provided earlier regarding operational measures being 
applicable to group two and four also applies here, since weather routing is predominantly a 
measure favoured by time charterers for monitoring and control purposes as well.  
 
Figure ‎7.4: Zero order relationship between weather routing and chartering group  
When controlling for sector the original relationship improves for both categories of sector but the 
chi squared statistic only improved significantly for the conditional table for the drybulk sector. The 
relationship can be said to have been replicated as the association persists for both categories of the 
test variable, but it can also be said that relationship holds more for one category of the test 
variable, since the association increases considerably and significantly to correlation coefficient of 
0.647 (p .021) when controlling for drybulk and to 0.418 (p 0.685) when controlling for wetbulk. This 
suggests that when holding other things equal (sector) the chartering group seems to have a 
stronger relationship to the implementation of the weather routing measure especially in the 
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drybulk sector. Although the relationship is found to be statistically significant for the drybulk sector, 
Table ‎7.10 below suggests the split of implementation between voyage (group one and three) and 
time charter (group two and four) is more apparent in wetbulk sector. 
 Wetbulk  Drybulk 
Grp. 1 
(N=1) 
Grp. 2 
(N=3) 
Grp. 3 
(N=3) 
Grp. 4 
(N=6) 
Grp. 1 
(N=10) 
Grp. 2 
(N=6) 
Grp 3 
(N=1) 
Grp 4 
(N=1) 
Implemented 0% 67% 33% 67% 70% 100% 0% 0% 
Not implemented 100% 33% 67% 33% 30% 0% 100% 100% 
Table ‎7.10: Conditional tables by sector for weather routing and chartering group 
When controlling for the size variable the original zero order relationship showed replication effects, 
as well as showing that the relationship holds more for large sized. The replication of similar and 
higher correlation coefficients for the test variable suggests that the relationship between chartering 
group and implementation of weather routing is robust. This implies that implementation of 
weather routing is affected by the chartering level of a firm. 
7.5.1.3. Relationship of implementation of weather routing with sector 
The alternative hypothesis being tested here is that there is a direct relationship between 
implementation of weather routing measure (Y variable) and sector in which the company operates 
(X variable). In order to see how sector (X) affects implementation of weather routing measure (Y) 
(zero order direct relationship) two test variables are introduced separately, the size (Za) of the firm 
and chartering group (Zb) the firm operates in. Size is introduced as a test variable separately 
because it is plausible that it may also partly explain the zero order relationship. Chartering group is 
introduced as a test variable because it is plausible that the difference in implementation may be 
partly explained by this variable.  
The effect size showed a small increase (compared to that of chartering group and weather routing 
implementation) in the zero order relationship between implementation of weather routing 
measure and sector (Cramers V = 0.295, p 0.058), which can be said to be statistically significant and 
represents moderate association which is the highest level of association observed so far. The actual 
levels of implementation are shown in Figure ‎7.5. It can be seen in this zero order relationship that 
the container sector has the least level of implementation of the measure. So although the four 
container sector respondents thought that weather routing had a high fuel saving potential this was 
not followed by its implementation, which would suggest that either this measure is not applicable 
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to the container sector or there are barriers are preventing uptake of the measure. The same applies 
to the wetbulk sector which had lower implementation compared to the drybulk sector.  
 
Figure ‎7.5: Zero order relationship between weather routing implementation and sector 
Controlling for size, the conditional relationship continues to show very similar levels of association, 
i.e. a replication effect, which suggests that the original relationship was not due to the influence of 
the size variable, hence sector is also a strong variable affecting implementation of weather routing. 
When controlling for chartering group the conditional relationships increase reasonably for all 
chartering groups reaching moderate to strong levels of association, suggesting the replication of the 
original zero order relationship with some level of specification effects. The association between 
implementation of weather routing and sector occurs in all conditional relationships explored 
reaching statistical significance in the zero order relationships, which implies that there exists an 
association between the two, thus the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
From the above findings one can conclude that the sector variable has the most influence on the 
adoption of the weather routing measure. The chartering group variable can also be said to be 
affecting the implementation of the weather routing measure. Furthermore, when controlling for 
sector, the chartering group’s relationship with implementation improves substantially and 
significantly. The size variable only in specific conditions affects the implementation of weather 
routing. However since all the variables are not controlled for simultaneously, their individual impact 
on the implementation of the measure remains unknown. It can be concluded that sectoral 
heterogeneity coupled with principal agent problems may be affecting the implementation of the 
weather routing measure and chapter eight will attempt to explore the causes of these. 
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Chi2 = 1.171 (p .559) 
FE = 1.130 (p .62) 
CV = .117 (p .559) 
Phi = N/A 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = N/A 
FE = .608 (p .876) 
CV = .136 (p .876) 
Phi = N/A 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = N/A 
FE = 1.343 (p .784) 
CV = .25 (p .517) 
Phi = N/A 
Group 1 
Chi2= 1.5 (p .72) 
FE = 1.528 (p .72) 
CV = .316 (p .72) 
Phi = .316 (p .72) 
Group 2 
Chi2= .515 (p 1) 
FE = 
CV = .179 (p 1) 
Phi = -.179 (p 1) 
Group 3 
Chi2= 2.1 (p 1) 
FE = 1.98 (p 1) 
CV = .548 (p 1) 
Phi = .548 (p 1) 
Group 4 
Chi2= .071 (p 1) 
FE = .386 (p 1) 
CV = .067 (p 1) 
Phi = .067 (p 1) 
Se
ct
o
r 
Small 
Chi2 = 3.08 (p .353) 
FE = 2.92 (p .353) 
CV = .383 (p 353) 
Phi = .383 (p .353) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 3.414 (p .33) 
FE = 3.408 (p .28) 
CV = .264 (p .331) 
Phi = .264 (p .331) 
 
Large 
Chi2 = 1.33 (p .773) 
FE = 1.208 (p 1) 
CV = .333 (p .773) 
Phi = .333 (p .773) 
 
 
Chi2= 7.421 (p .058) 
FE = 6.997 (p .064) 
CV = .295 (p .058) 
Phi = .295 (p .058) 
Group 1 
Chi2= 1.95 (p .685) 
FE = 1.937 (p .685) 
CV = .373 (p .685) 
Phi = .373 (p .685) 
Group 2 
Chi2= 3.09 (p .346) 
FE = 3.564 (p .346) 
CV = .440 (p .378 
Phi = .440 (p .378) 
Group 3 
Chi2= 1.56 (p 1) 
FE = 1.603 (p 1) 
CV = .471 (p 1) 
Phi = .471 (p 1) 
Group 4 
Chi2= 3.91 (p .379) 
FE = 3.63 (p .379) 
CV = .494 (p .379) 
Phi = .494 (p .379) 
C
h
ar
te
r 
gr
o
u
p
 Small 
Chi2 = 1.03 (p 1) 
FE = 1.32 (p 1) 
CV = .281 (p 1) 
Phi = .281 (p 1) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 3.99 (p .27) 
FE = 3.915 (p .25) 
CV = .333 (p .263) 
Phi = .333 (p .263) 
 
Large 
Chi2 = .232 (p 1) 
FE = 2.09 (p 1) 
CV = .667 (p 1) 
Phi = .667 (p 1) 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = 2.270 (p .685) 
FE = 2.324 (p .685) 
CV = .418 (p .685) 
Phi = N/A 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = 7.532 (p .0.21) 
FE = 6.638 (p .021) 
CV = .647 (p .021) 
Phi = N/A 
 
Chi2 = 3.442 (p .327) 
FE = 3.44 (p .327 
CV = .252 (p .348) 
Phi = .252 (p .348) 
Table ‎7.11: Summary of elaboration analysis for weather routing measure 
Chi2 = Chi-squared test 
FE = Fisher’s exact test 
CV = Cramer’s V 
p. = significance level 
Underlined values show a moderate and strong relationship 
Bold values show a statistically significant relationship 
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7.5.2. Fuel consumption monitoring 
In the preliminary analysis chapter it was seen that over 70% of the respondents thought that fuel 
consumption monitoring had the highest fuel saving potential as well as also being the highest 
implemented measure, over 70% (85 out of 119) of the respondents who selected this measure had 
already implemented this measure. Bar charts that disaggregated these results in the preliminary 
analysis showed that small sized companies had the highest level of implementation followed by 
medium sized and lastly large companies with the lowest level of implementation, quite opposite to 
the pattern observed for weather routing implementation. This section tests for the relationship that 
exists between implementation fuel consumption monitoring measure and size, sector and 
chartering group variables.  
7.5.2.1. Relationship of implementation of fuel consumption monitoring with size 
From Figure ‎7.6 below a clear relationship can be observed, the descriptive statistic for showing the 
strength of association showed a weak relationship between size and implementation coupled with 
a highly non-significant relationship. This zero order relationship had Chi-squared test result of 3.12 
(p 0.241) and Cramer’s V of 0.189 (p 0.208). This zero order relationship is much higher than that of 
the weather routing measure in the same context. 
 
Figure ‎7.6: Zero order relationship between fuel consumption monitoring and size 
The conditional relationship for the implementation of fuel consumption monitoring measure and 
size when controlling for sector reveals a specification or statistical interaction effect, which is also 
found to be statistically significant for the wetbulk sector. When controlling for the wetbulk sector 
the association strengthens significantly (Cramer’s V = 0.413, p 0.085), whereas controlling for 
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drybulk the zero order relationship weakened. So when sector is controlled the size differences in 
implementation of the measure mainly exist for the wetbulk sector. 90% of the small sized 
companies in the wetbulk sector respondents (N=10) had already implemented the fuel 
consumption monitoring measure whereas under 40% of the large companies (N=8) had 
implemented the measure in the same sector as shown in conditional Table ‎7.12. Thus, the original 
zero order relationship pattern remained for the wetbulk sector but did not apply to the drybulk 
sector.  
 Wetbulk  Drybulk 
Small 
(N=10) 
Medium 
(N=14) 
Large 
(N=8) 
Small 
(N=6) 
Medium 
(N=15) 
Large 
(N=1) 
Implemented 90% 64% 38% 83% 73% 100% 
Not implemented 10% 36% 63% 17% 27% 0% 
Table ‎7.12: Conditional tables by sector for size and implementation of fuel consumption monitoring 
When controlling for chartering group, the changes in the associations show a similar pattern to that 
which was observed for weather routing implementation, a specification effect i.e. relationship for 
voyage chartered out fleet is much stronger than that for groups which have more of the fleet 
chartered out on time. Once again this finding corroborates with the hypothesis that 
implementation in time chartered fleet is higher regardless of the size, but the above finding also 
suggests that implementation of fuel consumption monitoring is affected by size for groups which 
have a majority of their fleet chartered out on voyage. A closer examination of the conditional tables 
confirms this for chartering groups one and three (i.e. those with a majority of fleet voyage 
chartered out) show a relationship with highest implementation by small firms followed by medium 
and lowest implementation by large firms in those chartering groups. This relationship is not 
observed in the chartering groups two and four. This implies that for firms where fuel is mainly paid 
for by the shipowner (chartering group one), smaller companies have higher implementation of the 
measure. This is contrary to the commonly held view that larger companies would invest in this 
measure (this is supported by anecdotal literature from industry press, which almost always cites 
larger companies investment in this measure). Possible explanation of the higher implementation 
could be that the materiality of savings is envisaged easily by smaller firms coupled with the lower 
absolute capital expenditure, as a result of fewer ships.  
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  Chartering group 1   Chartering group 2 
Small 
(N=3) 
Medium 
(N=16) 
Large 
(N=4) 
Small 
(N=7) 
Medium 
(N=24) 
Large 
(N=2) 
Implemented 100% 69% 50% 100% 75% 100% 
Not implemented 0% 31% 50% 0% 25% 0% 
Table ‎7.13: Conditional table by chartering group for size and fuel consumption monitoring 
7.5.2.2. Relationship of implementation of fuel consumption monitoring with sector 
Figure ‎7.7 below shows the number or respondents who implemented the measure and the sector 
in which they operate. The relationship cannot be visually summarised, the zero order relationship 
had Chi-squared test result of 3.182 (sig 0.390) and Cramer’s V of 0.19 (p 0.390), which is very similar 
to that obtained for the zero order relationship of this measure with the size variable. The observed 
pattern of implementation by the different sectors is also very similar to that observed for weather 
routing and sector relationship. The associated high significance values mean that there is high 
chance of sampling error affecting the findings, thus the confidence in the strength of association is 
low.  
 
Figure ‎7.7: Zero order relationship between fuel consumption monitoring and sector 
Controlling for the size, the conditional relationships were lower for small and medium sized 
companies compared to zero order relationships but increased considerably among large sized 
companies with Chi-squared 5.833 (p 0.119) and Cramer’s V 0.645 (p 0.119). This seems to suggest a 
specification effect, which means that although there may not be a high relationship initially 
between sector and implementation of fuel consumption monitoring, breaking down this 
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relationship by size suggests that the pattern of implementation by sector among the size groups is 
somewhat different, i.e. when size is controlled the sectoral differences in implementation of fuel 
consumption measure tends to be much more amongst large sized companies. This implies that 
there is more sectoral heterogeneity and differences within large firms across the sectors. Looking at 
the conditional table for large and small companies shows that an average (across the sectors) 90% 
of small sized companies (N=18) had already implemented this measure, whereas for large sized 
companies an average (across sectors) of 65% of large companies had implemented this measure 
(N=14).  
 Small  Large 
Wetbulk          
(N=10) 
Drybulk          
(N=6) 
Cont.      
(N=0) 
Mixed             
(N=2) 
Wetbulk          
(N=8) 
Drybulk          
(N=1) 
Cont.        
(N=1) 
Mixed             
(N=4) 
Implemented 90% 83%   100% 38% 100% 100% 100% 
Not 
implemented 
10% 17%   0% 63% 0% 0% 0% 
Table ‎7.14: Conditional tables by size for fuel consumption monitoring and sector 
The conditional relationships increase when holding for various chartering groups, although not as 
much for group one. This is the same pattern that was observed in conditional relationships of 
weather routing and sector. This suggests that the chartering group variable has a moderating effect 
on the original relationship. When chartering group is controlled the sectoral differences in 
implementation of fuel consumption measure persists for all chartering groups but more so for 
groups two, three and four (although at highly non-significant levels). There is significant difference 
in correlation coefficients or relationships of implementation of this measure by sector between 
chartering group one and three (Table ‎7.16). The difference in these groups did not exist earlier and 
perhaps can be explained by the ownership structure of the groups. Chartering group one is owner 
operated fleet with majority chartered out on voyage, whereas group three is management 
company operated fleet with majority chartered out on voyage, who can be said to have higher 
demands on accurate fuel reporting from both owners and charterers, secondly their incentive may 
be the ability to save fuel costs as one of their key performance indicators, which is an important 
feature in the negotiation of their contract renewals with owners.  
7.5.2.3. Relationship of implementation of fuel consumption monitoring with chartering group 
The zero order relationship between implementation of fuel consumption monitoring measure and 
chartering group showed the highest level of association (Cramer’s V 0.216) compared to zero order 
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relationships of the measure with size of companies and sector they operated in. Figure ‎7.8 below 
shows the average implementation level amongst the chartering groups.  
 
Figure ‎7.8: Zero order relationships for fuel consumption monitoring and chartering group 
The conditional relationship when controlling for size revealed replication effects where controlling 
for medium size companies the association remained similar to the zero order relationship, and 
increased substantially when controlling for the large size category. Comparing the conditional 
tables, it can be observed that for the large sized firms there is significant variation in 
implementation across the chartering groups (partly because of the lower sample size), whereas for 
small sized firms implementation remained constant across all the chartering groups. The 
conditional tables controlling for size show that all the chartering groups in the small size category 
had 100% implementation of the measure, which declines to just over 70% average of chartering 
groups for medium sized companies and over 65% average of chartering groups in the large sized 
companies. There is no theoretical explanation as to why such a variation is observed nor do the 
results show previously observed differences between chartering group implementation.   
Conditional relationships when controlling for sector results in specification effect where the level of 
association controlling for the wetbulk improves the relationship and reduces when controlling for 
the drybulk sector. Examining the conditional tables suggest that the hypothesis on difference in 
implementation by chartering group holds in the wetbulk sector but not as much in the drybulk 
sector, i.e. group one and three have lower implementation in the wetbulk sector but this is not 
applicable to the drybulk sector. This to some extent explains the higher implementation average for 
energy efficiency measures in the drybulk sector.  
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  Wetbulk sector   Drybulk sector 
Group 1 
(N=4) 
Group 2 
(N=4) 
Group 3 
(N=3) 
Group 4 
(N=8) 
Group 1 
(N=7) 
Group 2 
(N=6) 
Group 3 
(N=1) 
Implemented 50% 75% 67% 88% 71% 83% 100% 
Not implemented 50% 25% 33% 13% 29% 17% 0% 
Table ‎7.15: Conditional tables by sector for fuel consumption monitoring and chartering group 
From the above analysis on implementation of fuel consumption monitoring it was observed that 
the size variable seemed to influence implementation only in combination with other firm 
characteristics especially the sector in which the firm operates in and the chartering level. The same 
can be said for the sector and chartering group variables, which seem to only be replicated for one 
test variable rather than both. This suggests that all the variables, the size of the firm, the sector in 
which the firm operates and the firm’s chartering level affect the implementation of fuel 
consumption monitoring. This is slightly different to what was observed for the variables affecting 
implementation of the weather routing measure, where only the sector and chartering group were 
mainly affecting the measure’s implementation. 
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Chi2 = 3.142 (p .241) 
FE = 3.221 (p .215) 
CV = .189 (p .208) 
Phi = .189 (p .208) 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = 5.45 (p .085) 
FE = 5.238 (p .085) 
CV = .413 (p .085) 
Phi = .413 (p .085) 
 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = .552 (p 1) 
FE = .730 (p 1) 
CV = .158 (p 1) 
Phi = .158 (p 1) 
 
Group 1 
Chi2 = 1.519 (p .753) 
FE = 1.317 (p .753) 
CV = .308 (p .753) 
Phi = .308 (p .753) 
 
Group 2 
Chi2 = .781 (p .599) 
FE = N/A 
CV = .214 (p .377) 
Phi = .214 (p .377) 
 
Group 3 
Chi2 = 7.00 (p .286) 
FE = 4.753 (p .286) 
CV = 1.00 (p .286) 
Phi = 1.00 (p .286) 
 
Group 4 
Chi2 = 2.21 (p .330) 
FE = 1.559 (p .679) 
CV = .372 (p .330) 
Phi = .372 (p .330) 
 
Se
ct
o
r 
Small 
Chi2 = .45 (p 1) 
FE = .929 (p 1) 
CV = .158 (p 1) 
Phi = .158 (p 1) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 1.151 (p .88) 
FE = 1.390 (p .782) 
CV = .149 (.801) 
Phi = .149 (.801) 
 
Large 
Chi2 = 5.833 (p .119) 
FE = 5.227 (p .119) 
CV = .645 (p .119) 
Phi = .645 (p .119) 
 
 
Chi2 = 3.182 (p .390) 
FE = 3.278 (p .354) 
CV = .19 (p .390) 
Phi = .19 (p .390) 
 
Group 1 
Chi2 = .518 (p .825) 
FE = .756 (p .825) 
CV = .18 (p .825) 
Phi = .18 (p .825) 
 
Group 2 
Chi2 = 1.979 (p .842) 
FE = 2.221 (p .710) 
CV = .363 (p .842) 
Phi = .363 (p .842) 
 
Group 3 
Chi2 = 1.55 (p 1)  
FE = 1.968 (p 1) 
CV = .471 (p 1) 
Phi = .471 (p 1) 
 
Group 4 
Chi2 = 4.63 (p .25) 
FE = 3.44 (p .35) 
CV = .538 (p .25) 
Phi = .538 (p .25) 
 
C
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r 
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 Small 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 3.965 (p .275) 
FE = 3.546 (p .299) 
CV = .315 (p .275) 
Phi = .315 (p .275 
Large 
Chi2 = 3 (p .6) 
FE = 2.551 (p .6) 
CV = .707 (p .6) 
Phi = 707 (p .6) 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = 2.024 (p .807) 
FE = 2.411 (p .807) 
CV = .326 (p .807) 
Phi = .326 (p .807) 
 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = .566 (p 1) 
FE = .911 (p 1) 
CV = .201 (p 1) 
Phi = .201 (p 1) 
 
 
Chi2 = 2.619 (p .514) 
FE = 2.328 (p .544) 
CV = .216 (p .514) 
Phi = (p .514) 
 
Table ‎7.16: Summary of elaboration analysis for fuel consumption monitoring measure 
Chi2 = Chi-squared test 
FE = Fisher’s exact test 
CV = Cramer’s V 
p. = significance level 
Underlined values show a moderate and strong relationship 
Bold values show a statistically significant relationship 
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7.5.3. General speed reduction 
In the preliminary analysis chapter it was seen that 70% of the respondents thought that general 
speed reduction had the highest fuel saving potential as well as being the third most implemented 
measure, over 60% (69 out of 115) of the respondents who selected this measure had already 
implemented this measure. Bar charts that disaggregated these results in the preliminary analysis 
did not show a clear trend. This section therefore tests for the relationship that may exist between 
its implementation and other firm characteristics.  
7.5.3.1. Relationship of implementation of general speed reduction with size 
Here it is hypothesized that there is direct relationship between the size of a company and its 
implementation of the measure. The zero order relationship between the implementation of general 
speed reduction measure with size shows a weak association with Cramer’s V 0.178 (p 0.286) and a 
low chi-squared test figure of 2.6 (p 0.286). This level of association is similar to that observed for 
zero order relationships for other measures and their relationship with size. Based on this initial 
relationship it can be said that there isn’t a good association between size and implementation of 
speed reduction measure.  
 
Figure ‎7.9: Zero order relationship between general speed reduction and size 
The conditional relationship when controlling for sector showed statistical interaction i.e. split 
effects. For the wetbulk sector the strength of the original relationship remained similar but 
increased considerably and significantly when controlling for drybulk (Cramer’s V = 0.547, p 0.029). 
So when sector is controlled the difference in implementation among the size groups mainly persists 
for the drybulk sector. This explains the Table ‎7.17 below where it can be seen that small companies 
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in the wetbulk sector are more likely to have implemented this measure than those in drybulk 
sector. In the wetbulk sector 78% of the small sized companies had implemented this measure which 
is the highest amongst other size groups in that sector. However in the drybulk sector there seems 
to be a considerable difference in the implementation with only 29% of small sized companies 
implementing general speed reduction which is the lowest compared to other sizes in that sector. 
This is analogous to the conditional relationship observed for implementation of the fuel 
consumption monitoring measure. The higher implementation by smaller firms in the wetbulk 
sectors for both the measures could be due to the relatively higher bargaining power of the major 
charterers in the wetbulk sector. Since the Cramer’s V statistic does not measure linear association 
the direction of the association cannot be said to be negative or positive.  
  Controlling for wetbulk  Controlling for drybulk 
 Small             
(N=9) 
Medium             
(N=10) 
Large             
(N=7) 
Small             
(N=7) 
Medium             
(N=14) 
Large             
(N=2) 
Implemented 78% 60% 57% 29% 86% 50% 
Not implemented 22% 40% 43% 71% 14% 50% 
Table ‎7.17: Conditional tables by sector for general speed reduction and size 
Conditional relationships when controlling for chartering group shows that the original relationship 
persists in all four chartering groups, suggesting a replication effect with an even stronger 
relationship for group three (Cramer’s V = 0.447). This suggests that size of a company can be said to 
be a robust variable affecting the implementation of general speed reduction.  
7.5.3.2. Relationship of implementation of general speed reduction with sector 
In Figure ‎6.23 it was seen that there existed some differences in the implementation of this measure 
amongst the different sectors in which companies operated. Therefore it is hypothesized that there 
could be some direct relationship between the sector a company operates in and implementation of 
the measure. The zero order relationship between the implementation of general speed reduction 
measure with sector shows a weak and a non-significant association (Cramer’s V 0.199, p 0.372), 
which is similar to that observed for zero order relationships of other measures and sector, although 
this zero order relationship is marginally higher compared to that of size and implementation of 
general speed reduction.  
Controlling for the size variable the zero order relationship between implementation of general 
speed reduction measure and sector increases the strength of the association to medium effect size 
for all three size groups. This pattern was also observed for the weather routing measure, however 
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the same conditional relationships showed a specification effect for the fuel consumption 
monitoring measure. Since the conditional relationship shows an increase in association for all three 
categories of the test variable, although not statistically significant, it implies replication of the zero 
order relationship i.e. there is a direct and robust relationship between sector and implementation 
of general speed reduction. 
 
Figure ‎7.10: Zero order relationship between general speed reduction and sector  
The conditional relationships when controlling for the chartering group variable showed that the 
original relationship improves substantially for group two and three and remains similar for group 
one and four. The relationship was also found to be statistically significant for group two with chi-
square statistic of 13 (df. 3) (p 0.077). This difference amongst the different categories of the test 
variable suggest that there is replication coupled with statistical interaction between the original 
relationship, in other words the relationship holds more or can be said to be specific to groups two 
and three. A closer examination of the conditional tables for groups two and three shows that 
actually the relationship is quite opposite between the two. For chartering group two (majority of 
the fleet owned and chartered out on time), the wetbulk and drybulk sectors had 100% 
implementation compared to no implementation at all in the wetbulk and drybulk sectors for 
chartering group three (management company with majority fleet out on voyage). So, group one 
and three (majority of the fleet on voyage charter) have lower levels of implementation compared to 
group two and four (majority of the fleet on time charter) thus again confirming the hypothesis that 
time chartered groups will have higher implementation of the speed reduction measure since fuel 
cost is being borne by the principal who is in control of implementing the measure i.e. incentives 
being aligned. This can be said to be more of the case in the wetbulk sector. 
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  Wetbulk sector   Drybulk sector 
Group 1 
(N=4) 
Group 2 
(N=10)  
Group 1 
(N=7) 
Group 2 
(N=6) 
Implemented 25% 80%  57% 100% 
Not implemented 75% 20% 43% 0% 
Table ‎7.18: Conditional tables by sector for general speed reduction and chartering group 
7.5.3.3. Relationship of implementation of general speed reduction with chartering group 
Analysis from section ‎5.6 shows that the speed reduction measure (ratio of operating speed to 
design speed) was not statistically different for voyage and time chartered ships in the wetbulk 
sector and drybulk sector, therefore the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The alternative 
hypothesis for the survey data analysis is that there is a relationship between the chartering group 
and implementation of speed reduction measure. The initial relationship between implementation 
of general speed reduction measure and chartering group shows very similar level of association 
found with chartering group and other measures, as well as being the strongest relationship 
compared to other independent variables (size and sector) related to the implementation, although 
this is once again a highly non-significant finding. Visually analysing Figure ‎7.11, it can be seen that 
group one and three (fleet chartered out on voyage) had lower implementation compared with 
group two and four (fleet chartered out on time), a finding which corroborates with the analysis in 
section ‎6.4.4 and Figure ‎6.25 (achieving speed reduction under different charters).  The pattern is 
also very similar to that observed for weather routing and chartering group, in Figure ‎7.4.  
 
Figure ‎7.11: Zero order relationship between general speed reduction and chartering group 
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When controlling for the sector of the companies, the zero order relationship increased markedly for 
both wetbulk and drybulk sectors. The replication suggests that the relationship between 
implementation of speed reduction and chartering group is robust even when controlled for sector. 
When adding extra categories of the test variable i.e. container sector the conditional relationship is 
the highest, but this could also be due to the relatively lower number of responses (N=2) resulting in 
many blank cells in the conditional tables. Because of the almost significant values the findings in the 
drybulk sector can be said to be inferable to the larger drybulk population. From Table ‎7.19 below it 
can be seen that the original pattern observed in the zero order relationship persists in the drybulk 
and wetbulk sector i.e. group one and three have lower implementation compared to group two and 
four in both sectors, which supports hypothesis 1c.  
 Wetbulk  Drybulk 
Grp. 1 
(N=2) 
Grp. 2 
(N=3) 
Grp. 3 
(N=2) 
Grp. 4 
(N=7) 
Grp. 1 
(N=6) 
Grp. 2 
(N=6) 
Grp 3 
(N=1) 
Grp 4 
(N=0) 
Implemented 50% 100% 0% 71% 67% 100% 0% - 
Not implemented 50% 0% 100% 29% 33% 0% 100% - 
Table ‎7.19: Conditional tables for general speed reduction implementation and chartering group 
The conditional relationships when holding for the size of companies showed specification effects as 
seen previously for other measures, when controlling for size. When controlling for larger companies 
the chartering group had a very strong association with implementation and when controlling for 
small companies the chartering group showed completely no association, thus statistical 
interaction/specification effect could be established. In other words the relationship between 
chartering group and implementation is more specific for large companies. On average across all 
chartering groups the larger firms had the highest implementation rate of over 80%, followed by 
medium sized firms at 75% and small sized firms’ implementation rate of just over 65%. The 
conditional relationship however does not have a similar pattern as observed above, rather the 
implementation rate across the chartering groups for all size categories are almost constant, 
suggesting that the null hypothesis regarding implementation and chartering group cannot be 
rejected.  
The above analysis suggests that the size of the firm, sector in which it operates and the chartering 
level are important factors in explaining the implementation of the general speed reduction 
measure. However the most important factor that seems to be causing variances in the 
implementation of this measure is the sector variable, which suggests sectoral heterogeneity (non-
market failure), could be a barrier to implementation for general speed reduction. This means that 
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although being the measure with highest fuel saving measure, sector specific issues such as the level 
of slow steaming allowed, charterparties, bill of ladings, route specific issues e.g. piracy are resulting 
in different levels of adoption of this measure.  
7.5.4. Concluding remarks 
This section of the chapter attempted to answer specific research questions 1b and 1c regarding the 
level of implementation. All of the top three measures believed to have the highest fuel saving 
potential had varying degree of implementation when disaggregated by size, sector and chartering 
group. For the fuel consumption monitoring and general speed reduction measures the conditional 
relationships showed replication effects in the majority of the cases, which suggests that the size of 
the firm, the sector in which it operates and chartering group have some causal effect on 
implementation. Whereas, for the weather routing measure the sector of operation and chartering 
level were the key causes of different levels of implementation and the size of the firm was not 
considered to be causing the differences in implementation.  
Where the chartering group is controlled or used as a test variable, a consistent theme amongst the 
conditional relationships was observed that is in agreement with the third hypothesis i.e. 
implementation of energy efficient operational measures will be higher for time chartered ships 
compared to voyage chartered ships, which confirms the effect of the principal agent problem in 
implementation of the operational measures analysed. 
The above analysis implies that both sectoral heterogeneity (non-market failure) coupled with 
principal agent problems (market failure) could be affecting the implementation of measures. This 
finding is only to some extent reflected in the preliminary analysis of the perception of barriers, 
(section ‎6.4.2) where mainly the split incentives were perceived to be the most important barriers. 
The following section attempts to compare the findings from this section with conditional 
relationships of perceptions of barriers.  
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 Size Sector Chartering group 
Si
ze
 
 
Chi2 = 2.648 (p .286) 
FE = 2.684 (p .256) 
CV = .178 (p .286) 
Phi = .178 (p .286) 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = .949 (p .667) 
FE = 1.046 (p .667) 
CV = .191 (p .667) 
Phi = .191 (p .667) 
 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = 6.941 (p .029) 
FE = 6.857 (p .029) 
CV = .549 (p .029) 
Phi = .549 (p .029) 
 
Group 1 
Chi2 = .933 (p .784) 
FE = .911 (p 1) 
CV = .258 (p .784) 
Phi = .258 (p .784) 
 
Group 2 
Chi2 = .606 (p 1) 
FE = 1.23 (p 1) 
CV = .201 (p 1) 
Phi = .201 (p 1) 
 
Group 3 
Chi2 = 1.2 (p 1) 
FE = 1.588 (p 1) 
CV = .447 (p 1) 
Phi = .447 (p 1) 
 
Group 4 
Chi2 = 1.029 (p 1) 
FE = 1.3 (p 1) 
CV = .293 (p 1) 
Phi = .293 (p 1) 
 
Se
ct
o
r 
Small 
Chi2 = 4.023 (p .18) 
FE = 3.863 (p .18) 
CV = .460 (p .18) 
Phi = .460 (p .18) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 3.77 (p .308) 
FE = 3.865 (p .282) 
CV = .293 (.308) 
Phi = .293 (.308) 
 
Large 
Chi2 = 1.436 (p .860) 
FE = 1.757 (p .860) 
CV = .309 (p .860) 
Phi = .309 (p .860) 
 
 
Chi2 = 3.163 (p .372) 
FE = 3.311 (p .334) 
CV = .199 (p .372) 
Phi = .199 (p .372) 
 
Group 1 
Chi2 = .638 (p 1) 
FE = 1.011 (p 1) 
CV = .222 (p 1) 
Phi = .222 (p 1) 
 
Group 2 
Chi2 = 13.00 (p .077) 
FE = 6.127 (p .077) 
CV = 1.00 (p .077) 
Phi = 1.00 (p .077) 
 
Group 3 
Chi2 = 6.00 (p .10) 
FE = 5.088 (p .10) 
CV = 1.00 (p .10) 
Phi = 1.00 (p .10)  
 
Group 4 
Chi2 = 1.71 (p .576)  
FE = 1.715 (p .576) 
CV = .378 (p .576) 
Phi = 378 (p .576) 
 
C
h
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r 
gr
o
u
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 Small 
Chi2 = 0 (p 1) 
FE = 0 (p 1) 
CV = 0 (p 1) 
Phi = 0 (p 1) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 1.635 (p .667) 
FE = 1.788 (p .697) 
CV = .226 (p .667) 
Phi = .226 (p .667) 
 
Large 
Chi2 = 6.00 (p .333) 
FE = 4.398 (p .333) 
CV = 1.00 (p .333) 
Phi = 1.00 (p .333) 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = 5.60 (p .147) 
FE = 4.837 (p .189) 
CV = .632 (p .147) 
Phi = .632 (p .147) 
 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = 5.489 (p .105) 
FE = 4.659 (p .105) 
CV = .650 (p .105) 
Phi = .650 (p .105) 
 
 
Chi2 = 2.695 (p .488) 
FE = 2.623 (p .498) 
CV = .239 (p .488) 
Phi =.239 (p .488) 
 
Table ‎7.20: Summary of elaboration analysis for general speed reduction measure 
Chi2 = Chi-squared test 
FE = Fisher’s exact test 
CV = Cramer’s V 
p. = significance level 
Underlined values show a moderate and strong relationship 
Bold values show a statistically significant relationship 
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7.6. Perception of barriers to energy efficiency 
This section aims to investigate the relationship or association between the perception of barriers to 
energy efficiency and the characteristics of firms, such as their size, sector in which they operate and 
their chartering levels. This will enable the answering of specific research question number two; how 
is the perception of barriers related to size, sector and chartering ratio? This question was partly 
answered in chapter six sections  6.4.2, where the same question was investigated but at a general 
level. The focus in this section is mainly on market failures i.e. split incentives and informational 
problems, the top most selected barriers by the respondents of the survey. Figure ‎7.12 below shows 
the distribution of the number of respondents who cited these as barriers. In order to perform the 
same type of elaboration analysis as above, a number of options are available for crosstabulation. 
One could use the absolute number (the frequency or number of times barrier cited) in the 
crosstabulations, which would result in large tables with many empty cells but still within the 
guideline limit of 8*8 table as suggested by de Vaus (1995). This would make tables unreadable 
visually and leave the analysis dependent heavily only on the descriptive statistics (e.g. the 
correlation coefficient). Alternatively, it was decided to employ collapsing or combining of categories 
approach for the split incentives barrier, which is advised by de Vaus (1995) if too many nominal 
categories are present. The frequency of citations were grouped into three groups, high (>=5) 
medium (3 – 4) and low (<=2), which results into equal split of the histogram frequency (33% of 
respondents for each group). Responses to informational problems did not vary as much, 98% of 
respondents cited the barrier between zero and four times throughout the survey and therefore 
there wasn’t a need to collapse the categories.  
Figure ‎7.12: Frequency distribution of split incentives barrier and information problem 
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The survey captured perception on barriers in two main ways as explained in ‎6.4.2. From these an 
approach similar to the summated scale is used to identify the position of the respondent regarding 
that barrier. An attempt was made to disaggregate the perception of barriers by size of companies 
and sector (figures C1.7 and C1.8 in appendix C). Some relationships could be visually identified for 
the size variable but it was not possible to identify relationships between sector and perception of 
barriers. In this section an in-depth analysis is carried out for the original relationships in order to 
assess whether these relationships are subgroup specific or apply generally.  
7.6.1. Perception of the split incentives barrier  
In section ‎6.4.2 it was seen that the split incentives barriers were the top rated barriers for four 
operational measures, which were mainly speed related fuel saving measures (general speed 
reduction, speed reduction – JIT arrivals, efficient voyage execution and optimisation of ballast 
voyages). There were mixed responses on each of the questions measuring the position of the 
respondent on this hence relationships were difficult to assess.  
7.6.1.1. Relationship of split incentives barrier perception with size 
Figure ‎7.13 below shows the zero order relationship between size of the company and perception of 
split incentives barrier. There were more respondents in large companies who did not perceive split 
incentives as an important barrier compared with medium and small sized companies. There was a 
weak but statistically significant association between size and perception (Cramer’s V = 0.181, p 
0.098).  
 
Figure ‎7.13: Zero order relationship between perception of split incentives and size 
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When controlling for sector, this original relationship showed a very marginal increase in association, 
the replication suggests that the relationship is not a spurious one. However, when controlling for 
chartering group the relationship between size and perception improved considerably and even 
significantly for chartering group four (management companies majority of fleet chartered out on 
time). A closer inspection of the conditional table reveals that 100% of this chartering group and 
chartering group two large firms had low citation of the split incentive barrier. Thus one can 
conclude that although the association between size and perception of the barrier persists amongst 
all groups, it holds more for specific subgroups of the sample. The finding suggests that larger firms 
with a majority of their fleet on time charter do not perceive the split incentive as barriers to 
implementation of energy efficiency operational measures.  This is corroborated with high levels of 
implementation for the weather routing and the general speed reduction measure but contradicts 
the high level of implementation of the fuel consumption monitoring measure by small firms in 
chartering group one.  
7.6.1.2. Relationship of split incentives barrier perception with sector 
Zero order relationship between split incentives perception and sector showed a weak association or 
no association which is also highly non-significant (Cramer’s V = 0.06, p 0.993).  This can also be seen 
from Figure ‎7.14 below, where all the companies in the sectors uniformly perceived the split 
incentive barrier.  
 
Figure ‎7.14: Zero order relationship between perception of split incentives and sector 
Conditional relationship between perception of the split incentive barrier and sector controlling for 
size showed a modest increase in associations from the zero order relationship. This increase was 
observed for all categories of the size variable, in other words the original relationship strengthened 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Wetbulk
(N=39)
Drybulk
(N=31)
Container
(N=6)
Mixed
(N=40)
%
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 
Split incentives barrier cited by sector 
Low
Medium
High
239 
 
when controlling for small, medium and large companies. The highest relationship was found to be 
when controlling for large companies. Large sized companies in all sectors were found to be 
clustered around the low level citation of the split incentives barrier, over 50% of the 19 respondents 
in the large size group fell in the low citation group, compared to 20% and 30% for medium and 
small sized groups, stressing on the previous zero order relationship between the split incentive 
barrier and size.  
When controlling for the chartering group, once again the strength of association increases for all 
four chartering groups and is similar across the groups. The increase is quite large compared to the 
zero order relationship, which suggests that chartering group is probably a suppressing variable 
which confounds the original relationship. Closer inspection of the conditional tables does not show 
any visual patterns or differences by sector and chartering groups, instead for all chartering groups 
the respondents are evenly spread across the perception categories. Therefore the perception of 
split incentives cannot be said to be different for each chartering group between the sectors. The 
higher conditional relationships therefore could be an artefact of the lower sample size resulting in 
sparsely populated crosstabulations cells.  
7.6.1.3. Relationship of split incentives barrier perception with chartering group 
The zero order relationship between perception of split incentives barriers and chartering group 
showed a weak and insignificant relationship (Cramer’s V = 0.172, p 0.661), similar to that seen for 
zero order relationship between split incentives perception and size. Figure ‎7.15 below shows this 
zero order relationship and it can be noted that there is a clear pattern for one of the chartering 
groups, which could be due to other variables that are investigated in conditional relationships that 
follow.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎7.15: Zero order relationship between perception of split incentives and chartering group 
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Controlling for the size variable shows some interesting results. The strength of association improves 
for all size categories but substantially when controlling for small and large sized companies, which 
suggests that the relationship observed in Figure ‎7.15 could be due to the size of companies, which 
as shown before is true for large companies. 75% of the respondents in the large size group were 
found to be in the low citation category across all chartering groups, as opposed to around 30% of 
respondents in the small and medium size groups in the same citation category across the chartering 
groups.  
 Small 
 
Large 
Group 1                 
(N=6) 
Group 2               
(N=4) 
Group 3                   
(N=1) 
Group 4                 
(N=5) 
Group 1                 
(N=3) 
 Group 2               
(N=1) 
 Group 3                   
(N=1) 
Group 4                 
(N=3) 
Low  33% 0% 0% 60% 67% 100% 0% 100% 
Med 17% 75% 0% 40% 33% 0% 0% 0% 
High 50% 25% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
Table ‎7.21: Perception of split incentives barrier and chartering group controlling for size 
When controlling for the sector variable the effect size increases considerably for both wetbulk and 
drybulk sectors to moderate level of association. From the conditional tables below it can be 
observed that chartering group two respondents (majority of the fleet owned and chartered out on 
time) have a contrasting perception of the barrier depending on the sector. There were also much 
larger variances among the groups in the drybulk sector, indicated by the higher Chi squared statistic 
(9.125, p 0.107) and higher level of association (Cramer’s V = 0.503, p 0.107). There isn’t a noticeable 
relationship between the chartering groups in the two sectors and the conditional table does not 
show previously observed split relationship between each of the chartering groups on voyage and 
time charter.  
 Wetbulk  Drybulk 
Group 1                 
(N=4) 
 Group 2               
(N=4) 
Group 3                   
(N=4) 
Group 4                 
(N=8) 
Group 1                 
(N=10) 
Group 2               
(N=6) 
Group 3                   
(N=1) 
Group 4                 
(N=1) 
Low  50% 0% 25% 50% 20% 67% 0% 0% 
Med 25% 75% 25% 13% 50% 33% 100% 0% 
High 25% 25% 50% 38% 30% 0% 0% 100% 
Table ‎7.22: Perception of split incentives barrier and chartering group controlling for sector 
The above findings suggest that the size of the firm has the highest causal effect on the perception 
of the split incentive barriers. Larger firms are less likely to cite the split incentives problem 
compared to smaller firms. Moreover, larger firms with a majority of their fleet on time charter do 
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not perceive the split incentive as barriers to implementation of weather routing and general speed 
reduction measures. Large sized firms in all sectors also did not perceive the split incentives as a 
barrier to implementation.  
The chartering group variable which is also an indicator of split incentives did not have a clear 
relationship with the respondents’ perception of the split incentives. Earlier it was suggested that it 
is plausible that principal agent problems or split incentives are affecting implementation but the 
respondents generally thought that this was not as important for their lack of implementation of 
measures.  
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 Holding/test variables 
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 Size Sector Chartering group 
Si
ze
 
 
Chi2 = 7.823 (p .098) 
FE = 7.262 (p .12) 
CV = .181 (p .098) 
Phi = .256 (p .098) 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = 3.207 (p .553) 
FE = 3.309 (p .564) 
CV = .205 (p .553) 
Phi = .291 (p .553) 
 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = 2.604 (p .726) 
FE = 2.976 (p .564) 
CV = .208 (p .726) 
Phi = .295 (p .726) 
 
Group 1 
Chi2 = 2.667 (p .758) 
FE = 2.67 (p .776) 
CV = .252 (p .758) 
Phi = .356 (p .758) 
 
Group 2 
Chi2 = 4.172 (p .413) 
FE = 4.238 (p .372) 
CV = .315 (p .413) 
Phi = .446 (p .413) 
 
Group 3 
Chi2 = 3.214 (p 1) 
FE = 3.562 (p 1) 
CV = .423 (p 1) 
Phi = .598 (p 1) 
 
Group 4 
Chi2 = 13.5 (p .006) 
FE = 12 (p .003) 
CV = .581 (p .006) 
Phi = .821 (p .006) 
 
Se
ct
o
r 
Small 
Chi2 = 4.236 (p .742) 
FE = 4.179 (p. 74) 
CV = .275 (p .742) 
Phi = .389 (p .742) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 2.589 (p .884) 
FE = 2.987 (p .853) 
CV = .141 (p .884) 
Phi = .2 (p .884) 
 
Large 
Chi2 = 3.8 (p .829) 
FE = 4.554 (p .759) 
CV = .316 (p .829) 
Phi = .447 (p .829) 
 
 
Chi2 = .828 (p .993) 
FE = 1.126 (p .992) 
CV = .06 (p .993) 
Phi = 0.08 (p .993) 
 
Group 1 
Chi2 = 5.024 (p .327) 
FE = 5.073 (p .313) 
CV = .354 (p .285) 
Phi = .501 (p .285) 
 
Group 2 
Chi2 = 5.73 (p .507) 
FE = 5.981 (p .491) 
CV = .388 (p .454) 
Phi = .549 (p .454) 
 
Group 3 
Chi2 = 2.25 (p .771) 
FE = 2.663 (p 1) 
CV = .354 (p .771) 
Phi = .5 (p .771) 
 
Group 4 
Chi2 = 5.248 (p .69) 
FE = 5.139 (p .645) 
CV = .362 (p .689) 
Phi = .512 (p .512) 
 
C
h
ar
te
r 
gr
o
u
p
 Small 
Chi2 = 9.271 (p .14) 
FE = 8.33 (p .182) 
CV = .538 (p .14) 
Phi = .761 (p .14) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 7.67 (p .276) 
FE = 7.4 (p .281) 
CV = .286 (p. 276) 
Phi = .404 (p. 276) 
 
Large 
Chi2 = 9.778 (p .464) 
FE = 7.930 (p .464) 
CV = .782 (p .464) 
Phi = 1.1 (p .464) 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = 6.369 (p .413) 
FE = 5.829 (p .563) 
CV = .399 (p .413) 
Phi = .564 (p .413) 
 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = 9.125 (p .107) 
FE = 7.793 (p .145) 
CV = .503 (p .107) 
Phi = .712 (p .107) 
 
 
Chi2 = 4.217 (p .661) 
FE = 4.273 (p .661) 
CV = .172 (p .661) 
Phi = .244 (p. 661) 
 
Table ‎7.23: Summary of elaboration analysis 
Chi2 = Chi-squared test 
FE = Fisher’s exact test 
CV = Cramer’s V 
p. = significance level 
Underlined values show a moderate and strong relationship 
Bold values show a statistically significant relationship 
 
243 
 
7.6.2. Perception of informational problems 
In chapter 6.4 it was seen that the informational barriers were also the top rated barrier for the four 
operational measures, which were more technical fuel saving measures (weather routing, autopilot 
adjustment and trim/draft optimisation). The combination of the split incentives barrier and 
informational barriers suggested that most respondents perceived the principal agent problems as 
important barriers to implementation. Having discussed split incentives, the following sections 
examine the relationship of perception of informational problems with firm characteristics in order 
to assess whether respondent perceptions are as a result of their belonging to certain population or 
sub-populations.   
7.6.2.1. Relationship of information barrier perception with size 
It is thought that there would be a relationship between size of company and the perception of 
informational problems as seen in the literature on barriers to energy efficiency (Sorrell et al. 2000). 
Thus, the alternative hypothesis is that there is a relationship between informational problems and 
size of the company. The initial relationship between perception of this barrier and size shows that 
large firms had perceived this to be less of a barrier than small sized firms. Figure ‎7.16 below shows 
that 50% of the large companies (ten respondents) did not cite this even once throughout the survey 
as opposed to small and medium sized companies. This suggests that there is some association 
between the size of companies and perception of this barrier, which is also indicated by the 
moderate effect size with Cramer’s V of 0.215 (p 0.556). To test the accuracy of this relationship, 
sector and chartering group variables are controlled for. 
 
Figure ‎7.16: Zero order relationship between perception of informational problems and size 
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When controlling for sector, the original relationship gets stronger for the wetbulk sector and 
persists for the drybulk sector. This implies that the zero order relationship applies more for the 
wetbulk sector than for the drybulk sector. Looking at the conditional tables for wetbulk sector, 
larger companies tend to cite this barrier more than the larger companies in the drybulk sector. A 
possible explanation to this could be because of the greater scrutiny faced in the wetbulk sector (e.g. 
through vetting) from major wetbulk charterers, which makes it an attractive market for suppliers or 
vendors of operational efficiency measures e.g. trim/draft optimisation, to concentrate their efforts 
in gaining market share in that sector, perhaps making the market inundated with a variety of 
information on costs and savings.  
Controlling for chartering group, the effect sizes increase to moderate effect sizes for all the 
chartering groups, suggesting the zero order relationship is replicated and therefore robust under all 
the controlled conditions. Examination of the conditional tables reveals that the small sized firms in 
chartering groups two and four (majority of the fleet out on time charter) perceived less 
informational problems compared to small sized firms in chartering groups one and three (majority 
of the fleet out on voyage charter). The same trend was not observed for large sized firms. The 
extent to which this perception affects implementation of small size firms is unclear, since 
implementation by small firms for all three measures controlling for chartering group showed no 
difference in implementation levels.  
7.6.2.2. Relationship of information barrier perception with sector 
The zero order relationship between perception of the barrier and sector is not as easily visualised 
compared to the relationship of informational problems and size. The crosstabulation is also difficult 
to read, however just using the descriptive statistic for measuring association, Cramer’s V 0.235 (p 
0.375), shows a weak to moderate relationship between the variables. This is very similar to that 
observed for the preceding variables (size and perception) zero order relationship but this 
correlation coefficient is much higher than that observed for zero order relationship between sector 
and split incentives.  
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Figure ‎7.17: Zero order relationship between perception of informational problems and sector 
The conditional relationships when controlling for size showed similar patterns of association as 
seen in previous conditional relationships between split incentives perception and sector. The effect 
size increases considerably when controlling for large sized companies. Conditional tables show that 
informational problems are perceived as less important barriers in small and medium wetbulk firms 
and perceived as important barriers for small and medium sized firms in drybulk sector. This is 
opposite of what is observed for large sized firms where informational problems are considered to 
be important in the wetbulk sector rather than drybulk sector. Chapter nine discusses why this is 
observed, despite larger firms according to theory and literature on barriers to energy efficiency 
facing less informational problems due to their resources to verify the credibility, source, quality of 
information on energy efficiency. 
Holding for chartering group, the strength of association increases for all the chartering groups, 
although all of the conditional relationships are highly non-significant. The conditional tables 
replicate the patterns observed above where the wetbulk sector perceived lower informational 
problems compared to drybulk sector.  
7.6.2.3. Relationship of information barrier perception with chartering group 
According to agency theory, the principal agent relationship leads to two problems; diverging 
interests and informational problems (costs of monitoring, obtaining information, etc.). The 
indicator for diverging interests in the survey was the citation of split incentive barrier as well as the 
chartering level. Correlation between split incentives and informational problems shows a 
statistically significant positive and moderate correlation of 0.335, p <0.01, although the scattergram 
shows a very wide spread. Here, the second measurement is used to hypothesize that there is some 
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relationship between actual chartering level and informational problems cited. Zero order 
relationship between information barrier and chartering group is the highest that has been observed 
so far, Cramer’s V = 0.288 (p 0.30). Figure ‎7.18 below shows the number of respondents citing 
information barrier by the chartering group. Although there isn’t a visual relationship it can clearly 
be seen that group three had the highest proportion of respondents that perceived no information 
related problems as a barrier affecting implementation.  
 
Figure ‎7.18: Zero order relationship between informational problems and chartering group 
When controlling for sector, the strength of the relationship improves to moderate levels for both 
the wetbulk and drybulk sectors but at statistically non-significant levels. Conditional tables show 
that in the wetbulk sector the differences amongst the different chartering groups citing no 
informational problems is not as wide ranging compared to the conditional tables of the drybulk 
sector, where chartering group one and two respondents perception is markedly different to group 
three and four. This pattern was also observed in the conditional relationship between split 
incentives and the chartering group.  
Controlling for size of companies, for small sized companies the effect size is substantial and 
statistically significant (Cramer’s V = 0.693, p 0.048), which suggests that there is a good possibility of 
a strong relationship between chartering group and perception of information barrier for small sized 
companies in the population. The conditional table for the small sized firm displays the hypothesised 
relationship where perception of the barrier is lower for chartering group two and chartering group 
four. This was not the case for medium sized and large sized firms. This relationship is similar to that 
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when the size variable was treated as independent and chartering group variable is used as a test 
variable.  
7.6.3. Concluding remarks 
The above analysis suggests that in most cases the larger firms perceive more informational 
problems than medium and small sized firms and this is mainly in the wetbulk sector. The 
explanation for this is provided in chapter nine, where it is discussed in the context of the findings 
from other methods. This finding is in contrast to the perception of split incentives barriers where 
they consider it as a less important factor that is affecting their implementation of measures. This 
suggests that sized based heterogeneity could also be influencing the uptake of operational 
measures. This sized based difference was also noted in two instances where the small sized firms in 
chartering groups two and four (majority of the fleet out on time charter) perceived less 
informational problems compared to small sized firms in chartering groups one and three (majority 
of the fleet out on voyage charter). This trend was not observed in the analysis of the perception of 
split incentives.  
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 Holding/test variables 
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 Size Sector Chartering group 
Si
ze
 
 
Chi2 = 11.015 (p .556) 
FE = 11.177 (p .452) 
CV = .215 (p .556) 
Phi = .304 (p .556) 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = 12.624 (p .10) 
FE = 11.1 (p .135) 
CV = .408 (p .103) 
Phi = .576 (p .103) 
 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = 2.92 (p .982) 
FE = 3.588 (p .985) 
CV = .221 (p .982) 
Phi = .312 (p .982) 
 
Group 1 
Chi2 = 10.875 (p .42) 
FE = 10.11 (p .407) 
CV = .509 (p .416) 
Phi = .720 (p .416) 
 
Group 2 
Chi2 = 5.906 (p .735) 
FE = 6.934 (p .736) 
CV = .375 (p .735) 
Phi = .530 (p .735) 
 
Group 3 
Chi2 = 4.629 (p .72) 
FE = 4.291 (p .722) 
CV = .507 (p .722) 
Phi = .717 (p. 722) 
 
Group 4 
Chi2 = 8.09 (p .257) 
FE = 7.538 (p .219) 
CV = .450 (p .257) 
Phi = .636 (p .257) 
 
Se
ct
o
r 
Small 
Chi2 = 6.808 (p .902) 
FE = 8.776 (p .937) 
CV = .285 (p .902) 
Phi = .493 (p .902) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 16.876 (p .51) 
FE = 17.8 (p .476) 
CV = .294 (p .505) 
Phi = .510 (p .505) 
 
Large 
Chi2 = 13.077 (p .46) 
FE = 11.087 (p .715) 
CV = .479 (p .460) 
Phi = .830 (p. 460) 
 
 
Chi2 = 19.268 (p .375) 
FE = 19.388 (p .353) 
CV = .235 (p .375) 
Phi = .408 (p .375) 
 
Group 1 
Chi2 = 7.194 (p .833) 
FE = 8.036 (p .736) 
CV = .424 (p .833) 
Phi = .6 (p .833) 
 
Group 2 
Chi2 = 10.07 (p .726) 
FE = 10.318 (p .708) 
CV = .420 (p .726) 
Phi = .728 (p .726) 
 
Group 3 
Chi2 = 0.9 (p 1) 
FE = 2 (p 1) 
CV = .224 (p 1) 
Phi = .316 (p 1) 
 
Group 4 
Chi2 = 7.286 (p .75) 
FE = 8.271 (p .657) 
CV = .348 (p .75) 
Phi = .604 (p .75) 
 
C
h
ar
te
r 
gr
o
u
p
 Small 
Chi2 = 23.06 (p .048) 
FE = 14.772 (p .204) 
CV = .693 (p .048) 
Phi = 1.201 (p .048) 
 
Medium 
Chi2 = 18.77 (p .214) 
FE = 16.101 (p .288) 
CV = .365 (p .214) 
Phi = .635 (p .214) 
 
Large 
Chi2 = 5.867 (p 1) 
FE = 9.084 (p 1) 
CV = .494 (p 1) 
Phi = .856 (p 1) 
 
Wetbulk 
Chi2 = 6.25 (p .807) 
FE = 6.584 (p .821) 
CV = .323 (p .807) 
Phi = .559 (p .897) 
 
Drybulk 
Chi2 = 10.6 (p .718) 
FE = 11.983 (p .588) 
CV = .443 (p .718) 
Phi = .767 (p .718) 
 
 
Chi2 = 17.721 (p .3) 
FE = 16.290 (p .3) 
CV = .288 (p .3) 
Phi = .5 (p .3) 
 
Table ‎7.24: Summary of elaboration analysis 
Chi2 = Chi-squared test 
FE = Fisher’s exact test 
CV = Cramer’s V 
p. = significance level 
Underlined values show a moderate and strong relationship 
Bold values show a statistically significant relationship 
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7.7. Concluding remarks 
Taking the above findings on implementation of measures and perception of barriers into account 
one can conclude that the chartering group variable i.e. the principal agent problem has a modest 
impact on the implementation of the three measures analysed. This is consistent with the theory 
and confirms the hypothesis that firms with a majority of the ships on time charter will have higher 
implementation of operational measures compared to firms with a majority of the ships on voyage 
charter. To some extent the sector variable also influences the implementation of the operational 
measures analysed, therefore sectoral heterogeneity i.e. non-market failures also affect the 
implementation of operational measures. The specific nature or direction of this influence or 
relationship remains unknown for the shipping sector and thus it could not be ex ante hypothesised 
which sector would have had higher implementation of the measures.  
In general, the size variable was important in defining perceptions of barriers, both for split 
incentives and informational problems. Some theories and literature exist, specifically for shipping 
and in the context of barriers to energy efficiency, they suggest that smaller firms would face higher 
information problems and fewer split incentives, but the results on the perception of the barriers 
above suggest otherwise. So the emerging picture appears to imply that market failures, specifically 
the principal agent problem and to some extent sectoral heterogeneity are an important factor 
explaining the lack of and differences in implementation of energy efficiency operational measures. 
On the other hand, sectoral and size heterogeneity seem to affect the respondents’ perception of 
barriers to implementation.  
In elaboration analysis one seeks to assess how much of the zero order relationship remains after 
the contribution of the test variables have been removed. Generally, the relationship strength 
decreases (meaning spurious relationship detected or intervening variables detected), remains the 
same (replication) or increases for one category of the test variable and decreases for another 
(specification). In most of the above cases of conditional relationships the strength increases for one 
category of the test variables and remains the same for other categories of the test variable. This 
implies that when holding other things equal, the original zero order relationship between the 
dependent variables with size, sector and chartering group (independent variables) are replicated. 
Hence all these variables have an impact on the dependent variables. Rosenberg (1968, cited by 
Peyrot 1996) and Babbie (2004) notes the possibility of situations where the relationship gets even 
stronger for one category of the test variable and remains constant for another category of the test 
variable. Since in the elaboration analysis above only one variable has been controlled each time, the 
conditional relationships only reflect control for one variable and ignore the remaining variable. It is 
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possible to control for several variables simultaneously in bivariate crosstabulations above but since 
the number of responses achieved in the survey is relatively small, it results in even smaller number 
of respondents in each cell to allow any meaningful interpretation. Furthermore, as described by 
Peyrot (1996), determining clear causality is seldom achievable because “variables introduced as test 
variables are themselves correlated, therefore it is not possible to tell whether their impact on the 
original relationship overlaps and if so by how much?” Peyrot (1996, p.8). This issue affects the 
internal validity of the quantitative self-administered questionnaire (whether conclusions 
incorporate causal relationships) and as explained in section ‎3.2.1, the mixed methods design 
strategy should help to overcome some of the weaknesses of the methods used. The next chapter 
thus uses a more qualitative method to investigate the principal agent problem in shipping. 
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8. Content analysis of charterparties  
This chapter combines the content analysis method and the principal agent theory framework as 
proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) to assess the barriers to and potential for improving energy 
efficiency. It is hoped that the content analysis method for analysing shipping contracts 
(charterparties) can reveal practical barriers that may be inhibiting uptake of operational measures, 
thus answering research question five. The aim of this chapter therefore is to provide completeness 
and comprehensiveness to the survey results discussed in the preceding chapters. An analysis of 
charterparties will also give a detailed context of the principal agent barriers that may be hindering 
the uptake of operational measures. 
The chapter begins with a brief section explaining the agency theory framework or propositions for 
the contract that governs the principal agent relationship. This is followed by the coding and 
categories development section that extracts relevant parts of the theory and framework in order to 
apply content analysis in a structured way. This is followed by the findings of the qualitative content 
analysis pertaining to the different types of contracts in shipping. As shown in Figure ‎8.1 below, this 
chapter deals with the highlighted components of the research framework as proposed in chapter 
three. Chapter nine then collates the findings from the various strands of research to explain 
implementation of measures and barriers to their uptake. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎8.1: Focus of chapter eight in context of the framework 
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Since this research employs the sequential explanatory design (Creswell 2009), the findings from the 
quantitative data collection and analysis from the previous chapter are used to build on and inform 
the qualitative data collection and analysis. “A sequential explanatory design is typically used to 
explain and interpret quantitative results by collecting and analysing follow-up qualitative data” 
(Creswell 2009, p.211). The qualitative data will help to explain the results in more detail. According 
to Krippendorff (2004) there are two reasons for starting the content analysis with research 
questions in advance of any inquiries; to gain efficiency and empirical grounding. The survey findings 
showed that operational measures had varying implementation when disaggregated by size, sector 
and chartering group. More specifically, the results showed that for speed related measures (general 
speed reduction and JIT arrivals) or ones that had an element of speed (efficient voyage execution 
and optimisation of ballast voyages) the respondents mainly cited that these were difficult to 
implement under different types of charter and that charterparties did not allow for their 
implementation (refer to Table ‎6.8). Charterparty clauses as a barrier were the fourth highest barrier 
of the total responses received. For the speed reduction measure, standard charterparty clauses 
were the top most selected respondent choices for lack of implementation. It is also suggested that 
the inability to implement a measure under different types of charter is also to some extent due to 
the charterparty clauses. Using these claims as a starting point for the inductive research, this 
chapter seeks to answer research question five which asks; how do the agency problems in contracts 
affect the implementation of energy efficient operational measures? 
A principal agent relationship is affected by several agency problems, problems of information 
asymmetry, goal conflict, risk bearing etc. (Eisenhardt 1989 and Wright, Mukherji & Kroll 2001). The 
goal of agency theory is to resolve these problems (Eisenhardt 1989) in order to maximise the 
principal’s welfare (Wright, Mukherji & Kroll 2001). One way in which this is done is through 
determining the most efficient type of contract given the agency problems. This chapter uses 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) propositions or framework and the content analysis method to distil the content 
of shipping contracts in order to identify the key agency problems and their effect on the 
implementation of energy efficient operations. In chapters five and seven it was observed that the 
type of contracts can have an impact on implementation. The conclusions from chapter five, and 
supporting analysis from the survey results show that operational measures implementation were 
believed to be more of a problem under voyage charter than in time charter. In this chapter the 
investigation delves deeper into understanding the content of the shipping contracts to examine 
how and why they affect the implementation of energy efficient operational measures. 
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8.1. The contract in the context of agency theory and energy efficiency 
 
This section examines the applications of agency theory, the research methods used to investigate 
contracts and to what extent has existing research combined these two in the context of energy 
efficiency. In chapter two agency theory (Ross 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 
1983) with its assumptions and linkages to the barriers to energy efficiency literature were 
examined. The shipowner and the charterer can be said to be involved in an agency relationship, in 
which one party (the principal i.e. charterer) delegates work to another (the agent i.e. shipowner), 
who performs that work (Ross 1973; cited by Eisenhardt 1989) or when one individual depends on 
the action of another (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). These two parties are linked via a contract. 
Agency theory is concerned with creating the most ‘efficient’ contracts that overcome the problems 
of agency i.e. goal conflict and informational problems between the principal and agent, as well as 
problems of risk.  Whilst much of positivist research has applied agency theory in organisational 
contexts e.g. owner-manager, shareholder perspectives (Ahimud and Lev 1981; Walking and Long 
1984; Wolfson 1985; etc) the application of agency theory to barriers in energy efficiency has only 
been applied in quantification exercises seeking to quantify the amount of fuel or energy falling 
under various principal agent cases (e.g. IEA 2007; Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006; Vernon and Meier 
2012) as examined in chapter five.  
Furthermore much of the principal agent research is based on research methods such as 
questionnaire (Eisenhardt 1985 and 1988), and other data analysis such as meta-data analysis 
(Ahimud and Lev 1981) with very limited agency theory research focussing on the contract itself or 
contract design (Crocker and Reynolds 1993; Aubert et. al. 1997; Molinie and Abran 1999; Stremitzer 
2005; etc.). The studies that focussed on contract design and agency theory (e.g. Aubert et. al. 1997; 
Masten & Saussier 2000; etc.) did not use the content analysis method but rather used a case study 
design using interviews and questionnaire methods for analysing contractual outcomes of two 
organisations. Having also attempted quantification of principal agent problems in chapter five, this 
research further seeks to extend this (agency theory and barriers to energy efficiency) by 
investigating the nexus between the principal and the agent, the contracts. More generally, 
contracting practices in shipping in the context of agency theory only have been examined by 
Pirrong (1993), Bergantino and Veenstra (2002), Tamvakis (1995), Tamvakis & Thanopoulou (2000) 
and Veenstra and Dalen (2011). These studies have not extended the examination of contracts in the 
context of energy efficiency. Very little grey literature exists regarding this subject e.g. Devanney 
2011a; Faber et al. (2012) and much of this is legal e.g. Zerman (2011), Makkar (2005), Williamson 
(2012), which lack a theoretical view. Although some studies point towards contracts that are geared 
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towards objectives that override energy efficiency (e.g. Lovins 1992), to date there has not been an 
analysis of contracts in any industry to see specifically how individual contracts or clauses (during 
design or operation) affect the potential of energy efficiency. In summary: 
 Agency theory has generally been applied in an organisational economics context e.g. 
shareholder perspectives, owner-manager, etc. 
 Agency theory and its implications on contract design have produced limited research and 
testable hypothesis. 
 Agency theory and contract design research are based on research methods other than content 
analysis, thus a suitable framework for this research is lacking.  
 Agency theory and barriers to energy efficiency literature that uses agency theory have mainly 
focussed on quantification of the principal agent problem. 
 Agency theory has seen limited application in the examination of shipping markets and 
contractual practices 
 Contract analysis in shipping i.e. charterparties have been discussed in other aspects e.g. laytime 
and demurrage, etc. 
 Grey literature on charterparties and energy efficiency mainly focussed on speed clauses.  
 Contracts in shipping have therefore not been investigated thoroughly in the context of agency 
theory and energy efficiency. 
8.1.1. Framework for agency theory and contract analysis 
Since the literature on conducting agency theory and energy efficiency content analysis of contracts 
is scarce, Eisenhardt’s (1989) framework is thought to help with the initial category development for 
content analysis of charterparties in the context of agency theory and energy efficiency. Eisenhardt 
(1989) defines two types of contracts; behaviour oriented and outcome oriented. Outcome based 
contracts tie agent compensation to agent performance e.g. piece rate (Sharma 1997), stock 
options, commission component etc. whereas behaviour based contracts tie compensation to 
monitored agent behaviour e.g. hourly rate (Sharma 1997), salaries etc.  
 The question that agency theory aims to answer is which of the aforementioned two types of 
contracts is more efficient given the situation or circumstances and assumptions regarding the 
entities e.g. agent opportunism, risk aversion, goal conflict, information availability, task 
programmability etc. In order to do this a good understanding of the situation and the parties is 
crucial. To that end, Eisenhardt (1988) uses empirical research methods to investigate the above 
circumstances to predict the best type of contract that is used in compensation of retail staff. In this 
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research, the information regarding the above is derived from informal ethnographic methods such 
as observations, the survey method, literature research and grey literature (e.g. industry specific 
news and reports).  
According to Eisenhardt (1989) options for observing behaviour (pre contract i.e. adverse selection 
and post contract i.e. moral hazard) are to invest in information systems or contract on outcome 
based contracts. The core of agency theory is therefore the trade-off between the cost of measuring 
behaviour and the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Table ‎8.1 summarises the suitability of the contracts in each situation based on Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
propositions for the type of contracts based on the above features: 
 Proposition 1: When contract between principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more 
likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 
 Proposition 2: When the principal has information to verify agent behaviour, the agent is more 
likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 
 Proposition 3: Information systems are positively related to behaviour based contracts and 
negatively related to outcome based contracts. 
 Proposition 4: Outcome uncertainty is positively related to behaviour based contracts and 
negatively related to outcome based contracts. 
 Proposition 5: The risk aversion of the agent is positively related to behaviour based contracts 
and negatively related to outcome based contracts. 
 Proposition 6: Risk aversion of the principal is negatively related to behaviour based contracts 
and positively related to outcome based contracts. 
 Proposition 7: The goal conflict between principal and agent is negatively related to behaviour 
based contracts and positively related to outcome related contracts.  
 Proposition 8: Task programmability is positively related to behaviour based contracts and 
negatively related to outcome based contracts. 
 Proposition 9: Outcome measurability is negatively related to behaviour based contracts and 
positively related to outcome based contracts. 
 Proposition 10: The length of the agency relationship is positively related to behaviour based 
contracts and negatively related to outcome based contracts.  
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Research 
type 
Agency theory 
component 
Behaviour based contract Outcome based contract 
Basic and 
Positivist 
type 
Goal conflict/self 
interest 
Suitable when there is goal 
congruency 
Suitable when there is 
goal conflict  
Information  Suitable when information to 
verify agent behaviour is 
available 
Suitable when information 
to verify agent behaviour 
is not available 
Extended and 
principal-
agent type 
Risk  Suitable when agent is risk 
averse (and principal can take 
extra risk) 
Suitable when agent is less 
risk averse (and principal 
risk averse) 
Task 
programmability 
Suitable when task is 
programmed 
Suitable when task is less 
programmed 
Outcome 
measurability 
Suitable when outcome is less 
measurable 
Suitable when outcome is 
measurable 
Outcome 
certainty 
Suitable when outcome is 
uncertain 
Suitable when outcome is 
certain 
Length of 
relationship 
Suitable in a long term 
relationship 
Suitable in a short term 
relationship 
Table ‎8.1: Suitable contracts in different situations 
 
 Behaviour based contract Outcome based contract 
Goal conflict/self interest present   
Information is available   
Risk averse agent   
Task is programmable   
Outcome is certain   
Outcome is measurable   
Long relationship   
Table ‎8.2: Use of contracts in different situations 
Sharma (1997) extends the above propositions to cater for principal agent relationship where the 
professions are concerned, for example the level of coproduction, agent investments, competition 
between agents etc. Four sets of propositions are discussed, of which the most relevant to the 
shipping context are the agent investment and competition propositions. When there are many 
competing providers of the same or similar services (substitutes), agents are more likely to assume 
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greater risk in order to accommodate the principals (Sharma 1997), this means that the risk aversion 
of the agent is lower therefore outcome based contracts can be used in competitive exchanges. 
Regarding the contract specific investment, according to Sharma (1997) “The professional agent is 
less likely to behave opportunistically when the institutional context permits principals to require 
that agents make investment in assets specific to the exchange” (Sharma 1997, p.786). The example 
given here is that of ‘no win no fee’ type institutional practices by lawyers, thus compensation is 
based on the outcome making it an outcome based contract. An example of this in shipping is 
investment by shipowners to comply with some charterers strict vetting procedures in order to 
proceed to the next stage of selection.  
The above propositions shall now be applied to shipping to verify the analogies presented in chapter 
five. The above two types of contracts, behaviour based and outcome based, can be said to be 
analogous to the two most prevalent contracts for carriage of goods in shipping, the voyage charter 
and the time charter. The time charter is where the agent gets paid a certain amount per day which 
can be said to be a behaviour based contract e.g. salaries and hourly rates, since the compensation is 
based on some time period over which behaviour of the agent is monitored. The voyage charter, 
where the agent gets paid a certain amount per tonne of cargo of carried or delivered, can be said to 
be an outcome based contract e.g. piece rates, commission, because the compensation of the agent 
is based on certain measured outcomes e.g. delivery of goods (in good time and good condition). 
Other hybrid forms of carriage of goods contracts as mentioned in section ‎5.2 are beyond the scope 
of investigation. Having established shipping contracts with broad level agency contracts, each of the 
above propositions is briefly tested to see whether it relates to the right type of contract in shipping. 
This is done for both, in general and in the context of energy efficiency. Similar type of analysis is 
performed by Eisenhardt (1985 and 1988) to empirically test (using questionnaires) whether the 
proposition and features of sales personnel in retail are related to the choice of contracts. The 
propositions in general and in the context of energy efficiency are thereafter tested against the 
evidence from the charterparty content analysis. Examining how agency problems manifest 
themselves in shipping contracts and in the context of energy efficiency measures will then allow for 
answering the research question, on how contracts (charterparty or specific clauses) can affect the 
implementation of energy efficient operational measures. Understanding this relationship would 
enable the research to corroborate findings from survey results on whether or not charterparties or 
clauses are a barrier to implementation of measures.  
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Research type Agency theory 
component 
Behaviour based contract 
 ($/day) Time charter 
Outcome based contract  
($/tonne) Voyage charter 
Basic and 
Positivist type 
Goal 
conflict/self 
interest 
Suitable when there is goal congruency 
Case two of principal agent matrix where time 
charterer can implement measures as seen in 
chapter five 
Suitable when there is goal conflict  
Case four of principal agent matrix (quasi usage 
problem) as seen in chapter five 
Information  Suitable when information to verify agent 
behaviour is available 
Noon reporting, weather routing, hull condition 
monitoring 
Suitable when information to verify agent behaviour is 
not available 
Charterer has no access to shipowners operational 
efficiency e.g. speed, other measures, hull condition 
Extended and 
principal-agent 
type 
Risk  Suitable when agent is risk averse  
During a recession shipowners prefer the  time 
charter market (Stopford 2008) 
Offhire stoppage to mitigate principal’s risk 
(Shaddick 2012) 
Suitable when agent is not risk averse 
During an upturn shipowners prefer the voyage 
market (Stopford 2008) 
Demurrage payment to mitigate agent’s risk  
(Shaddick 2012) 
Voyage charter generally is more risky (Girvin 2007; 
Wilson 2010; Chong 1993). 
Task 
programmability 
Suitable when task is programmed 
Shipowners actions are dependent on charterers 
instructions, inventory schedule, etc. 
Suitable when task is not programmed 
Laycan, Laytime, Laydays, Bad Weather Allowances, 
Notice of Readiness all vary in a voyage charter 
suggesting contract is versatile 
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Outcome 
measurability 
Suitable when outcome is not measurable 
Main outcome is ship seaworthiness, not being 
off hire, meeting speed and consumption 
guarantee, which are difficult to measure 
Suitable when outcome is measurable 
Delivery of goods (through Bill of Ladings), ‘Arrived 
ship’ rules affecting demurrage and laytime 
calculations 
Outcome 
certainty 
Suitable when outcome is uncertain 
Performance outcome of agent is unknown  
Principal’s cargo schedules may be unknown 
Suitable when outcome is certain 
Charterer can expect cargo delivery with reasonable 
certainty within a specific time range 
Length of 
relationship 
Suitable in a long term relationship 
Behaviour of shipowner is monitored over a 
longer period of time, operational efficiency is 
ascertained over this time 
Suitable in a short term relationship 
Behaviour of shipowner is not known due to little 
monitoring and contact 
Table ‎8.3: Eisenhardt (1989) propositions and type of contracts applied to shipping 
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8.2. Charterparties and principal agent contracts 
Under Hague-Visby rules and English common law there are several obligations placed on the 
shipper (charterer) and the shipowner. A shipowner has implied obligations from these sources 
which are; that a ship is seaworthy, that the ship will proceed with reasonable despatch and that the 
ship will proceed without unjustifiable deviation (Girvin 2007). A shipper has obligations to not ship 
dangerous goods and to nominate safe ports (Girvin 2007). Table ‎8.4 below shows these split 
according to the type of charter. For the purpose of this analysis, the shipowners obligations seem to 
be the most relevant to focus upon for energy efficiency.  
 Shipowner Shipper 
Voyage 
charterparty 
 Ship is seaworthy 
 Proceed with reasonable despatch 
 Without unjustifiable deviation 
 Not to ship dangerous goods 
Time 
charterparty 
 Ship is seaworthy at commencement  Use between good and safe ports 
 Not to ship dangerous goods 
Table ‎8.4: Obligations of the shipowner and shipper under voyage and time charters 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the shipowner’s obligations are concentrated in the voyage charter, 
which has been referred to as a risky adventure (Chong 1993). Thus in the voyage charter the 
shipowner is exposed to higher risk, than in a time charter, making the outcome based contract 
more suitable. There are four stages in the performance of a voyage charterparty; the preliminary 
voyage to the loading point, loading operation, laden voyage to delivery point and discharging 
operation, as shown in Figure ‎8.2. Responsibility for stages one and three fall on the shipowner and 
stage two and four fall jointly between shipowner and charterer (Girvin 2007). From Table ‎8.5 below 
it can be seen where the potential conflict of interest lie between the agent and the principal in a 
voyage charter and the following sections show how charterparty clauses deal with each conflict.  
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Voyage leg Shipowner Charterer 
Stage 1 - Sea 
passage to 
loading port 
- Reach before (become an arrived ship 
and tender Notice of Readiness - NOR) 
before laycan 
- To have a flexible date of arrival or 
expected readiness to load 
- Arrive in time for laytime 
- Wants a fixed date of arrival or 
expected readiness to load to organise 
cargo 
Slow or optimal steam to load port Utmost despatch towards load port 
Stage 2 - 
Loading 
operations 
Minimise delay (opportunity cost), but 
also gain income from demurrage 
 
Prefer all round 24 hour period in which 
to give NOR 
Prefer specific time period in which to 
give NOR 
Prefer port charter (transfer risk of 
delay to charterer) 
Prefer berth charter (transfer risk of 
delay to shipowner) 
Stage 3 - Sea 
passage to 
discharging 
port 
Slow or optimal steam to discharge port Utmost despatch towards discharge 
port 
Have liberty to deviate to ports for 
bunkering or loading extra cargo and 
maintenance 
Strictly no deviation allowed except 
for saving a life or property.  
Use weather routing for efficient route Most direct contractually agreed route 
Stage 4 - 
Discharging 
operations 
Prefer all round 24 hour period in which 
to give NOR  
Prefer specific time period in which to 
give NOR 
Prefer port charter (transfer risk of 
delay to charterer) 
Prefer berth charter (transfer risk of 
delay to shipowner) 
Table ‎8.5: Potential conflict of interests between principal and charterer in the voyage charter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎8.2: Components of a voyage charter 
L D 
Arrived 
ship + NOR 
Laytime Laytime Laycan 
Charterer duties 
Shipowner duties 
ERL/ETA 
Reasonable 
despatch if 
no ERL/ETA 
Reasonable despatch 
Seaworthy ship 
No undue deviation 
Arrived 
ship + NOR 
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8.3. Categories and coding development 
Chapter four outlined the content analysis method and stages that are used in this research as well 
as describing the unit of analysis and sampling procedures relevant for the content analysis used in 
this research. Having familiarised with the purposive sample of the most prevalent or important 
charterparties, the next step in the content analysis is to generate some broad categories that will 
guide further reading of charterparties. This step is similar to the operationalization stage of the 
survey method. In content analysis the most important step is to define the categories within the 
data. As Berelson (1952; cited by GAO 1989) states: 
“Content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Particular studies have been productive to the 
extent that the categories were clearly formulated and well adapted to the problem and to the 
content.” (Berelson 1952, p. 147)  
The research is interested in assessing whether the implementation of measures varies by types of 
charter and whether this is caused by specific clauses in the types of charter. Thus it is reasonable to 
begin with contextual units (charterparty clauses) that deal with each of the measures. The initial 
categories are obtained from the survey research method and familiarisation of a few charterparties 
(following inductive content analysis and using previous research and data specific categories), 
which then guided the content analysis. The initial categories attempted to relate various 
charterparty clauses to the relevant operational measures as shown in Table ‎8.6. 
 Speed related 
measures 
Trim/draft 
optimisation 
Weather 
routing 
Measure Xi Measure Xii 
Voyage 
charterparty 
Utmost 
despatch clause 
Trimming clause Deviation 
clause 
  
Time 
charterparty 
Slow steaming 
clause 
Trimming clause Deviation 
clause 
  
Table ‎8.6: Initial categories for content analysis of charterparties 
The categories then also draw from agency theory contracting literature as described in section ‎8.1.1 
and ‎8.2. This was further refined through an iterative reading so that the categories applied to all 
measures. The first three categories are the most important to positivist type agency theory 
research and it is found that these easily manifest or exhibit themselves within the contracts, as 
shown in Table ‎8.7. 
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Type of 
contract 
Agency propositions 
(coding categories) 
Speed related 
measures 
Trim/draft 
optimisation 
Weather 
routing 
Voyage 
charterparty 
Goal conflict Utmost despatch   
Information    
Risk Place of NOR   
Task programmability    
Outcome measurability NOR clause   
Agent competition    
Time 
charterparty 
Goal conflict    
Information Type of reporting   
Risk    
Task programmability    
Outcome measurability    
Agent competition    
Contract specific 
investment 
   
Table ‎8.7: Further category development from inductive content analysis of charterparties 
From the above matrix category format and using examples from Mayring (2000) the final coding 
agenda focussed on the goal conflict categories, information categories (positivist type) and one 
proposition from the remaining extensions of the principal agent theory (refer to appendix D for full 
coding scheme). These categories were sometimes latent and at times easily manifested themselves 
in the contract. For example the voyage charterparty (outcome based contract) manifested clearly 
the goal conflict between the principal and agent, and clauses were used specifically to address this 
issue. Coding was limited to the contextual units (i.e. charterparty clauses of interest) and took place 
through multiple iterations over time. Initial coding of each contextual unit began with manual 
annotation of the charterparty text (for close reading). The relevant text was then transposed to a 
spreadsheet, grouped according to sector and type of charterparty as shown in Table ‎8.8. By 
systematically organising the data in this way, emerging patterns and relationships were easily 
observed. The next section provides a brief description and context of some of the clauses (shown in 
Table ‎4.8) that are thought to be affecting the implementation of two of the top three (by potential 
and implementation level) energy efficient operational measures as suggested by the survey results. 
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 Publisher Year Utmost 
despatch 
NOR & 
Laytime 
Deviation Additional 
other 
Wetbulk       
Charterparty 1       
Charterparty 2       
Drybulk       
Charterparty 1       
Charterparty 2       
Container       
Charterparty 1       
General       
Charterparty 1       
Table ‎8.8: Voyage charterparties content organised in a spreadsheet 
 
 Publisher Year Utmost 
despatch 
Performance Deviation Drydocking Other 
Wetbulk        
Charterparty 1        
Charterparty 2        
Drybulk        
Charterparty 1        
Charterparty 2        
Container        
Charterparty 1        
Charterparty 2        
General        
Charterparty 1        
Table ‎8.9: Time charterparties content organised in a spreadsheet 
8.3.1. Clauses affecting speed reduction measure 
8.3.1.1. Utmost despatch clauses 
Utmost despatch, all convenient speed and due despatch are often the opening clauses used in 
voyage charterparties (as an express obligation imposed on the shipowner) to instruct the owners to 
proceed at full speed once the cargo is loaded i.e. when ship is chartered for the voyage or even 
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when the ship is on hire under time charter. According to Chong (1993) the obligation to proceed 
with utmost despatch means a vessel must commence voyage to the port at such time as it is 
reasonably certain that proceeding ‘normally’ she can arrive at the port by the stipulated date. The 
shipowner's obligation to proceed with reasonable despatch applies both to the voyage to load port 
(stage one) and the voyage to discharge port (stage three), whereas other obligations such as 
seaworthiness and deviation do not apply to the approach voyage (Wilson 2010). However, 
performance of this obligation is judged, not on a strictly objective basis, but in relation to what can 
reasonably be expected from the shipowner under the actual circumstances existing at the time of 
performance. The rule is of general application, and is not confined to contracts for the carriage of 
goods by sea. In the case of other contracts the condition of reasonable time has been frequently 
interpreted; and has invariably been held to mean that the party upon whom it is incumbent duly 
fulfils his obligations notwithstanding ‘protracted delay’, so long as such delay is attributable to 
causes beyond his control, and he has neither acted negligently nor unreasonably (Wilson 2010). 
Mankabandy (1975) explains “The test of reasonableness is whether a prudent person having 
control over the voyage, would have permitted the relevant delay or would have ordered the vessel 
to proceed on her voyage” (Mankabandy 1975 p.637). According to Girvin (2007) and Chong (1993) 
utmost despatch is applicable when there is no time specified for a particular obligation as shown in 
the case of Hick v Raymond. When time is specified in the form of expected readiness to load (ERL) 
or estimated time of arrival (ETA) by the shipowner, the clause results in: 
 “Absolute obligation on the part of the shipowner to commence the approach voyage on a date 
where proceeding with reasonable despatch, the chartered vessel would be reasonably certain of 
arriving at the port of loading by the expected ready to load date” Chong (1993, p. 411) 
There are conflicting interests with regards to fixing a date, a charterer desires a fixed date in order 
to procure the cargo, whereas the shipowner on the other hand desires flexibility given that the 
voyage is connected to a previous voyage, intermediary voyages and other delays (Chong 1993; 
Wilson 2001; Spurin 2004). To accommodate these two conflicting interests the ERL clause is used. 
This means that the shipowner is duty bound to start the approach voyage which would enable the 
chartered ship to arrive at the load port by the stipulated expected ready to load (ERL) date. The 
calculation (counting back) of the time required to meet the ERL date is then based on ‘normal’ time 
required, which consequently determines the start time (referred to as ‘start in’ time) (Chong, 1993). 
From Hick v Raymond utmost despatch is described as “the party upon whom it is incumbent fulfils 
his obligations notwithstanding protracted delay...” (Girvin 2007). There are several legal cases that 
define what reasonable despatch is and when the obligation begins, as shown below (Wilson 2010): 
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Voyage charter 
 EL Oldendorff & Co GmbH v Tradax Export SA 
 Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Qijefabriker AB– The Wilhelm 
 Suzuki & Co Ltd v T Benyon & Co Ltd 
 Hick v Raymond 
 Louis Dreyfus & Co v Lauro 
Time charter 
 Whistler International Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd – The Hill Harmony case 
 Mitsui OSK Lines v Garnac Grain Co Inc – The Myrtos case 
From the brief analysis of the above cases and their description from Wilson (2010) and Girvin 
(2007), it is difficult to assess at what speed a ship is required to travel whilst on the approach 
voyage and discharge voyage in the voyage charterparty. However the following clause shows that it 
is clearly not to be the most economical or ship owner’s optimal speed with the use of the word 
‘unless otherwise agreed’. 
“It is hereby agreed between owners and charterers that the vessel be presented at the loading 
port... and there being in every respect fitted for carriage of the cargo shall load the cargo, which the 
charterers bind themselves to supply, and carry it with all possible despatch (unless economic speed 
to conserve is fully expressed) to the port of discharge..” Nuvoy 1984 
 
Under a time charterparty reasonable despatch is not an issue (Spurin 2005). However, time 
charterparties have also been found to contain these clauses (Girvin 2007). A possible reason for this 
could be due to bill of lading requirements, subletting on time and voyage charters as seen in the Hill 
Harmony case and Myrtos case (Girvin 2007). The following quote from BIMCO special circular on 
slow steaming clauses emphasises that compliance with charterers’ instructions in terms of slow 
steaming will not constitute a breach of any obligation that the owner may have under the 
charterparty or contracts of carriage to proceed with due despatch. This once again confirms that 
utmost despatch is not an economical or reduced speed with respect to fuel consumption: 
“Sub clause e: For the avoidance of doubt, where the Vessel proceeds at a reduced speed or with 
reduced RPM pursuant to Sub‐clause (a), then provided that the Master has exercised due diligence 
to comply with such instructions, this shall constitute compliance with, and there shall be no breach 
of, any obligation requiring the Vessel to proceed with utmost and/or due despatch (or any other 
such similar/equivalent expression)” (BIMCO 2011) 
According to Zerman (2011) slow steaming, eco steaming, etc. in order to conserve fuel (where the 
contract of carriage does not contain an express liberty clause permitting it to do so) is almost 
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certainly considered to be unjustified. Slow steaming in a legal context is in fact a deviation 
(discussed below) and thus an owner would have to make considerations in implementing these into 
the charterparty and bill of lading (Zerman 2011). A Bill of Lading holder also has an equal and valid 
reason to expect the cargo to be delivered in the discharge port without unreasonable delay or 
undue deviation (Zerman 2011). Consequently, this would mean that any voyage charterparty with 
utmost despatch clauses will automatically confer to the relevant bill of lading, except in very few 
cases such as the liner or container trade as seen above.  
8.3.1.2. Virtual Arrival clauses 
Virtual Arrival (OCIMF and INTERTANKO 2010) is a process whereby a vessel’s speed is reduced in 
order to meet a revised arrival time, thus enabling the vessel to arrive at a port at the right time (Just 
in Time - JIT). The process is in recognition of the current state of shipping operations which may not 
be optimal from an energy efficiency perspective. Above it was seen that the current contracting 
process through the use of standard voyage charterparty clauses stipulates that vessels proceed at 
utmost despatch towards a port, this is regardless of the prevailing conditions at that port. Therefore 
conditions that affect the berthing of the vessel such as temporary congestion or lack of cargo space 
(quay side, oil tank space, etc.) are simply ignored in the current system. It is therefore inefficient for 
a vessel to steam at full speed and then wait at anchor for a berth or storage space to become 
available. Virtual arrival therefore shifts the port waiting time into extra sailing time, resulting in fuel 
cost savings from speed reduction, without affecting demurrage income that would have been 
gained had laytime been exceeded. Laytime (see section below) starts counting from the original 
Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) and Notice of Readiness (Virtual NOR) and not the new ETA after 
reduced speed. An example of how savings are calculated is shown in appendix D.  
8.3.1.3. Slow steaming clauses 
Whilst most standard form voyage and time charterparties require utmost despatch in the discharge 
voyage and on the approach voyage (if ERL is not agreed), some may allow for economic speed in 
order to save fuel as shown in the quote below. In a time charter, since the charterer is generally in 
control of the speed at which the ship travels, slow steaming clauses are a common practice.  
“Charterers shall be entitled from time to time to instruct the vessel to proceed at reduced speed for 
economic or other reasons subject to prior consultation with owners concerning the characteristics of 
the vessel and its machinery in this respect....” Intertanktime charterparty 
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8.3.1.4. The laytime provisions and related clauses 
In a voyage charterparty the charterer is regarded as having paid for the time required to load and 
discharge the cargo in the freight rate i.e. stage two and stage four of the voyage (Wilson 2010). The 
amount of time allowed for these operations is called laytime or lay days (generally 72 hours) and 
when this time has been exceeded, the charterer is liable to pay compensation to the shipowner 
generally in the form of liquidated damages called demurrage. The most intractable issue is to define 
at which point laytime begins (Wilson 2010; Girvin 2007, Spurin 2005). The starting point for laytime 
is determined by two conditions that have to be met; first, the ship must be an ‘arrived ship’ by 
reaching the agreed destination either berth, dock or port (these are clauses for shifting risk of delay 
between parties), secondly, the ship must tender a valid notice of readiness (NOR) at that specified 
place and at the specified time. Close reading of charterparties showed that there was variation in 
the different types of charter regarding the place and times for NOR. There were also differences as 
to the commencement of laytime after both conditions had been met (some charterparties 
mentioned six hours and some twelve hours). With regards to times of tendering NOR, some 
allowed NOR to be tendered any time of the day and any time of the year whereas some only in 
business hours in working weekdays only. These clauses are thought to have direct implications on 
the speed at which the ship will travel. According to Capt. Habibi (personal communication, 
February, 2012), it is in the owners interest to time the arrival of the ship at the agreed destination 
prior to the NOR beginning time so as to avoid unexpected delay arising from pilotage or 
manoeuvring at port. Where the NOR time has elapsed and the owner has not reached the agreed 
destination, then there is little negotiation as to what could be done, the shipowner is bound to 
proceed at the destination at charterparty speed and wait for the next available NOR tendering time 
(Habibi 2012). Having defined utmost despatch clauses, slow steaming and laytime clauses, the next 
section looks at another implied and expressed obligation of the shipowner, the obligation not to 
deviate, which is thought to be affecting implementation of operational measures.  
8.3.2. Clauses affecting weather routing and efficient voyage execution measures 
8.3.2.1. Deviation clauses 
The obligation by law on the shipowner is that he is to proceed in that ship by the ‘usual and 
customary course’ (Girvin 2007). A deviation is therefore a deliberate and unjustifiable departure 
from this course in the third stage of the voyage (discharge voyage). When there isn’t an express 
route given by the charterer, the usual route is direct geographical route (Girvin 2007) and in 
practice, very few standard charterparties make an express provision for the route to be followed 
(Wilson 2010). From Reardon Smith Line v Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance, the direct 
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geographical route can be modified in many cases for navigational or other reasons. Furthermore 
the case describes that it is not the geographical route but the usual route which has to be followed, 
though in many cases they may be the same as each other.  Thus the direct geographical route is the 
benchmark (Girvin 2007) but it is upon the shipowner to show that a different route is customary 
(Girvin 2007). Under the implied obligation of not to deviate, a departure from the direct route in 
order to take on bunkers may be only be justified if it can be shown that it is usual practice. The only 
other justifiable deviations that are allowed by common law and Hague-Visby rules are that of saving 
life (in some cases also property) and avoiding danger to the ship and cargo. It has become a 
common practice to include in the contract so called liberty clauses e.g. Gencon 1994. These are 
express clauses that allow departure from the usual route and generally allow the shipowner to call 
at any port for ‘whatever’ reason. However they are interpreted narrowly by courts because they 
are normally drafted in favour of the shipowner (Wilson 2010). From this analysis it can be seen that 
there are several levels of liberty or deviation that can found in charterparties and this was also 
established in the close reading of charterparties. This is reflected in the categories of the coding 
agenda as narrow or strict level of liberty.  
8.4. Results and analysis 
The content analysis was conducted on standard form voyage and time charterparties in order to 
see how the contracts addressed the principal agent problems and consequently their effect on the 
implementation of energy efficiency measures. The analysis focussed mainly on two out of the four 
aspects of the implied and expressed obligations of the carrier; reasonable despatch and deviation. 
These clauses can be said to be related to two energy efficiency operational measures; general 
speed reduction and weather routing. The results of the content analysis below are for the speed 
reduction measures and its categories as per the coding agenda (as shown in appendix D).  
8.4.1. Speed reduction measures 
As seen in chapter seven the implementation of speed reduction measures for firms whose fleet was 
chartered out mainly on voyage charter was around 65% compared to firms whose fleet was 
chartered out on time charter which had around 80% implementation rate. Can the difference in 
speed reduction measure between voyage and time charter be explained by contracts that aim to 
reduce agency costs or agency loss through stricter charterparty clauses and as a result have an 
adverse effect on the implementation of this measure? In chapter five, it was hypothesised that for 
operational measures in time charter there would be less exposure to the ‘efficiency’ principal agent 
problem because the charterer pays for fuel and also makes the decision on implementation, 
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whereas operational measures (mainly related to speed) in voyage charter would be prone to quasi 
‘usage’ problem because the charterer does not pay for the fuel directly and cannot select the 
energy saving measure. The preceding section discussed reasonable despatch concept and in the 
coding agenda its relationship with energy efficiency and speed reduction measure was outlined. 
The results of the content analysis are presented in the following sections.  
8.4.1.1. Speed reduction in voyage charterparties  
8.4.1.1.1. Goal conflict 
It was seen earlier that reasonable despatch was an obligation in order to mitigate the risk that is 
borne by charterers with respect to their cargo and counterparty. It was also understood that the 
speed of the vessel was not the energy efficient speed for both the approach and the discharge 
voyage. Close reading of the charterparties revealed that there were different express obligations of 
utmost despatch, which are consequently coded into four categories under the goal conflict 
proposition of the principal agent theory. Focussing on the voyage charterparties, most of the 
charterparties require owners to proceed at utmost despatch for the approach and discharge voyage 
(Girvin 2007). The use of utmost despatch in both legs means that there is no potential for speed 
reduction. The typical clause read: 
“The vessel shall proceed with due despatch to a safe port, berth, dock.... for loading the cargo, as 
ordered by charterers... and being so loaded proceed as ordered on signing of B/L ... as ordered by 
charterers” Bimchemvoy 2008, Intertanko 1976 and Asbatankvoy.  
 
There were differences, however, in the use of express obligation for reasonable despatch, where 
some charterparties expressly mentioned reasonable despatch only for the laden leg and some for 
both legs. This suggests that the contract has some potential for speed reduction. In these cases the 
negotiation on the ETA/ERL date can have a potential for implementation of speed reduction. The 
typical clause read 
“It is mutually agreed between the owners and charterers that the vessel being in every respect fit for 
carriage of cargo shall proceed to the loading port or loading range ...and there load the cargo. Being 
so loaded the vessel shall carry the cargo with all possible despatch to the port of discharge or 
discharging range...” Polcoalvoy 1997 
Another difference that was observed was that a small proportion of charterparties did not expressly 
mention reasonable despatch for both the approach and discharge voyage. These could be said to 
be providing an opportunity to implement general speed reduction. The typical clause read as 
follows: 
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“The said vessel shall proceed to the loading port....and being so laoded the vessel shall proceed to 
the discharging ports...” Scancon  
The only charterparties that allow for a balanced negotiation are Orevoy & Nuvoy, neither have 
utmost despatch clause for approach voyage and have an option of waiving utmost despatch in 
laden leg: 
“Clause 7: After completion of prior commitments as may be stated in box 8, the vessel shall proceed 
to the loading port or berth. The vessel shall carry the cargo with possible despatch to the ports or 
berths stated. However, unless 'no' is inserted in box 17 Part A (Reduced voyage speed), the owners 
may order the vessel to proceed at reduced speed solely to conserve fuel” Orevoy 
 
“Clause 1: being in every respect fitted for carriage of the cargo shall load the cargo, which the 
charterers bind themselves to supply, and carry it with all possible despatch (unless economic speed 
to conserve is fully expressed) to the port of discharge..” Nuvoy 84 
 
On tabulating the results as shown in Table ‎8.10 it was clear that there was a relationship between 
use of utmost despatch clauses and sector (wetbulk, drybulk and general charterparties). The 
different categories discussed above belonged to specific sectors, for example the lack of express 
mention of reasonable despatch was only found in general form charterparties (used for trades for 
which no specifically approved form is in force). Gencon makes no mention utmost despatch for the 
loading or discharging leg. The Gencon 1976, despite being the most commonly used general 
purpose charterparty (Faber et al. 2012) has been criticized by UNCTAD (1990) which presents 
several cases that show ambiguity in the wording of the charterparty and describes it as 
insufficiently comprehensive which requires an undue number of additional clauses in every case. 
These results are consistent with the survey findings, which showed that the standard charterparty 
clauses as barriers were higher for the bulk sectors compared to the container sector. The difference 
between the bulk and container sector can be explained by the use of bill of ladings, where liner bill 
of ladings e.g. Conlinebill 2000, permit the owner-operator to slow steam.  
“Sub-clause (e) sets out how to deal with the ‘due despatch’ obligations common to charterparties 
and contracts of carriage. In the liner trade, this is not an issue because liner terms and conditions 
normally confer on the owners/vessel operators a right to slow steam (see for example Clause 5 
(Scope of Carriage) of Conlinebill 2000 which gives an express right to slow speed without liability for 
delay). However, in other trades where such rights are not given and due despatch obligations apply, 
some mechanism needs to be included in the clause to permit slow steaming without liability for 
delay” BIMCO (2011, p4). 
 
 
 
272 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎8.3: Perception of standard charterparty as barriers for speed reduction 
Utmost despatch clauses are not an issue in the container sector because liner terms and conditions 
normally confer on the shipowner or vessel operators a right to slow steam (BIMCO 2011). This is 
due to a historic bargaining power enjoyed by carriers, which the Hague-Visby rules sought to 
address (Wilson 2010). The obligation to prosecute voyages at utmost despatch is still removed from 
container related bill of ladings (contract between shipper and operator) such as the Conlinebill 
2000, which give an express right to slow speed without liability for delay (BIMCO 2011). It is 
perhaps due to this reason that the container sector has seen significant reduction of operating 
speed. In addition to this, there are several other reasons for reduction of speed, there is a longer 
chain of principals and agents in the container sector (as shown in chapter five) and therefore 
individual shippers or cargo owners as principals in the voyage charter generally don’t have control 
over the speed of the ship (compared to that of the bulk voyage charterer). The freight rates paid by 
the shippers do not reflect the cost savings achieved by the operators due to speed reduction (unlike 
the BPvoy charterparty shown above), which means that operators have a greater incentive for 
speed reduction.  
In the container sector the relationship between the principal (shipper) and agent (owner-operator) 
is similar to that found in the voyage charter (outcome based contract) and is an example where two 
of the agency problems are prominent. The principal and agent have goal conflict on the issue of 
speed (principal generally has the incentive to receive goods quickly due to inventory and 
opportunity costs and supply chain demands, whereas agent has the incentive to reduce speed to 
save on fuel costs, thus the use of outcome based contract according to Eisenhardt (1989) 
proposition one). Secondly there is also an information problem (hence the use of outcome based 
contract based on Eisenhardt’s proposition two and three) as the principal generally does not have 
the information on the speed of the ship to be able to demand a discount or reduction in freight 
rates that arise as a result of the agent’s actions, as illustrated by analysis above. The information 
asymmetry as a result of the ‘one to many relationship’ instead leads to a favourable position for the 
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agent, where the agent not only keeps the savings from speed reduction (E.g. Maersk Line saved 
$300 million annually through slow steaming) but is also is able to demand higher freight rates as a 
result of increase in fuel costs, suggesting a split freight rate and fuel cost elasticity. This split 
elasticity is highlighted by the two quotes below: 
 “Inttra chief executive Ken Bloom said: “Unless and until shippers are willing to pay for shorter 
transit times, carriers will take the prerogative, which is theirs to take, to get savings from slow 
steaming even if doing so increases the customer’s total supply chain cost” Lloyds List (2013) 
“St. Amand also mentioned bunker adjustment factors (BAFs), a tool used by liners to protect 
themselves against fuel price increases, saying some BAFs were so effective that some owners are 
rooting for fuel prices to go up” Sustainable Shipping News (2011c) 
Only in very rare situations has a container line (owner-operator) lowered the fuel surcharges based 
on the savings achieved from speed reduction, resulting in 5 – 10% reduction in the BAF for the 
shipper (Sustainable Shipping News 2011a).  
Table ‎8.10: Utmost despatch clauses by sector charterparties and voyage stages 
Sector Voyage 
charterparty 
Utmost despatch to load 
port 
Utmost despatch to discharge 
port 
Wetbulk BIMCHEMVOY   through B/L 
INTERTANKVOY   through B/L 
ASBATANKVOY   through B/L 
BEEPEEVOY 4 Stated speed Stated speed 
SHELLVOY 6  + stated speed Stated speed 
Drybulk COALOREVOY   
OREVOY   or reduced speed 
NIPPONORE   
POLCOLVOY   
SYNACOMEX   
BHPBVOY03   
NIPPONCOAL   
NUBALTWOOD   through B/L 
RIO DOCE ORE   
AMWELSH   
GRAINCON   
General GENCON   
SCANCON   
NUVOY   or reduced speed 
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8.4.1.1.2. Information 
In a voyage charter the shipowner is the sole entity to make decisions on the speed of the ship, 
although he is bound by charterparty obligations such as those seen above. It was observed that 
some voyage charterparties go to the extent of describing the speeds at which the ship ought to 
travel in both the approach and discharge voyage and the fuel consumption for both legs. This is 
highly unusual for voyage charterparties and a characteristic of the time charterparty, which contain 
clauses for adjustment of hire in case of loss of speed or increase in fuel consumption. These voyage 
charterparties not only rely on voyage outcomes such as delivery of goods but also make use of 
information systems found in behaviour based contracts to tie performance with remuneration, as 
shown below: 
 “Owners undertake that the Vessel shall, upon completion of loading the cargo, proceed at the 
speed stated in Section B.25 of PART 1 ("Charter Speed"), or at such her speed, not exceeding the 
speed stated in Section B.26 of PART 11 (“Maximum Speed”), as may be stated in Charterers' Voyage 
Orders. Charterers shall have the right at any time during the voyage to instruct Owners to adjust the 
vessel's speed. .....If Owners increase the speed of the Vessel in accordance with Charterers’ Voyage 
Orders, any increase in the freight rate consequent thereon shall be calculated in accordance with the 
Example set out in Clause 31. If the Vessel fails to maintain Charter Speed, or Owners fail to comply 
with any instructions in Charterers’ Voyage Orders requiring an increase of speed pursuant to this 
Clause 3, Owners shall, subject to Clause 38, be liable for all loss, damage, cost...” BP Voyage 
Charterparty 
 
The stated speed was only found in wetbulk charterparties of oil majors. Major drybulk charterers 
charterparties (e.g. Vale & BHP charterparties) only contain utmost despatch clauses for both the 
ballast and laden voyages. Both Shell and BP voyage charterparties prescribe specific speeds at 
which the vessels should perform the voyages. These standard form charterparties have been 
designed by individual firms with a monopoly in the transport of oil (Wilson 2010). The specific 
speeds at which the vessel should travel is for both the preliminary voyage and discharge port 
voyage. Stating the specific speed is highly unusual of the voyage charterparties and is in contrast to 
those that have been developed by BIMCO, ASBA and other publishers which only incorporate 
utmost despatch clauses. The above clause from BP and Shell voyage charterparties can also be 
viewed as an opportunity for energy efficiency because information on the speed of ships is known 
by both the entities in the relationship. On the other hand the majority of the charterparties that 
make use of utmost despatch give no information to the charterer regarding the speed of the ship. 
Furthermore even the charterparties that allow for slow steaming do not require the speed to be 
stated in the charterparty. Therefore it is likely that in these cases that there is information 
asymmetry regarding the speed and fuel consumption of the ship.  
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8.4.1.1.3. Outcome certainty 
8.4.1.1.3.1. ETA/ERL in charterparties  
In the preceding section discussing shipowner’s obligation for utmost despatch, it was seen that the 
obligation to proceed at utmost despatch in the approach voyage is overruled when there is an 
expected date agreed between the parties. For the standard form charterparties that had specific 
mention of the ETA or ERL for the loading operation, there could be seen an opportunity for speed 
reduction, since it is mutually agreed between both the parties. Where this does not exist the 
obligation to proceed at utmost despatch is present and therefore the opportunity to reduce speed 
in the approach voyage or ballast leg could be said to have been lost. Findings of the content analysis 
are presented in Table ‎8.11 below. All voyage charterparties had some sort of input for agreeing the 
ETA/ERL between the charterer and shipowner. Additionally some drybulk and general 
charterparties were also found to contain running days notices (usually of around ten days). The use 
of the ETA/ERL overrides the utmost despatch in the ballast to the load port (Wilson 2010), 
therefore it becomes possible for the owner to implement speed reduction as long as the parties 
agree on the date. The incentives to do this are however very strongly related to the freight market, 
which brings the question of opportunity costs for both the parties.  
8.4.1.1.3.2. Place of NOR 
As discussed earlier in section  8.3.1.4, in order for the laytime to begin, the vessel must be an arrived 
ship and present a valid NOR. To be classed as an arrived ship the vessel must reach the specific 
point specified in the charterparty, which can either be a berth, dock or a port. In the case of berth 
or dock charters the risk of delay must be borne by the shipowner (Wilson 2010). According to 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) proposition as the agent (shipowner) becomes less risk averse, it becomes 
attractive to pass the risk to the agent using an outcome based contract, which was thought to be 
the case with voyage charters. However, when the agent becomes more risk averse, it becomes 
more expensive to shift the risk to the agent (Eisenhardt 1989). As for the risk averse principal 
(charterer) it becomes more attractive to pass the risk to the agent (Eisenhardt 1989). In voyage 
charters the overriding concern to both parties is the question as to which of them will bear the risk 
of loss resulting from delays of different types (Wilson 2010). It is possible for both parties to 
transfer the risks and one such clause is the use of specific places in which NOR can be tendered. The 
use of specific places for NOR tendering is directly related to delays due to congestion. In common 
law there are no provisions in the charterparty covering delay resulting from congestion in port 
(Wilson 2010). However, a shipowner in many cases may not be willing to take this extra risk 
(especially in the case of berth charters) and has the option to shift the risk back to the charterer 
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using several clauses such as the ‘reachable berth’, ‘whether in berth or not’ (WIBON) clauses. The 
table below shows the type of charters used by various charterparties.  
There was a clear difference in the charterparties of the different sectors, wetbulk charterparties 
generally were found to be port charters whereas most drybulk charterparties were observed to be 
berth charterparties. The difference in the use of different charters in the sectors could be related to 
the level of congestion at ports or waiting time for berths, which may be very different for both 
sectors. In wetbulk charterparties the ships that carry crude oil cargoes often have a few ports for 
loading cargo, for example half of the crude oil cargoes emanate from the Middle East Gulf (Mokia & 
Dinwoodie 2002). Mokia and Dinwoodie (2002) discuss the range of delays that occur in the 
common crude oil loading and discharging regions, ranging from political issues in the 
Mediterranean/Black Sea and bad weather in the North Sea. This suggests the unwillingness of 
shipowners to subsume the additional risk despite the major charterers who publish their own 
charterparties having higher bargaining power (UNCTAD 1990 and Wilson 2010). The unwillingness 
of shipowners for the additional risk was even found in the drybulk charterparties, where 
subsequent clauses to berth charters allowed for charters to be port charters in case of congestion, 
i.e. shifting back the risk (Wilson, 2010).  
8.4.1.1.3.3. NOR times 
As described earlier the purpose of such notice is to inform the charterer that the ship is in all 
respect ready to load or discharge and to also provide a starting point for the calculation of laytime. 
Some charterparties require giving advance notice of readiness (sailing telegrams), for example 
Polcoalvoy, Nipponcoal and Orevoy require master to provide at least ten days written notice of 
expected readiness. In any case, the simple NOR provides certainty to the charterer (Wilson 2010). In 
the close reading stage it was observed that there were varying times in which a valid NOR can be 
tendered, which would affect the speed at which the ship would travel. The table below shows the 
findings of charterparties that had flexible NOR compared to those that had specific times in which 
NOR can be tendered.  
Once again the wetbulk charterparties had no specific times in which NOR had to be tendered 
whereas in contrast a majority of the drybulk and general charterparties had specific times in which 
shipowners had to tender NOR. For example Synacomex charterparty required owners to tender 
NOR between 0800-1700 on weekdays and Saturdays between 0800-1200, Sundays and holidays 
excluded. Perhaps one of the reasons for the sectoral differences is the port operation times, where 
wetbulk terminals generally operate throughout the day (evidenced by the twenty four hour 
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pumping clauses), in contrast to drybulk terminals which suspend operation at night time. Nuvoy 
along with a few other charterparties allowed the parties to negotiate the NOR tendering times, the 
options were 24hrs SHINC (Sundays and holidays inclusive), 24hrs SHEX (Sundays and holidays 
excluded), Office hours SHEX. 
Voyage 
charterparty 
Utmost despatch 
to load port 
Utmost despatch to 
discharge ports 
ETA/ERL Specific 
NOR times 
Specific 
NOR place 
BIMCHEMVOY   through B/L    
INTERTANKVOY   through B/L    
ASBATANKVOY   through B/L    
BEEPEEVOY 4 Stated speed Stated speed    
SHELLVOY 6  + stated speed Stated speed    
COALOREVOY      
OREVOY   or reduced speed    
NIPPONORE    User  
POLCOLVOY      
SYNACOMEX      
BHPBVOY03    User  
NIPPONCOAL    User  
NUBALTWOOD   through B/L    
RIO DOCE ORE      
AMWELSH      
GRAINCON      
GENCON      
SCANCON      
NUVOY   or reduced speed  User User 
Table ‎8.11: Summary table for speed reduction in voyage charterparties 
From the above findings it can be concluded that wetbulk charterparties (especially those of oil 
majors) seem to have more potential for implementation of speed reduction, followed by the 
general charterparties and some drybulk charterparties. Yet, Devanney (2011a) notes that wetbulk 
charterparty speeds remain high, above that which is optimal for the charterer even after 
accounting for inventory costs. In chapter five and in the beginning of this chapter it was 
hypothesised that voyage charterparties would be prone to quasi ‘usage’ problems because the 
charterer does not pay for the fuel directly, cannot select the energy saving measures (or in this case 
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inability to determine the speed at which the ship would travel through the use of blanket utmost 
despatch clauses) which would result in higher energy consumption than is reasonable (Meier and 
Aide 2007). As seen above, the oil major charterparties explicitly stated speeds at which the ship 
should travel for both ballast and laden legs and also remunerate owners for the increase in speed. 
An example of this is shown below from BPvoy3.  
“Thereupon the vessel shall proceed with such cargo at a speed which owners undertake shall be 
........... knots (‘Base Speed’), as ordered on signing Bills of lading or as provided in Clauses 24 and/or 
26 to....”  
“Charterers shall have the right at any time during the voyage to order the vessel to increase speed 
in order to arrive at a port or place on a certain date” 
“If vessel fails to maintain Base Speed, or fails to comply with the instructions as to the increase of 
speed given by charterers pursuant to this clause, owners shall, subject to clause 46, be liable for all 
costs....” 
“If charterers order the vessel to increase speed under the provisions of clause 3 such rate shall be 
increased by ................. New Worldscale points for each knot of increased speed above the Base 
Speed or on a pro rata basis for fractions of a knot up to a maximum of ........... knots. Such increase 
shall be calculated in accordance with the following example: 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎8.4: Example of control over speed in BP voyage charterparty 
8.4.1.1.4. Addressing agency problems of goal conflict, lack of information and outcome certainty 
From the above example of a voyage charterparty (outcome based contract) it is clear that the oil 
major charterer is well informed of the speed at which the ship should be travelling at (i.e. there 
isn’t a lack of information). This means that the voyage charterparty at best addresses somewhat the 
informational problems, which leaves the agency problems of goal conflict and outcome certainty to 
be addressed in those contracts.  
Outcome certainty and goal conflict has recently been addressed through determining the way NOR 
is tendered. The oil major’s ability (through the use of their own charterparty) to govern the speed 
of ships on a voyage charter has been used in the Virtual Arrival process (as briefly mentioned in 
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section  8.3.1.2) to address outcome certainty and take advantage of the current downturn in the 
market. It is clear that this practice or process (virtual arrival/Just In Time) therefore works well for 
charterparties where speed is largely controlled by the charterer. The process also relies heavily on 
good communication and co-ordination with ports or terminals. Many of the ports however do not 
use advanced scheduling systems to be able to predict the level of congestion at a particular date 
and time in the future, in fact many drybulk ports around the world have impromptu arrivals based 
on first come first serve (FCFS) basis (Alvarez, Longva & Engebrethsen 2010).  
Figure ‎8.5 below shows that for berthing ships there is an average delay of around two to three days 
for drybulk ports and the constant port congestion would mean that any speed reduction en-route 
would result in further delays as position in the queue is lost. On the other hand oil terminals 
controlled by oil majors (vertically integrated) tend to have better capabilities and communication 
with the shipowners or charterers and therefore can make use of the virtual arrival process. The 
Virtual Arrival process tackles the goal conflict problem between the principal and the agent by 
creating incentives to reduce speed, but it has yet to address the lack of information on speed in the 
various prominent voyage charterparties (e.g. BIMCO voyage charterparties) and outcome 
uncertainty as a result of poor port infrastructure (e.g. developing nation ports). To that end the 
drafting committee of BIMCO has been trying since 2011 to integrate the Virtual Arrival clauses into 
its charterparties but the progress has been slow and at the time of writing the clause has yet to be 
approved and published by the committee.  
 
Figure ‎8.5: Port Congestion Index for drybulk ports 
Source: OCIMF and INTERTANKO (2010) 
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8.4.1.2. Speed reduction in time charterparties 
8.4.1.2.1. Goal conflict 
For the implementation of operational measures in the time charter it was hypothesized that the 
principal agent efficiency problem would be less of a problem or incentives would be aligned 
because the principal is responsible for fuel cost and also deciding upon its implementation i.e. 
determining speed. However, utmost despatch clauses were also found in time charterparties, even 
though charterers may have an interest in order to save costs.  
Speed reduction in time charterparties is generally governed through the use of slow steaming 
clauses which allow the charterer to order the master to reduce speed to a certain extent (under 
normal operating conditions). Table  8.12 below shows the time charterparties with utmost despatch 
clause and built in slow steaming clause. Conflicts of interest may arise when the shipowner (agent) 
has obligations towards other third parties such as such as holders of bills of lading and engine 
manufacturer’s recommendations. So even where the owners and charterers have similar or non-
conflicting interests in slow steaming, the bill of lading holders must be taken into account as well 
(Zerman 2011). Another goal conflict arises due to subletting of the vessel under time charters; 
“Under a sub-charter party, the sub-time charterers may have a right to request slow steaming and 
request their disponent owners accordingly. The head charter party may not have a similar clause 
and head owners would be well within their rights to deny the request given their exposure to cargo 
interests” (Zerman 2011) 
Speaking to an industry expert (head of shipping group of a law firm) on this regard (personal 
communication, November 2013), the above conflicts may not be as pervasive since charterparties 
would ensure that similar clauses flow from head charterparty to the sub-charterparty. Secondly, 
even if a shipowner is in a situation where utmost despatch obligations were not adhered to due to 
the charterers slow steaming orders, the shipowner has a defence to being sued by cargo interests. 
In fact, it is the charterer’s responsibility to ensure that compliance  with slow steaming orders does 
not lead to the breach by the owner for the contract of carriage (bill of ladings), as highlighted from 
the BIMCO slow steaming clause: 
“The Charterers shall ensure that the terms of the bills of lading, waybills or other documents 
evidencing contracts of carriage issued by or on behalf of the Owners provide that compliance by 
Owners with this Clause does not constitute a breach of the contract of carriage. The Charterers 
shall indemnify the Owners against all consequences and liabilities that may arise from bills of 
lading, waybills or other documents evidencing contracts of carriage being issued as presented to 
the extent that the terms of such bills of lading, waybills or other documents evidencing contracts of 
carriage impose or result in breach of the Owners’ obligation to proceed with due despatch or are to 
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be held to be a deviation or the imposition of more onerous liabilities upon the Owners than those 
assumed by the Owners pursuant to this Clause” (BIMCO 2011) 
Time 
charterparty 
Utmost despatch in all 
voyages  
Built in slow steaming  
clause 
INTERTANKTIME   
BIMCHEMTIME  * 
BPTIME 3   
SHELLTIME    
BHPBTIME03   
BALTIME   
GENTIME   
NYPE 46   
NYPE 93   
ASBATIME   
BOXTIME   
* Clause 11 of BIMCHEMTIME 1984 contains slow steaming clause however no slow steaming clause 
in BIMCHEMTIME 2005. 
Table ‎8.12: Time charterparties with utmost despatch clause and built in slow steaming clause 
8.4.1.2.2. Information 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) when the principal has information to verify agent behaviour, the 
agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. Information systems for verification of 
agent behaviour are therefore positively related to behaviour based contracts and negatively related 
to outcome based contracts (Eisenhardt 1989). Therefore information systems in a time charter (a 
behaviour based contract) play a vital role in the agency relationship. The information systems in the 
time charter need to counter the problem of adverse selection (pre-contractual opportunism e.g. 
misrepresentation of ability) and moral hazard (post contractual opportunism e.g. lack of effort or 
shirking). Thus, it is impossible for a principal to observe an agent’s quality and behaviour at no cost 
(Aubert, Patry & Rivard 2003).  
The time charter contract can be seen as an outsourcing contract which seeks to satisfy the need for 
transporting goods for the charterer. According to Aubert, Patry & Rivard (2003, p. 182) “in 
outsourcing contracts, the most obvious manifestation of moral hazard is a reduction in the level of 
effort by the supplier, resulting in lower service quality”. Within a time charter contract ‘service 
quality’ is measured through two important standards, the speed and consumption guarantee (in 
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specific weather conditions) and offhire clauses in the contract. Both of these standards have 
different remedies, when a ship does not meet its speed and consumption guarantee, the charterer 
can claim for underperformance and when the ship is offhire, the charterer can avoid payment of 
daily charter rate. Information regarding these standards can be obtained by the principal through 
direct monitoring or observation, using weather routing service providers, supercargo on-board 
ships, more recently Satellite Automated Identification Systems (AIS was originally intended 
primarily for collisions avoidance under the IMO Safety of Life at Sea convention) and even using 
agent’s own noon reporting, which has the probability of being less accurate and prone agent 
shirking. Aubert, Patry & Rivard (2003) also suggest other ways of monitoring such as benchmarking 
agent’s performance with other agents or the market. Finally, additional information on speed can 
come about as a result of the length of the agency relationship, which is positively related to the 
behaviour based contract. In long term relationships the principal will learn about the agent and 
over time be able to assess behaviour more readily (Eisenhardt 1989) thus be able reduce 
information asymmetry. The typical length of time charters in shipping however tend to be short, 
with the majority of the fixtures falling within six months for drybulk and container sectors and one 
year for wetbulk sector, as shown below in Figure ‎8.6. The short time period also may not justify the 
cost associated with more advanced monitoring of speed or other measures such as using weather 
routing transponder technology on-board ships for some time charters (personal communication 
with head of commercial operations of a large oil major, 2012).   
 
Figure ‎8.6: Duration of fixtures for different sectors       
The speed and consumption guarantee in time charters presents the risk of adverse selection, which 
will develop if the principal cannot verify the claims of the agent. Although, actual ship speed is 
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observable by calculating duration between port to port or ship log books (Veenstra and Dalen 2011) 
and even increasingly satellite data, but these are far from being accurate. The same can be said for 
methods of measuring actual fuel consumption. Devanney (2011b) shows how shipowners overstate 
their ability (by over specifying speed and under specifying consumption) in order to obtain a long 
term charter contract, since the penalties for underperformance would outweigh the additional 
revenue. Veenstra and Dalen (2011) show evidence from analysis of time charter fixtures that 
suggests otherwise, i.e. shipowners engage in strategic behaviour, quoting lower warranted speed 
and higher fuel consumption in time charters, that is different not only based on technical (e.g. due 
to hull fouling) but also because of other market factors, even for the same ships. Although when it 
comes to longer term contracts they do not find similar understating of speed and overstating of fuel 
consumption. This exhibits the classical principal agent problem of information asymmetry, where 
the shipowner has “superior knowledge about the real performance of the ship in terms of speed 
and fuel consumption and their interest to minimise outcome of the claim process” Veenstra and 
Dalen (2011, p48). To counter such agent behaviour Aubert, Patry & Rivard (2003) suggest 
information gathering exercises and better contract designs, which for example impose even heavier 
penalties, thus repel low quality agents. In some shipping markets, such as the wetbulk and some 
drybulk markets, there is a practice to protect against such adverse selection through a procedure 
called ship vetting. Ship vetting includes gathering information of a prospective ship’s maintenance 
record, dates since when the ship is classed by its classification society, the flag it flies, numbers of 
name changes and ownership changes, dates since last special survey and dry dock, port detentions, 
and voyage chartering history (Bergantino and Veenstra 2002). Therefore, ship vetting serves as a 
procedure to extract the quality of ship operators (Bergantino and Veenstra 2002). According to 
Strandenes (1999, cited by Bergantino and Veenstra 2002) the adverse selection principal agent 
problem is however more applicable or representative of the voyage charter market than in the time 
charter market.  
Moreover, the source of information (on prevailing weather conditions to determine good weather 
conditions to test the speed and consumption guarantee) in the time charter contracts has seen 
much debate. The time charterer has the right to appoint a weather routing company (Makkar 
2005), and in the absence of such services the vessel (i.e. master or officers noon reporting and logs) 
are relied upon. Without the use of weather routing company, charterers are generally 
‘handicapped’ as they only have access to daily noon reporting and four hourly log abstracts 
(Williamson 2012). Only if there is a major discrepancy between vessels logs and weather routing 
company, the weather routing company information is relied upon, as shown below (Makkar 2005); 
284 
 
“Under most circumstances, where the differences are not major, most panels will tend to accept 
the reports of the ship, as the Master and Officers are deemed to be the best judges on the voyage 
of actual conditions. A heavy burden is placed upon Charterers to show that the ship logs are not 
reliable and should be disregarded”. Note that this is from New York arbitration, but the same rules 
are followed for London Arbitration. 
 
Makkar (2005) cites a legal case, which shows that the judges found a continuous series of 
differences between reports from the vessel and weather routing company, and therefore fair 
weather conditions reported by the weather routing company were deemed more reliable. 
Table ‎8.13 shows the results of charterparty content analysis for monitoring agent behaviour. 
Time 
charterparty 
Use of weather 
routing company 
Use of agents noon 
reporting/deck logs 
Use of 
supercargo 
INTERTANKTIME    
BIMCHEMTIME    
BPTIME 3    
SHELLTIME     
BHPBTIME03    
BALTIME    
GENTIME    
NYPE 46    
NYPE 93    
ASBATIME    
BOXTIME    
Table ‎8.13: Time charterparties use of the different forms of monitoring for speed 
8.4.1.2.3. Outcome measurability  
According to Eisenhardt (1989) outcome measurability is negatively related to behaviour based 
contracts and positively related to outcome based contracts, i.e. when outcome is easily measured 
outcome based contracts are suitable and when outcome is not so easily measured then behaviour 
based contracts are suitable. Outcomes in contracts may not be easily measured because of the long 
time required to complete and difficulty in measuring in a practical amount of time (Eisenhardt 
1989), which is representative of the time charter market. The main outcome in the time charter 
contract is the provision of transport service with a reasonable service quality (i.e. achieving the 
speed consumption guarantee and not spending time being offhire). Measuring these outcomes 
through information systems aforementioned can be a complex, costly and time consuming process 
for the charterer. Most contracts as a result focus only on monitoring under performance and have a 
relevant clause for deduction of hire or making a claim, though some contracts focus on both under 
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and over performance and remunerate accordingly. Sometimes the outcome measurability is subject 
to standard criteria and sometimes subject to very stringent criteria for under or over performance. 
As an example, the speed and consumption performance is subject to a moderate weather 
condition, whereas in other charterparties the ship performance is supposed to handle very harsh 
weather conditions, as shown below;  
“..Under normal working conditions and in moderate weather (which for the purpose of this clause 
shall exclude any periods of winds exceeding Force 4 on the Beaufort scale...” Bimchemtime 
“.. Good weather up till Force 8 on Beaufort scale...” Shelltime 
As can be seen from Table ‎8.14 there seem to sectoral differences in charterparties, where most 
wetbulk charterparties contain stringent criteria for measuring performance but at the same time oil 
major charterparties compensating for over performance. This could be related to the bargaining 
power of major charterers in the wetbulk sector. Faber et al. (2012) also conclude that in the case 
where the ship underperforms, the shipowner must compensate the charterer but when the ship 
over-performs in most cases the charterer benefits instead of the owner.  
Time 
charterparty 
Compensate for 
over performance 
Moderate 
criteria 
Stringent 
criteria  
INTERTANKTIME    
BIMCHEMTIME    
BPTIME 3    
SHELLTIME     
BHPBTIME03    
BALTIME  *  
GENTIME    
NYPE 46  *  
NYPE 93  User specified  
ASBATIME  *  
BOXTIME    
*Good weather conditions not described 
Table ‎8.14: Outcome measurability in time charter contracts 
This section identified the agency problems (goal conflict, information problems and outcome 
certainty) in time charterparties mainly for speed reduction measures. The goal conflict between the 
principal and agent in the time charterparty is also manifested through the use of utmost despatch, 
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which may affect the implementation of the speed reduction measures. However there is a greater 
chance of implementation of this measure because not only is the charterer responsible for fuel 
costs but was shown to be the responsible entity for ensuring the contracts in the principal agent 
chain did not conflict, and if they did, the charterer would indemnify the shipowner. On the subject 
of information asymmetry all charterparties were found to have clauses that require ship masters 
reporting, with very few charterparties containing express clauses for weather routing companies 
reporting. The main outcome for a time charter is meeting speed and consumption guarantee and 
not being offhire and therefore providing good quality transport service. The problem of outcome 
certainty is linked to monitoring of performance of the two criteria aforementioned. The content 
analysis showed that in the case where the ship underperforms, the shipowner must compensate 
the charterer but when the ship over-performs in most cases only the charterer benefits instead of 
the owner. These principal agent problems can be said to have determining consequences on the 
implementation of speed reduction measures as well as other operational measures such as hull 
maintenance.  
8.5. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, the propositions of agency theory are used to evaluate voyage and time charter 
shipping contracts. The survey method was used to explore perceptions of barriers to 
implementation of measures and the content analysis method in this chapter to explore the 
observed level of the principal agent problem as a potential barrier in uptake of operational energy 
efficiency measures in shipping. The nexus of the principal agent problem is the contract and agency 
theory aims to create efficient contracts that attempt to resolve agency problems (i.e. reduce agency 
costs). This presents a problem in the context of implementation of energy efficient operational 
measures because the contracts are often focussed in reducing agency costs e.g. resolving conflicts 
or aligning incentives, thus they may forego or not prioritise the benefits of energy efficiency. There 
is very sparse literature on principal agent problems in shipping and there is hardly any investigation 
into the design of adequate contracts for energy efficiency both in shipping and other industries. 
Using Eisenhardt (1988 and 1989) and Sharma (1997) propositions, two contracts of carriage in 
shipping are tested for their being outcome based or behaviour based contracts. It is suggested that 
the voyage charter is representative of an outcome based contract and the time charter is 
representative of the behaviour based contract.  The voyage charter had more obligations on the 
shipowner (agent) in all four stages of the voyage which seemed to override or conflict with energy 
efficiency objectives. For example the voyage contract deals with the different agency problems by 
obliging the ship to proceed with utmost despatch in both the preliminary and laden voyage and 
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tendering Notice of Readiness in specific time slots and places, all of which have conflicts with the 
implementation of speed reduction measures. The example of Virtual Arrival is given to show how 
this intense focus of charterparties on agency has been dealt with. Virtual arrival can be thought of 
as a way of dealing with the three main agency problems, goal conflict, information asymmetry and 
outcome certainty.  
The results of the content analysis show that the majority of charterparties require utmost despatch 
in the preliminary voyage. However this was only applicable whenever no time is specified (Wilson 
2010). Time is generally specified when settling the contract in the form of Expected Readiness to 
Load (ERL) date, which is based on the negotiation between the shipowner and charterer, thus there 
could be potential for implementation of slow steaming at this stage. All charterparties were found 
to have ERL date stipulated either in the preamble or within the main clauses. There were clear 
differences in the use of utmost despatch in the preliminary voyage across the sectors, all general 
voyage charterparties not having any express mention, three out of eleven drybulk charterparties 
without express mention, whereas all wetbulk charterparties analysed had express mention of 
utmost despatch or equivalent. One of the possible explanations of the sectoral differences could be 
the publishers and year of publishing. In the drybulk sector, the three voyage charterparties that did 
not have express mention of utmost despatch were published by BIMCO between 1980 and 2003. 
BIMCO was originally more representative of shipowners, however in the last few decades the 
documentary committee (which is responsible for drafting standard form charterparties) can be said 
to be representing fairly the interests of both parties (Wilson 2010). Utmost despatch clauses were 
not an issue in the container sector because operator’s liner terms and conditions normally confer 
on the owner or vessel operators a right to slow steam. Other charterparties making use of express 
mention tended to be privately published by major charterers or trading houses or associations (e.g. 
Nipponore, Nipponcoal, Synacomex etc). In the laden leg once again there were sectoral differences 
on the use of utmost despatch clauses. Only one of the drybulk charterparties and general 
charterparties had in-built clauses for reduced speed (economical speed to conserve fuel). Oil major 
charterparties mainly relied on stated speed clauses for voyage charters. With these results it is clear 
that the focus of the contracts was around the goal conflict within the agency relationship.  
Utmost despatch clauses were also found to be expressly mentioned in the time charterparties, even 
though it was believed that the goal conflict for implementation of operational measures would not 
exist i.e. charterers paying for fuel and deciding upon implementation of operational measures. 
Possible reasons for this were sub chartering, obligations to engine manufacturers and bill of lading 
holders’ rights. The results of the content analysis show that only two of thirteen charterparties had 
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built in slow steaming clauses. However there was a greater chance of implementation of speed 
reduction measure because not only is the charterer responsible for fuel costs but was shown to be 
the responsible entity for ensuring the contracts in the principal agent chain did not conflict, and if 
they did, the charterer would indemnify the shipowner. Therefore, on the subject of goal conflict, 
the above results for both types of contracts show that implementation of speed reduction 
measures is more problematic in the voyage charter, which supports the conclusions from chapter 
five and supporting analysis from survey results, which showed that implementation of operational 
measures and specifically speed reduction, were more of a problem under voyage charter than in 
time charter.  
Indicators of outcome certainty in the voyage charterparty such as place of tendering Notice of 
Readiness (NOR) and time of tendering NOR were also thought to be important contractual features 
in the voyage charter that would impact the implementation of speed reduction measures. These 
are important clauses as they reveal the level of risk assumed either by the principal or the agent 
and affect the certainty in the contract. There were differences in places of NOR and timings of 
tendering of NOR in the charterparties of the different sectors, wetbulk charterparties generally 
were found to be port charters with no specific NOR timings, whereas most drybulk charterparties 
were observed to be berth charters but with specific NOR timings. This is perhaps due to increased 
congestion as a result of fewer ports and geopolitical issues in oil terminals and ports which tend to 
operate 24 hours a day as opposed to many drybulk ports that open for much less time. The 
implication of the open NOR time and place clauses is that shipowners can better manage the speed 
reduction or speed profile during the voyage.  
For the implementation of speed reduction measure in the time charter another important agency 
problem is that of information. Information asymmetry between principal and agents leads to 
adverse selection and moral hazard. The charterer seeks information about the prospective ship 
through measuring the service quality in two main ways; speed and consumption guarantee and 
offhire guarantee. Information systems employed to counter adverse selection include ship vetting 
as a form of screening the agent, and information systems employed to counter moral hazard 
include supercargo and monitoring through third party sources. The length of the contract generally 
leads to better information (reduction of information asymmetry), however the majority of the 
shipping contracts were shown to be for less than three to six months in the drybulk and container 
sectors and between six months and one year in wetbulk sector. The short duration of the contract 
also makes it difficult for the charterer to recoup investment in better information systems that are 
ship specific.  
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Similar coding agenda was developed for the weather routing measure and the same template can 
also be used to investigate implementation of other measures in the context of principal agent 
problems and energy efficiency. It is believed that the various levels of liberty and deviation clauses 
may impact the implementation of weather routing measure and efficient voyage execution in the 
voyage charter. The results of the final coding have been difficult to obtain due to lack of time and 
resources (the use of multiple coders in such type content analysis) and the inability to establish a 
robust relationship between these clauses and use of weather routing measure. However, from the 
initial category development some early conclusions can be drawn. On the subject of goal conflict 
between principal and agent and implementation of weather routing measure, wetbulk and drybulk 
charterparties were found to have stricter limitations compared to general and container 
charterparties that contained higher levels of liberty clauses, which allowed for example bunkering 
enroute, calling at other ports, etc. These liberal clauses are found to have been inserted 
predominantly for the shipowners benefit and the courts apply the principle of ‘contra proferentem 
– against the drafter’ giving them an extremely restricted interpretation (Wilson 2010). On the 
subject of information asymmetry between principal and agent, oil major charterparties prescribed 
specific routes to be taken by the ship or when these were not described, the Worldscale routes or 
BP Shipping marine distance tables were mentioned. On the other hand, in the remainder of the 
charterparties the principal had no information at all as to what route is being taken by the agent, 
since they did not prescribe specific routes for the voyage.  
The content analysis method combined with Eisenhardt’s (1989) agency theory propositions 
provided a framework to analyse the shipping contracts more systematically and from a theoretical 
point of view. The agency theory propositions as categories for content analysis for both types of 
contracts for carriage of goods illustrated agency problems in the contracts more clearly, with which 
it is possible to conclude that the agency problems in contracts are affecting the implementation of 
at least the speed reduction measure. 
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9. Discussion 
The aim of this chapter is to triangulate the research findings from the three methods used to 
answer the research questions. To put the findings in context, the chapter relates these findings with 
similar studies and explains the key findings with general barriers theory and agency theory. The 
chapter follows sequentially each of the research questions and hypotheses and concludes with key 
recommendations from this research and further work required to enhance the understanding of 
barriers to energy efficiency in shipping.  
9.1. Implementation of energy efficiency operational measures 
Energy efficiency is one of the means through which rising global CO2 emissions and dangerous 
climate change could be avoided. This research reviewed several empirical studies across different 
sectors and showed that despite the substantial abatement potential at negative costs, cost-
effective energy efficiency measures are not always implemented. The lack of implementation 
results in an energy efficiency gap, which refers to the difference between the actual lower levels of 
implementation of energy efficiency measures and the higher level that would appear to be cost-
effective from the consumers or firms point of view based on techno-economic analysis. Thus the 
energy efficiency gap can be a result of: 
 Modelling artefacts – incorrect energy efficiency potentials based on different viewpoints e.g. 
technologists versus an economist. 
 Rational behaviour – incorrect parameters that do not reflect accurately the situation faced by 
firms or consumers e.g. cost and access to capital. 
 Market barriers and failures – socio-economic barriers e.g. power, culture, and economic market 
failures e.g. split incentives and information asymmetry. 
To date there exists mainly grey literature and a couple of MSc dissertations that have explored 
barriers to energy efficiency in shipping. These have alluded to the energy efficiency gap and barriers 
that are affecting implementation but have not done so in a methodologically rigorous manner. A 
review of the empirical studies on barriers to energy efficiency in other sectors led to the 
construction of a framework that needed to be followed in order to theoretically and rigorously 
examine barriers to energy efficiency in shipping. In order to assess whether there is an energy 
efficiency gap in shipping, it is important to understand the actual level of implementation of energy 
efficiency measures. To that end, the first research question aimed to investigate the actual level of 
uptake of energy efficient operational measures. This has not been examined previously, so it is 
thought that this research creates a baseline on the level of implementation of operational 
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measures in shipping. The online questionnaire method (as discussed in chapter three and four) was 
employed to answer the research question which asks: 
Research question 1: To what extent are energy efficient operational measures implemented in 
shipping? 
Three hypotheses were developed to address the research question regarding the implementation 
of energy efficient operational measures: 
Hypothesis 1a: Energy efficient operational measures are not fully implemented.  
Hypothesis 1b: Implementation varies across the measures according to size and sector. 
Hypothesis 1c: Implementation of energy efficient operational measures is higher for time chartered 
ships compared to voyage chartered ships. 
General barriers literature proposes that engineering-economic analysis based on cost-effectiveness, 
would show higher levels of implementation of measures whereas the actual level of 
implementation may be lower (Golove and Eto 1996 and Brown 2001). The actual implementation 
rate was measured using two questions in the online questionnaire. The first question attempted to 
limit the number of measures to five measures with the highest fuel saving potential, similar to 
Harris (2000) and Velthuijsen (1993). The respondents were then asked whether they had 
implemented the measure they believed to have high fuel saving potential. The survey showed 
statistically significantly that, no measure that was believed to have a high fuel saving potential was 
fully implemented. The average implementation of operational measures was between 45-65% 
across all the measures (CL 95%) and implementation between the measures ranged between 35-
75% (CL 95%). Combining the respondents who have already implemented a measure and those 
planning to implement a measure, the average across all the measures is between 65-75% (CL 95%). 
On average each company had implemented between two and three measures (CL 95%). The 
average implementation rate across all the operational measures is similar to the Faber, Behrends & 
Nelissen (2011) survey of five shipowners, who report implementation for operational measures of 
around 60%. Similarly, Maddox Consulting (2012) based on expert judgement report implementation 
of six operational measures to be around 65%.  
In non-shipping sectors, Harris (2000) shows an implementation rate of energy efficient measures 
implemented by industrial firms to be around 80%. For households or residential sectors Kema-
Xenergy, Itron & RoperASW (2004) shows an implementation rate for energy efficient appliances to 
be around 50% and IEA (2007) show an implementation rate for space heating measures of around 
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50% as well. Thollander and Palm (2013) cite three government initiatives (based on energy audits 
and recommendations that aimed to promote implementation of energy efficiency in organisations) 
had implementation rates between 40-80%. Therefore, the implementation rate of operational 
measures for shipping can be said to be in the same range as the aforementioned sectors, where the 
energy efficiency gap has been established.  
There has been considerable discussion in other sectors around the lower observed level of 
implementation of energy efficient measures and a large extent of this has revolved around barriers 
that may be inhibiting their uptake. In the general barriers theory, market barriers and failures are 
attributed as the reasons for the lower implementation. The results obtained from the survey 
method are in line with the first hypothesis (1a) that operational measures are not fully 
implemented. However, this hypothesis is broad and generalised (in that it is not supported by a 
specific theory, rather by the general barriers theory), therefore hypotheses 1b and 1c are used to 
test the results with specific theories.  
Other barriers that are not related or rooted to the economic agency theory have also been 
discussed in the literature, these are generally called market barriers (access to capital, 
heterogeneity, hidden costs and risk). Each of these market barriers are supported by a separate 
theory for example hidden costs is explained by transaction cost theory (Willaimson 1979), access to 
capital and risk is explained by capital asset pricing model and theory (CAPM) (Fama & French 2004) 
and it is possible for agency theory to explain some aspect of these market barriers. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this research to investigate each of these in greater detail to explain the energy 
efficiency gap in shipping, rather this research uses the agency theory to explain the market failures, 
as the majority of these can be explained by the agency theory alone. Hypothesis 1b states that 
there is variation across the implementation of measures amongst different groups of respondents, 
which would be a reflection of some of the above market barriers and therefore the theories 
aforementioned. For example sectoral differences in implementation would suggest that there is 
market heterogeneity (i.e. when a measure may be cost-effective in most circumstances but not in 
others, leading to excessive potential being claimed for the measure). At a general level, average 
implementation rates by different size groups showed that the small sized firms (with five to ten 
ships in the fleet) had higher implementation rate than large firms (Table ‎6.6). Sector average 
implementation rate showed that the drybulk sector had the highest implementation rate 
(Table ‎6.6) followed by wetbulk and container sectors. There is insufficient literature to explain the 
above findings but it is hoped that by examining relationships at a detailed level would provide some 
insights into the differences. There is quite a large difference between the level of implementation 
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amongst different measures, when disaggregated by size and sector. Overall the variation among 
measures did not show any consistent relationship with size or sector across the implementation of 
measures. When examining the relationship at a more detailed level (i.e. between implementation 
of a single measure and size or sector and controlling for other variables) for measures that had the 
highest implementation some statistically significant relationships were observed. Measures that 
had the highest implementation were weather routing, general speed reduction and fuel 
consumption monitoring, which were the focus of the detailed analysis.  
The bivariate elaboration analysis controlled for one independent variable (test variable e.g. sector) 
at a time when examining the relationship between implementation of the aforementioned 
measures and another independent variable (e.g. size). The reason for controlling for only one test 
variable at a time is to maintain a sufficient level of populated cells in the crosstabulations. 
Controlling for only one test variable at a time means that each conditional relationship could 
potentially be affected by the third independent variable, e.g. relationship between implementation 
of weather routing and size, controlling for sector, could be affected by the correlation between 
sector and chartering group. Indeed correlations between the latter two independent variables were 
quite high. For example, it was seen that there are almost three times more large companies in the 
wetbulk sector compared to drybulk sector and that there are more of chartering groups one and 
two in drybulk sector compared to the wetbulk sector and vice versa for groups three and four. The 
implication of these relationships is that in the following analysis the impact of a test variable would 
be possibly inflated by its relationship to another uncontrolled test variable.  
The relationship between implementation of weather routing and size of the firm showed a weak 
zero order relationship, but when controlling for sector the relationship improved to a moderate 
level (not statistically significantly) for the drybulk sector. The zero order relationship between 
implementation of weather routing and sector was also found to have a moderate effect size 
(measured by Cramer’s V correlation coefficient) as well as being statistically significant, which 
further improved when controlling for size. This finding suggests that when examining relationships 
at a per measure level, some patterns of association exist between implementation of measures and 
size as well as sector. The relationship between implementation of other measures with size and 
sector resulted in very similar results. Four moderate to strong relationships, which are also 
statistically significant, were observed and will be used for the discussion with results of other 
methods; 
1. Zero order relationship between implementation of weather routing and sector (0.295, p 0.058) 
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2. Conditional relationship (controlling for sector) between implementation of weather routing and 
chartering group  (0.647, p 0.021,  drybulk) 
3. Conditional relationship (controlling for sector) between implementation of fuel consumption 
monitoring and size of the firm (0.413, p 0.085, wetbulk) 
4. Conditional relationship (controlling for sector) between implementation of general speed 
reduction and size of the firm (0.549, p 0.029, drybulk) 
From the above results it can be seen that controlling for sector, conditional relationships between a 
measure and size improve to strong levels, so sector as a test variable results in more stronger and 
statistically significant relationships. However, it could also be said that there is a lack of consistency 
in relationships across the measures, for two of the measures the original relationship is for size of 
the firm, and the remainder two are for sector and chartering group. The meaning of the above 
results has been explained in further detail in chapter seven but it is important to highlight these 
here as they may be explained by research findings from other methods. For example could 
charterparty content analysis method explain why there is a sectoral difference in implementation of 
weather routing? (relationship one above). Can the sectoral difference be explained by the different 
types of charterparties in the sectors? Analysis from chapter seven on relationship four showed that 
in the wetbulk sector 78% of the small sized companies had implemented the general speed 
reduction measure which is the highest amongst other size groups in that sector. Whereas, in the 
drybulk sector there seems to be a considerable contrast in the implementation with only 29% of 
small sized companies implementing general speed reduction which is the lowest compared to other 
sizes in that sector. This could be explained from the charterparty analysis which showed that major 
wetbulk charterers have significant bargaining power, which smaller sized firms operating in that 
sector may be subject to, through oil major’s charterparties, which were shown to have the highest 
speed reduction potential.  
Although even more moderate and strong effect sizes were observed in other relationships, based 
on the few statistically significant results above, hypothesis 1b cannot be fully accepted and the null 
hypothesis cannot be totally rejected, thus implementation of measures could be said to be to some 
extent varying for size and sector. The inability to accept the hypothesis is mainly due to the smaller 
sample sizes for the remainding conditional relationships.  
This research however has primarily focussed on one economic theory that is used to explain some 
of the market failures to energy efficiency, the agency theory, as discussed in chapters two and five. 
To briefly recap for the purposes of further explanation of the results, the theory states that 
principals and agents have certain characteristics (e.g. risk aversion) and as a result will face two 
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main problems in an agency relationship; conflict of interests and information asymmetry, resulting 
in ex-ante and ex-post agency problems. This economic theory has then been applied to the 
discussion of barriers to energy efficiency and specifically to explain the energy efficiency gap. On 
one of the aforementioned problems, conflict of interest, several studies categorised the conflict of 
interest (referred to as ‘split incentives’) into four cases based on the type of contract, refer to 
Table ‎5.8 for further details.  
In order to observe the extent of barriers, the non-shipping sector empirical studies then further 
break down implementation of measures by ownership. Extending the agency theory to the energy 
efficiency context, under the principal agent problem methodology or matrix, it is hypothesised that 
implementation of measures will differ according to the four cases. In the two of the 
aforementioned non-shipping studies (Kema-Xenergy, Itron & RoperASW 2004 and IEA 2007) the 
implementation of energy efficiency measures differed significantly between owned (owner-
occupied) and rented properties, confirming the efficiency principal agent problem. Harris (2000) 
does not observe significant differences in businesses that own their premises and those that lease 
their premises, and as mentioned earlier finds the highest level of implementation compared to any 
other barriers to energy efficiency study. A plausible explanation of this could be the nature of the 
contracts in the industry such as their length and retrofit clauses as suggested by Meyer (2008). IEA 
(2007) in the case of energy efficiency measures implemented by owned versus rented residential 
properties showed that implementation varied significantly across the different measures, in some 
cases by up to 30% (for roof insulation) between the groups.  
The above studies focus on technical energy efficiency and show evidence that the principal agent 
efficiency problem exists, however there is a problem when investigating operational efficiency, 
since no study to date has investigated how implementation of operational measures is affected the 
same cases. For example the studies generally hypothesize that rented households (with no energy 
included in rent) have lower implementation of technical measures (due to efficiency principal agent 
problem), and this has been confirmed by many studies (e.g. Gillingham, Harding & Rapson 2011; 
Maruejols and Young 2011). It is important to extend this hypothesis to investigate that the same 
rental households (with no energy included rents) may perhaps have better operational efficiency. 
Conversely, rented households (with energy included in rents) have higher implementation of 
technical measures but may suffer from lower implementation of operational measures. The key 
here is the end user’s or tenant’s (principals) incentives to conserve energy. Whilst operational 
efficiency in households or other sectors may not be as important (as suggested by the lack of 
research on this subject), it certainly is in the case of shipping, since operational efficiency can have a 
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higher impact as shown in chapter five. There have been large energy end use studies of households 
but most of them have concentrated on technical efficiency and whilst some studies have attempted 
to profile occupant energy use and behaviour (operational) these have fallen short of disaggregating 
these for different cases of the principal agent matrix (e.g. Zimmermann et al. 2012). There exist 
only a few anecdotes of occupant behaviour for the different types of principal agent cases e.g. 
occupant’s leaving windows open during the low temperature months when landlords pay for 
utilities, Levinson and Neimann (2003) and Gillingham, Harding & Rapson (2011).  
Using ownership and rent as an indicator of the principal agent problem, and consequently denoting 
the split incentive market failure, this research attempted to identify the observed extent of the 
principal agent barrier in shipping. The chartering level is used as a proxy to the ownership type, 
resulting in four groups based on ownership and chartering (refer to section 6.5 for further details). 
In chapter three and five it was hypothesised that shipping firms that own a majority of the fleet and 
charter out their fleet primarily on voyage charter have lower implementation of operational 
measures compared to those that own the vessels and charter out primarily on time charter. The 
total number of measures implemented across the groups varied slightly but not significantly. 
Overall the groups with a majority of their fleet chartered out on time charter had slightly higher 
(65% compared to 60%) implementation of the all the measures, but the results show there was a 
non-significant and weak relationship between the chartering group and number of measures 
implemented when viewed at an aggregate level.  
Detailed analysis at per measure level reveals that there is a good level of association between 
implementation of a particular measure and the chartering group. For instance, the implementation 
of weather routing, controlling for sector, shows that there is a significant difference in 
implementation between the different chartering groups. The group that owns and operates on 
voyage charter had lower implementation compared to the group that owns and operates on time 
charter and this was more of a case in the drybulk sector. A possible explanation of this observation 
is that weather routing seems to be more applicable to time charterers who use it for monitoring 
purposes as well, rather than using it solely for optimal routing. The results of the charterparty 
content analysis also supported this, as it showed that two of the drybulk charterparties made 
explicit mention or use of weather routing services for monitoring, despite the precedence given to 
master’s own reporting, whereas none of the wetbulk charterparties had weather routing service 
clauses. The implementation of the speed reduction measure and its association with chartering 
group, controlling for sector, reveals a similar pattern, i.e. the group that owns and operates on 
voyage charter had significantly lower implementation compared to the group that owns and 
297 
 
operates on time charter, for both wetbulk and drybulk sectors. Linking this finding with 
charterparty content analysis, one can see that there were several agency related reasons for 
voyage charterparties to restrict speed reduction through utmost despatch, notice of readiness time 
and place clauses in all four parts of the voyage. These results cannot be corroborated with the 
results of the calculated speed difference between voyage chartered and time chartered ships, 
investigated in research question four (section  5.6) due to the relatively small sample size of time 
chartered ships. The survey respondents also thought that speed reduction was more achievable in 
time charter than in voyage charter, which further supports the hypothesis. These results seem to 
suggest that hypothesis 1c can be accepted, since the implementation of the operational measures 
and specifically the speed reduction measure is higher in time charter than voyage charters.  
So far the first research question has been concerned with the level of implementation of 
operational measures and through use of some of the inbuilt survey indicators has been able to 
explain the variations in implementation of measures. The following section corroborates these 
results with the respondents’ perception of barriers to implementation of energy efficient 
operational measures and observed level of barriers to energy efficiency.  
9.2. Factors affecting implementation 
It is acknowledged in the barriers discussion that possible reasons for the difference between the 
observed lower levels of implementation of energy efficiency measures could also be due to 
modelling artefacts, inaccurate representations of the real world situation and the existence of 
barriers that actually affect implementation. This research took a novel approach to investigating the 
barriers that may be affecting implementation of energy efficiency measures. This was done through 
measuring inbuilt survey indicators as illustrated in the preceding section, through the perception of 
barriers and then comparing this to the observed level of barriers. The second research question 
addresses the perception of barriers to energy efficiency by asking: 
Research question 2: What factors are perceived to be the most important in explaining the lack of 
implementation of energy efficient operational measures? 
The hypothesis developed to address the research question was; 
Hypothesis 2: Market failures (principal agent problems specifically) are perceived to be more 
important than non-market failures for lack of implementation of operational measures. 
The online questionnaire method was employed to answer the research question in order to explain 
the lack of implementation of operational measures from the respondent’s point of view. The 
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perception of barriers to implementation was measured by two different types of survey questions. 
A general level question was asked for all those measures that were thought not to have a high fuel 
saving potential (i.e. after the first survey question). The second survey question was to ask those 
respondents who had not yet implemented the measures that they believed had a high fuel saving 
potential. These were more detailed and tailored to the measures in question. Results from the first 
type of survey question show that there are specific barriers pertaining to each of the measures. 
Lack of reliable information on cost and savings mainly affects the more technical operational 
measures, representing a quarter of the responses for each of these measures. For the measures 
mainly related to speed, the respondents mainly cited that these were difficult to implement under 
different types of charter and that charterparties did not allow for their implementation, which 
together represented on average half of all the responses received for each of these measures. 
Therefore, suggesting that informational problems mainly affect the technical operational measures 
whereas split incentives affect speed related operational measures. Connecting this with the 
implementation of speed related measures by sector, which shows that the wetbulk and drybulk 
sectors have similar implementation rates of around 60%, with the container sector having 75% 
implementation of the measure, suggests that principal agent problems may be a cause of the lack 
of implementation. This is supported with the results of the last survey question on speed reduction, 
where more of the wetbulk and drybulk sector respondents compared to container sector 
respondents believed it would be difficult to implement speed reduction measures under different 
types of charter and that charterparty clauses were an important hurdle. The charterparty content 
analysis further corroborated the observed differences in level of implementation of speed 
reduction by showing that most of the wetbulk and drybulk sector charterparties had all contained 
certain clauses that inhibit uptake of the speed reduction measure, whereas general use 
charterparties contained none.  
For all the measures, lack of access to capital barrier was the least cited which could be due to the 
relatively lower capital expenditure required for operational measures. This is confirmed by Sorrell 
et al. (2004) and Thollander and Ottosson (2008) (these studies are referenced because they were 
shown to be methodologically rigorous and therefore their results were more valid than other 
studies, refer to chapter two for further details) who find that capital barriers to energy intensive 
production processes generally were regarded as the highest barrier. So from the first question type 
on barriers to energy efficiency perception, market failures can be concluded to be more important 
factors than non-market failures affecting the implementation of operational energy efficiency 
measures.  
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The results from more detailed questions on barriers to implementation of measures showed that in 
general, market failure barriers were twice as likely to be cited as barriers compared to market 
barriers (non-market failures). This is in contrast to Thollander and Ottosson (2008) who show that 
most respondents cited barriers that were non-market failures. Sorrell et al. (2004) also show that 
for each of the three case industries, capital barriers were always the most important perceived 
barrier. Indicators of market failures and split incentives within survey questions from Sorrell et al. 
(2004) ranked around the middle of all the barriers cited by the respondents. Disaggregating the 
perception of respondents by size, sector and chartering group, generally did not show a consistent 
pattern of association between the perception of a barrier and any of the above independent 
variables. Bivariate elaboration analysis shows three statistically significant relationships between 
the market failure indicators and the independent variables, as follows; 
1. Conditional relationship (controlling for chartering group) between split incentives and size 
(0.581, p 0.006 for chartering group four). 
2. Conditional relationship (controlling for sector) between information problems and size (0.408, p 
0.103 for wetbulk) 
3. Conditional relationship (controlling for size) between informational problems and chartering 
group (0.693, p 0.048 for small sized firms) 
None of the above relationships are zero order relationships, which implies that they only exist 
under specific circumstances. Similar to the relationships mentioned in section ‎9.1, these are mainly 
found to apply to the size of the firm instead of the sector or chartering group variables. This is an 
unexpected result, since previous discussion and debate around barriers to energy efficiency has not 
produced enough on this subject. Economic theory such as the transaction cost theory (Williamson 
1985) that suggests different costs for different sized firms has not been well discussed in the 
context of barriers to energy efficiency. In shipping the size of the firm is briefly discussed by Faber 
et al. (2009) quoting that “smaller ship owners and operators may experience high transaction costs 
as they cannot spread the costs of e.g. gathering information over a large number of ships” (Faber et 
al. 2009, p.98). The size of the firm has been discussed very briefly by DeCanio (1993) in the context 
of barriers to energy efficiency, and this can be linked to the principal agent problem through use of 
agency theory. For example large “multidivisional corporations” (DeCanio 1993, p908) face several 
factors that may result in overly stringent investment criteria despite the lower cost of capital faced 
by the firm and overly stringent criteria as a result of divergence of preferences (split incentives) 
between owners and manager or shareholders and executives (Antle & Eppen 1985, Lambert 1986). 
This suggests that larger organisations may be more susceptible or perceive split incentives to be an 
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important barrier. The first conditional bivariate relationship above suggests that the perception of 
split incentives has a strong relationship with size for one of the chartering groups. The cross 
tabulation for chartering group four (management company with a majority of its fleet chartered out 
on time charter) shows that all of the large firms perceived the split incentive barriers as not 
important, with small and medium sized companies perceiving split incentive barriers as important. 
This result is somewhat in line with Thollander and Ottosson (2008) who show that ‘slim 
organisation’ is an important barrier to adoption of energy efficiency measures but is quite in 
contrast to the results of Sorrell et al. (2004) who show that the practices and procedures of large 
firms (such as energy accountability, level of sub metering and energy objectives of departments 
thus reflective of the split incentive barrier) are important issues for large organisations “In sum, 
split incentive problems related to accountability and equipment purchasing are evident within the 
sector – particularly at large sites – but are only considered of medium importance to energy 
efficiency” (Sorrell et al. 2004, p216).  
The second bivariate relationship suggests a relationship between perception of informational 
problems and size of the firm that exists mainly for the wetbulk sector. The large firms perceived the 
informational problems to be more important than small firms. This result is the opposite of what 
was perceived of split incentives by the large firms. There is no specific theory that predicts the 
relationship between size of the firm and the level of informational problems, but one can 
extrapolate from other theories and use empirical evidence on this subject. One can extrapolate 
from what is known about the purchasing pattern of energy goods, which have been described as 
credence goods i.e. those whose utility is difficult to ascertain even after purchase. “Imperfect 
information is more likely to occur when products are purchased infrequently.., which is an 
unfortunate characteristic of many energy related investments” (Palm and Thollander 2013). From 
this one can assume that smaller firms are likely to have relatively smaller and infrequent purchases 
compared to larger firms and therefore smaller firms may be more susceptible to information 
related problems than larger firms. Secondly, results from the survey conducted by Sorrell et al. 
(2004) show that “smaller (brewing sector) firms had poorer specific energy consumption and were 
more likely to lack information” (Sorrell et al. 2004, p217).  
The results of the above bivariate relationship thus are opposite to what has just been suggested in 
theory and literature for split incentives and informational problems and their relationship with size 
of the firm. One possible explanation to this contradictory finding is that the information problems 
barrier in the survey was used to encapsulate all types of information problems; information 
asymmetry, imperfect information (information based adverse selection and moral hazard), lack of 
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information, source of information, form of information and public good attributes of information. It 
is possible that the respondents of the larger firms were alluding to any one of the above. Sorrell et 
al. (2004) suggest that lack of information or availability of information may not be a problem but 
rather the search costs or time required (hidden costs) to discern quality from various sources of 
information is more of a problem. The fact that the relationship holds in the wetbulk sector also 
suggests that these might be the problems that are encountered by the firms operating in that 
sector. Indeed much of the IMO (equivalent of government sponsored) information on energy saving 
potential in the second greenhouse gas study (Buhaug et al. 2009) has used energy saving potentials 
directly from one single equipment and engine manufacturer’s brochure. Possible reasons as to why 
this mainly holds for the wetbulk sector could be the heterogeneous nature of the ships themselves, 
geographical location, the markets and the type of chartering arrangement mainly prevalent in this 
sector, (discussed further in research question three).  
The third bivariate relationship confirms that informational problems are related to the chartering 
group (statistically significantly only in small firms). In the small sized firms, groups that had mainly 
chartered their fleet out on time charter had cited lower informational problems compared to those 
that had mainly chartered their fleet out on voyage charter. This result can be explained using tenets 
of agency theory and principal agent problem cases. Under the time charter, the time charterer pays 
for the fuel and is in some operational control of the ship, therefore the charterer would have the 
incentive to implement operational measures. Combining this with the earlier proposition of 
frequency of purchases (credence good) the charterer is able to improve his information on several 
aspects of the contract and operation (e.g. reduce adverse selection, effective monitoring, 
purchasing good quality information) and thus the operational efficiency of the ship. On the other 
hand a small shipowner-operator (with less than ten ships) with the majority of its fleet on voyage 
charter is less likely to be able to learn from frequent purchasing or implementation of operational 
measures. This is further supported with the moderate and statistically significant correlation 
between perception of split incentives and informational problems. In section  7.4 it was seen that 
when controlling for size and sector, the relationship between perception of split incentives and 
chartering group strengthened to very high levels (close to statistically significant levels, refer to 
Table ‎7.23). The correlation would therefore imply a similar pattern of association for information 
problems as confirmed by the third bivariate relationship. Based on these it can be concluded that 
only in specific situations market failures are perceived to be more important for operational 
measures in shipping than non-market failures, thus the second hypothesis can be to some extent 
accepted.  
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The previous two research questions attempted to explore the implementation and perception of 
barriers to implementation of energy efficient operational measures. The following research 
questions are an attempt to see whether the implementation of measures and the perceptions of 
respondents are observed in practice. Research question three and four are the result of the 
secondary or desk research carried out in the first step or stages of this research, in order to gauge 
the level or pervasiveness of the principal agent problems in shipping. The third research question 
asks: 
Research question 3: What population of ships is affected by the principal agent problem in 
implementation of energy efficient operational measures? 
The hypothesis developed to address the research question was; 
Hypothesis 3: A high proportion of the population is affected by the principal agent problem when 
implementing energy efficient operational measures. 
This research question was mainly answered through secondary data analysis. The methodology set 
out in IEA (2007) is followed. In order to answer this research question it is first necessary to identify 
situations where principal agent problems may exist (step one of IEA methodology). This is done 
through an overview of contracts used in shipping which are matched to various cases of the 
principal agent matrix as shown in Table ‎5.13. From the principal agent literature in other industries, 
it is concluded that in carriage of goods contracts in shipping, the charterer is the principal and the 
shipowner-operator is the agent. To briefly recap for the purposes of further discussion, the cargo 
owner operator’s shipping fleet which are mostly bareboat charters is identified as case one of the 
principal agent matrix, where no principal agent problems are likely to occur. The time charter was 
identified to be case two of the principal agent matrix, where the efficiency principal agent problems 
can occur. The voyage charter was identified to case four of the principal agent matrix, where the 
usage principal agent problems can occur. No contracts in shipping were identified for case three of 
the principal agent matrix, where both efficiency and usage problems could occur.  
The principal agent discussion is extended to show that the same entity may have a different role in 
its relationship with other stakeholders even in the same contractual context e.g. carriage of goods, 
and that there are several dimensions or contexts where principal agent relationships exist other 
than contracts of carriage. Extending the one principal one agent for case two (time charter) and 
case four (voyage charter), shows that for a ship there are numerous conflicting interests along the 
chain of principal agent relationships. According to Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) and IEA (2007) 
each energy efficiency measure can represent a different case. For most operational measures the 
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time charter can be said to represent case one of the principal agent matrix where it is likely that no 
principal agent problem exists, because the principal (charterer) is in operational (although not 
direct) control of the vessel and can select operational measures to implement. Whereas for 
operational measures in the voyage charter can be said to represent case four of the principal agent 
matrix, where the usage problem can occur, because the principal seldom selects the operational 
measures. From the charterparty content analysis it is found that only in a limited number of 
situations (in the case of oil major charterparties) can a charterer select the speed (as an operational 
measure) of the ship, which could be said to be reflecting case one of the principal agent problem. 
Thus the implementation of operational measures should therefore be higher in time charter than in 
voyage charter, according to the above classification. This is in line with the results of the survey 
method which confirmed the hypothesis that the chartering group that had the majority of its fleet 
chartered out on time charter had higher implementation of operational measures compared to the 
groups that had a majority of the fleet chartered out on voyage charter.  
To estimate the population of ships affected by the efficiency and usage principal agent problems, 
secondary fixtures data and IEA (2007) methodology were used. The results show that on average 
across different ship types or categories, just under 90% of the wetbulk fleet on the charter market 
(carriage of goods contracts) is allocated to case four, therefore a majority of this sector could be 
said to be potentially affected by the usage problem and over 10% of the charter market wetbulk 
fleet is allocated to case two, which is can be affected by the efficiency problem. This translates to 
just over 10% of the fleet on charter market falling under case one for operational measures, where 
it is likely that no principal agent problems occur. The proportion falling in case one could be higher 
because of oil major charterparties control on speed reduction measures.  
On average across the different drybulk ship types over 60% of the drybulk fleet on charter market is 
allocated to case two, which can be affected by the efficiency problem and just under 40% of the 
drybulk fleet is allocated to case four, which could be affected by the usage problem. This translates 
to just over 60% of the wetbulk fleet on charter market falling under case one for operational 
measures. For carriage of goods contracts, the whole of the container fleet could be affected by the 
usage problem (where shipper is the principal and carrier is the agent) and there is no difference in 
the number of cases affected by principal agent problems related to technology and operational 
measures.  
Table ‎9.1 shows that the results are to some extent in contrast with the respondent population 
obtained in the survey, which showed that 60% of wetbulk sector respondents had their fleet 
chartered out on time and the remaining 40% on voyage charter. The results of the drybulk 
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calculation correspond to some extent to the respondents of the survey. The reasons as to why 
weighting of the sample was not carried out are:  
 The chartering ratio of the firm is not well known prior to selection of the respondent,  
 The selection of large and medium size companies was based on a census so can be said to be 
reflective of the sample if similar response rates are achieved between the strata 
 There would be too many categories to weight the sample   
 The chartering ratio (interval variable) was arbitrarily reduced to nominal level variable i.e. into 
groups 
 Calculated Survey 
 Wetbulk Drybulk  Wetbulk 
(N=20) 
Drybulk 
(N=18) 
Voyage charter 90% 40% 40% 62% 
Time charter 10% 60% 60% 38% 
Table ‎9.1: Differences in the proportions of sectors on the charter market 
The results obtained from the calculation shown above, are very similar to those obtained by Pirrong 
(1993) and Stopford (2008). Pirrong’s (1993) analysis of bulk shipping markets and contracting 
practices suggests that voyage contracting is common in oil trades post 1973, whereas for more than 
half of the drybulk commodities long term contracting or vertical integration is used. Possible 
explanation for the differences between the calculated population and survey sample could mainly 
be due to the unit of analysis, where the calculated proportion is based on number of ships, whereas 
survey proportions are based on arbitrary grouping based on chartering ratio of the firm. Secondly, 
the difference may be because of the quality of data obtained from Clarkson’s SIN, which was shown 
to be under-representing smaller ships and some Asian market fixtures, but this could also be said 
for the survey respondents, so it is likely that this is not a cause of the difference. Thirdly, the time 
periods could to some extent explain the differences, the data for the calculation was derived for the 
year 2011, whereas the survey was conducted in 2012 and since the charter market is highly liquid, 
ships could be on time charter in one period and move to voyage charter in another. 
The proportion of the shipping population potentially affected by principal agent problems i.e. 
attribution to principal agent cases, shows that results are not different from that of IEA (2007) case 
studies looking at commercial office spaces variations across countries. In the Japanese commercial 
leases nearly 50% is identified as case four, and over 15% identified in cases one and two. In the 
Norwegian case study almost 90% of the population is attributed to cases two and four, with only 
10% of the population attributed to case one. Similarly Vernon and Meier (2012) show a very large 
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proportion of the population of the US trucking industry is affected by the usage problem (i.e. case 
four). These findings correspond to the results obtained in this research for the wetbulk sector. The 
Dutch case study of commercial office space (IEA 2007) is the most relevant to this research because 
it looks at what energy saving investment decisions can be made by the end user (including 
operational measures) in all four cases but with the caveat that it aggregates all four cases into just 
two cases, case one and case two (because they assume all energy costs are eventually passed on). 
The results show that a majority (60%) of the population falls under case one when this approach is 
used, similar to what was found in this research for the drybulk sector. This approach shows that, 
rather than just using contracts to identify and attribute principal agent problems, it is important to 
understand what energy efficiency decisions are being made by each party in the relationship, as 
advocated by Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) and further investigated by Maruejols and Young 
(2011). Therefore, for operational measures in the drybulk sector it can be said that a smaller 
proportion of the population is affected by the principal agent problem and in the wetbulk and 
container sector a high proportion of the population is affected by the principal agent problem, thus 
hypothesis three can be accepted for wetbulk sector and to some extent for the drybulk sector.  
Having identified the pervasiveness of the principal agent problem in the shipping sectors the next 
research question investigated how the principal agent affects the energy end-use through energy 
consumption and energy efficiency. The purpose of this was to identify if there is a difference 
between energy consumption and energy efficiency of ships that are attributed to the different 
cases in research question three and use this as a check for previous analysis and conclusions. 
Research question 4: How is the energy efficiency in operations affected by the principal agent 
problem? 
The hypothesis developed to address the research question was; 
Hypothesis 4: Operational energy efficiency of ships is better for time chartered ships compared to 
voyage chartered ships. 
This research question was answered through secondary desk research using technical details 
obtained from databases such as the Clarksons World Fleet Register (WFR) and operational 
efficiency (using satellite data) from a separate study (Smith et al. 2013). The question is mainly 
focussed around the operational energy efficiency of ships and how this compares for the voyage 
and time charter. The results of this analysis would be compared to the results from the survey on 
implementation of energy efficient operational measures implemented under the two types of 
charter. Unfortunately, the filtering of both fixtures to compare ships that have purely been on 
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voyage charter and purely been on time charter (including removing those ships that had been 
sublet on voyage charter) results in very few cases under the time charter, therefore the mean 
operational efficiency results do not produce statistically significant results. Comparing the 
operational efficiency averages of the voyage chartered panamax drybulk ships (649 cases) and time 
chartered panamax drybulk ships (which had fifteen cases, highest number of filtered cases) also did 
not produce statistically valid results. The operational efficiency means and ratio of operational 
speed to design speed were found to be identical for both the types of charter. Because of the low 
number of cases the results cannot be corroborated with the survey findings on the level of 
implementation of operational measures by the different chartering groups. It is acknowledged in 
literature (for example IEA (2007)) that finding the real energy efficiency or energy consumption for 
different cases in principal agent matrix is rarely straightforward and assuming that energy 
consumption or efficiency in the different cases can also be futile. In fact in some case studies, IEA 
(2007) make bold assumptions on the level of energy efficiency of cases, whereas in some, cases are 
assumed to have equal consumption and energy efficiency. Given the low sample size for time 
chartered ships hypothesis four cannot be accepted. It has to be assumed that the observed 
operational efficiency of ships is equal for voyage and time chartered ships, despite the survey 
results suggesting that operational efficiency may be different for both.  
Agency theory proposes two key problems that would affect the principal agent relationship, goal 
conflict and informational problems. It then attempts to create the most efficient contract given the 
aforementioned problems encountered in an agency relationship. The following research question 
attempts to identify manifestations or examples of the agency problems in shipping contracts and 
clauses which could be consequently affecting the implementation of energy efficient operational 
measures. Thus an understanding of how the agency problems are dealt with in shipping contracts 
could explain why certain operational measures are implemented or not implemented.  
Research question 5: How do the agency problems in contracts affect implementation of energy 
efficient operational measures? 
Hypothesis 5: Agency problems affect the implementation of energy efficient operational measures. 
To answer this research question the content analysis method was employed to analyse thirty 
voyage and time charterparties. Eisenhardt (1988 and 1989) framework and propositions are used to 
guide the initial category development with the categories further refined using ethnographic 
content analysis for the speed reduction measure in voyage and time charterparties. It was found 
that under common law and international treaties there were more obligations on shipowners in 
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voyage charter than any other party or any other charter. In the voyage charterparties, the goal 
conflict agency problem was manifested through use of utmost despatch clauses, notice of readiness 
places and times. These are clauses which would mostly impact the level of implementation of speed 
reduction measures.  
Utmost despatch was categorised in four different levels; i) most of the charterparties require 
owners to proceed at utmost despatch for the approach and discharge voyage, ii) some only in 
laden, iii) some with no express mention and iv) some allowed users to determine whether utmost 
despatch or economic despatch. The implication of this is that speed reduction measures became 
difficult to implement under various voyage charterparites. This supports the survey results that 
show that the use of utmost despatch clauses were the most important perceived barrier to speed 
reduction. There was also found to be a good relationship between use of utmost despatch clauses 
and sector charterparties (wetbulk, drybulk and general charterparties). All wetbulk charterparties 
made use of the first level of utmost despatch, whereas drybulk charterparties used second and 
fourth level and general form charterparties making no express mention of utmost despatch. This 
relationship can explain the the general survey results (uncontrolled for other variables) which 
showed that the wetbulk sector had the lowest implementation of speed reduction followed by 
drybulk and then container sector with the highest implementation. Comparing this with the 
perception of barriers it can be seen that a large number of respondents in the drybulk and wetbulk 
sectors had perceived standard charterparty clauses whereas many fewer respondents in the 
container sector thought this to be the case.  
There was a clear association between the charterparties of the different sectors and their use of 
Notice of Readiness (NOR) places (port or berth charters). Wetbulk charterparties generally were 
found to be port charters whereas most drybulk charterparties were observed to be berth 
charterparties in the standard form charterparties. The implication of this clause is which party 
would bear the risk of delays. In the end however both sector charterparties used further clauses to 
shift back the risk of delays to the principal i.e. charterer. The delays in the voyage are closely related 
to the port infrastructure and efficiency. The survey results on the ‘speed reduction due to port 
efficiency’ measure to some extent are supported with the above results. It was seen that the 
wetbulk sector had a slightly lower (although not statistically significantly and with a weak 
relationship) implementation of this measure compared to the drybulk sector, despite the measure 
being advocated by the wetbulk sector. This result contradicts the perception of the respondents 
where more drybulk sector respondents compared to wetbulk sector respondents (statistically 
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significantly and moderate relationship) perceived port infrastructure and efficiency to be an 
important barrier when considering the implementation of speed reduction. 
Another closely related clause to the implementation of speed reduction measures which relies on 
port infrastructure is the time at which NOR can be tendered. Again, there was a clear association in 
the charterparties in the use of all round NOR or specific timing NOR and the sector. Wetbulk 
charterparties had no specific times in which NOR had to be tendered whereas in contrast the 
majority of the drybulk and general charterparties had specific times in which shipowners had to 
tender NOR. This relationship could be explained by the differing port operation times. The 
implication of this is that the shipowners have more flexibility and can therefore possibly implement 
speed reduction as there isn’t a rigid time slot which must be adhered to. In the worst case scenario, 
a specific NOR could incentivise the shipowner to increase speed in order to arrive within the time 
window in order to tender a valid NOR and be classed as an ‘arrived ship’. This analysis would 
suggest that the wetbulk sector has more opportunities for implementation of speed reduction 
measure but this is in contrast with the results from the survey mentioned above on the 
implementation of speed reduction measure due to port efficiency.  
In time charterparties agency problems of goal conflict were manifested through use of utmost 
despatch clauses and informational problems manifested through monitoring clauses. The use of the 
utmost despatch clause again would mostly impact the level of implementation of speed reduction 
measures. There were other clauses that were examples of goal conflict such as those for drydocking 
and hull cleaning, but due to resource constraints and for comparison, only the clauses affecting 
speed reduction were analysed in detail.  
For operational measures in time charterparties the incentives of the principal and agent would be 
aligned to some extent, as discussed in research question three. The use of utmost despatch clauses 
in voyage charters was used as an example of goal conflict between principal and agent in the 
voyage contract. However, the results of the charterparty content analysis show that almost all time 
charterparties also had utmost despatch clauses. Possible reasons for this conflicting interest could 
be due to other stakeholders, such as engine manufacturers guarantees, final bill of ladings holders 
and sublet charterers. Despite these conflicts, it was concluded that the time charter presented 
more opportunities for speed reduction because of the charterer responsibility not only for fuel 
costs but also other sub charters or contracts. Connecting this analysis with earlier findings from 
research question three and research question one, which suggested that the respondents with the 
majority of their ships on time charter have higher implementation of operational measures and 
that operational measures in time charters would represent case one, i.e. no conflict of interest, 
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suggests that this is a valid conclusion at least for some operational measures (such as speed 
reduction). This statement would have benefited from the findings of research question four but no 
apparent differences in calculated operational energy efficiency between the types of charter were 
observed.  
Behaviour based contracts (i.e. time charterparties) require good information for selecting and 
monitoring the agent behaviour. It was found that in most standard time charterparties the major 
source of monitoring information (and the one that gets legal precedence) is the agent itself and 
only in a couple of charterparties use of independent information is used. Survey results show 
otherwise, i.e. implementation of weather routing services is higher for vessels chartered out mainly 
on time than on voyage charter. The opposing results from the methods are perhaps suggesting that 
in practice things are rather different to the results of the standard form charterparty content 
analysis, which does not reflect actual clauses used in a contract (probably due to amendments such 
as charterers rider clauses, deletion of some clauses etc.).It can be concluded from the above that 
the goal conflict agency problem is present in both voyage and time charterparties but more 
pervasive in voyage charters than in time charter, therefore the implementation of speed reduction 
is affected more in the voyage charter than in time charter. The need for information for monitoring 
the agent in the time charter could be said to result in higher implementation of weather routing 
measures in time charters. Agency problems can be said to be negatively related to the 
implementation of speed reduction measures and positively related to the implementation of the 
weather routing measure. The hypothesis that agency problems affect the implementation of energy 
efficiency operational measures can therefore be accepted for the aforementioned two measures.  
9.3. Concluding remarks 
Improved energy efficiency has a key role as one of the strategies to address the challenges of 
climate change. For policy makers the focus on energy efficiency is expected given that many energy 
efficiency improvements have been shown to be cost-effective and can be made using existing 
technologies and practices across many sectors as evidenced by the cross sector empirical studies 
and MACC’s that are increasingly used to inform policy discussions. Knowing that there exists an 
energy efficiency gap is renewing the interest from key policy stakeholders on the barriers that may 
be inhibiting uptake of energy efficiency measures. This is particularly relevant to the shipping 
sector, where numerous studies have shown significant abatement potential at negative costs. To 
that end, the IMO at an international level, the EU commission and the UK government at the 
regional level have commissioned various studies on barriers to energy efficiency in shipping. The 
reasons for the interest in barriers to energy efficiency are twofold; it enables policy makers to 
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develop policies which would overcome such barriers, since the existence of market failures is a 
prerequisite for market intervention and secondly barriers may directly be affecting another policy’s 
effectiveness. 
The aim of this research was to understand the energy efficiency gap in shipping by examining the 
level of implementation of energy efficient operational measures and the barriers that may be 
affecting implementation of such measures. The research aimed to investigate the barriers to energy 
efficient operations by combining the perception of barriers and the observed level of barriers to 
energy efficient operations using a mixed methods approach. Previous to this research there were 
no baselines on the level of implementation of energy efficient operational measures and relatively 
little research had used agency theory to examine the principal agent problems and other barriers to 
energy efficient operations in shipping.   
9.3.1. Relevance of market barriers and failures 
In the shipping industry in recent years, there has been considerable debate on whether there are 
barriers that are causing the sub-optimal levels of uptake of energy efficiency measures, which result 
in an energy efficiency gap. The evolution of the literature on barriers in other sectors, dating from 
the early 1980’s to date has suggested that the energy efficiency gap exists and it can be explained 
by market failures and non-market failures. Empirical analysis based on a variety of methods on this 
subject has confirmed this hypothesis, to such an extent that this discussion is now being referred to 
as barriers theory.  
This research uses one of the building blocks of the general barriers theory, the economic agency 
theory, to investigate the barriers to energy efficiency in an in-depth and testable manner. In the 
context of barriers to energy efficiency, market failures such as the split incentives, informational 
problems, etc. can be explained by the economic agency theory. Yet, the literature review showed 
that the theory has been relatively little used in the empirical examination of barriers to energy 
efficiency in general and in shipping, and only a few studies have applied the tenets of the theory to 
estimate the different patterns of energy end use.  
Barriers to energy efficiency have been well discussed and matured in some sectors such as buildings 
(residential and commercial) and to some extent in the transport sector. The use of agency theory in 
the aforementioned sectors has only been applied to estimate how energy end use is affected by the 
agency problem of split incentives. Given the extensive evidence for an efficiency gap that is 
presented for other sectors of the economy, it is plausible that the energy efficiency gap exists for 
shipping. The review of barriers literature in shipping showed that to date there has been very 
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limited methodologically rigorous analysis of the barriers which may be resulting in an energy 
efficiency gap in shipping. To that end this research used the agency theory to investigate the energy 
efficiency gap for the shipping sector. 
9.3.2. Theoretical framework and method 
The application of agency theory in explaining barriers to energy efficiency in other sectors has been 
investigated mainly for technical measures and using secondary data to estimate the impact of the 
principal agent problem. In shipping however, there exist many opportunities for firms to improve 
energy efficiency through operational measures that are cost-effective under current circumstances. 
The novelty of this research is not only that it applies the agency theory for operational measures 
but also uses three methods (primary and secondary) to collect data and triangulate between the 
findings of each of the methods. The survey method is used to understand and create a baseline for 
the level of implementation of operational measures and how the implementation varies among 
different cases of the principal agent problem, as well as understanding the perception of barriers. 
The survey results are compared with observations of the principal agent problem for which data is 
derived from content analysis of charterparties (carriage of goods contracts between principal and 
agent) and matching operational efficiency data with fixtures.  
Agency theory is believed to be the most relevant theory to use in this research because it can be 
used to explain a large part of the economic barriers (Figure ‎1.5) especially that relating to market 
failures. There are also other economic theories that could be used to examine the barriers in 
shipping. For example, information economics could also be used to investigate market failures 
especially that relating to moral hazard and adverse selection. The transaction cost theory could be 
relevant for investigating market barriers (non-market failures) e.g. cost of capital and hidden costs. 
Behavioural economics theories (e.g. social capital, diffusions of innovations) could be used to 
investigate behavioural and social barriers.  However, the aforementioned theories are focussed on 
a subset of barriers and although they may provide depth to the investigation, they may not provide 
a fuller picture as offered by agency theory on the diverse range of barriers. This is because the 
agency relationship is applicable in a variety of settings ranging from policy and organisational to an 
individual level, which makes the theory highly applicable to socio-economic settings. Moreover, 
agency theory is a solution oriented theory as it attempts to suggest the best contract that reduces 
agency problems. Because of the broad applicability, applying the theory to examine barriers to 
energy efficiency in the context of shipping would result in a better explanation of the rationale of 
the principals and agents in implementation of operational measures. With regards to its solution 
orientation, it enables focussed analysis of the existing contracts in shipping with a view to identify 
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instances of agency problems that are found in the contracts, which are thought to be directly 
affecting implementation of energy efficient operational measures. The theory has been mainly 
applied in organisational research and majority of the research using a variety of empirical methods 
supports the theory, which makes it testable and empirically valid. Several attempts have been made 
to create even more testable propositions from the theory (e.g. Eisenhardt 1989; Sharma 1997; 
Wright et al. 2001; etc.) and some of these have been used in this research to evaluate shipping 
contracts.  
As with any theory, agency theory has its proponents and critics. The chief criticism of the theory is 
that the theory is not capable of adequately portraying a real world situation. This is to some extent 
a valid criticism, as seen in chapter five, the one principal and one agent relationship is far from 
being representative of the shipping industry. Thus, every effort was made to reflect a variety of 
settings in shipping at a high level but at the micro level analysis always being at the singular level. 
This research also countered this criticism by using a mixed methods approach to test and validate 
the propositions made in chapter five. In conclusion, transferring the agency theory from its 
organisational research origins to new dimensions, in conjunction with the mixed methods used 
within this research can be deemed suitable for empirically investigating barriers to energy 
efficiency. This research also shows that combining the positivist type and principal agent type 
research yields a better understanding of the situation, as opposed to the existing dichotomy in 
research or application of agency theory. 
9.3.3. Appropriateness of methods 
Research into barriers to energy efficiency is difficult because they are intangible, though real, and 
because it is empirically challenging to find the true reason for lack of implementation. Several 
attempts have been made to empirically examine the phenomenon but only a few rigorous studies 
were identified. In light of this shortcoming, this research developed a unique approach of 
combining methods, in order to triangulate and overcome the shortcomings, validity and reliability 
of using only one method, for the diverse and multifaceted barriers to energy efficiency. The 
research attempts to identify the observed level of principal agent problems in shipping through two 
strands of research;  
1) Secondary desk research, using a set principal agent methodology and actual ship operational 
data  
2) Primary research through content analysis of shipping contracts (charterparties).  
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The findings of the observed level of the principal agent problems using the above research 
techniques are corroborated with primary research from a survey of shipping firms which attempts 
to gauge the perception of barriers to energy efficiency as well as to provide additional indication for 
the principal agent problems. The survey at a general level received enough responses to make 
broader generalisations about the sector, therefore had good external validity but when the 
population is stratified by size and sector, insufficient responses were achieved in each strata and 
therefore inferences to the population or specific groups cannot be made, especially in the bivariate 
elaboration analysis. The number of responses should be viewed in light of the industry specific 
context, where many similar studies have failed to reach such a high number of responses in 
methodologically rigorous manner as evidenced in chapter two. The survey method’s internal 
validity relied on accurately measuring the principal agent concept. The chartering ratios of firms, 
which were then subsequently categorized and were suitable indicators used to measure the 
principal agent problem, as tested in the piloting stage (explained in section ‎4.1.5.2). For the content 
analysis method, the ethnographic technique proved valuable for creating the theory derived 
categories for the key agency propositions and operational measures. Despite the scarce literature 
on the application of content analysis method for contract analysis, the method guided by agency 
theory propositions led to insightful findings of the shipping contracts, which also explained some of 
the findings of the survey method.  
9.3.4. Key findings 
Following the literature based principal agent methodology, in the first instance it was concluded 
that the voyage charter could represent the principal agent usage problem i.e. end user is neither 
able to select the energy-using technology or make the energy efficiency investment nor pays the 
energy cost. The time charter could represent the principal agent efficiency problem i.e. end user 
cannot choose the energy using technology or make an energy efficiency investment, instead the 
agent selects the energy-using technology and makes the energy efficiency investment, but the end 
user pays for the energy use. Using fixtures data from Clarksons Shipping Information Network (SIN) 
and making assumptions on operational parameters e.g. average speed, average haul, based on 
literature e.g. Buhaug et al. (2009) and Stopford (2008), it was estimated that a large proportion of 
the wetbulk sector fleet and around 40% of the drybulk sector fleet were on voyage charters. A small 
proportion of the wetbulk sector fleet and 60% of the drybulk sector fleet was on time charter. The 
finding from this secondary data implies that for technical measures the drybulk sector fleet would 
be more prone to the efficiency principal agent problem compared to the wetbulk sector fleet, 
whereas the wetbulk sector fleet would be more prone to the principal agent usage problem. For 
operational measures, 60% of the drybulk sector fleet on time charter compared to the small 
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proportion of the wetbulk sector fleet that was on time charter implies that the drybulk sector is less 
exposed to principal agent problems when implementing operational measures, because the entity 
that specifies the operation of the ship also pays for the fuel.  
 Voyage charter Time charter 
Technical 
measures 
A) Case 4 usage problem 
Wetbulk ≈90% of fleet affected 
Drybulk ≈40% of fleet affected 
B) Case 2 efficiency problem 
Wetbulk ≈10% of fleet affected 
Drybulk ≈60% of fleet affected  
Operational 
measures 
C) Case 4 usage problem  
Wetbulk ≈90% or less of fleet affected 
Drybulk ≈40% of fleet affected 
D) Case 1 no PA problem 
Wetbulk ≈10% 
Drybulk ≈60% 
 
Table ‎9.2: Population that could be potentially affected by principal agent problems 
The secondary analysis also attempted to investigate the differences in operational efficiency of 
ships on voyage charter versus ships on time charter. This analysis used estimates of operational 
data for ships (obtained from Smith et al. 2013 using Satellite Automated Identification System, S-
AIS) and split the data between ships operating on voyage and time charters (fixtures data from 
Clarksons SIN). The number of ships on time charter along with their operational efficiency had a 
very small sample compared to voyage chartered ships, therefore any meaningful comparison of the 
operational efficiencies between the two was difficult, thus the full extent of observation of barriers 
has not been possible. It is hoped that over a longer period of data collection, statistical significance 
could be achieved. 
The findings from the analysis above corroborated the survey results which showed that on average 
more operational measures were being implemented by firms in the drybulk sector than in the 
wetbulk sector. This was also the case when looking at each measure individually i.e. weather 
routing, fuel consumption monitoring and general speed reduction. For all the aforementioned 
measures the implementation of operational measures is also considerably lower by firms in the 
wetbulk sectors which have a majority of their fleet on voyage charter, supporting the above 
conclusion. This is also the case for general speed reduction, despite some wetbulk charterparties 
allowing for implementation as shown in the charterparty analysis, suggesting that the opportunity 
to implement speed reduction is not taken up. The reasons for the lack of take-up of this operational 
measure are explained in detail in section  6.4.4.1. This observation is also emphasised by the 
respondents’ perceptions in those sectors, more drybulk sector respondents thought they could 
achieve speed reduction in the voyage charter than wetbulk sector respondents. However, in 
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contrast, throughout the survey the split incentive indicators were perceived to be less important 
barriers by more wetbulk respondents under voyage charter than drybulk respondents. Therefore, 
for the measures and population investigated the observed level of principal agent problem can be 
said to be not completely matching with the perception of principal agent problems.  
The final piece of the jigsaw to triangulate with was the charterparty content analysis. The principal 
agent usage problem (end user is neither able to select the energy-using technology or make the 
energy efficiency investment nor pays the energy cost) in the voyage charter is confirmed with the 
wide use of the utmost despatch clause in the voyage charter. For example most drybulk sector 
voyage charterparties were found to contain the utmost despatch clause, which could be due to the 
inability to negotiate speed and freight rate based on speed, thus the principal i.e. the charterer is 
neither able to implement the measure nor sees the direct costs/savings related to that measure. 
The voyage charterparties also contained several other clauses such as the notice of readiness (NOR) 
time and place clauses, linked to agency theory propositions of risk and outcome certainty, which 
were thought to affect the implementation of speed reduction measures. 
It was clear from the survey results that market failures were perceived to be more important 
barriers to operational energy efficiency measures compared to non-market failures. Although non-
market failures could be more impeding for technical measures, but this is beyond the scope of this 
research. Based on the above analysis, (informed by the chartering ratio, on perception and 
charterparty analysis) the principal agent problem in shipping sector is a plausible explanation for 
some of the energy efficiency gap in implementation of operational measures in the charter market. 
The full extent of the principal agent problem in shipping could not be verified because of the 
limitations of the operational data estimates but this research has shown that the problem exists in 
operations, is significant and it affects the wetbulk sector fleet more than the drybulk sector fleet in 
the charter market. Other plausible reasons for the lack of implementation of operational measures 
could be attributed to non-market failures (market barriers) such as lack of finance, this seems to be 
an industry wide perception even though most of the operational measures would require relatively 
lower capital investment compared to technical measures. In the present market shipowner-
operators may be finding it difficult to make investments off the balance sheet and traditional forms 
of finance such as bank loans are difficult to obtain. Although the survey indicated that lack of 
finance may not be a barrier for operational measures, it is possible that access to finance may be an 
issue, but to what extent it affects each of the sectors and size of the firms, is yet to be investigated. 
Another plausible explanation for the lack of uptake of measures could be a combination of 
organisational barriers such as culture combined with another non-market failure, risk. The shipping 
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industry has been described as a more risk averse industry compared to other transport industries, 
where the investment in energy efficiency is determined by the trade-off between higher 
operational costs of an inefficient ship versus higher risk premiums by investors for an efficient ship, 
and given the culture and norms of the majority of the industry the most fuel efficient may not 
always be the best outcome.   
9.3.5. Recommendations 
This research mainly explored the issue of split responsibility for capital and operational costs 
between entities in the shipping industry. Key recommendations from this research can be divided 
into three; recommendations to academia, industry and policy.  
Key recommendations to academic researchers researching the subject of barriers to energy 
efficiency in shipping and other sectors are: 
 In order to investigate barriers to energy efficiency, it is suggested that a suitable existing and 
testable theory is used. This has the benefit that it provides the emerging barriers research 
credibility and firmly grounds it on a specific discipline e.g. economic, psychological. This 
necessitates focus and depth to cover some of the barriers in detail rather than attempting to 
discuss the breadth of all the barriers to energy efficiency.  
 The subject of barriers to energy efficiency is relatively new but complex and therefore requires 
more than one method for the research to be valid. This research showed that the use of mixed 
methods i.e. combining quantitative and qualitative, as well as methodological and data 
triangulation yields a better insight on the subject of barriers to energy efficiency. However, the 
mixing of methods requires careful consideration in terms of research design and its connection 
with the use of the underlying theory.  
 Literature on barriers to energy efficiency has predominantly focussed on measuring 
perceptions of barriers to energy efficiency in different sectors. This research has shown that it is 
equally important to compare the perceptions with the observations of barriers to energy 
efficiency. This can be done through the framework that has been developed in this research 
which provides a step by step approach to combining the barriers investigation with different 
methods and theories to compare perceived and observed barriers to energy efficiency, which 
can be applied to newer contexts such as other transport sectors e.g. aviation. 
 This research used a mixed methods strategy and one specific theory to investigate the barriers 
to energy efficiency. The challenge was to translate the organisational research based agency 
theory to investigate energy efficiency in operations, thus expanding the theory to richer 
contexts in accordance with Eisenhardt (1989) recommendations. Typically agency theory 
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empirical research, even when based on organisational research, has used mono-methods, so 
one could say that the deployment of mixed methods in the order used in this research has 
helped to deepen the positivist type agency theory research. As an example, the broader or 
higher level contractual dichotomy was enough in devising the survey but the agency theory 
propositions stemming from principal agent type research were required in constructing the 
categories of the content analysis method. This suggests that for exploring new applications or 
contexts of agency theory and its offerings, it is helpful to use both positivist and principal agent 
type research and combine these with a variety of research methods.  
This research investigated barriers to energy efficient operations through methods which made the 
research well connected to the shipping industry and as such the problems faced in the industry 
were better understood. Table ‎5.15 briefly described key problems that were observed in the 
shipping industry and which were mainly affecting implementation of operational measures. The 
recommendations for the industry to overcome some of the problems that are relevant to this 
research are: 
 Both voyage and time charterparties need to be reviewed from an energy saving point of view 
and be able to align the incentives of the shipowners and charterers for implementing 
operational measures. The Virtual Arrival clause is just one example of how incentives for 
implementing weather routing and speed reduction measures have been aligned for the 
shipowner and charterer. There is potential to improve the operational efficiency by redrafting 
the clauses that tackle the split incentives in the maintenance of ships which directly affect 
operational efficiency, for example hull cleaning routines, hull coatings, propeller polishing, dry-
docking etc.  
 Information systems for verification are pivotal, especially to time charter contracts. Currently 
the majority of shipping companies rely on manual data transfer between ship and shore. 
Investment by shipping companies into more reliable forms of data capture related to fuel 
consumption can provide better transparency of the vessels overall fuel consumption as well as 
to ascertain the impact of individual measures on fuel consumption. Equipped with this 
information the shipping company can be in a better position to negotiate and possibly obtain a 
higher premium on the time charter rates and make a return on energy efficiency investment.  
 Innovative financing models that require zero capital expenditure from the shipowner and 
charterer are needed to overcome split incentives that arise as result of contractual 
arrangements and duration which affect the implementation of some operational energy 
efficiency measures requiring larger initial outlay. The need for this innovative thinking would 
become more clear as implementation moves from well-known operational measures or ‘low 
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hanging fruits’ to more technical retrofit measures to improve energy efficiency and measures 
requiring greater collaboration between the stakeholders.  
Understanding of barriers to energy efficiency can help policy in either addressing the barrier 
directly or overcoming the barrier to improve the effectiveness of other policies. Recommendations 
for policy to address the split responsibility and operational efficiency are: 
 The principal agent problem in operations has largely been overlooked by regulators. The EEDI 
as a minimum efficiency standard attempts to improve technical efficiency of ships at the design 
stage and to some extent reduce the principal agent problem that exists at design. The ship 
energy efficiency management plan (SEEMP) as a mandatory requirement may prompt the 
shipowners and charterers to think about energy efficiency in operations but because it does not 
mandate the implementation of operational measures, ships in-use efficiency and emissions 
remain uncontrolled and have been shown in this research to be susceptible to principal agent 
problems. A possible instrument through which both design and operational efficiency can be 
improved is through market based measures but careful consideration needs to be given to the 
correct level of incentivisation of the right stakeholders to be effective given the industry’s 
contractual and institutional modus operandi.  
 One of the key corrective policies for market failures such as the principal agent problems, is to 
improve access to information on energy efficiency. Various sectors make use of the minimum 
efficiency standards to drive energy efficiency and also make the information publically 
available, for end users to factor into their purchasing decisions (e.g. A-G ratings on fridges, fuel 
consumption on cars). In shipping, not only is this a problem for technical efficiency, due to lack 
of publically available verified EEDI scores for example, but for operational efficiency there exists 
no platform over which ship’s operational efficiency can be benchmarked or compared. In the 
private domain, if a shipowner is better able to portray the energy efficiency of a ship, then 
there is a greater chance that energy efficiency is rewarded through higher charter rates. 
Similarly, if the charterer understands the operational energy efficiency of the ship that is on a 
voyage charter, then there can be better negotiation on implementation of operational 
measures such as speed reduction, which could consequently affect the freight rate. If 
operational efficiency is rewarded than it could spur investment into the various operational 
measures available, this would be possible if information on the savings achieved from various 
interventions was verified and transparent, possibly from classification societies and 
government demonstrations, making the information more accessible and reliable.   
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9.3.6. Future work 
The survey that has been conducted to understand the level of implementation and behaviour 
around operational measures could be extended to include technical measures (newbuilds and 
retrofits measures) to understand the full extent of the principal agent problem in shipping. 
Examples of these would be an investigation of maintenance related measures e.g. hull cleaning, 
propeller polishing, hull coatings etc, which are also believed to be affected by principal agent 
problems.  
The findings from the survey show that the size of the firm is also an important factor to understand 
when investigating the implementation of measures. Agency theory does not focus on this and 
therefore it could be examined further using other theories such as organisational theory and theory 
on diffusion of innovations. Moreover, the survey did not include very small firms with less than five 
ships, numbering around 6000, due to the time and resources required to construct a reliable and 
accurate sampling frame. Thus future research could focus on this group which may have a different 
level of implementation and perception of barriers to energy efficiency. The data obtained through 
the online questionnaire method contains rich descriptions from respondents on why certain 
measures are being implemented and explanations of driving forces as well as why certain measures 
are not being implemented. This data could be further analysed using different methods e.g. content 
analysis.  
Two important questions from this research could have been better answered with the use of more 
data that would result in improved statistical significance. The comparative analysis of operational 
efficiency of ships on the different time charters could be extended to cover a longer period, which 
would result in more ships on time charter. Secondly, the response rates of the survey could be 
improved for each stratum within the sampling frame, in order to allow for further layers of test 
variables to be introduced in the bivariate analysis without affecting the statistical significance of the 
relationships.  
The shipping sector is increasingly finding itself in the midst of a plethora of global and regional 
environmental regulations, ranging from regional MRV to global GHG levy and from global SOx and 
NOx limits to ballast water regulations. It is clear from this that it is only set to intensify in the future 
and therefore the fundamental question of which stakeholders to incentivise and target with such 
policies remains pivotal to the discussion. This research has shown the importance of understanding 
the incentives of two key shipping stakeholders in the context of energy efficiency, which can affect 
shipping’s transition towards a more resilient, low carbon and sustainable industry.  
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Appendix A – Methods 
Research strategy 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Role of theory in relation to 
research 
Deductive, theory testing Inductive, theory construction 
Epistemological orientation 
(what should be regarded as 
acceptable knowledge) 
Positivism (advocates methods 
of the natural sciences to the 
study of social reality) 
Interpretivism (constrasting 
positivism views, people and 
their institutions are different) 
Ontological orientation 
(concerned with the nature 
of social entities) 
Objectivism (ontological 
position that social phenomena 
and their meaning have an 
existence that is independent 
of social actors) 
Constructionism (ontological 
position that asserts that social 
phenomena and their meaning 
are continually being 
accomplished by social actors) 
Table A1: Difference between quantitative and qualitative research strategy 
Source: Bryman (2008) 
 
 
 
 Quantitative Qualitative Mixed methods 
Strengths  Can generalize results 
if correct sampling is 
followed 
 Allows to more 
credibly assess cause 
and effect 
relationships 
 Relatively quicker to 
obtain and analyse 
data compared to 
qualitative 
 Useful for studying 
large populations 
 Can understand a 
limited number of 
cases or phenomena 
in depth 
 Data is generally 
collected in more 
naturalistic contexts 
 Can shift focus of the 
research as more 
inductive 
 
 Can use strengths of 
additional methods to 
counter weaknesses 
of other methods 
 Can provide stronger 
evidence for a 
conclusion through 
corroborated findings 
 Can add 
complementary views 
to each methods 
findings 
 Can increase 
generalizability of 
results 
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Weaknesses  Difficult to create 
indicators for what is 
being measured 
 More prone to 
confirmation bias 
 Generally results in 
abstract knowledge to 
specific situations 
 Knowledge 
produced may not 
be generalizable  
 More difficult to test 
the hypothesis 
 Takes relatively 
longer to collect and 
analyse data 
compared to 
quantitative 
 Results can have 
researcher bias 
 Difficult for a single 
researcher to conduct, 
unless phased 
approach is used. 
 Mixing methods 
requires additional 
training 
 More time consuming 
than just a single 
method 
Table A2: Advantages and disadvantages of qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods strategy 
Source: Mostly from Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004) and Creswel (2009) 
Mixed methods strategy 
Strength Explanation 
Completeness Refers to the notion that the researcher can bring together a more 
comprehensive account of the area of enquiry in which he or she is 
interested if both quantitative and qualitative research are employed. 
Different research 
questions 
This is the argument that quantitative and qualitative research can each 
answer different research questions. 
Explanation One method is used to help explain findings generated by the other method. 
Context Refers to cases in which the combination is rationalized in terms of 
qualitative research providing contextual understanding coupled with either 
generalizable, externally valid findings or broad relationships among 
variables uncovered through a survey. 
Illustration Refers to the use of qualitative data to illustrate quantitative findings, often 
referred to as putting ‘meat on the bones’ of ‘dry’ quantitative findings. 
Confirm and 
discover 
This entails using qualitative data to generate hypotheses and using 
quantitative research to test them within a single project. 
Enhancement Augmenting either quantitative or qualitative findings by gathering data 
using a qualitative or quantitative research approach. 
Table A3: Strengths of mixed methods 
Source: Bryman (2006) 
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Typological questions  This research 
1) Are the quantitative and qualitative data collected 
simultaneously or sequentially? (Morgan 1998; 
Morse 1991). 
Quantitative data is collected first, 
followed by qualitative data collection 
2) Which has priority – the quantitative or the 
qualitative data? (Morgan 1998; Morse 1991). 
Quantitative data has priority over 
qualitative data (Following Creswell (2009) 
sequential explanatory design) 
3) What is the function of the integration – for 
example, triangulation, explanation, or 
exploration? (Creswell 2002); Greene, Caracelli & 
Graham 1989). 
Function of integration is: completeness, 
explanation, different research questions, 
illustration, confirming and discovering 
and enhancement. 
4) At what stage(s) in the research process does 
mixed methods research occur? (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie 1998). It may be at stages of research 
question formulation, data collection, data 
analysis, or data interpretation. 
Mixed methods research occurs after 
research questions have been formulated 
and follow through from data collection to 
interpretation.  
5) Is there more than one data strand? (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie (eds.) 2003). With a multi-strand study, 
there is more than one research method and 
hence source of data.  
There are different data strands/sources 
as a result of different methods. 
Table A4: Typological questions in mixed methods research 
Source: adapted from Bryman (2008) 
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Research designs 
Table A5: Main types of research design 
Research 
Design 
Description 
Longitudinal 
(Panel & 
Cohort) 
The collection of data is more than once. There are two types of longitudinal 
design; panel and cohort. Panel studies survey a random sample at one point in 
time and then survey the exact same respondents a later point in time. Cohort 
study surveys a sample of respondents selected based on a specific criteria and 
then surveys based on the same criteria (Bryman 2008) 
Cross-sectional Collection of data from more than one case at single point in time i.e. a 
snapshot of all the variables to detect patterns of association. Examples of this 
are generally found in research employing surveys. 
Case study The collection of data from one or more groups at a time.  “Entails studying two 
contrasting cases using more or less identical methods” (Bryman 2008, p.58). It 
involves investigation of a phenomenon within its real life context using 
multiple sources of evidence (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007). 
Experimental Collection of data is based on a control group which is exposed to a treatment 
and another control group which is not (Bryman 2008). Examples of these are 
generally found in clinical or laboratory experiments.  
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 Longitudinal Experimental Cross-sectional Case study 
Strengths 
 
 Can examine changes in 
variable of interest over 
time 
 Data on many variables 
from a large number of 
sample 
 Generates hypotheses for 
future research 
 External validity is strong 
with use of random 
sampling 
 
 Can draw valid conclusions 
about causality  
 Maximises internal validity  
 Results are more 
generalizable 
 Used as a gold standard or 
yardstick against all non-
experimental designs 
 Highly replicable 
 Conducted when there are 
constraints of time or 
resources (Collis & Hussey, 
2003) 
 Are generally inexpensive 
(Collis & Hussey, 2003) 
 Brings stability to the 
research (Barrington, 2012)  
 Data on many variables from 
large number of sample 
 Generates hypotheses for 
future research 
 External validity is strong with 
use of random sampling 
 Provides in depth data in a 
specific context 
 Attempts to investigate the 
real life context of a 
phenomenon 
 Advocates use of multiple 
sources of evidence for 
validity.  
 Useful for exploratory and 
explanatory questions 
 Multiple case strategy 
enable some generalization 
Weaknesses  Requires relatively more 
resources (Time and cost) 
 Respondents may drop out 
from panel studies 
 Eco-logical validity may be 
jeopardised (Bryman, 2008) 
 May not represent the real 
context or environment 
which is a threat to external 
validity 
 Difficult to control for variety 
of variables 
 Eco-logical validity may be 
jeopardised (Bryman, 2008) 
due to the instruments used 
 No control of independent 
variable 
 Increased chances of error as 
 Single case strategy may not 
be representative, making 
generalization difficult. 
 External validity is generally 
weak 
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due to the instruments used 
 No control of independent 
variable 
 Increased chances of error 
as internal validity is 
typically weak 
 
 
 
 
 Can result in ‘Hawthorne 
effect’ (subject bias) if not 
conducted properly.  
 Does not lend itself to some 
types of research, i.e. 
requires good control over a 
subject or manipulation 
 Not feasible for many 
business and management 
and social research questions 
internal validity is typically 
weak 
Table A6: Strengths and weaknesses of research designs 
Source: Bryman (2008), Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2007), Hussey & Hussey (1997)
347 
 
 
Research methods 
Interviews 
Interviews are a systematic way of talking and listening to people in order to collect data as well as 
to gain knowledge from individuals. Gray (2004) gives the following as reasons to conduct an 
interview over other research methods: there is a need to attain highly personalized data, there are 
opportunities required for probing, a good return rate is important, respondents are not fluent in 
the native language of the country, or where they have difficulties with written language.   
Quantitative interview or structured interviews use questionnaires (administred by an interviewer) 
based on a predetermined and standerdised or identical set of questions (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill 2007), in order to maximise reliability and validity of measurement of key concepts 
(Bryman 2008). Corbetta (2003) adds that the questions are also in the same sequence. The 
questions are directly drawn from research questions or used to answer research questions 
(Bryman, 2008). Structured interviews involves the use of closed, closed ended, pre coded or fixed 
choice of questions but can inlcude some open ended questions (Bryman 2008).  
Qualitative interviews or semi structured interviews refer to a context in which the interviewer has a 
series of questions that are in a form of an interview schedule but the interviewer is able to vary the 
sequence of questions (Bryman, 2008). Unstructured interviews are based on topics or issues called 
an interview guide (Bryman, 2008). There is emphasis on greater generality in order to formulate 
initial research ideas and there is much greater interest of respondents point of view (Bryman, 
2008). They often inlvolve use of open ended questions, that can be later coded.  
Content analysis  
Quantitative content analysis (NCA) is an approach to the analysis of documents that seeks to 
quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner 
(Bryman 2008). Research questions guide the selection of content to be analysed and the coding 
schedule (Bryman 2008). Quantitative content analysis can be applied mainly to cross-sectional 
designs but may also be useful in longitudinal and comparative designs (Nuendorf 2002).  
Qualitative content (LCA) analysis is comprised of searching underlying themes in the materials being 
analysed, illustrated with examples and quotations (Bryman 2008). Qualitative content analysis aims 
to be systematic and analytic but not rigid (Altheide 1996). Categories and variables initially guide 
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the study, but others are allowed and expected to emerge during the study as the researcher is in a 
state of constant discovery, comparison of situations, settings, styles etc (Altheide 1996).  
Focus groups 
The focus group method is a form of group interview in which there are several participants 
(including a moderator) and questioning is on a particular fairly tightly defined topic (Bryman 2008). 
The emphasis is on interaction within the group and joint construction of meaning (Bryman 2008). It 
has also been called the focussed interview, in which interviewees are selected because they are 
known to have been involved in a particular situation (Bryman 2008) therefore the ‘information rich’ 
(Krueger & Casey 2000; cited by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007) participants are usually chosen 
on a non-probability sampling method (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007). Focus groups may be 
conducted several times with similar participants to enable trends and patterns to be identified 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007). This research method is primarily used for collection of 
qualitative data, however it can produce quantitative data (Stewart & Shamdasani 1990) 
Observation  
Structured observation entails the direct observation of behaviour and the recording of that 
behaviour in terms of categories that have been devised prior to the start of data collection 
(observation schedule) (Bryman 2008). It aims to ensure systematic recording of behaviour in order 
to aggregate the behaviour of all those in the sample and the resulting data resembles of that 
obtained from a questionnaire and is underpinned by a cross-sectional design generally (Bryman 
2008). There is a continuous degree of involvement by the observer, from complete observers 
(detached) to complete participants (involved) (Gold 1958; cited by Bryman 2008). Structured 
observation tends to fall in the detached category, whereas ethnographic observation falls in the 
involved category (Gold 1958; cited by Bryman 2008). 
Ethnographic observation is the involvement of the researcher in the social life of those he or she 
studies, observing behaviour, listening and asking questions. This method typically involves gaining 
further data through interviews and content analysis or collection of documents (Bryman 2008).  
Much of the sampling in this method is based on a combination of convenience sampling and 
snowball sampling (Bryman 2008) 
Self-completion questionnaire 
Self-completion questionnaires include all modes (postal/mail, web/internet, mixed modes, etc) of 
data collection in which each person is asked to respond to the same set of questions (usually 
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closed) in a pre-determined order (de Vaus 2002) by themselves (Bryman 2008). This method of data 
collection is by far the most used research method under the cross-sectional research design 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007). Self-completion questionnaires tend to have closed questions, 
easy to follow designs and are shorter in contrast to other research methods such as structured 
interviews etc. Self-completion questionnaires can be used for descriptive or explanatory research 
and are used to answer pre-formulated research questions (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007) and 
therefore conform to the deductive theory testing research, which generally implies a quantitative 
strategy.  
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 Interviews 
(Structured and 
unstructured) 
Content analysis 
(Quantitative and 
qualitative) 
Focus groups Structured Observation 
and ethnographic 
observation 
Self-administered 
Questionnaire 
Strengths  Structured interviews 
maximise reliabilty and 
validity of 
measurement of key 
concepts 
 Provides much more 
detailed information 
than what is available 
through other data 
collection methods 
 Results in generally 
good response rates 
 Allows for probing and 
prompting for other 
peripheral issues 
 Requires relatively 
more training 
compared to other 
methods 
 Coding scheme  
makes the research 
method transparent 
and replicable 
 Longitudinal analysis 
can be performed 
with ease 
 Unobtrusive  and 
non-reactive 
 Widely applicable to 
unstructured 
information 
 Allows convenient 
access to data that is 
difficult to gain from 
other methods 
 Represents data 
which is thoughtful  
 Emphasize a specific 
theme or topic of 
relevance to the 
participants 
 Saves time and 
money compared to 
interviews 
 Emphasises the social 
context, participant 
as member of the 
group and participant 
ownership 
 Results in more 
realistic accounts 
compared to the 
interview due to 
group settings and 
less artificial settings 
 There is generally 
no problem of 
access 
 Unobtrusive way of 
analysing a real life 
situation 
 No problem of 
reactivity 
 Useful in 
investigating issues 
that may be 
uncomfortable for 
participants to 
discuss 
 Stronger external 
validity 
 Cheaper and quicker 
to implement and 
administer 
 Absence of social 
desirability bias 
 No interviewer 
variability 
 Provides 
convenience to 
respondents 
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Weaknesses  Structured interview is 
less flexible and highly 
standerdised 
 Resource constraints 
(time, money & 
people) 
 Interviewees 
behaviour, attitudes, 
norms, beleifs and 
values can result in 
errors and raise 
concerns  
 Susceptible to social 
desirablity bias and 
acquiescence 
(acceptance) 
 Weak external validity 
due to small sample 
sizes and non random 
sample of in-depth 
interviews 
 Highly dependent on 
documented data, 
therefore can only get 
as good as the 
document 
 Coding manuals 
require coder 
interpretation  
 Some difficulty in 
answering 
exploratory questions 
 Difficult to connect 
with theory 
 
 Less control over 
proceedings of the 
group 
 Data is difficult to 
organise and analyse 
 Susceptible to group 
effects and 
expressing culturally 
expected views 
 
 Difficult to take 
notes on the 
observations 
 Difficult to combine 
with other methods 
 Ethical problems 
with covert 
research 
 Researcher may be 
seen as intrusive 
 Difficulty in 
differentiating 
private and public 
research 
 Weak internal 
validity 
 Inability to prompt 
and probe 
 Questionnaire can 
be read as a whole 
 Do not know who 
actually responds to 
answers 
 Not appropriate for 
some types of 
respondents  
 Difficult to establish 
causality (internal 
validity) 
 Difficult to get 
meaningful aspect of 
social action 
 Difficult to create 
indicators or 
measurements  
Table A7: Strengths and weaknesses of research methods. Source: Bryman (2008), Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2007), Creswell (2009) 
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Content analysis forms 
Types of qualitative content analysis Description 
Discourse analysis Focuses on how particular phenomena are represented or 
their manifestations in various matters. Discourse is defined 
as text above the level of sentences.  
Social constructivist analysis Focuses on discourse analysis in order to understand how 
reality comes to be constituted in human interactions 
Rhetorical analysis Focuses on how messages are delivered and with what 
effects 
Ethnographic content analysis Advocated by Altheide (1987) does not avoid quantification 
but encourages accounts to emerge from reading of texts. 
Conversation analysis Researcher recodes verbal interactions in natural settings 
aiming to create collaborative construction of 
conversations.  
Table A8: Various forms of qualitative content analysis 
Source: Krippendorff (2004) 
 
 Quantitative content analysis Ethnographic content analysis 
Research goal Verification Discovery, verification 
Reflexive research design Seldom Always 
Emphasis Reliability Validity 
Process Serial Reflexive, circular 
Researcher involvement Data analysis, interpretation All phases (as shown above) 
Sample Random or stratified Purposive and theoretical 
Pre-structured categories All Some 
Type of data Numbers Numbers, narrative 
Data entry points Once Multiple 
Narrative description/comment Seldom Always 
Emerging concepts Seldom Always 
Data analysis Statistical Textual, statistical 
Data presentation Tables Tables and text 
Table A9: Comparison of quantitative and ethnographic content analysis 
Source: Altheide (1987) 
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Questionnaire design and implementation  
The TDM guidelines for survey implementation are as follows (Dillman 2009): 
1. To the extent possible, personalize all contacts to respondents 
2. Send a token of appreciation with the survey request 
3. Use multiple contacts and vary the message across them 
4. Carefully and strategically time all contacts with the population in mind 
5. Consider contacting by another mode when possible 
6. Keep email contacts short and to the point 
7. Take steps to ensure that emails are not flagged as spam 
8. Carefully select the sender name and address and the subject line for email communication 
9. Provide clear instructions for how to access the survey 
10. Make obvious connections between the opening screen and other implementation features 
11. Assign each sample member a unique ID number 
12. Know and respect the capabilities of the web servers 
13. Establish a procedure for dealing with bounced emails 
14. Establish procedures for returned incentives 
15. Establish procedures for dealing with respondent inquiries  
16. Implement a system for monitoring progress and evaluating early completes  
Dillman’s (2009) advice on design is as follows: 
1. Decide whether an electronic alternative to a web survey is more appropriate (e.g. fillable PDF 
or email survey) 
2. Choose how the survey will be programmed and hosted commensurate with the needs, skills, 
and sponsorship of each survey 
3. Evaluate the technological capabilities of the survey population 
4. Take steps to ensure that questions display similarly across different platforms, browsers and 
user settings 
5. Decide how many questions will be presented on each web page and questions will be arranged 
6. Create interesting and informative welcome and closing screens that will have a wide appeal to 
the respondents 
7. Develop a screen format that emphasises the respondent rather than the sponsor 
8. Use a consistent page layout across the screens and visually emphasize question information 
that respondents will need to complete the survey while deemphasizing information that is not 
essential to the task 
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9. Do not require responses to questions unless absolutely necessary for the survey 
10. Design survey-specific and item-specific error messages to help respondents troubleshoot any 
issues they may encounter 
11. Evaluate carefully the use of interactive features, balancing improvements in measurement with 
the impact on respondent burden and the implications for mixed mode survey 
12. Use audiovisual capabilities of the web survey sparingly and evaluate the different effect they 
may have on respondents 
13. Allow respondents to stop the survey and finish completing it at another time 
14. Whenever possible, collect paradata that provide feedback on how the respondent interacts 
with the questionnaire 
15. Test the survey using a variety of platforms, connection speeds, browsers and user controlled 
settings and test the database to ensure that items are collected and coded correctly 
16. Take screenshots of each page of the final questionnaire for testing and documentation 
Literature on incentives 
Birnholtz et al. (2004) examined the effects of a cash incentive ($5 USD) in postal survey and ($5 
USD) in Amazon gift vouchers via both postal delivery and e-mail and found that Amazon gift 
vouchers (online incentive) resulted in significantly lower response rates than cash-based incentive 
delivered in the post. The literature on the use of incentives for web surveys is not so clear and 
Couper (2000) cautions on the little experimental literature on strategies that may work or that may 
not work. Goritz (2006) considers different types of incentives used in web surveys e.g. lottery 
based, monetory, non-monetory, prepaid or on-return incentives and conclude that incentives 
motivate people to start a web survey and have better retention rates when an incentive is offered. 
However, the study excludes mixed mode follow up surveys (i.e. if potential respondents were 
solicited on the phone to take a web survey), which is the case in this research. Millar and Dillman 
(2001) examine the response rates to web and mixed mode surveys on highly internet-literature 
population with full internet access. They find that a combination of both postal and email contacts 
and delivering a token cash incentive in advance are useful methods for improving web response 
rates. There are also several pitfalls in using monetary or lottery incentives as they could directly 
affect external validity, by creating a bias by attracting a particular type of respondent (Goritz 2006). 
None of the studies that investigated barriers to energy efficiency discussed in chapter two make 
use of incentives including those that were concluded to be methodologically rigorous (e.g. Rohdin, 
Thollander & Solding 2007;Thollander & Ottosson 2008; Sorrell et al. 2000 & 2004). 
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Pretesting  
Pretesting questions: 
1. Was there a particular question that took longer to fill out? 
2. Do you have any comments on wording of the questions and choices, was there anything you 
did not understand 
3. Did you become bored at any point? If so which question/where? 
4. Are there any obvious spelling or other mistakes? 
5. Are there any other comments that would help improve the questionnaire? 
Some of the comments from pretesting are shown in table A1.1, including comments from one 
expert in the subject of surveys and social research. Below is another comment by another expert.  
“ p. 1 - Introduction page: 
I think this would be better presented directly as part of the Low Carbon Shipping consortium project in the 
first instance - with reference to the funders and consortium stakeholders - this will make it come across as 
more official and will increase the chances of people responding. 
Make sure that if you say it will take 5 minutes that it will take that - if it actually takes 15 minutes then it's 
better to say that. 
  
'Please select FIVE operational energy efficiency measures from the list below that you believe have the 
highest potential for fuel savings and CO2 reductions' 
- Is there difference between fuel savings and CO2 savings in the context of these measures? If yes then this 
potentially ambiguous, if no then CO2 savings is a redundant term and can be deleted. 
- Are the options provided subject to different forms of interpretation (need someone with expertise in these 
methods to know this). E.g. are there different ways to enact Trim/draft optimisation with different results? If 
there are then you may need some kind of a comments box to allow people to express which form they are 
thinking of. 
- Add 'Don't know' option or be mindful in interpretation that people may not tick boxes - but that doesn't 
mean these measures are not being implemented because the respondent simply is not aware of them. 
 
'From your choices to [Q1] could you indicate whether you are implementing them or not' 
- Are you interested if people are implementing choices they did not select in Q1? If so where is this data 
captured? If not, you need to be careful not to interpret their non-selection in Q1 as not meaning they are not 
doing them. 
 
'When thinking about your response to [Q2] implementation, you selected you are beginning to 
consider GENERAL SPEED REDUCTION, could you indicate what has/have been the MAIN DRIVERS for this?' 
- Change this to: When thinking about your response to [Q2] on implementation, you selected you are 
beginning to consider GENERAL SPEED REDUCTION, could you indicate what has/have been the MAIN DRIVERS 
for this?  
- The wording of this question suggests you are assuming that measures selected in Q1 are those being 
implemented - this is not entailed by the question wording (see above). 
- Add 'Don't know' option or be mindful in interpretation that people may not tick boxes - but that doesn't 
mean these measures are not being implemented because the respondent simply is not aware of them. 
 
'When thinking about your response to [Q2] implementation,you selected considering and still deciding on 
implementation for TRIM/DRAFT OPTIMIZATION, could you indicate what have been the MAIN REASONS 
forthis?' 
- Sort out word spacing on screen. 
- You've got a 'don't know' options for this but not previous screens - it's best to be consistent. 
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'When thinking about your response to [Q2] implementation, you selected considered but decided against for 
SPEED REDUCTION DUE TO PORT EFFICIENCY, could you indicate what have been the MAIN REASONS for this?' 
- No comments 
 
'When thinking about your response to [Q2] you have indicated that you have already implemented EFFICIENT 
VOYAGE EXECUTION, how important do you think the following are in influencing your decision to implement 
this measure?' 
- Changed wording structure of question ('implementation') missing - change to be consistent with previous. 
 
'Thinking about a VOYAGE/VOYAGE charter, how important are the following factors when fixing a ship?' 
- Consider changing to: Thinking about a VOYAGE/VOYAGE charter, how important are EACH of the following 
factors when fixing a ship?  
 
'Thinking about a PERIOD/TIME charter, how important are the following factors when fixing a ship?' 
- Consider changing to: Thinking about a PERIOD/TIME charter, how important are EACH of the following 
factors when fixing a ship? 
 
'As an informational tool, how important do you think the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) will be for 
comparison of ships during the selection process?' 
- No comments 
 
'The International Maritime Organzation (IMO) considers speed optimization to be one of the best practice 
measures that should be incorporated in the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), do you think 
this is achievable under the following:' 
- No comments 
 
'How important do you think are the following in their potential to reduce CO2 emissions achievable from 
speed reduction?' 
- Confusing ambiguous question. Do you mean 'How important do you think are the following in their potential 
to reduce CO2 emissions achievable from speed reduction?' or 'How important do you think are the following 
reducing CO2 emissions through speed reduction?' The first wording suggests that the things listed have the 
potential to undermine our attempts to save carbon from speed reduction. The second is a neutrally worded 
question which requests an assessment of the impact of these things on savings. 
- This question needs clarification 
 
'Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your assistance in providing the information is 
very much appreciated. I will endeavour to send you a full report containing the summarized results and 
analysis of this study.' 
- consider rebranding this along the lines of what is suggested at the top to make it seem more part of the `low 
carbon shipping' consortium work, etc. Generally the survey looks good to me Nish”  
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Respondent Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
1 All of those 
that listed 
lots of 
answers 
took longer, 
but maybe 
easier for 
those who 
actually 
know about 
shipping to 
answer 
Energy efficient 
operational measures is a 
bit of a mouthful and I 
didn't understand most 
of the techy questions, 
but again I'm sure those 
you have selected to 
send the q'aire to will.  A 
pilot with those who 
have a better 
understanding of the 
shipping sector than me, 
may help with that. 
A little bit with 
the long list of 
possible 
measures, but 
again if I 
understood 
more about 
what each of 
those measures 
actually meant 
and took the 
time to consider 
them, then it 
would 
presumably be 
more 
interesting. 
 I don't think so.  My only 
comment would be that 
in your last page you say 
that you will 'endeavour' 
to get the results back to 
them, which makes it 
sound like a really strain/ 
hassle for you to do so.  
Might you say that you 
will send those who are 
interested (asking them 
to opt out if they're not) a 
summary of your 
findings?  That way they 
definitely get something 
out of their participation. 
2 The multi 
column 
multi row 
take quite a 
while 
I'm not a shipping expert 
so have no idea if the 
terminology (of which 
there is a fair bit) is usual 
in the field. Need to pre-
test on your target 
sample. Mostly the 
questions are pretty 
clear. 
Yes. None that I 
voyageted 
but I've 
printed out 
the 
questionnaire 
to have a 
look. 
Don't tell people it will 
take 5 minutes if it will 
actually take 15! / I'll get 
back to you with 
comments on the print 
out if need be 
3 What would 
be 
considered 
Q3, as it 
added in 
elements 
that I did 
not tick in 
Q2 so I had 
to go back 
and figure 
out what I 
had ticked 
and not 
ticked 
Implementing -- you are 
asking about considering 
AND implementing, so I 
would word the question 
"considering or 
implementing yet." /  / 
Answer categories: Need 
to add 'did not consider' 
and 'not applicable' into 
the question on 
considering / 
implementing. You could 
also get rid of extra 
words, to increase 
readability -- i.e. delete 
'on implementation' and 
'against implementation' 
and delete 'considered 
and' in the answer 
category 'considered and 
plan to implement'. /  / 
You refer to Q1 and Q2, 
but they are never 
labelled as such.  
According to Dillman and 
de Vaus, it is very 
important to number 
each question, so it 
would be good to add 
these into the survey, if 
you can. /  /. /  / I would 
suggest possibly 
separating the one long 
sentence (in the why? 
Not bored, but 
have to bear in 
mind that the 
repetitive 
nature of the 
questions might 
lose some 
people's interest 
-- but this is just 
something that 
happens in 
surveys. Only 
way to avoid it is 
to break up 
sections, and 
you've done 
that quite nicely. 
There were 
some typos -- 
2 question 
marks at the 
end of one 
sentence; 
space left out 
between 
"thatyou 
have 
considered 
and plan to 
..." 
On the first page, I would 
probably put a very 
introductory sentence to 
say "I am Nish. I am a PhD 
student at UCL Energy 
Institute" and then 
continue with the rest of 
it.  Only saying this 
because it starts with 
things about 'my 
research' and I am just 
wondering if they know 
who you are? /  / Also, as 
far as a pre-test, you 
might want to ask people 
at the beginning to take 
notes  -- otherwise, they 
will probably not 
remember details to be 
able to feedback at the 
end of the questionnaire.  
This type of pre-test 
might work well for print 
questionnaires, but I think 
on-line might be a bit 
different.  Might even be 
a good idea to sit down 
with people as they go 
through it (though I know 
that is pretty much 
impossible!). 
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questions) into 2 
sentences and putting 
them on separate lines, 
so that the second line 
starts "Could you indicate 
...[why]?" This would 
increase readability. /  / 
You most often spoke of 
MAIN REASONS but once 
changed the language to 
MAIN DRIVERS. I would 
try to stay consistent 
(and stick with the 
former). /  / I would re-
word this sentence: "How 
important do you think 
are the following in their 
potential to reduce 
CO2..." to "How 
important do you think 
the following are in their 
potential to reduce CO2 
....” 
4 No no, but it would be good 
to have question / page 
number. 
(a) good 
questionnaire 
design, in 
particular the 
breadcrumb at 
the beginning / 
(b) toward the 
end, it seams 
that I answer 
the same 
question twice? 
No To include page or 
question number and [p 
of p] page number of 
page count? / or To 
include % of completion 
as the bar shading seams 
a little inaccurate 
5 No Questionaire looks really 
good. Here's a couple of 
things that may help if i 
were to nitpick: /  / - Q1 
and Q2 seem to be aimed 
at shipowner and 
charterer respectively. 
Therefore, it may help to 
give an option of not 
applicable on each or be 
explicit on who it's aimed 
at. / - Q3 and a couple of 
others might be good if 
you allowed the user to 
give a reason why. I'm 
not sure how that fits 
with your analysis 
framework though. / - 
The question on potential 
to reduce CO2 emissions 
from speed reduction. i 
thought the option of 
trade/route was a bit 
unclear. Did you mean 
potential changes in 
trade demand or were 
you referring to specific 
trade/route 
No problem in 
terms of length - 
in fact you could 
probably 
squeeze in a few 
more questions. 
No  
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combinations. / - 
Question numbers would 
help especially since you 
ask later on were any 
questions unclear. It may 
be useful to say at the 
start that there are only x 
number of questions - 
becuase it is very short, 
which is a great thing and 
people are more likely to 
fill it out if it's shorter. /  / 
Hope these are some 
help.  Looking good 
though - great work! 
6 don't think 
so 
I've put some comments 
in an email that I'll send 
now 
yes, but that's 
just my 
attention span 
and because its 
4pm in the 
afternoon. 
not that I 
voyageted 
Just wondering if 
"opimization of ballast 
voyages" needs further 
explanation? do you 
mean minimisation of 
their duration or 
optimisation of speed on 
the ballast voyage? In 
your list of drivers, I think 
some of them are drivers 
but are some of them just 
absent barriers (e.g. high 
savings potential is clearly 
a driver, but is "allowed 
under charterparty" a 
driver, or just the absence 
of a charterparty barrier? 
Maybe just use the words 
"influences to the 
consideration" instead of 
drivers? or separate out 
to distinguish between 
the two? In your question 
"how important do you 
think are the following in 
their potential to reduce 
CO2 emissions achievable 
from speed reduction"? 
doesn't it depend on the 
charterparty? I didn't get 
a question asking me for 
the profile of my 
organisation - is that 
because its just a sample 
survey? Otherwise, think 
its looking really good - 
have you figured out 
anything about hosting 
and do you want CWR 
involved? 
7 No I found the 'importance 
of EEDI' question odd, 
maybe 'will you use' or 
'do you think the EEDI 
will be a good 
information tool?'. A 
couple of the choices 
Didn't become 
bored. 
repetition of 
somewhat 
unimportant 
in the choices 
of the 
question: 
'How 
Clever survey, I like how it 
knew the responses from 
Q2 and used those 
throughout. 
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options may have been 
differently worded, for 
example, 'somewhat not 
achievable' could be 
'somewhat 
unachievable'. On the 
'how important do you 
think are the following in 
their potential to reduce 
CO2', somewhat 
unimportant was given as 
an option twice. The 
'considering 
implementing' choices 
were quite long, maybe 
shorter, like: 'might 
implement', 'won't 
implement', 'planning 
implementation', 'already 
implemented'. / Also, 
giving people a 'don't 
know' gives them the 
option not to give a 
useful answer, and there 
is already a central 
'neither important nor 
unimportant' option for 
these people. What is the 
difference between don't 
know and neither 
important nor 
unimportant? / 
important do 
you think are 
the following 
in their 
potential to 
reduce CO2 
emissions 
achievable 
from speed 
reduction?' 
Table A1.1: Comments from seven participants to the survey pretest 
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Emails to participants 
First contact email  
 
Dear ……………, 
Further to our recent telephone conversation, I attach the survey link, which is for an important piece of 
research that I am carrying out as part of my PhD at University College London (UCL), Energy Institute.  
This survey is the first one of its kind and to appreciate your participation, you will receive an anonymous 
summary results report of the operational energy efficiency measures being applied in the sector and what 
issues are affecting their uptake, enabling you to be better informed of the opportunities and challenges in 
energy efficiency.  
The survey is brief and will only take about 10 minutes to complete. The information will be treated as strictly 
confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the UK Data Protection Act 1998. Data 
Protection Ref for this survey: Z6364106 /2011/09/43.  
Please click the link below to go to the survey web site: 
https://qtrial.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6m09Afw8hc6KNms 
 
Should you have any comments or questions, please feel free to contact me at 
nishatabbas.rehmatulla.09@ucl.ac.uk 
I look forward to your response and thank you in advance for your time and cooperation. It is only with the 
generous help of industry participants like you that my research can be successful. 
Sincerely, 
Nishat Rehmatulla 
Doctoral Researcher 
UCL Energy Institute 
Central House 
14 Upper Woburn Place 
WC1H 0NN 
London, UK 
+ (44) 7540051942 
http://www.lowcarbonshipping.co.uk/ 
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Second reminder email 
 
Dear …………….,  
Further to our telephone conversation two weeks ago, I would like to remind you about the above mentioned 
survey, which is for an important piece of research that I am carrying out as part of my PhD at University 
College London (UCL), Energy Institute. 
 
Your company has a sizeable number of ships operating in the container sector. The response rate to the 
survey has been very low from this sector and your responses will be invaluable in making my research 
findings more generalizable.     
This survey is the first one of its kind and I would really appreciate your participation. For your participation 
you will receive a FREE anonymous summary results report of the operational energy efficiency measures 
being applied in the sector and what issues are affecting their uptake, enabling you to be better informed of 
the opportunities and challenges in energy efficiency. 
 
The survey is brief and will only take about 10 minutes to complete. The information will be treated as strictly 
confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the UK Data Protection Act 1998. Data 
Protection Ref for this survey: Z6364106 /2011/09/43.  
Please click the link below to go to the survey web site: 
https://qtrial.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6m09Afw8hc6KNms 
Should you have any comments/questions, please feel free to contact me 
at nishatabbas.rehmatulla.09@ucl.ac.uk 
I look forward to your response and thank you in advance for your time and cooperation. It is only with the 
generous help of industry participants like you that my research can be successful. 
Sincerely, 
Nishat Rehmatulla  
Doctoral Researcher 
UCL Energy Institute 
Central House 
14 Upper Woburn Place 
WC1H 0NN 
London, UK 
+ (44) 7540051942 
http://www.lowcarbonshipping.co.uk/ 
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Further contact for item non response 
 
Dear ……………., 
I would like to humbly thank you for your participation in the survey.   
 
Your inputs are invaluable to my PhD/research.  
I looked at your response on the chartering ratio question and didn't quite get the answer, apologies if this was 
a confusing one. I would like to simplify it as: 
- How much of your fleet is 'owned' and chartered in on 'time' or 'bareboat' basis? (Total must equal 100%) 
- How much of your fleet is traded out on 'voyage', 'time', 'COA' or 'bareboat' basis? (Total must equal 100%) 
I attach a draft survey report and I shall update this in the next couple of months as soon as I get statistically 
significant responses.  
 
I thank you once again for your participation.  
 
Kind regards, 
Nishat 
 
Email upon completion 
 
Dear ………….., 
 
I would like to humbly thank you for your participation in the survey.  
 
Your inputs are invaluable to my PhD/research. As a respondent, the results and summary analysis report will 
be sent to you as soon as I gather statistically significant responses.  
 
I thank you once again for your participation. 
 
Kind regards, 
Nishat 
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Survey questions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Opening page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Question 1 
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Figure A3: Question 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Question 3 
 
 
366 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5: An example of question 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A6: An example of question 5 
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Figure A7: An example of question 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A8: An example of question 7 
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Figure A9: An example of question 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
369 
 
 
  
Figure A10: Question 9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A11: Question 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A12: Question 11 
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Figure A13: Question 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A14: Question 13 
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Figure A15: Question 14 
Respondent profiling questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A16: Question 15 
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Figure A17: Question 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A18: Question 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A19: Question 18 
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Figure A20: Question 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A21: Question 20 
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Figure A22: Question 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A23: Closing page 
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Appendix B – Secondary data analysis 
Analysis of principal agent problems in other operational measures 
 Charterer can select weather 
routing measure 
Charterer cannot select weather 
routing measure 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment),  
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
All time charters  
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
 
Charterer does not pay 
energy bill (indirect energy 
payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
NA 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
All voyage charters 
Table B1: Weather routing and principal agent problems 
 Charterer can select speed 
reduction measure 
Charterer cannot select speed 
reduction measure 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment),  
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
All time charters  
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
 
Charterer does not pay 
energy bill (indirect energy 
payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
Some voyage charters 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
Most voyage charters 
Table B2: Speed reduction and principal agent problems 
 Charterer can select Just In 
Time arrival measure 
Charterer cannot select Just In 
Time arrival measure 
Charterer pays energy bill 
(Direct energy payment),  
No principal agent problem. 
Case 1 
All time charters 
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
 
Charterer does not pay 
energy bill (indirect energy 
payment) 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
Some voyage charters 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
Most voyage charters 
Table B3: Just In Time arrivals and principal agent problems 
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Estimating the proportion of the fleet affected by principal agent problems 
 Fixtures on 
voyage 
Fixtures on time 
Wet VLCC 1698 18 
Wet Suezmax 1616 15 
Wet Afra 4069 20 
Wet Panamax 1420 10 
Wet Handy 5117 58 
Total 13920 121 
Dry Cape 1262 111 
Dry Panamax 2653 394 
Dry Handymax 1268 170 
Dry Handysize 288 34 
Total 5471 709 
Cont Post Panamax  57 
Cont Panamax  196 
Cont Sub Panamax  380 
Cont Handy  897 
Cont Feedermax  509 
Cont Feeder  12 
Total  2051 
Table B4: Number of fixtures on voyage and time charters for 2011 
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 Ships on Voyage Ships on Time Ships in fleet 
Wet VLCC 450 18  
Wet Suezmax 393 14  
Wet Panamax 334 9  
Wet Afra 729 17  
Wet Handy 1171 47  
Total 3077 105  
    
Dry Cape 468 104  
Dry Panamax 1150 329  
Dry Handymax 800 159  
Dry Handysize 234 31  
Total 2652 623  
Table B5: Number of ships on voyage and time charters for 2011 
 Ships on 
Voyage 
Ships on Time 
Wet VLCC 150 20 
Wet Suezmax 127 13 
Wet Afra 131 13 
Wet Panamax 101 16 
Wet Handy 269 49 
Total 778 111 
Dry Cape 110 90 
Dry Panamax 184 322 
Dry Handymax 53 132 
Dry Handysize 10 23 
Total 357 567 
Table B6: Number of ships on voyage and time charters for 2011 adjusted for time.  
Methodology for adjusting proportion of time chartered ships 
For estimating number of ships on time charter: 
A) Time charters before 2011 but long enough to fall in 2011: 
1. Number of days difference between Laycan to beginning of 2011 (Days360) 
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2. Time charter length in days (Period*30) 
3. If time charter days are long enough to fall in 2011, fixture considered (1), not considered (0) 
4. If considered then how many days in 2011 
5. Proportion of days in that year on TC 
6. Sum of all proportions 
 
B) Time charters during 2011: 
1. Number of days difference between Laycan to end of 2011 (Days360) 
2. Time charter length in days (Period*30) 
3. Proportion of days in that year on TC 
4. Sum of all proportions 
Sum of proportions from A+B 
For estimating number of ships on voyage charter: 
1. Pivot table to get number of ships and number of fixtures per ship 
2. Apply assumptions for each ship type E.g.  
Average haul 5000 miles for oil & products (Stopford, 2009) 
Average journey length at 12kn/hr = 5000/288 = 17.4 days 
Ballast to loaded days ratio = 0.9. = 15.6 days  
Total days = 33 days = 1.1 months per fixture 
3. Number of fixtures * Days per fixture 
4. Sum of all proportions 
 
Per ship  year basis Wetbulk Drybulk Container 
% of total merchant shipping CO2 emissions ≈23% ≈18% ≈27% 
% of ships on voyage charter in charter market ≈90% ≈40% N.A 
% of ships on time charter in charter market ≈10% ≈60% 100% 
Average length of time charter in months 17 8 11 
% of ships on fixtures less than 6 months 8% 39% 41% 
% of ships on fixtures less than 1 year 32% 59% 76% 
% of ships on fixtures less than 2 years 53% 84% 82% 
% of ships on fixtures less than 3 years 81% 94% 87% 
% of ships on fixtures less than 4 years 83% 96% 88% 
% of ships on fixtures less than 5 years 94% 98% 91% 
% of ships on fixtures more than 5 years 6% 2% 9% 
Table B7: Summary of durations of fixtures for three main sectors (Data from Clarksons SIN) 
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SPSS outputs for comparison of means of cases 
Group Statistics Wet VLCC 
 Group N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
DWT Voyage 384 304686.03 9927.566 506.614 
Time 27 312275.93 27443.368 5281.479 
NOE Voyage 384 4.356589 1.1037005 .0563230 
Time 27 4.268556 .7791916 .1499555 
Speed 
ratio 
Voyage 384 .862013 .0719670 .0036725 
Time 27 .873963 .0790131 .0152061 
TE Voyage 384 2.294395 .3658314 .0186688 
Time 27 2.277951 .3405321 .0655354 
Table B8: Summary statistics comparison between voyage and time chartered VLCC’s 
 
Independent Samples Test Wet VLCC 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
DWT Equal variances 
assumed 
12.449 .000 -
3.220 
409 .001 -7589.897 2357.209 -
12223.654 
-
2956.141 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-
1.431 
26.481 .164 -7589.897 5305.721 -
18486.339 
3306.545 
NOE Equal variances 
assumed 
3.036 .082 .407 409 .684 .0880334 .2162160 -.3370001 .5130668 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
.550 33.808 .586 .0880334 .1601841 -.2375681 .4136348 
ratio Equal variances 
assumed 
.221 .639 -.829 409 .408 -.0119493 .0144219 -.0402996 .0164011 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-.764 29.115 .451 -.0119493 .0156433 -.0439379 .0200394 
TE Equal variances 
assumed 
.001 .972 .227 409 .821 .0164440 .0725276 -.1261294 .1590174 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
.241 30.377 .811 .0164440 .0681426 -.1226493 .1555374 
Table B9: Comparison of means analysis between voyage and time chartered VLCC’s 
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Group Statistics Wet Suez 
 Group N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
DWT Voyage 269 155812.62 6641.177 404.920 
Time 15 157606.40 6099.680 1574.931 
NOE Voyage 269 6.367521 1.1954972 .0728908 
Time 15 6.239600 1.1435330 .2952590 
speed ratio Voyage 269 .846130 .0626054 .0038171 
Time 15 .849202 .0612269 .0158087 
TE Voyage 269 3.339458 .4341512 .0264707 
Time 15 3.276887 .2665038 .0688110 
Table B10: Summary statistics comparison between voyage and time chartered Suezmax’s 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
DWT Equal variances 
assumed 
.073 .787 -1.022 282 .308 -1793.775 1755.050 -5248.437 1660.886 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.103 15.908 .286 -1793.775 1626.151 -5242.675 1655.124 
NOE Equal variances 
assumed 
.152 .697 .404 282 .686 .1279208 .3164953 -.4950722 .7509139 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
.421 15.755 .680 .1279208 .3041232 -.5176059 .7734476 
speed 
ratio 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.060 .806 -.185 282 .853 -.0030722 .0165913 -.0357306 .0295862 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.189 15.677 .853 -.0030722 .0162630 -.0376060 .0314616 
TE Equal variances 
assumed 
.240 .625 .552 282 .581 .0625712 .1133846 -.1606164 .2857588 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
.849 18.429 .407 .0625712 .0737268 -.0920651 .2172074 
Table B11: Comparison of means analysis between voyage and time chartered Suezmax’s 
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Figure B1: Comparison of Average Normalized operational efficiencies for voyage and time chartered 
ships  
 
Figure B2: Average normalized operational efficiencies for voyage and time chartered ship 
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Subletting analysis 
One of the key assumptions of the analysis in step two and step three is regarding the level of sub 
chartering that can take place in charters. For the analysis in step two and three, it was assumed that 
a ship remains in the state of the same charter throughout the period of fixture or charterparty. 
However, it is often suggested that a ship on time charter (or case two) may not remain solely under 
that charter. This is thought to be the case because charterparties allow for subletting the vessel. 
Brief review of the charterparties shows that subletting clauses not only are present in time 
charterparties, but are also present in voyage charterparties (e.g. Orevoy, Asbatankvoy) and can 
even include the same type of charter i.e. time head charterparty and time sublet charterparty. Thus 
subletting can occur in a variety of situations, however the subletting scenario that can affect the 
above results is when a ship on time charter is sublet under a voyage charter. When ships on time 
charter are filtered for subletting (based on the following method), the number of ships on time 
charter decreases to very low levels for any meaningful comparison. 
The main assumptions for this analysis are: 
 The fixture/charter period is assumed to be the maximum of the range given in the fixture 
reporting, the range difference is on average around two to three months and this type of 
reporting is mainly prevalent in dry bulk fixtures, e.g. six to nine months is assumed to be nine 
months.  
 For fixtures where there are options for subsequent charters, the minimum option period is 
assumed, which is prevalent mainly in the wetbulk sector e.g. 1yr/6m/6m is assumed to be only 
one year.  
 For the wetbulk sector the analysis excludes vessels chartered for storage purposes.  
 The analysis only takes into account the recorded fixtures and calculates the estimated end date 
based on the length of charter added to the laycan date (when this is not available the contract 
date is used), thus does not take into account early redelivery of the vessel.  
 Clarksons fixtures data is not comprehensive as “fixtures are provided only as reported” 
(Clarksons SIN website). 
 Fixtures for the year 2011 are obtained for voyage charters and for time charters fixtures for 
2009, 2010 and 2011 are used to check if any fixtures are still valid in 2011 as shown in 
Table ‎5.25. 
 
A ship is said to be sublet when the laycan date (or contract date) for a single voyage charter or 
multiple voyage charters fall between the time charter beginning and end dates. The following plots 
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show the level of subletting in each of the ship types and sectors followed by figure of mean results. 
As can be seen from the histograms in appendix B and figures B3 and B4, the level of subletting is 
higher in wetbulk sector than drybulk sector and higher for larger ships than smaller ship sizes. 
Furthermore, the correlation of subletting with the length of time charter (Table B12) shows that 
there is strong relationship between the number of times a ship is sublet and the length of the time 
charter. Figure ‎5.31 also shows the 95% confidence level (+/- 2 standard error of the mean) number 
of sublets per ship type. Due to the smaller sample sizes in wetbulk sector, the population mean 
range varies significantly, whereas for the drybulk sector, the sample means can be estimated to be 
very close to the population mean. These findings suggest that the number of ships that fall into case 
one and two (as shown in Table ‎5.21 and Table ‎5.23) in step two of the above methodology can be 
said to be high level estimates, since some of those ships are further sublet into voyage charters, 
changing the categorisation from case two to case four. So for example for the wetbulk sector, the 
10% estimate of the charter fleet categorised as case two for technology and case one for operations 
may not be as high, because as shown in this analysis a ship in wetbulk sector on time charter would 
be sublet on average at least once in the time charter period or a majority of the fleet would be 
sublet once or more. In the drybulk sector, the 60% estimate of the charter fleet categorised as 
falling in case two for technology and case one for operations would remain as a high estimate but 
not decrease substantially compared to wetbulk because the average level of subletting is much 
lower or the majority of the fleet is not sublet. It can however also be said that the level of subletting 
(from time charter to voyage charter) may not really change the categorisation of ships because the 
entity paying for fuel in the end remains the same, i.e. a charterer in a head time charter who is the 
principal in the original contract (even though acting as agent for the sub-charterer/principal). 
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Figure B3: Distributions of number of subletting in wetbulk sectors 
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Figure B4: Distributions of number of subletting in wetbulk sectors 
 Mean no. of sublets per TC Mean duration of head TC in months Correlation 
Wet VLCC 1.48 17.66  
Wet Suez 2.4 18.7  
Wet Afra 0.35 14.44  
Wet Panamax 1.80 15.92  
Wet Handy 0.58 16 0.82 
Dry Cape 0.56 10  
Dry Panamax 0.69 8.86  
Dry Handymax 0.39 7.67  
Dry Handysize 0.16 7.14 0.80 
Table B12: Relationship between number of subletting and average length of time charter 
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Appendix C – Survey data and analysis 
Grouping A 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C1: Distributions of group 1: Majority of the fleet is owned and voyage chartered out 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C1: Summary statistics of group 1: Majority of the fleet is owned and voyage chartered out 
Voyage Out 
  
Mean 77.71429 
Standard Error 3.083862 
Median 75 
Mode 100 
Standard Deviation 14.13203 
Sample Variance 199.7143 
Kurtosis -0.95057 
Skewness 0.458146 
Range 40 
Minimum 60 
Maximum 100 
Count 21 
Time Out 
  
Mean 22.28571 
Standard Error 3.083862 
Median 25 
Mode 0 
Standard Deviation 14.13203 
Sample Variance 199.7143 
Kurtosis -0.95057 
Skewness -0.45815 
Range 40 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 40 
Count 21 
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Figure C2: Distributions of group 2: Majority of the fleet is owned and time chartered out 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C2: Summary statistics of group 2: Majority of the fleet is owned and time chartered out 
Time Out 
  
Mean 85.14286 
Standard Error 3.058389 
Median 90 
Mode 100 
Standard Deviation 14.0153 
Sample Variance 196.4286 
Kurtosis -0.78393 
Skewness -0.66377 
Range 40 
Minimum 60 
Maximum 100 
Count 21 
Voyage Out 
  
Mean 10.2381 
Standard Error 2.813153 
Median 5 
Mode 0 
Standard Deviation 12.89149 
Sample Variance 166.1905 
Kurtosis 0.969684 
Skewness 1.37357 
Range 40 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 40 
Count 21 
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Figure C3: Distributions of group 3: Management company with majority fleet voyage chartered out 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C3: Summary statistics of group 3: Management company with majority fleet voyage chartered 
out 
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Standard Error 5.297915 
Median 80 
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Standard Deviation 15.89374 
Sample Variance 252.6111 
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Range 40 
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Maximum 100 
Count 9 
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Standard Error 4.625146 
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Sample Variance 192.5278 
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Figure C4: Distributions of group 4: Management company with majority fleet time chartered out 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C4: Summary statistics of group 4: Management company with majority fleet time chartered 
out 
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Grouping B 
  
Figure C5: Distributions of group 1: Majority of the fleet chartered out on voyage charter 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C5: Summary statistics of group 1: Majority of the fleet voyage chartered out 
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Figure C6: Distributions of group 2: Majority of the fleet time chartered out 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C6: Summary statistics of group 2: Majority of the fleet time chartered out 
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Figure C7: Perception of barriers cited by respondents across the survey disaggregated by size 
  
Figure C8: Perception of barriers cited by respondents across the survey disaggregated by sector 
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Figure C9: Factors affecting implementation by size 
 Figure C10: Factors affecting implementation of measures by sector 
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Appendix D – Charterparty content analysis 
Voyage charterparty coding  
Speed reduction measures 
Coding category 
and questions 
Definition Example Coding rule 
Goal conflict 
 
Q: How does the 
outcome based 
contract address 
the principal 
agent speed goal 
conflict? 
 
Q: How does the 
goal conflict 
affect speed 
reduction 
measure 
implementation? 
Conflicting interests between 
the charterer (principal) and 
shipowner (agent), which 
means use of: 
-Utmost despatch clauses in 
both voyage legs 
“The said vessel being suitable for 
mechanical loading and grab discharge, 
shall with all convenient speed sail and 
proceed to the loading port. ...Being so 
loaded the vessel shall therewith 
proceed with all convenient speed to 
the discharging ports” 
VSG1 = utmost 
despatch in ballast leg 
(load port) AND laden 
leg (discharge port)  
 
 
Conflicting interests between 
the charterer (principal) and 
shipowner (agent), which 
means use of: 
-Utmost despatch clauses 
only in laden leg 
“The vessel shall proceed with due 
despatch to a safe port, berth, dock.... 
For loading the cargo, as ordered by 
charterers... And being so loaded 
proceed as ordered on signing of B/L ... 
As ordered by charterers” 
VSG2 = utmost 
despatch in only laden 
leg  
 
 
Conflicting interests between 
the charterer (principal) and 
shipowner (agent), but no 
use of utmost despatch 
clauses. 
“The said vessel shall proceed to the 
loading port....and being so loaded the 
vessel shall proceed to the discharging 
ports...” 
VSG3 = No utmost 
despatch clause 
 
 
Conflicting interests between 
the charterer (principal) and 
shipowner (agent), which 
means use of: 
-Slow steaming clause 
“,,,However, unless 'no' is inserted in 
box 17 Part A, the owners may order 
the vessel to proceed at reduced speed 
solely to conserve fuel” 
VSG4 = Slow steaming 
clause is present 
 
 
Lack of 
Information 
 
Q: How does the 
outcome based 
contract address 
the principal 
agent 
information 
problem? 
 
Q: How does 
information 
problem affect 
speed reduction 
measure 
implementation? 
Charterer (Principal) 
knows/agrees the speed at 
which the ship shall proceed 
through use of  
- Specific speed clause 
- Slow steaming clause 
“..proceed at the speed stated in 
Section B.25 of PART 1 ("Charter 
Speed"), or at such her speed, not 
exceeding the speed stated in Section 
B.26 of PART 11 (“Maximum Speed”), 
as may be stated in Charterers' Voyage 
Orders. Charterers shall have the right 
at any time during the voyage to 
instruct Owners to adjust the Vessel's 
speed...” 
VSI1 = Speed is stated  
 
 
Charterer (Principal) does not 
know/did not agree the 
speed at which the ship shall 
proceed i.e. use of utmost 
despatch clause. Only the 
shipowner (agent) knows the 
speed of the ship.  
 VSI2 = Speed is not 
stated 
 
 
Outcome 
uncertainty 
 
Q: How does the 
outcome based 
contract address 
outcome 
Contracting on specified 
outcomes of Shipowner 
(agent) by use of laycan & 
laytimes as well as: 
-Specific NOR times 
-Specific NOR locations 
-ETA/ERL 
“NOR to load and discharge at the first 
or sole port shall be tendered in writing 
to the charterers between 0800 and 
1700 hours Mondays to Friday and 
0800 - 1200 on Saturday. Following 
tender of NOR, laytime shall 
commence 12 hours” 
VSOU1 = Specific NOR 
times and locations 
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Weather routing & efficient voyage execution measure 
Coding category 
and questions 
Definition Example Coding rule 
Goal conflict 
 
Q: How does the 
outcome based 
contract address 
the principal agent 
goal conflict? 
 
Q: How does focus 
on PA goal conflict 
affect weather 
routing & efficient 
voyage execution 
measure 
implementation? 
 
 
 
 
Conflicting interests 
between the charterer 
(principal) and 
shipowner (agent), 
which means use of: 
-Strict 
deviation/charterer 
clauses 
“The vessel shall be at the liberty to tow or 
be towed, to assist vessels in all positions of 
distress and to deviate for the purpose of 
saving life or property. On the laden leg the 
vessel shall not take on bunkers or deviate or 
stop, except as allowed in this clause, 
without prior permission of charterers, cargo 
insurers, and owners P&I club.” 
VWG1 = No 
geographical 
deviation allowed 
(liberty level 1) 
 
 
Conflicting interests 
between the charterer 
(principal) and 
shipowner (agent), 
however does not use 
strict deviation clauses, 
Liberty clause which 
allows for bunkering 
only 
“The vessel shall have the liberty to sail with 
or without pilots, to tow or to the assistance 
of vessels in distress, to call at any ports for 
bunkers, and to deviate for the purpose of 
saving life or property or for any other 
reasonable purpose” 
VWG2 = 
Geographical 
deviation allowed 
for bunkering only 
(liberty level 2) 
 
 
Conflicting interests 
between the charterer 
(principal) and 
shipowner (agent), 
however no use of 
strict deviation clauses, 
Liberty clause which 
allows for en route port 
calls, extra cargo etc.  
 
“In the event that this CP is for part cargo, 
the owners shall have the liberty of 
loading/discharging other part cargo for the 
account of other charterers or shippers 
from/to port enroute or not enroute. B) 
when owners exercise this option this shall in 
no way constitute a deviation....The 
charterers shall procure that the owners 
option as provided for in this clause shall be 
duly incorporated in B/L issued under this 
charterparty” 
VWG3 = 
Geographical 
deviation allowed 
for bunkering and 
extra cargo (liberty 
level 3) 
 
 
Information 
 
Q: How does the 
outcome based 
contract address 
the principal agent 
information 
problem? 
 
Q: How does focus 
on information 
problem affect 
weather routing & 
efficient voyage 
execution measure 
implementation? 
Charterer (Principal) 
knows/agrees the route 
on which the ship shall 
proceed through use of  
- specific route 
- Worldscale routes 
“If owners or master unilaterally elect to 
proceed by a route that is different to that 
specified in Worldscale or different to that 
agreed between owners and charterers, 
freight shall be paid in accordance with the 
worldscale rate or in accordance with any 
special rate applicable for the agreed route” 
VWI1 = Information 
on route 
 
 
Charterer (Principal) 
does not know the 
route on which the ship 
shall proceed due to 
use of  
-shipowner 
deviation/liberty clause 
“The vessel has liberty to call at any port in 
any order, for any purpose, to sail without 
pilots, to tow and assist vessels in all 
situations and also to deviate for the purpose 
of saving life or property” 
 
VWI2 = No 
information on 
route 
 
 
 
uncertainty? 
 
Q: How does 
outcome 
uncertainty affect 
speed reduction 
measure 
implementation? 
 
Contracting on outcomes of 
Shipowner (agent) by use of 
laycan & laytimes as well as: 
-Non specific NOR times 
-Non specific NOR locations 
-No ETA/ERL 
“Upon arrival at customary anchorage 
at each port of loading or discharge, 
the Master or his agent shall give the 
Charterer or his agent notice by letter, 
telegraph, wireless or telephone that 
the Vessel is ready to load or discharge 
cargo, berth or no berth” 
VSOU2 = Non specific 
NOR times and 
locations 
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Time Charterparties 
General speed reduction 
Category 
 
Definition Example Coding rule 
Goal conflict 
 
Q: How does the 
behaviour based 
contract address 
the principal 
agent goal 
conflict, if any? 
 
Q: If there is goal 
conflict, how 
does goal 
conflict affect 
speed reduction 
measure 
implementation? 
Principal paying for fuel and 
determining speed. 
Shipowner does not have 
conflicting interest with this. 
This is through  
- use of guaranteed speed 
and consumption  
“The average speed of the vessel shall 
not be less than "X" knots when loaded 
and "X" knots in ballast on an average 
daily consumption of no more than "X" 
metric tons of fuel oil...” 
TSG1 = Speed and 
consumption 
specified 
Conflicting interest based on 
agents obligations to follow 
the principals’ slow steaming 
instructions while taking into 
account the safety 
of the vessel, cargo 
obligations towards third 
parties, such as holders of 
bills of lading, manufacturers 
recommendations. 
- Use of slow steaming clause 
 
“The charterers shall be entitled from 
time to time to instruct the Vessel to 
proceed at reduced speed for economic 
or other reasons subject to prior 
consultation with the owners 
concerning the peculiar characteristics 
of the Vessel and its machinery in this 
respect. The charterers shall indemnify 
the owners and hold them harmless 
against all consequences or liabilities 
towards third parties resulting from 
such instructions” 
TSG2 = Built in slow 
steaming clause 
For several reasons (e.g. 
ballast legs, subletting) the 
time contracts also have  
- Use of utmost despatch 
clauses 
- Use of supercargo clauses 
“The master shall perform the voyages 
with due despatch”           
       
“The charterer is entitled to appoint a 
supercargo, who shall accompany the 
vessel at the charterers risk and see that 
voyages are performed with due 
despatch” 
TSG3 = Utmost 
despatch clause 
Conflict arises when 
prolonged periods of slow 
steaming or ultra slow 
steaming. Principal agent 
‘efficiency’ problem. Extra 
investment is required for 
the measures 
implementation. 
 
 
“...provided that such instructions will 
not result 
in the Vessel’s engine(s) and/or 
equipment operating outside the 
manufacturers’/designers’ 
recommendations as published from 
time to time. If the 
manufacturers’/designers’ 
recommendations issued subsequent to 
the date of this Charter Party require 
additional physical modifications to the 
engine or related equipment or require 
the purchase of additional spares or 
equipment, the Master shall not be 
obliged to comply with these 
instructions. 
TSG4 = Ultra slow 
steaming clause 
Information 
problems 
 
How does the 
behaviour based 
contract make 
use of 
information 
systems required 
in a behaviour 
based contract? 
 
Q: How does 
focus on agent 
Charterer (Principal) knows 
and agrees the speed at 
which the ship shall proceed 
through use of 
- Monitoring through 
weather routing company 
clauses 
 
 
 
“Charterer may employ the services of 
an independent Weather Bureau 
Reporting such as Oceanroutes to 
route/monitor the vessel and master is 
to comply with the reporting procedure. 
The vessel shall be capable of at all 
times of performing at the agreed speed 
and consumption in the weather 
conditions as stated in Appendix A and 
in the event that this is not the case the 
charterer shall be compensated for slow 
speed or over consumption and shall 
have the right to deduct this amount 
from hire.”  
TSI1 = Use of weather 
routing company 
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monitoring 
affect speed 
reduction 
measure 
implementation? 
Charterer (Principal) knows 
and agrees the speed at 
which the ship shall proceed 
through use of 
- Agents noon reporting  
- supercargo 
“Evidence of weather conditions to be 
taken as reported daily on the noon 
position report to charterer” 
 
“The charterer is entitled to appoint a 
supercargo, who shall accompany the 
vessel at the charterers risk and see that 
voyages are performed with due 
despatch” 
TSI2 = Use of noon 
reports and/or 
supercargo clauses 
Outcome 
measurability 
 
 
 
 
Outcome is based on ship 
under performance. If ship 
under performs then  
- Deduction for under 
performance (of speed) or 
over consumption (of fuel) 
“...Charterers have the right to make 
deductions from hire in respect of any 
time lost and any additional bunkers 
consumed by reason of the vessel to 
maintain warranted capability” 
TSO1 = Clause for 
deduction for any 
under performance 
Outcome is based on ship 
under and over performance 
- Compensates for over 
performance (of speed) or 
under consumption (of fuel) 
“Increase or decrease in service speed 
leads to deduction or addition of hire 
paid and increase or decrease in 
bunkers consumed leads to additional 
bunkers consumed or saved  shall be 
deducted or added to hire” 
TSO2 = Clause for 
deduction or addition 
for any under or over 
performance 
In different weather 
condition 
- Wind speed minimum BF 4 
as bad weather 
 
“..Under normal working conditions and 
in moderate weather (which for the 
purpose of this clause shall exclude any 
periods of winds exceeding Force 4 on 
the Beaufort scale...” 
TSO3 = Clause for 
weather conditions 
not exceeding Force 
4. 
- Wind speed minimum BF 5 
or above 
“.. Good weather up till Force 8 on 
Beaufort scale...” 
TSO4 = Clause for 
weather conditions 
not exceeding Force 
5. 
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Email to survey respondents on charterparties  
Dear ………., 
This is to inform you that the survey you participated has had over 100 responses so far. I hope to 
achieve 150 responses by April, in order to make broader generalizations about the industry and 
specific sectors.  
Concurrently for the PhD, I am also analysing charterparties to examine how the specifics of each of 
the standard charterparties influence operational efficiency of a ship, e.g. what energy efficiency 
measures are incorporated within, what are the pertinent clauses that limit takeup of such 
measures, speed clauses etc.  
I would really appreciate if you could help me by identifying which standard charterparties you most 
often use/come across in your sector AND whether you or the opposite party would tailor them to 
specific needs e.g. with rider clauses. 
Sincerely, 
Nishat Rehmatulla 
Doctoral Researcher 
UCL Energy Institute 
Central House 
14 Upper Woburn Place 
WC1H 0NN 
London, UK 
+ (44) 7540051942 
http://www.lowcarbonshipping.co.uk/ 
Wet bulk  Dry bulk  General  
Voyage  Voyage  Voyage  
BIMCHEMVOY  COALOREVOY  GENCON  
INTERTANKVOY  OREVOY  MULTIFORM  
ASBATANKVOY  NIPPONORE    
BEEPEEVOY 3  NIPPONCOAL  Time  
SHELLVOY 5/6  GRAINVOY  BOXTIME  
EXXONVOY90  BALTIMORE  LINERTIME  
MOBILVOY  NORGRAIN    
TEXACOVOY94  SYNACOMEX  OTHER (Please Specify)  
      
Time  Time    
INTERTANKTIME  BALTIME    
ASBATANKTIME  GENTIME    
BPTIME 3  NYPE 93    
SHELLTIME   NYPE 46    
BIMCHEMTIME  ASBATIME    
      
Other (Please specify)  Other (Please specify)    
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Figure D1: How virtual arrival savings are calculated  
Source: OCIMF and INTERTANKO (2010) 
 
 
 
 
